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U.S. Navy
ONI Translation

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

1 JANUARY - 31 MARCH, 1944

PG Numbers 31850-31855

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OF
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Grid charts referred to may be found in the War Diary for 18 January to 30 June, 1943.

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WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

1 - 15 JANUARY, 1944

PG/31850

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1 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Eisenbart":

U 314 AC 9597.
U 957 AC 9587.
U 716 AC 9577.
U 601 AC 9497.
U 387 AC 9487.
U 277 AC 9477.

Group "Isegrimm":

U 956 AB 5584.
U 360 AB 5837.
U 636 AB 5971.
U 425 AB 8316.

In port:

U 354 Harstad,
U 307, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703, 965 Bergen,
U 278 Kristiansand (South).

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 354 put out from Harstad at 0930,
put in to Narvik at 1400.
U 965 put out from Bergen for AB 66
at 1530.
U 278 put out from Kristiansand (South)
for Bergen at 0830, (put in to
Farsund owing to weather conditions).

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

2 BF 109 on meteorological reconnaissance
of the area Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet.
1 Ju 88 on shipping, airfield and harbor
reconnaissance of the northeast coast of
Kola - Ponoï - West Fairway - Gulf of Mezen -
west coast of Kanin Peninsula - Kanin Nos.
Reconnaissance of the Kola coast (Kildin -
Ponoï) - west coast of Kanin - Kanin Nos,
no shipping sighted. Gulf of Mezen not
covered because of fog.
1 Ju 88 carried out shipping reconnaissance
on route Kirkenes - Petsamo - AC 8954 - AC 6793 -
Kolguev South - Kolguev North - AC 9833 -
Vardø - Kirkenes. Nothing located or sighted.

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Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88 as far as AB 7762, without sighting enemy. Reconnaissance area 50% covered.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

- 0842 Short signal 0824/704 received from U 601 (Hansen) in the patrol line:
"Am being attacked by surface forces."
- 1017 "Hansen" reported in radio message 0828/705:
"Am being attacked by escort vessel in AC 9497. Depth charges. Suspect convoy. Visibility 1 mile."
- 1344 Radio message 1115/149 received from U 277 (Lübsen):
"Sighted 1 destroyer, hydrophone contact with 2 destroyers, probably escorting a fast single ship. High speed. Northerly course. Weather, good visibility."
- 1355 A further message received from "Hansen", radio message 0901/147:
"Escort vessel in AC 9497, shell fire, forced to retire eastwards. Fired miss from tube V. After submerging, depth charges. Suspect convoy from indistinct hydrophone bearings. Course unknown. Good visibility."
- 1442 "Lübsen" reported in radio message 1302/714:
"Withdrew from destroyer sending morse. Formation zig-zagged off in a westerly direction. Am in pursuit. AC 9413. Snow and hail."
- 1448 Short signal 1134/154 received from "Lübsen":
"1 destroyer in AC 9419."
Further report in short signal 1535/718:
"Have contact with destroyer, my position is AC 9178."

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(b) By air reconnaissance:

1345 At 1040 in Polyarno port:
1 warship (small cruiser or large
destroyer), 2 medium-sized freighters.
Warship making smoke.

At 1044 off Vaenga, 3 medium-sized
steamers lying stopped. Ship in
tow consisting of 2 lighters,
proceeding in a southeasterly direction.
Defense, heavy anti-aircraft fire at
Polyarno and Russian Straits.

1610 At 0840 in Teriberka harbor, 2 coastal
freighters 800 to 1,000 G.R.T. lying
stopped.

At 0842 north of Teriberka, 1 patrol
vessel, easterly course, medium speed.

At 0939 in AW 2253, 1 patrol vessel,
course northeast.

At 1000 Tokanka harbor occupied by 10
ships including 6 coastal freighters
of 800 to 1,000 G.R.T. each, 1 probable
refrigerator ship about 4 - 6,000 G.R.T.,
and 3 fishing vessels about 200 G.R.T.

At 1025 1 patrol vessel in AW 2359, course
northeast, medium speed.

No ships sighted in Ponoï estuary.
Light anti-aircraft fire from patrol
vessel in AW 2359, no losses.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio
traffic to submarines in the operational
area. "L 20" named.

Murmansk area: minesweeper No. 117,
guardboats Nos. 503, 514.

Tokanka area: guardships Nos. 17, 81,
minesweeper No. 112, guardboats Nos. 501,
504, 514.

Archangel/Gorlo Straits area: minesweepers
Nos. 45, 62, 114, 116, guardboats Nos. 605,
610, 615, 617, 625.

Britain: one British unit or warship
appeared in radio traffic with Archangel.

Radio traffic with Britain: Murmansk
broadcast 2 radio messages, Archangel one;
in the morning 2 urgent operational radio
messages from Murmansk to Whitehall, for
the "Meteorological Office".

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On 31 December at 0044 a Russian minesweeper at sea transmitted a very urgent message to the Staff of the White Sea Fleet Archangel and coastal defenses at Polyarno.

At 0231 Archangel transmitted urgent message to escort forces under her command and at 0240 a similar message to ice-breakers in her command.

At 1738 a Russian minesweeper received a very urgent radio message from Archangel, relayed by Polyarno.

On 1 January at 1000 Iokanka transmitted a very urgent radio message from Archangel to all escort vessels in the command.

At 1413 and 1416 Archangel transmitted very urgent messages (2) to Kola for all escort forces.

At 1727 Archangel broadcast a very urgent message (2) to all escort forces.

At approximately 1830, about 5 minesweepers at sea in the Gorlo Straits/Archangel area, according to radio traffic "GQQ". One of them received a very urgent radio message from Archangel which was repeated at 1907 from Iokanka to all escort forces in its command.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

U 601 (Hansen) transmitted in short signals 1015/706 and 1020/706:

"Look out for beacon signals", and:
"Can only proceed at 8 knots."

The patrol line of group "Eisenbart" which should have started at 1200 via 3 position lines, was ordered not to proceed for the time being, in radio message 1041/708, because of "Hansen"'s messages. Since no course has been established, we may reckon for the time being with the possibility of a PQ convoy which according to dead reckoning could still be about to put in to port provided it was going at low speed and hauled off sufficiently far to the northwest. However, the prospects are very slender.

1326

"Hansen" reported in short signal 1212/150 that he was able to proceed at full speed again.

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1332

Radio message 1232/142 was received from "Hansen":

"Am searching AC 9725 on southerly courses. Weather, good visibility, bearing exact."

It is presumed that the remaining boats, too, had operated from the most northerly convoy route southwards until they received "Lubsen"'s message.

Radio message 1359/717 was therefore sent to Group "Eisenbart":

"If no contact, proceed at 1800 via the old patrol line in accordance with message No. 719. Position line I at 1400 on 2 January, all times 12 hours later."

1600

Radio message 1445/719 received:

"Sea area free to the south. Beware westbound convoy. Operating on message from "Lubsen"."

After the air reconnaissance had produced no result, radio message 1751/720 was sent:

"1. If no contact or information about the convoy, group "Eisenbart" to occupy position line I, increased cruising speed.

2. Report loss of contact by short signal."

2032

Radio message 1942/724 received from "Lubsen":

"Lost contact at 1700 in grid square 8366."

This is 24 miles southwest of position line I.

It now appears quite clearly that the course of the convoy is northwest, and that it is south of the position line planned for the return route of the boats.

The two boats at the extremities of the patrol line, U 957 (Schaar) and U 314 (Basse), were requested in radio message 2120/726 to report their arrival at the position line.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats of group "Isegrimm" are assembling in the attack areas ordered and proceeding to the Bear Island passage via position line I.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 354 (Herbschleb), seventh operation, (see Appendix II/1).

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III a):-

The enemy formation intercepted off the Gorlo Straits seems only to be a small convoy, possibly a tanker being escorted to Britain.

2. Re III d):-

The contact group "Eisenbart" has had with the enemy is reflected also in the intercepted radio traffic. The concentration of escort vessels in the Gorlo Straits may be due to the fact that the convoy which has arrived is being further escorted to Archangel.

3. Re IV a):-

Since the messages received from the boats up till now do not give a clear picture, and as developments indicate that we can only reckon with search groups, destroyers or fast escorted single ships, I do not intend to let the whole of group "Eisenbart" operate on these, especially since group "Isegrimm", approaching from the west, may re-intercept the small convoy. Meanwhile the suspected route of the PQ convoy is to be combed once again, as planned.

(Signed) Peters.

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2 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Eisenbart":

U 314)
U 957) proceeding from position line I,
U 716) AC 6837 - 6777, to position line II,
U 601) AC 5383 - 5862.
U 387)
U 277)

Group "Isegrimm":

U 956)
U 360) proceeding from position line I,
U 636) AB 5591 - 5988, to position line II,
U 425) AB 6186 - 6814.

In port:

U 354 Narvik,
U 307, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen,
U 278 Farsund.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 965 proceeding from Bergen to AB 66.
U 278 proceeding from Kristiansand (South)
to Bergen, put in to Egersund at 1245.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88,
route Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E -
Banak. Not an exhaustive reconnaissance of
the area, nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 on shipping, airfield, harbor, and
ice reconnaissance, route Kirkenes - Vardø -
Cape Teriberski - Iokanka - AW 2348 - Cape
Gorodetski - AW 2519 - Nukuev - AC 8988 -
Kiberg - Kirkenes. Not exhaustive owing
to weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 He 111,
route Vaernes - AF 1125 - Bodø. Reconnaissance
area 50% covered, no enemy sighting report.
1 Ju 88 over Faeroes area, no enemy sighting
report.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

One patrol vessel in AW 2124, course northwest. Tokanka harbor occupied by 10 ships, consisting of 1 merchant ship (4 - 6,000 G.R.T.), 1 merchant ship (3 - 4,000 G.R.T.), 8 probable patrol vessels of 500 G.R.T. each. A fishing vessel outside the harbor entrance. Tokanka airfield only partially covered, believed to be unoccupied.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Tokanka/Gorlo Straits area: minesweepers Nos. 45, 112, 114, guardboat No. 610.
Archangel/Gorlo Straits area: guardship No. 77, minesweepers Nos. 12, 115, 116, guardboats Nos. 615, 617, 625.
Britain: no units or warships appeared. During the day and the evening Archangel broadcast several very urgent radio messages to all escort forces.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

In short signal 0007/727 U 957 (Schaar) reported arrival at position line I at 0600, U 314 (Basse) in short signal 0253/728 at 0500.

0321 Radio message 0321/729 was therefore sent to group "Eisenbart":

"At 0600 on 2 January proceed from position line I to position line II from AC 5383 to 5862, arriving at 2000, and to position line III from AC 4331 to 4697, arriving 3 January at 0900."

Group "Isegrimm" is proceeding from the west via position lines II and III, and will arrive at the latter at 2200.

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1527 Radio message 1527/738 sent to group
 "Isegrimm":

"3 January at 0600, occupy attack areas,
depth of sweep 30 miles:

"Mohs" AC 4143, "Becker" 4187, "Hildebrandt"
4455, "Bentzien" 4723.

Move from north to south in the attack
areas, every 9 hours, beginning in the
south."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

At 1339 U 314 (Basse) reported damage to
engine, and at 2126 that the damage had
been completely repaired.

U 601 (Hansen) reported, in reply to a
query, that he still had the "Naxos"
instructions for U 277 and U 360 on board.

Sailing order for U 354 (Herbschleb):

"1. Put out from Narvik at 0930 on 3
January.

2. While passing "Luchs 1", proceed
with Diesel and electric engines on
the surface, in accordance with
"Luchs" orders.

3. Proceed through Westfjord at a
distance of 50 miles from the coast,
to HA 1 - Trondheim. Proceed on to
Bergen as soon as possible.

4. Radio service "Anton", Northern Waters
very long wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re IV b):-

Out of the 6 boats in group "Eisenbart" and
the 4 boats in group "Isegrimm" it is intended
to place 6 in attack areas to patrol the
Bear Island passage.

2 boats (U 387 and U 277) are due to be
relieved. The rest are to call at Narvik
for equipment with T5 torpedoes and "Borkum"
and "Naxos" instruments, so that they will
be available again as reliefs or for operations.

Boats which are not required for patrolling
the Bear Island passage are to lie at Hammerfest,
at operational readiness.

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Because of the lack of air reconnaissance I consider it necessary to patrol the Bear Island passage with six boats - provided that this number can be maintained. With a distance of 22 miles between the individual boats, I think we have every chance of intercepting single escorted ships or convoys. The movements of the boats will have to be kept uniform so that the distance between them will never vary. It is regrettable that PQ convoys will none the less continue to be intercepted very late so that there will only be a relatively small area to the east available for operations against them.

(Signed) Peters.

3 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Eisenbart":

U 314)
U 957) proceeding from position line II,
U 716) from AC 5383 - 5862, to position
U 601) line III, from AC 4331 - 4697.
U 387)
U 277)

Group "Isegrimm":

U 956 AC 4143.
U 360 AC 4187.
U 636 AC 4455.
U 425 AC 4723.

In port:

U 354 Narvik,
U 307, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen,
U 278 Egersund.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 965 proceeding from Bergen to AB 66.
U 354 put out from Narvik for Trondheim
at 1100.

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II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

4 BF 109 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance route Petsamo - Kildin - Varlamova - Petsamo.

In Kola Bay and Vaenga Bay only a few small craft and patrol vessels, otherwise nothing sighted.

1 Ju 88 on shipping reconnaissance on flying route Alakurtti - southwest and south coasts of Kola - southern sector - West Fairway - Dvina estuary - Alakurtti.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Strip reconnaissance south of Bear Island by 3 aircraft with radar and one supply aircraft with radar. Nothing sighted or located, flying route only partially covered.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Bodø - AF 1121 - Vaernes. Reconnaissance area 70% covered, no enemy sighting report.

1 Ju 88 over the Faeroes area, no enemy sighting report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

0813 Radio message 0655/752 received from U 360 (Becker):

"3 hydrophone bearings on 250°, am in AC 4417, sound gradually shifting westwards."

0815 Short signal 0801/753 from "Becker":

"According to hydrophone bearing the convoy is on 275°. My position is AB 6638."

0907 Short signal 0851/755:

"According to hydrophone bearing the convoy is on 250°. My position is AB 6628."

1555 After an interval of 7 hours, radio message 1510/764 received from U 636 (Hildebrandt):

"8 moderately loud depth charges at 0910 in AC 4457."

Presumably these were intended for "Becker", who was forced to submerge.

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In radio message 1545/765 "Becker" was requested to report.

1844 Radio message 1632/767 received from "Becker":

"At 0900 AB 6629, driven off by 2 destroyers, diving capacity restricted, no contact, am withdrawing."

Contact was established again by U 636 (Hildebrandt) who reported in short signal 2125/776:

"2 destroyers in AB 6712."

2202 In short signal 2158/778 he reported that he had lost contact.

2250 Short signal 2244/780 from "Hildebrandt":

"Am being driven off. My position is AB 7714."

(b) By air reconnaissance:

West of Kildin, 2 patrol vessels, one course east, one course west.

No shipping traffic observed in the White Sea from Rutchi to Archangel and Molotovsk. No reconnaissance made of Archangel and Molotovsk harbors because of weather conditions. The whole of the White Sea is free of ice with the exception of isolated ice formations off the south coast of Kola Peninsula and north of Unskaya Bay. Floe-ice in the fairway to Archangel.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Iokanka area: minesweepers Nos. 45, 114.

Iokanka/Gorlo Straits area: minesweeper No. 62, one other, probably No. 113.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardship No. 83, guardboats Nos. 610, 615, 623, 625, 519.

Britain: no units or warships appeared. No Murmansk - Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

0845 Radio message 0845/758 sent:

"Group "Isegrimm", Group "Eisenbart" to

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operate against the convoy on "Becker"'s hydrophone bearing of 275° from AB 6638."

Of the boats returning from the eastern Barents Sea, only "Büchler" was ordered to continue the homeward passage in radio message 1035/759. All the other 9 boats of group "Eisenbart" and "Isegrimm" are to operate on "Becker"'s report. When it emerged that this is probably the single escorted ship sighted on 1 January by U 601 (Hansen) and U 277 (Lübsen), which, at a cruising speed of 9 knots, could have just reached the Bear Island passage, group "Eisenbart" was ordered to remain there.

1708 Radio message 1708/766 sent:

"Take up positions in new attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles:

1. "Basse" AC 4143, "Schaar" 4178, "Dunkelberg" 4429, "Hansen" 4484, "Lübsen" 4735 as group "Eisenbart", cruising speed.
2. If no further information, "Mohs" AB 5843, "Becker" 5886, "Hildebrandt" 8253, "Bentzien" 8296, maximum continuous speed, as group "Isegrimm".

1819 Radio message 1819/770 sent:

"U 965 (Ohling) to report position by short signal. Proceed towards AB 84 at maximum continuous speed. This grid square lies 90 miles southwest of the attack areas allocated to group "Isegrimm", so that if the convoy is intercepted this fifth boat could also join the operation."

"Ohling" reported his position as AF 5331 in short signal 2052/92.

1850 Radio message 1840/773 sent because of the report of damage to "Becker":

1. Group "Isegrimm", new attack areas: "Mohs" AB 5843, "Hildebrandt" 5886, "Bentzien" 8253.
2. "Becker" to return to Andfjord - Narvik unless able to restore completely with own resources ability to submerge."

2224 Short signal 2209/779 from "Becker":

"Completely clear to submerge again, my

position is AB 6593."

Radio message 2305/782 was thereupon sent:

- "1. "Becker" to operate on report from "Hildebrandt", maximum speed.
2. Convoy expected in AB 8230 at 0800 on 4 January."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Before group "Eisenbart" arrived at the last position line,

0340

radio message 0340/749 was sent:

- "1. Return to Narvik: "Büchler", "Lübsen", after passing position line III, via AC 4790, "Mohs" via AB 6380 at 2200 on 3 January.
2. New attack areas for group "Isegrimm" at 0000 on 4 January: "Basse" AC 4143, "Schaar" 4178, "Dunkelberg" 4429, "Becker" 4473, "Hildebrandt" 4731, "Bentzien" 4759, depth of sweep 30 miles.
3. "Hansen" to announce by time short signal, arrival in AC 4473 to hand over "Naxos" instructions to "Becker". Then return to Andfjord - Narvik."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III a):-

"Hildebrandt"'s messages confirm the details about the convoy, estimated by dead reckoning: course about 250°, speed 9 knots.

2. Re IV a):-

If the convoy reported by "Becker" is not intercepted by the U-boats in their new attack areas by tomorrow morning, the air reconnaissance will have to decide whether this is a worthwhile target. Otherwise it is intended to break off the operation on the next day in order to get on with the new equipment of the boats.

(Signed) Peters.

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4 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Eisenbart":

U 314 AC 4143)
U 957 AC 4178)
U 716 AC 4429) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 601 AC 4484)
U 277 AC 4735)

Group "Isegrimm":

U 956)
U 360) operating against the PQ convoy
U 636) (AB 8230).
U 425)

In port:

U 307, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen,
U 278 Egersund.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 965 proceeding from Bergen to AB 84.
U 354 proceeding from Narvik to Trondheim.
U 387 put in to Harstad at 2045 from the operational area.
U 287 put out from Egersund at 0900 for Stavanger.
U 739 put in to Kristiansand (South) at 1145.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

2 BF 109, on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance Kola Bay - Polyarno harbor - Vaenga Bay and Murmansk harbor. Not exhaustive owing to thick fog.

2 BF 109 on shipping reconnaissance Kola Bay - Vaenga harbor - Polyarno - Murmansk. No shipping observed. Harbors not covered owing to fog.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

4 BV 138, without radar, on fan reconnaissance against a located formation. Aircraft no. 1, flying route Tromsø - AB 9244 - Tromsø. Broken

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off because of icing and because the route was lost. Aircraft no. 2, Tromsø - AB 9192 - AB 5975 - AB 8231 - Tromsø. Aircraft no. 3 broken off because of damage to cooling system. Aircraft no. 4 Tromsø - AB 9456 - AB 8519 - AB 5511 - AB 9456 - Tromsø.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance as far as AF 1534 (in the direction of Jan Mayen). No enemy sighting report. Reconnaissance area 60% covered.

3 FW 200 and 2 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance between 68° 45' N and 72° 30' N as far as 7° 15' W. No enemy sighting report.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Sola - AF 7648 - AF 8733 - Sola. No enemy sighting report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

0926 U 636 (Hildebrandt) reported in radio message 0830/787 on its contact with the enemy yesterday:

"Probably a fast escorted single ship; at 2226 miss against a destroyer from tube 5."

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Archangel/Gorlo Straits area: minesweepers Nos. 113, 114, guardboat No. 625.

Britain: no units or warships appeared. Radio traffic with Britain: very little from Murmansk, no Archangel broadcast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

In order at least to remain abreast of the pursued convoy during the air reconnaissance, radio message 1157/791 was sent to group "Isegrimm":

"1. At 2000 on 4 January form patrol line from AB 7321 to 8475, in the following order: "Mohs", "Becker", "Hildebrandt", "Bentzien", U 965 (Ohling).

2. If no contact by 2000, and no air report

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received, the boats are to return to the Bear Island passage."

The air reconnaissance made no enemy sighting report.

Radio message 1716/795 was therefore sent:

"If no contact has been made, group "Isegrimm" to move away at 2000 on 4 January, course 68°, speed 10 knots."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Eisenbart", consisting of 5 boats, in the Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re III a):-

It seems unlikely that further pursuit of this apparently small enemy formation would be worthwhile, nor would it have much prospect of success.

The operation has therefore been broken off and group "Isegrimm" has been ordered to proceed in patrol line towards Bear Island passage from where they will be relieved or equipped with T5 torpedoes in due course.

(Signed) Peters.

5 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Eisenbart":

U 314 AC 4143)
U 957 AC 4178)
U 716 AC 4429) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 601 AC 4484)
U 277 AC 4735)

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Group "Isegrimm":

U 956 AB 5824)
U 360 AB 5856)
U 636 AB 5894) course 68°, speed 10 knots.
U 425 AB 8239)
U 965 AB 8372)

In port:

U 387 Harstad,
U 307, 711, 713, 737, Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen,
U 739 Kristiansand (South).

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 278 proceeding from Egersund to Bergen,
put in to Bergen at 1800.
U 354 put in to Trondheim from Narvik at
0900.
U 387 put in to Narvik from Harstad at
1430.
U 739 put out from Kristiansand (South)
for Bergen at 0810.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Supplement to 4 January:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance,
route Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E,
nothing to report.

5 January:

2 BF 109 on meteorological and shipping
reconnaissance Kola Bay - Polyarno - Vaenga -
Murmansk, area only partially covered because
of low-lying fog.

2 BF 109 on meteorological and shipping
reconnaissance Kola Bay - Polyarno - Vaenga
and Murmansk harbor. Nothing to report
because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Vaernes - AB 7733 (in the direction of Jan Mayen) -
Trondheim - Gaardermoen.
Reconnaissance area 20% covered.

No enemy sighting report.

1 Ju 88 over the Faeroes area, no enemy sighting
report.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In Vaenga Bay 3 small freighters about 1,000 - 2,000 G.R.T. Varlamova airfield, Kola south and Murmanski channel heavily occupied.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1120

4 January:

Rough bearing of 78° obtained on a British unit or warship in radio traffic with Murmansk at 1252.

At 1254 Main Naval D/F Station Hammerfest obtained a bearing of 80.6° gradually decreasing by 4° on a British unit or warship.

At 1952 Polyarno broadcast code word "Gopak" Set Navolok (AC 8855), first priority (Most Immediate) to all naval forces of the Russian Northern Waters Fleet.

At 2020 Kola broadcast a message, first priority, to all naval forces of the Northern Waters Fleet, which was repeated by Iokanka at 2105 for all patrol forces.

5 January:

2335

At 1550 Polyarno broadcast a radio message of first priority (Most Immediate) to all naval forces of the Northern Waters Fleet.

At 1610 the message was repeated by Archangel to the same address and to Belushya.

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: minesweeper No. 114, guardboats Nos. 610, 615, 625.

Britain: very little Murmansk and Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Eisenbart", 5 boats in Bear Island

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passage,
Group "Isegrimm", 5 boats, in patrol
line southwest of Bear Island.

2131

Radio message 2131/713 sent:

"Departure at 0800 on 6 January:

1. "Mohs", "Hildebrandt" to Andfjord -
Narvik, "Lübsen" to Hammerfest -
Narvik, to be at approach point
at 1500.
2. To attack areas depth of sweep 25 miles:
"Basse" AC 4118, "Schaar" 4172,
"Dunkelberg" 4422, "Becker" 4454,
"Bentzien" 4489, "Ohling" 4752, as
group "Isegrimm". "Schaar" to put
in to Narvik on 12 January.
3. "Hansen" to AB 6665 to hand over
"Naxos" instructions to "Becker",
then Andfjord - Narvik. "Becker" to
announce arrival at rendezvous by
time short signal."

On the basis of the shortest distance from
the ice limit to Norway, the attack areas
have been spaced 22 miles apart. The
boats U 956 (Mohs) and U 601 (Hansen) are to
be equipped with "Zaunkönig" acoustic
torpedoes, and then to go to Hammerfest and
wait there in readiness.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 387 (Büchler), fourth
operation, (see Appendix II/2).

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re III d):-

The lively radio traffic between British and
Russian naval forces and Russian coastal radio
stations indicates movements of enemy forces in
the Barents Sea. The approach of a QP convoy
is not impossible.

(Signed) Peters.

6 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 314 from AC 4143 to 4118)
U 957 from AC 4178 to 4172)
U 716 from AC 4429 to 4422) depth of
U 360 to 4454) sweep 25 miles.
U 425 to 4489)
U 965 to 4752)

In port:

U 387 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 278, 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 277 put in to Hammerfest at 1700
from AC 4735.
U 601 proceeding from AC 4484 to
Narvik.
U 636 proceeding from AB 66 to
Narvik.
U 956 proceeding from AB 63 to
Narvik.
U 739 put in to Bergen at 1700
from Kristiansand (South).

II. Air reconnaissance:

Fliieger Fuehrer North (East):

No operations reported.

Fliieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Fliieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance,
flying route Vaernes - AF 1693 - AF 4771 -
Sola. No enemy sighting report.
Reconnaissance area 50% covered.

1 aircraft broke off meteorological reconnaissance
in AF 7598.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

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(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardboats Nos. 605, 610, 615, 625, 627.

Britain: no units or warships appeared.

Radio traffic with Britain: little

Murmansk broadcast, no Archangel broadcast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Six boats (group "Isegrimm") in attack areas south of Bear Island.

The meeting between "Hansen" and "Becker", which was ordered in conjunction with the relief of the boats in the Bear Island passage, was canceled in radio message 0150/715, after "Becker", in radio message 2333/714, had reported that he did not need the instructions for installing and using "Borkum - Naxos".

1753 Radio message 1753/732 sent to group "Isegrimm":

"Nine hourly movements to north and south within the attack areas. At 2100 on 6 January be at northern limit, at 0600 at southern limit, etc. Irregular courses on the surface. Make continuous use of hydrophone during poor visibility. Avoid danger of surprise by infra-red location."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 314 (Basse), in short signal 0236/717, reported the ice limit at AC 1776. According to this, a passage north of Bear Island appears to be no longer possible.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 387 (Buchler):

"1. Put out from Narvik at 1000 on 7 January.

2. When passing "Luchs 1", proceed on the surface with Diesel and electric motors, in accordance with "Luchs" orders.

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3. Proceed via Westfjord at a distance of 50 miles from the coast to HA 1 - Trondheim. Proceed to Bergen as soon as possible.

4. Radio service "Anton", and Northern Waters very long wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

Teleprinter message received from Naval Chief Command Norway, addressed to Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats, Ops., in which it is requested that our U-boats should be used to protect our own convoys off the west Norwegian coast against enemy submarines.

A teleprinter message was therefore sent to Naval High Command Naval War Staff 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats, Ops., and Naval Chief Command Norway, stating that Captain U-boats, Norway had no boats available for this task; and that although he considered operations against enemy submarines to be necessary he did not believe that U-boats would be suitable for this purpose.

VII. Survey of the situation:

A report on the U-boat situation in Northern Waters as on 6 January, 1944, was dispatched in a teleprinter message (see Appendix V.).

(Signed) Peters.

7 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 314 AC 4118)
U 957 AC 4172)
U 716 AC 4422)
U 360 AC 4454) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 425 AC 4489)
U 965 AC 4752)

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In port:

U 277 Hammerfest,
U 387 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 278, 355, 703, 739 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 601 put in to Harstad at 1400,
put in to Narvik at 1900.
U 636 put in to Harstad at 1510.
U 956 put in to Harstad at 1300,
put in to Narvik at 1900.
U 387 put out from Narvik for
Trondheim at 1000.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance,
route Kirkenes - Rovaniemi, broken off north
of Ivalo owing to weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance,
route Gerdermoen - AB 7846 - Vaernes. Area
70% covered.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very little radio
traffic to submarines in the operational
area.

Murmansk/Iokanka area: minesweepers Nos.
31, 61, 62.

Britain: no units or warships appeared.
Radio traffic with Britain: very little
Murmansk -, no Archangel broadcasts.

1055

6 January:

At 2140, Tsip Navolok transmitted a first
priority (Most Immediate) radio message to
Polyarno, which was broadcast at 2152 to all
naval forces.

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(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Six boats (Group "Isegrimm") south of Bear Island.

Group "Isegrimm" was moved 70 miles to the west:

1443 Radio message 1443/756:

"1. At 1800 on 7 January group "Isegrimm" to proceed at a speed of 7 knots to attack areas, depth of sweep 25 miles: "Basse" AB 6234, "Schaar" 6268, "Dunkelberg" 6533, "Becker" 6644, "Bentzien" 6678, "Ohling" 6943.

"2. At 0600 on 8 January nine-hourly movements to north and south within the attack areas starting from the southern limit."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 739 (Mangold) and U 278 (Franze):

"1. Put out from Bergen forenoon of 8 January.

2. Proceed to AB 93 at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.

3. Operational Order No. 1, radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave. After passage report of 67° N, Northern Waters wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III d):-

I consider that the numerous urgent radio messages to naval forces off the Russian coast must be connected with the movements of warships in the Murmansk/Archangel area. It is not impossible that preparations are being made for a QP convoy.

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2. Re IV b):-

The attack areas are being moved westwards for the following reasons:-

- a) to get further to leeward for purposes of attack on the PQ convoys which are to be expected;
 - b) to remove the boats from their well-known positions at the narrowest point of the Bear Island passage. At the same time the attack areas were spaced as far apart as is compatible with a depth of sweep of 25 miles, in order to patrol the area as closely as possible and prevent the enemy from slipping past unnoticed.
3. On my suggestion a radio message was sent to Group North/Fleet by Admiral Northern Waters, concerning PQ convoys, in which it was requested that the air reconnaissance against such convoys should be increased again. (See Appendix IV.)

(Signed) Peters.

8 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 314 AB 6234)
U 957 AB 6268)
U 716 AB 6533) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 360 AB 6644)
U 425 AB 6678)
U 965 AB 6943)

In port:

U 277 Hammerfest,
U 636 Harstad,
U 601, 956 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 278, 355, 703, 739 Bergen.

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(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

- U 956 put out from Narvik for Ramsund at 1400.
- U 387 proceeding from Narvik to Trondheim.
- U 739 put out from Bergen for AB 93 at 1430.
- U 278 put out from Bergen for AB 93 at 1430.
- U 277 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik at 2030.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak. Flying route not exhaustively covered, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88, Stavanger - AF 1166 - Vaernes. Area 50% covered, no enemy sighting report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

At 0311, Polyarno transmitted a message of first priority for all naval forces in Northern Waters.

At 0322 Archangel repeated the same message to all naval forces in Northern Waters.

Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: minesweepers Nos. 31, 37, 113, 114, guardboats Nos. 610, 615, 625.

Britain: no units or warships appeared.

British radio traffic: no Murmansk - Archangel broadcasts.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" west of Bear Island passage (6 boats).

Owing to bad visibility and winter conditions in Northern Waters there are few means of obtaining ships' positions, so that there have been numerous instances of considerable corrections from estimated position.

In the case of the last convoy this led to a wrong estimate of the enemy's course as a result of U 277 (Lübsen)'s report of 26 December.

An attempt will be made to give better opportunities for obtaining ships' positions, by regular daily radiation of a suitable radio beacon.

In radio messages 1335/773 and 1349/774 the boats received details for the present attack areas.

In radio message 2308/778 a short signal was requested from the most northerly boat of the position, to obtain an adequate radio direction finder bearing.

U 957 (Schaar) reported, in radio message 0241/768, damage and 24 cbm. of fuel oil.

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs),
(see Appendix III/1).

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 956 (Mohs), third operation (interrupted), (see Appendix II/3).

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. Re IV b):-

If it should be found that with the strong radio beacons used and with the aid of radio stations it is possible to obtain adequate ships' positions beyond the ranges assumed

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so far, it is intended to arrange a similar service of groups of radio beacons for the Barents Sea and for Arctic waters.

2. A teleprinter message was received from Group North/Fleet in respect of the proposal of Naval Chief Command Norway concerning the operation of our own U-boats against enemy submarines in the Norwegian area:

"Concur with Captain U-boats, Norway's opinion."

All the experiences of the last few years show the inadvisability of the proposal of Naval Chief Command, Norway. Moreover there are not sufficient forces for this purpose, as the U-boats available are required for other tasks.

(Signed) Peters.

9 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 314 AB 6234)
U 957 AB 6268)
U 716 AB 6533) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 360 AB 6644)
U 425 AB 6678)
U 965 AB 6943)

In port:

U 956 Harstad,
U 601, 636 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 387 put in to Trondheim from Narvik at 1915.
U 739 proceeding to AB 93 from Bergen.
U 278 proceeding to AB 93 from Bergen.
U 277 proceeding to Narvik from Hammerfest.
U 956 put out from Harstad at 0900 for AB 6268.

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II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Armed night reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88 over the Kandalaksha and Louschi area.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 He 111, flying route Vaernes - AF 1121 - Vaernes. Area 70% covered, no enemy sighting report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

2237 Short signal 2225/793 received from U 314 (Basse):

"Have twice observed radar location from enemy aircraft during the day."

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: minesweepers Nos. 114, 116, guardboats Nos. 610, 615, 625, unidentified vessel.

Britain: no units or warships appeared.

British radio traffic: very little Murmansk broadcasts, little urgent Archangel broadcasts.

2013 At 1700, unidentified signal station in the Archangel area transmitted a first priority (Most Immediate) radio message to Archangel.

1435 The following facts make it appear possible that an allied convoy, probably from Archangel or the Gorlo Straits, is proceeding in a westerly direction (QP).

On 7 January, 2308 and 9 January, 0423 urgent weather reports from Murmansk to Whitehall (British home radio station); during the night of 8/9 January, renewed Archangel broadcasts (3 urgent radio messages).

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On 9 January, 0727 a radio message of first priority from Ponoï (AW 2914) to Archangel.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 957 (Schaar), in short signal 1311/784 reported that he could obtain a good ship's position by radio direction finder bearings. "Schaar" is the second boat from the north, and about 200 miles from the coast. Presumably all other boats of group "Isegrimm" can obtain useful bearings.

2158 Radio message 2158/792 was sent:

"1. U 956 (Mohs) to proceed from Andfjord via AB 6510 to AB 6268, depth of sweep 25 miles, to relieve "Schaar". Be at southern limit of attack area at 1200 on 10 January.

2. "Schaar" to return to Andfjord - Narvik via AB 6510."

In view of U 314 (Basse)'s report and the results of the radio intercept service,

2328 radio message 2328/795 was sent:

"Russian radio traffic and radar from enemy aircraft in the Bear Island passage may indicate the approach of a QP convoy."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 601 (Hansen),
(see Appendix III/2).

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from 601 (Hansen), eighth operation,
(see Appendix II/4).

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III d):-

The conclusions drawn by the Main Naval D/F Station as to the meaning of the urgent radio messages of the last few days seem to be rather too bold. We shall have to wait for

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more comprehensive and clearer information on the QP convoy.

2. Re III a):-

There has been no radar reconnaissance by our own air forces in U 314 (Basse)'s attack area either at or about the time given in his message. We must therefore reckon with enemy long-range reconnaissance aircraft, probably from Russia, which are intended to reconnoiter our own disposition in preparation for the passage of the expected convoy.

3. Re IV b):-

The successful assistance given to boats at sea by radio beacons promises to be of real value for intercepting and maintaining contact with convoys.

(Signed) Peters.

10 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 314 AB 6234)
U 957 AB 6268)
U 716 AB 6533) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 360 AB 6644)
U 425 AB 6678)
U 965 AB 6943)

In port:

U 601, 636 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 387, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 278 proceeding from Bergen to AB 93.
U 739 proceeding from Bergen to AB 93.
U 956 proceeding from Harstad via
AB 6510 to 6268.
U 277 put in to Harstad at 0410 from
Hammerfest, put out from Harstad
at 1030, put in to Narvik at 1500.
U 601 put out from Narvik at 1000, put
in to Ramsund at 1200, put out from
Ramsund at 1730, put in to Harstad
at 2315.

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II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88, route Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AB 7876 - Vaernes. Area 40% covered, no enemy sighting report.
1 Ju 88 on route Vaernes - AE 6787 - Vaernes. Area 60% covered. Nothing to report.
Reconnaissance of shipping berths in the Faeroes by 2 Ju 88.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

2 destroyers lying stopped in AE 9585 (Soervaagsfjord).

1841 Ships in Thorshavn at 1249 according to an aerial photograph: 4 small and medium-sized merchant ships and 13 coastal vessels. Observation made difficult by a snow storm, oblique aerial photographs from a height of 500 m., distance 3 - 5 km.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Iokanka area: guardships Nos. 25, 77, 81, minesweepers Nos. 31, 53, 114, guardboat No. 519.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardboats Nos. 610, 615, 617, 625.
Britain: no units or warships appeared.
British radio traffic: very little Murmansk broadcast, moderate, partly urgent, Archangel broadcasts.

0210 and 0925 At 0300 and 0800 destroyer "H" received urgent radio messages from Polyarno;
2140 at 0350 it received one from Archangel.

2240 At 0836 and 1945 destroyers "B" and "H" received urgent radio messages from Polyarno.

Note: It is possible that on the night of 9/10 January both destroyers proceeded from

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Kola Bay to Gorlo Straits in order to meet freighters from Archangel and Molotovsk assembling for the expected QP convoy. In addition to this, there was a lively exchange, during the morning and evening, of urgent radio messages (operational and direction finder service) between British radio stations in Polyarno (MGD), Archangel (GQC) and Murmansk (WUK).

0210 and 2140 At 0002 and 1850 two Russian M.T.B.s were exchanging radio messages.

At 1526 urgent radio message from Polyarno to submarine "S 14".

(e) By G.I.S stations:

G.I.S. station Denmark reported from Reykjavik on 5 January:

"Norwegian ship Lyra now in Reykjavik."

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" (6 boats) west of the Bear Island passage.

Group "Isegrimm" received orders in radio message 1939/707 to move one attack area further north, to fill the gap left by U 956 (Mohs) who has been detailed to salvage the meteorological survey ship "Hessen".

U 601 (Hansen) received orders in radio message 1932/706 to discontinue his return to Hammerfest and to proceed at high speed to occupy the southernmost attack area of group "Isegrimm".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

On receipt of a message from the meteorological ship "Hessen" (meteorological operation "Einsiedler") reporting the breaking of her crank shaft in AB 1696, U 956 (Mohs) received the following orders in radio message 1939/707:

"Proceed immediately at high speed to AB 2747 to salvage the meteorological ship "Hessen" (105 G.R.T.) whose steering is out of control."

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In giving the position, a southward movement due to the strong north wind, has been taken into account. "Mohs" received more detailed instructions in radio message 2359/710:

- "1. From 1500 on 11 January, the "Hessen" will transmit 5 figure groups as a beacon signal, sum total of digits of every third number 25, for 3 minutes every half-hour, on 448 kc/s. Transmit short signal "No", if not found by 0300 on 12 January.
2. Norwegian seal hunter, 24 m. long, with motor. Recognition signals from the coast.
3. Tow boat off to point "Hans", AB 9665 bottom left. If this is impossible, send short signal "Narvik" and take off gear and crew. If necessary, wait for improvement in weather conditions. Do not transmit any other radio messages, except announcement of arrival."

(d) Miscellaneous:

Radio message 0046/797 received from U 277 (Lübsen):

"Have been freed by high tide and with the help of a tug, am proceeding to Harstad."

In reply to a query U 314 (Basse), the most northerly boat of group "Isegrimm", reported in short signal 2209/708, that, while the radio beacons were being transmitted at midday, he was able to obtain a good ship's position.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. (a) U-boat reports:

Short report from U 277 (Lübsen), fourth operation (see Appendix II/5).

(b) Plans:

Teleprinter message received from Naval War Staff, 1st Division, IU in reply to the request of Naval Chief Command Norway that U-boats should be used to attack enemy submarines off the Norwegian coast:

"Captain U-boats Norway's view is endorsed. It is impossible to divert U-boats to hunt submarines."

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VII. Survey of the situation:

Assistance for the meteorological ship "Hessen" is, under the circumstances, both a matter of course and also a necessity.

Since, however, in nearly all meteorological operations breakdowns of one kind or another have occurred in the meteorological ships, I consider that before these operations are started a most careful check on the ship's structural and mechanical condition should be made in all cases.

If weather conditions permit, the U-boat should try and tow the meteorological ship, which has a displacement of 105 G.R.T., as far as the approaches to Tromsø. But it will be necessary to carry out an anti-submarine hunt in the inshore waters and to have some tugs in readiness. To render this assistance means that one of our U-boats will be out of action for 5 or 6 days, and would not be available if a QP convoy were running.

This rendering of assistance must not endanger the operational capacity of the U-boat. The beacon signals have been chosen in such a way that they will resemble British or Russian radio messages as closely as possible.

(Signed) Peters.

11 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 314 AB 6234)
U 716 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 425 AB 6644)
U 965 AB 6678)
U 956 from AB 6268 to AB 2747.

In port:

U 277, 636 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 387, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

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(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 957 proceeding from AB 6268 to Narvik,
put in to Harstad at 1850.
U 278 proceeding from Bergen to AB 93.
U 739 proceeding from Bergen to AB 93.
U 601 put out from Harstad at 0100 for
AB 6943.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88,
route Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E -
Banak. Nothing to report.

Harbor and shipping reconnaissance by 2 BF 109
of Ponoï harbor, Vaenga Bay, Murmansk harbor
and reconnaissance of the airfields at Varlamova,
Murmanski, Shongui, broken off at Arktino.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 He 111,
route Vaernes - AB 7727 - Vaernes. Reconnaissance
area 50% covered, no enemy sighted.
1 FW 200 on special mission for operation
"Bassgeiger".
1 Ju 88 over the Faeroes sea area.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic
to submarines in the operational area, "S 14"
mentioned by name.

Iokanka area: minesweepers Nos. 113, 114.
Britain: no units or warships appeared.
Very little Murmansk broadcast, no Archangel
broadcast.

1906 At 1708, Russian M.T.B. "S 13" at sea according
to radio traffic with Tsip Navolok.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" (6 boats) west of Bear Island passage.

The two new boats coming up from the south U 278 (Franze) and U 739 (Mangold) received orders in radio message 0113/688:

"Proceed at increased cruising speed on the surface."

It is intended that they should relieve U 314 (Basse) and U 716 (Dunkelberg), which are to go to Hammerfest to replenish supplies.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

Radio message 1848/717 sent to U 956 (Mohs):

"Boat must not be endangered by towing the "Hessen", she must remain clear for operations."

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 277 (Lübsen):

"1. Put out from Narvik at 0900 on 12 January.

2. When passing "Luchs 1" steer with both Diesels and electric engines in accordance with "Luchs" orders.

3. Proceed via Westfjord at a distance of 50 miles from the coast to HA 1 - Trondheim.
Continue to Bergen as soon as possible.

4. Radio service "Anton", Northern Waters very long wave."

1945

Radio message 1731/719 from U 278 (Franze):

"Hydrophone gear out of order....."

"Franze" received orders in radio message 2015/718 to put in to Narvik.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

In reply to the rejection both by us and Group North/Fleet of the suggestion to operate U-boats against enemy submarines, the following teleprinter

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message was received from Naval Chief Command, Norway, Operational Staff:

"Naval Chief Command Norway, cannot agree with Group North/Fleet's opinion, as instances both from the last and from this war are sufficient proof that U-boats can successfully operate against submarines. Conditions are, without question, more favorable off our own than off the enemy's coast. The strengthening of our defenses against landings must again be stressed. In our opinion, the only adequate reason for turning down the proposal would be a lack of forces which is not envisaged in the present state of U-boat warfare."

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re IV d):-

U 278 (Franze) and U 739 (Mangold) are intended as reliefs for U 314 (Basse) and U 716 (Dunkelberg). "Mangold" has not yet reported passing 67° N. He is evidently considerably behind "Franze".

(Signed) Peters.

12 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 314 AB 6234)
U 716 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 425 AB 6644)
U 965 AB 6678)
U 601 AB 6943)
U 956 AB 19/27 salvaging weather ship "Hessen".

In port:

U 957 Harstad,
U 277, 636 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 387, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

- U 277 put out from Narvik at 0900 for Trondheim.
- U 287 put out from Trondheim at 0900 for Bergen.
- U 957 put out from Harstad at 1000, put in to Narvik at 1500.
- U 278 put in to Narvik from Bergen at 1930.
- U 739 proceeding from Bergen to AB 93.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88, route Kirkenes - Nautsi - Alakurtti and Rovanimie.

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88, route Banak - Bear Island - Hope Island - Banak. Exhaustive, nothing to report.

Meteorological operation "Svartisen" supplied.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

11 January: Special mission for "Bassgeiger" carried out, nothing special to report.

12 January: Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 He III, route Vaernes - AB 7767 - Vaernes. Reconnaissance area 80% covered, no enemy sighted.

1 Ju 88 over the Faeroes sea area, no enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

0146 Radio message 2215/63 received from U 739 (Mangold):

"Submerged in AF 5534 from a continuous location and from "Naxos"; was then passed over by 4 fast vessels, course 120°, at high speed, according to a hydrophone measurement they were S-boats.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

A new type of fast vessel is operating with the Russian Northern Waters Fleet, the Russian "Bo-boat" (meaning "large submarine chaser"). Possibly similar, but larger than a "Mo-boat" ("Mo" means "sea chaser" hitherto called "guardboat Mo"). Six "Bo-boats" have appeared in radio traffic since November 1943. Probably used to chase submarines and for escort duties, like Mo-boats.

Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Britain: no units or warships appeared. Little Murmansk broadcast, no Archangel broadcast.

1040 At 0545 and 0719, Polyarno broadcast to all naval forces 2 first priority radio messages (Most Immediate).

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" (6 boats) west of the Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

0406 U 956 (Mohs) reported in short signal 0342/728 that he had not yet found the meteorological ship "Hessen".

0433 Radio message 0433/729 was therefore transmitted to "Mohs":

"Search the area to the north as far as AB 1690. Repeat search at dawn, look out for the same beacon signals." The "Hessen" has been requested for a new position report.

1950 Radio message 0912 received from U 965 (Ohling):

"Have picked up the following radio message 0830:

"Captain U-boats from "Mohs": have "Hessen" in tow."

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 737 (Brasack):

"1. Put out from Trondheim on forenoon of

CONFIDENTIAL

13 January.

2. Proceed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast to Narvik via Westfjord. 4 probable M.T.B.s were reported at 2215 on 11 January in AF 5534, course 120°.
3. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

The following teleprinter message was received from Group North/Fleet with regard to the opinion expressed by Naval Chief Command, Norway, re the use of our own U-boats to hunt submarines in the inner leads:

- "1. The opinion expressed on 8 January with regard to the use of German U-boats is supported.
2. There can be no doubt that small U-boats used as anti-submarine chasers in coastal waters would be successful, if only in frightening off enemy submarines. 35 ton U-boats have operated successfully off Sevastopol. The Group cannot judge whether small Italian submarines of 35 tons and 80 tons, which are still available or under construction, would be suitable for such a task, and whether they could be supplied with crews and made available."

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III a):-

The M.T.B.s reported by U 739 (Mangold) appear to be approaching Frohavet. The coastal defenses have been informed of this.

2. Re IV c):-

U 956 (Mohs) is towing the "Hessen" against westerly to southwesterly wind, strength 4-6. It must be assumed that as this U-boat is little suited to towing ships, the speed of advance will be small.

(Unsigned).

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13 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 314 AB 6234)
U 716 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 425 AB 6644)
U 965 AB 6678)
U 601 AB 6943)
U 956 with "Hessen" from AB 52 to AB 9662.

In port:

U 278, 636, 957 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 278 put out from Narvik for AB 6540
at 2200.
U 277 proceeding from Narvik to Trondheim.
U 387 proceeding from Trondheim to Bergen.
U 739 proceeding from Bergen to AB 93.
U 737 put out from Trondheim for the
operational area at 1300.
U 703 put out from Bergen for Kiel at 0730.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Photographic night reconnaissance of Murmansk
by 1 Ju 88.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88, route
Vaernes - AB 7876 - Vaernes.
1 Ju 88 on route Vaernes - AF 7137 - Vaernes.
Reconnaissance area 50% covered, no enemy
sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Kola inlet from Cape Belokamennaya to Shavor

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Point, probably a destroyer of the "Gnevni" class, 6 freighters totaling about 6,000 G.R.T., 1 harbor vessel. 8 aircraft, probably "MBR 2", at the seaplane base at Gryasnaya Bay.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: minesweeper No. 116.

Iokanka area: minesweeper No. 31, guardboat No. 519.

Britain: no units or warships appeared.

Very little Murmansk broadcast, no Archangel broadcast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" (6 boats) west of the Bear Island passage.

Radio message 1351/754 sent to U 739 (Mangold) who has arrived from the south.

"1.

2. Proceed via AB 6850, 6270 to relieve "Basse" at 1200 on 14 January in attack area AB 6234, depth of sweep 25 miles, group "Isegrimm". Start at 1500 on 9 hourly movements from the southern limit of the attack area, thus leaving the northern limit at 2400, etc., irregular courses."

Radio message 1358/753 sent to U 314 (Basse):

"Return to Hammerfest at 1200 on 14 January via AB 6330 and point SR 1. Report ice hindrance after putting in."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

Radio message 9665/751 sent to U 956 (Mohs):

"Report by short signal estimated time of arrival at point "Hans", AB 9665, bottom left, 18 hours in advance. U-boat will be met at sea."

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(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 278 (Franze), see Appendix III/3).

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. (a) U-boat reports:

Short report from U 957 (Schaar), first operation, (see Appendix II/6).

(b) Plans:

Teleprinter message received from Naval War Staff 1st Div., IU, re the proposal by Naval Chief Command, Norway, to Naval War Staff 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats, Ops., of 11 January:

- "1. Putting U-boats into operation against submarines has little prospects of success, and could only result in chance successes.
2. The present state of U-boat warfare requires maintaining the highest possible number of boats in the Atlantic.
3. The number of boats under the command of Captain U-boats, Norway has been increased to 24 boats plus 3 experimental boats with new conning towers. It is intended to increase the number to 30, which will considerably reinforce the defenses against landings.
4. U-boats in Norway will be allocated by Naval War Staff, 1st Div."

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re IV a):-

U 956 (Mohs) is to hand over the meteorological ship "Hessen" to the coastal defenses about 20 miles from the coast.

(Signed) Peters.

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14 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 314 AB 6234)
U 716 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 425 AB 6644)
U 965 AB 6678)
U 601 AB 6943)
U 956 with "Hessen" from AB 19 to AB 9662.

In port:

U 636, 957 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 355 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 277 put in to Trondheim from Narvik
at 0900.
U 387 proceeding from Bergen to Trondheim.
U 739 proceeding from Bergen to AB 6234 via
AB 6850 and 6270.
U 737 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.
U 278 proceeding from Narvik to AB 6540.
U 314 at 1200 returning to Hammerfest via
AB 6330.
U 703 put in to Kristiansand (South) from
Bergen at 1800.
U 312 put in to Kristiansand (South) from
Kiel at 2000.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 He 111, route
Vaernes - AB 7763 - Vaernes. Reconnaissance
area 70% covered, no enemy sighted.
1 Ju 88 over the Faeroes sea area.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

1540 U 965 (Ohling) reported "Naxos" location by radio message 1116/762.

He is in AB 6678.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russia: radio messages show that the western Matochkin Straits are free of ice and that at the moment the west coast of Novaya Zemlya between Gusini Nos north (AT 4856) and Lagernaya (AT 4625) is apparently still navigable for shipping.
Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Britain: no units or warships appeared.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" (6 boats) west of the Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 956 (Mohs) with meteorological ship "Hessen" in tow proceeding from AB 52 to point "Hans", AB 9665. No report.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III a):-

This is the second instance of a "Naxos" location observed by group "Isegrimm". It appears that long-range reconnaissance aircraft with radar are searching for our boats at regular intervals. It should be attempted to establish just when these flights take place and to order the boats to remain submerged during these periods, particularly if they have just arrived at new positions.

2. Re IV b):-

Group North/Fleet reported by telephone the opinion of C-in-C U-boats that group "Isegrimm" should preferably be moved further to the west, against approaching PQ convoys.

Teleprinter message, S.O.s only, was therefore sent to Group North/Fleet:

"Most Secret S.O.s only, by hand of officer only."

With reference to moving the U-boat positions in the direction of Jan Mayen, the following comments are submitted:-

1. Our general plan which is based on the present number of boats and on the fact that there is a greater certainty of intercepting convoys at points of concentration, as well as on the necessity of always having a certain number of boats at operational readiness in Hammerfest, was reported via Admiral Northern Waters in Serial Number Most Secret 69, dated 7 January.
2. With the present main point of concentration of PQ convoys, a movement of the U-boat disposition to southwest would have the advantage of increasing the attack period by $1\frac{1}{2}$ days. It would however be possible, with ice conditions as they are at present, for the convoy to evade such a position, as happened in the case of the last PQ convoy, where enemy aircraft and search groups were sent ahead to locate our U-boat positions. Consequently air reconnaissance would be necessary, and QP convoys would have to be initially intercepted exclusively by the Air Force.
3. Probable numbers of boats available are as follows:

At operational readiness: 17 January: 10;
24 January: 11; 30 January: 14; 7 February: 15. Moving the U-boat position would necessitate that 9 - 10 boats are always at sea. This would make continuous heavy demands on our available forces and supplies. We must take into consideration unforeseen damage to boats (e.g. U 703, U 711, U 713).
4. In our opinion therefore, it would be inadvisable to place our U-boat position near Jan Mayen, since it is known from experience that the boats would there have to contend with

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strong enemy air reconnaissance as well as with attacks from aircraft based on Iceland. Moreover the patrol line might be endangered by flank attacks from search groups.

5. If the patrol line is to be moved, a line from AB 4856 to 8814 is considered acceptable.

(Signed) Peters.

15 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 739 AB 6234)
U 716 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 425 AB 6644)
U 965 AB 6678)
U 601 AB 6943)
U 956 with "Hessen" from AB 19 to AB 9665.

In port:

U 636, 737, 957 Narvik,
U 277, 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 355 Bergen,
U 312, 703 Kristiansand (South).

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 387 proceeding from Trondheim to Bergen.
U 278 proceeding from Narvik to AB 6268
via AB 6540.
U 314 put in to Hammerfest at 1600.
U 312 put out from Kristiansand (South)
for Bergen at 0800.
U 703 put out from Kristiansand (South)
for Kiel at 1210.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88, route
Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak.
Nothing to report.

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Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88, route Vaernes - AB 7763 - Vaernes. Reconnaissance area 20% covered. No enemy sighted.
1 Ju 88 over the Faeroes sea area, no enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Britain: no units or warships appeared. Radio traffic with Britain: very little Archangel broadcast, no Murmansk broadcast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" (6 boats) west of Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 956 (Mohs) reported (on request) by short report 1237/784 that his position is AB 6382.

According to this, he has covered, with "Hessen" in tow, about 270 miles at a speed of 3.6 knots during the last 76 hours.

This still leaves about 180 miles to the coast. The weather is at present comparatively calm, although there is a possibility of squalls.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 716 (Dunkelberg) received orders in radio message 1355/791, to return to Hammerfest via AB 6390 to replenish supplies, when he has been relieved by U 278 (Franze).

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V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re IV b):-

U 716 (Dunkelberg) and U 314 (Basse) should be kept at operational readiness in Hammerfest after replenishing supplies and after minor repairs.

As soon as three more boats are available, it will become possible to move the U-boat patrol line forward to the southwest in the direction of Jan Mayen.

(Signed) Peters.

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APPENDIX II

Short reports

1. Short report from U 354 (Herbschleb), seventh operation.
2. Short report from U 387 (Büchler), fourth operation.
3. Short report from U 956 (Mohs), third operation, broken off.
4. Short report from U 601 (Hansen), eighth operation.
5. Short report from U 277 (Lübsen), fourth operation.
6. Short report from U 957 (Schaar), first operation.

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APPENDIX II/1

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 354 (Herbschleb), seventh operation

- 7 December Put out from Hammerfest, put in to Narvik on 1 January 1944.
- From Attack areas southeast of Bear Island.
8 December
- From Proceeding westwards via AB 6275 to
23 December AB 5693 in patrol line.
- From Operated against convoy in the area
25 December south of Bear Island, until 26 December in AC 4259. From there proceeded in search line from AC 4685 to 5776 (Scharnhorst). No survivors sighted in the high seas (seaway 8).
- From Proceeded to patrol line AC 5833 and
28 December returned to Narvik from there on 28 December via AC 5450 and AC 4450 because of damage to radio installation.
- 18 December At 1600, in AC 4385, visibility 1,000 m., sighted red rocket and gunfire about 15 kilometers off. A search group of 2 patrol vessels according to a hydrophone bearing. 31 depth charges after hydrophone hunt. Surfaced and crash-dived again from a patrol vessel with infra-red location.
- 26 December Land plane in AC 4184, type not identified.
- 26 December Crash dived in AC 4256 from a destroyer 1,500 m. off, dead ahead.

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Suggestions:

1. Stronger aerial leads and connections.
2. Ready-made reserve flex with insulation and fittings which need only be screwed into position.
3. Independant wiring system from the bridge down to the radio cabin so that even if all the aerials have short-circuited through the boat, an emergency aerial can be rigged up even in heavy seas.

Captain U-boats Norway, Most Secret 31 A Ops.

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APPENDIX II/2

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 387 (Büchler), fourth operation

- 7 December Put out from Hammerfest, 5 January, 1944
put in to Narvik. Proceeded via
AC 4280 to attack area AC 4123. No
enemy sighted.
- Attack areas against PQ convoy:
- 18 December AC 4355.
- 19 December AC 4123, via 4246 to 4156.
- 21 December AC 1738.
- 24 December Via AB 6162 to patrol line from
AB 5622 to 9136, as fleet number 2.
- 25 December Operated on report of convoy in AB 6720,
course 60°. Nothing sighted.
Hydrophone gear out of order.
- 26 December Patrol line from AC 1778 to 4734,
fleet number 2. Operated on report
of convoy in AB 6365.
- 26 December At 1405 in AC 4153 2 patrol vessels
(our own ?) on varying courses.
No anti-submarine measures, contact
lost.
- 27 December Fruitless search for survivors of the
"Scharnhorst" in AC 49 and 57.
- 28 December Patrol line via AC 6177 to 5858, as fleet
number 7, to patrol line AC 6177 to 5838,
as fleet number 6. Operated on sighting

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report from "Schaar" in AC 5637, nothing sighted.

29 December In patrol line AC 6965 to 6844, as fleet number 6.

31 December In patrol line AC 9597 to 9477, as fleet number 6.

1 January At 0820 operated on report of the enemy in AC 4977 from "Hansen"; at 1200 on report of the enemy in AC 9413 from "Lübsen". Nothing sighted.

1 January Proceeded via AC 6776, 5836, 4667, 4790 to Andfjord - Harstad - Narvik.

Total days at sea during third and fourth operations: 76.

One day in between for replenishing supplies at Hammerfest.

Captain U-boats Norway, Most Secret, 80 A Ops.

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APPENDIX II/3

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters.
6. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 956 (Mohs), third operation,
broken off

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| 28 December | Put out from Bergen, 7 January, 1944,
put in to Narvik. |
| 1 January | Attack area AB 5584. |
| 3 January | AC 4143, depth of sweep 30 miles. |
| 3 January | Operated on report from U 360
(Becker), hydrophone bearing 250°,
in AB 6628. |
| 4 January | In patrol line AB 7321 to 8472.
No enemy sighting report. |
| 6 January | Began return passage to equip
with T 5 torpedoes. |
| 7 January | Put in to Harstad. |

Captain U-boats Norway Most Secret,
106 A Ops.

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APPENDIX II/4

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 601 (Hansen), eighth operation

- 18 December Put out from Trondheim, 7 January 1944 put in to Narvik. Proceeded via AC 45 to attack area AC 4468, joining group "Eisenbart".
- 23 December AB 6573.
- 24 December AB 6727 in patrol line.
- 25 December At 0900 passed over by PQ convoy in AB 6727. Contact maintained from 1035 in AB 6724 till 1410 in AB 6496; according to dead reckoning, convoy course 60°, speed 9 knots, according to last sighting easterly course. Southwesterly gale, poor visibility. Contact lost. Last hydrophone bearing at 1636 in AB 6576.
- 26 December Operated at 0945 on message from "Lübsen" reporting convoy in AB 6365, course east. No contact made, proceeded to AC 5171, broke away from patrol line at 2015. Proceeded at maximum speed to AC 4940, to join in systematic search by group "Eisenbart" for survivors of the "Scharnhorst".
- 27 December Search abandoned at 1805. Proceeded to AC 5676, patrol line.
- 28 December At 2200 operated on message from "Schaar" reporting convoy in AC 5637, course southeast, speed 7 knots.

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- 29 December Proceeded to AC 6864, patrol line at 1300.
- 30 December Proceeded to AC 9497, patrol line, at 2000.
- 1 January At 0815 patrol vessel in AC 9485, probably a corvette, gunfire about 8.8 cm., circling shot from tube V, preliminary run 1000 m., tube-runner, missed. Submerged, 5 inaccurate depth charges, noise band on a true bearing of 250° without variation, presumably convoy. A search to the south showed sea area to be clear. Operated on message from "Lübsen" at 1300 reporting the same westbound convoy in AC 9413 proceeding at a cruising speed of 11 knots. No contact since 1700, proceeded to patrol line I, AC 6791.
- 2 January At 0600 proceeded to AC 5672, patrol line II.
- 3 January At 0900 operated on a message from "Becker", group "Isegrimm" hydrophone bearing on convoy in AB 6628, westerly course. At 1815 group "Eisenbart" discontinued, proceeded to attack area AC 4484.
- From 5 January 0100, patrol in attack area AC 4484.
- 6 January At 0800 started return passage to Andfjord. No location, no infra-red location, no enemy air activity. Quadruplet (torpedo tubes) damaged by choppy seas. Covers and rods broken off, unserviceable through icing up. Captain reported heeling up to 60° in sea 7 - 9.

Captain U-boats Norway, Most Secret 121 - A 01

APPENDIX II/5

COPY

Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret

Short report from U 277 (Lübsen), fourth operation

- 23 December Put out from Hammerfest. 6 January, 1944, put in to Hammerfest, 10 January put in to Narvik.
- 24 December Proceeded to patrol line from AB 5622 to AB 9136. Group "Eisenbart".
- 25 December Operated against PQ convoy.
- 26 December At 0925 in AC 4421 convoy, course 90°, distance 3,500 m. - 4,000 m. Driven off by destroyers with gunfire. Contact lost owing to weather conditions and poor visibility.
At 1245 in AC 4158 numerous explosions ("Scharnhorst" action?).
At 1430 in AC 4272 hydrophone bearing on destroyer, pursued it in southerly direction.
From 1630 to 1830 in AC 4285 heavy gunfire, star shells and anti-aircraft fire on 130° - 170°. Operated on this ("Scharnhorst" action).
From 1855 to 1907, 6 loud explosions on a true bearing of 162°. Probably torpedoes. After this broke off because distance was too great, and operated against convoy to the north.
- 27 December Fruitless search for survivors from the "Scharnhorst", very poor visibility, sea 7.

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27 December
to
1 January, 1944

Proceeded in patrol line from
AC 5858 to AC 6844 and AC 9477.

1 January

At 0945 destroyer in AC 9417.
Attempted radio traffic.
Hydrophone contact with 2 destroyers
and one fast vessel (120
revolutions) on a northerly course.
Large high searchlight. Contact
on and below surface until 1700.
Enemy destroyer made morse signals
to us twice more with a search-
light. Then location.

1 January
to
3 January

Proceeded via 3 position lines to
attack area AC 4735.

6 January

At 0800, return passage.

9 January

At 0900 sank a drifting mine,
mark XIV, in AC 5995.

Experiences:

Difficulties in obtaining fixes and
very bad weather conditions (average
condition, sea 6 and wind 6-7) had
a considerable effect on the operation.

Captain U-boats Norway, Most Secret
137 - A Ops.

APPENDIX II/6

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 957 (Schaar), first operation

- 14 December 1943 Put out from Kiel for Bergen via Kristiansand, 21 December put out from Bergen, 12 January, 1944 put in to Narvik.
- 22 December to 10 January Operation against PQ convoy, in patrol line group "Eisenbart" grid squares AB and AC. No enemy air activity.
- 27 December Fruitless search for "Scharnhorst" survivors, in very poor visibility and heavy seaway.
- 28 December At 2200, in AC 5637, vessels at 3000 m. distance making infra-red locations, was driven off. At 2219 fired T 5 torpedo from stern. 11 minutes later, loud explosions astern, no visual observation was made, withdrew. At 2243 fired T 5 torpedo from bow at pursuing destroyer, distance 1200 m. Crash-dived. Explosion after 3.5 minutes. Boat descended to 2A + 40. Eleven minutes after firing of second torpedo a third loud explosion with hissing and gurgling noises. At A + 60 hydroplane motor in bow broke down, 6 tons water and fuel in the boat. Re-loaded tube 5. Surfaced after noise of screws had ceased. Oil patches and strong smell on the surface. Probably sank one destroyer and made one other hit. No further contact owing to poor

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visibility and compass failure.
During crash-diving after explosion bow-cap jammed open. Torpedo, T 1, F.A.T. 1, crushed balance chamber. The T 5 torpedo used for reloading unserviceable owing to flooding of motor compartment. Breakdowns during operation:- rod aerial broken, bow hydroplane motor waterlogged, one 2 cm. twin mounting broken, "Naxos" dipole and echo sounder failed, 3 bridge belts broken.

10 January At 1200 began return passage via Harstad.

Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret, 160 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX III

Sailing orders

1. Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs).
2. Transfer order for U 601 (Hansen).
3. Sailing order for U 278 (Franze).

APPENDIX III/1

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 8 January, 1944.

Most Secret

Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs)

1. Put out from Narvik on the afternoon of 8 January to take on torpedoes at Ramsund. Report by time short signal on 479 kc/s when ready to put out from there.
2. Proceed at once via Tjeldsund to Andfjord, from Lodingen to Harstad with district pilot, at maximum cruising speed.
3. Continue third operation. Proceed to relieve U 957 (Schaar) in attack area AB 6268, depth of sweep 25 miles, group "Isegrimm". Nine-hourly north and southward movements within the attack area.
4. Operational Order for Northern Waters U-boats No. 1, Northern Waters wave. Radio silence except for reports of tactical importance. Use short signals for preference. Pay attention to routines on group wave length.

(p.p.) Reche.

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APPENDIX III/2

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 9 January, 1944

Most Secret

Transfer order for U 601 (Hansen)

1. Put out from Narvik on the afternoon of 10 January via Ramsund. Proceed through Tjeldsund - Finnsnesrennen, from Lødingen to Tromsø with district pilot. From Tromsø with escort to Hammerfest. Make fast at "Black Watch".
2. U-boats' Northern Waters wave. Report arrival at Lødingen by time short signal on 470 kc/s.
3. Five-hours' readiness at Hammerfest. Ensure receipt of radio messages on U-boat wave.
4. Approaches by hydrophone:
 - a) "Luchs 1" approach on the surface.
 - b) At "Luchs 2" announce passing six hours in advance by time short signal with addition "two".
 - c) "Luchs 3" only on special instructions from A 1 Admiral Polar Coast. Then short signal accordingly.

(p.p.) Reche.

APPENDIX III/3

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 13 January, 1944.

Most Secret

Sailing order for U 278 (Franze)

1. Put out from Narvik at 2200 on 13 January.
2. Proceed via Tjeldsund to Andfjord, from Lodingen to Harstad with district pilot.
3. Relieve U 716 (Dunkelberg) in attack area AB 6268, depth of sweep 25 miles, at 0000 on 16 January. Proceed via AB 6540. At 0300 start from southern limit nine-hourly movements within the attack area, i.e., be at northern limit at 1200, etc. Irregular courses.
4. Operational Order No. 1. U-boats' Northern Waters wave.
5. It may be expected that PQ convoys will run approximately once every fortnight. The last PQ convoy sailed from 23 to 31 December, 1943.
6. Our own forces:

Group "Isegrimm": U 739 (Mangold) AB 6534, U 716 (Dunkelberg) AB 6268, U 360 (Becker) AB 6533, U 425 (Bentzien) AB 6644, U 965 (Ohling) AB 6678, U 601 (Hansen) AB 6943, all depth of sweep 25 miles, regular north and southward movements within the attack areas.
U 956 (Mohs) proceeding from AB 52 to AB 9665 with trawler in tow.
U 314 (Basse) on return passage to Hammerfest via AB 6330.
Daily meteorological reconnaissance by Ju 88 to Spitsbergen. Further air activity will be announced.
7. Probable ice limit: AB 3260 - 3660 - 3940 - 6330 - AC 1770 - 1950.
8. U-boats which are near the enemy will send "flying weather" for the operation of the German Air Force by short signal, as follows:-
 1. The boat with the lowest fleet number will transmit, without being previously requested, between 0300 and 0400. If it fails to do so, the next boat will.

2. Transmission on request.

Form of short signal: 2 three-figure groups.
The groups comprise: first figure, visibility in miles, second figure, wind 1 (= NE) to 8 (= N), third figure, wind strength. Fourth figure (second group), cloud base in 100 meters, fifth figure, type of showers: 1 rain, 2 snow, 3 soft hail, sixth figure, incidence of showers in 10 per cent.

Example:

941 equals "visibility 9 miles, wind south, 1".
126 equals "cloud base below 100 m., snowshowers 60%".
In case of low-lying fog the second group is reduced to 2 figures.

Peters.

APPENDIX IV

COPY

Teleprinter message: Emergency Group North/Fleet.

Yellow - Most Secret

With reference to operations against PQ convoys the following report is submitted:

1. Captain U-boats, Norway considers that the continuous occupation of the Bear Island passage by 6 boats is the maximum which can be achieved in order to ensure that there will always be an adequate number of U-boats in readiness at Hammerfest, in case of the approach of convoys. This opinion is shared here.
2. These boats will, of necessity, have to be drawn up in the area of the Bear Island passage and up to 100 miles west of it, if it is to be avoided that convoys can circumnavigate the U-boat position in the open sea. A position one of whose flanks is based on Jan Mayen has proved unsuccessful, since the boats are there quickly intercepted by enemy air reconnaissance and attacked by aircraft and submarines. (This is the probable cause of the loss of U 644 (Jensen).)
3. Consequently PQ convoys are intercepted by the U-boats relatively late so that boats newly brought up can only join in the attack east of the Bear Island passage. However, it is of the greatest importance that the time available for attacks shall be as long as possible, particularly as long as the Air Force remains without bomber squadrons.
4. For these reasons it is considered essential that Luftlotte 5 should, if at all possible, resume its daily reconnaissance of the sea area Iceland/Jan Mayen, in order to intercept PQ convoys as early as possible. Failing that, a reconnaissance should be flown on alternate days and reinforced as soon as reports of a PQ convoy begin to accumulate.
5. It is requested to restore the old and well-tried method of command at Luftflotte 5 so that reconnaissance of, and attack on, convoys will again be under the command of Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten for the entire period of an operation. The best and quickest communications exist with Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten, and at the same time, the advantages of a unified air force command would be obtained.

Any bomber squadrons which may once more be allocated to Northern Waters should also be placed under his command.

Admiral Northern Waters, 69 A 1.

APPENDIX V

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
2. Admiral Northern Waters.
3. Emergency for information Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
4. Emergency for information Naval War Staff, 2nd Div.,
C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
5. Emergency for information Admiral Commanding U-boats.
6. Immediate for information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
7. Immediate for information 13th U-boat Flotilla.
8. Immediate Naval Chief Command, Norway.

Clear as multiple address message

Most Secret

U-boat situation in Northern Waters as of
6 January, 1944

1. Six boats patrolling Bear Island passage, all equipped with "Borkum" and "Naxos", and "Zaunkönig" acoustic torpedoes. In attack areas at intervals of 22 miles.
2. At present U 601 (Hansen) and U 956 (Mohs) are putting in to Narvik to take on T 5 torpedoes. Subsequently they will be held in readiness at Hammerfest.
3. Overhauls in dock are being started on U 354 (Herbschleb) at Trondheim, U 387 (Büchler) at Bergen, U 277 (Lübsen) at Bergen, U 636 (Hildebrandt) at Narvik.
4. The following are coming up from the south to join Captain U-boats' forces:- U 278 (Franze), U 739 (Mangold), both to be kept in readiness at Hammerfest.
5. Dock repairs completed:- U 703 (Brünner) on 10 January, U 737 (Brasack) on 12 January.
6. On 12 January U 957 will be withdrawn to dock for a short period at Narvik.
7. At operational readiness in northern Norway (including the six boats in the Bear Island passage):-
On 10 January: 8 boats, apart from 3 boats now approaching from the south.
On 15 January: 10 boats, apart from 1 boat approaching from the south.
On 20 January: 12 boats.

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8. Newly allocated U-boats which are still in home ports have not been taken into consideration, as their time of arrival cannot yet be estimated.
9. Boats with torpedo mine equipment: Up till now U 601 (Hansen), U 636 (Hildebrandt). Newly equipped: U 956 (Mohs), U 957 (Schaar), U 965 (Ohling), U 990 (Nordheimer).

Captain U-boats Norway, 77 - A Ops.

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WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

16 - 31 JANUARY, 1944

PG/31851

16 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrim":

U 739 AB 6234)
U 278 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533)
U 425 AB 6644) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 965 AB 6678)
U 601 AB 6943)
U 956 with the "Hessen" from AB 6580
to AB 9662.

In port:

U 314 Hammerfest,
U 636, 737, 957 Narvik,
U 277, 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 355 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 737 put out from Narvik for the west at 2200.
U 277 put out from Trondheim for Bergen (via
inner leads).
U 387 put in to Bergen from Trondheim at 2230.
U 312 proceeding from Bergen to Kristiansand
(South).
U 716 put in to Hammerfest at 2345.
U 703 proceeding from Kristiansand (South)
to Kiel.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on armed reconnaissance of mine-swept
channel and straits: no traffic observed.
4 BF 109 on meteorological reconnaissance and
fighter thrust in Murmansk - Kola area.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance,
Vaernes - AF 1133 - Vaernes. Route 70% covered.
Enemy not sighted.
1 Ju 88 in Faeroes sea area, enemy not sighted.

Teleprinter message received from Luftflotte 5:

"C-in-C of the German Air Force, Operational Staff
has ordered Luftflotte 5 to state its attitude to
the proposal of Naval War Staff, that the Air

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Force should again fly a regular convoy reconnaissance in the Northern area in order to relieve the U-boats. Luftflotte 5 is ready, in principle, to do this, but in practice can only comply with the request if further forces and fuel are made available. Without these further reconnaissance cannot be carried out. An application for additional forces has therefore been submitted to the C-in-C of the German Air Force by Luftflotte 5."

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations:

Agent of G.I.S. Station, Denmark reported from Reykjavik:

"Danish boatman stated that his tanker, after discharging its cargo, is to put out in convoy on 20 January. Tried to obtain confirmation. However, all I learned was that a convoy is to put out at about the given date."

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" (6 boats) west of Bear Island passage.

- (c) Special operations by single boats:

U 956 (Mohs), with the meteorological ship "Hessen" in tow, reported that he will be off point "Hans" at 1100 on 17 January. A rendezvous at sea with an R-boat and a tug, preferably 2 hours earlier, has been arranged.

- (d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 737 (Brasack), (see Appendix III/1).

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

I consider it necessary that the present ice limit southeast, east and north of Jan Mayen should be accurately determined, before the transfer of the U-boat patrol line to the southwest takes place. If the disposition of our U-boats could be made

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to adjoin the ice limit, PQ convoys would find it difficult to evade our U-boats to the north. The air reconnaissance reports on this matter are incomplete and inaccurate. U 737 (Brasack) is therefore to carry out ice reconnaissance.

(Signed) Peters.

17 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 739 AB 6234)
U 278 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 425 AB 6644)
U 965 AB 6678)
U 601 AB 6943)

In port:

U 314, 716 Hammerfest,
U 636, 957 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 355, 387 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 312 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand (South) at 1500.
U 703 put in to Kiel from Kristiansand (South) at 1400.
U 277 proceeding from Bergen to Trondheim.
U 737 proceeding from Narvik to Jan Mayen.
U 956 put in to Tromsø at 2130 with meteorological survey ship "Hessen".

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, course Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak. Not exhaustive, nothing to report. Owing to weather conditions no ice sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, course Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. Reconnaissance area 25% covered, enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 in sea area of the Faeroes, enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

14 January to 15 January an unidentified vessel (0443 possibly an ice-breaker) in the Matochkin Straits area according to radio traffic. Was in radio communication with Cape Vikhodnoi.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" (6 boats) west of Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 956 (Mohs) and the meteorological survey ship "Hessen" were met by escorts at 0930 off approach point "Hans". "Mohs" received orders to put in to Narvik.

V. Reports of successes:

U 956 (Mohs) has towed into port a meteorological survey ship (105 G.R.T.) over a distance of 420 miles.

VI. Survey of the situation:

As far as can be judged, U 956 (Mohs) has carried out his operation with great skill and seamanship.

After replenishing supplies and a short overhaul, the boat is to join group "Isegrimm".

(Signed) Peters.

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18 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 739 AB 6234)
U 278 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533)
U 425 AB 6644) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 965 AB 6678)
U 601 AB 6943)

In port:

U 314, 716 Hammerfest,
U 636, 957 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 312, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 956 put out from Tromsø for Narvik at 0630,
put in to Narvik at 1700.
U 277 put in to Bergen from Trondheim at 1830.
U 737 proceeding from Narvik to Jan Mayen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, course
Vaernes - AB 7711 - Vaernes.

Reconnaissance area 60% covered. Enemy not
sighted.

1 Ju 88 in sea area southwest of the Faeroes.
Enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

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(d) By radio intercept service:

16 January:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardship No. 81, guardboat No. 625.
Matochkin Straits area: one unidentified vessel (443) probably an ice-breaker.
Britain: no units or warships appeared.
Radio traffic with Britain: little Murmansk, very little Archangel broadcasts.

17 January:

Russia: 17 January at 0218 and 0233 Belushya transmitted 2 most urgent radio messages to Archangel.
Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Iokanka area: guardship No. 80, minesweepers Nos. 33, 53.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardship No. 81, minesweepers Nos. 31, 61.
Britain: no units or warships appeared.

18 January:

At 0500 Sosnovets light switched on.
(Shipping movements Gorlo Straits - AW 2895.)
Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Iokanka area: guardships Nos. 77, 80, minesweepers Nos. 31, 61, motorboat "PS 48".
Britain: one unit (1250) located by direction finder in AF 7921.
Britain: no units or warships appeared.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" (6 boats) west of Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 956 (Mohs) put in to Narvik after bringing meteorological survey ship "Hessen" in.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 314 (Basse), first operation, (see Appendix II/1).

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A teleprinter message has been received from U 314 (Basse) containing the ordered ice report and a report on the recently tried system of radio beacons:

- "1. Drift-ice limit on 14 January from northwest to southeast past Bear Island. South coast of Bear Island ice-free. Southernmost point of ice limit 15 miles southeast of Bear Island.
2. Report on radio beacons: Audibility of radio beacons generally 3 to 4. Minimum 1 - 2 degrees. Despite that, radio beacons on two cross bearings from two transmitters, are as much as 60 miles out; this becomes immediately apparent where plottings from 3 transmitters show a large triangle of error. With a small triangle the margin of error is about 15 miles. Directional deflections and twilight effects occur. Personal opinion: If boats have been without a fix for a long time, radio beacon bearings must be taken from 3 or 4 transmitters; this would still allow an error of 15 miles. There must be accurate data on which to base the fix, otherwise useless."

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III.c):-

The urgent radio messages along the Murman coast may be connected either with Russian M.T.B. activity or operations against the Norwegian coast.

2. Re VI:-

In taking radio bearings from U-boats errors occur due to pitching in rough seas. If the auxiliary aerial is iced up, the sense finding is often made more difficult in obtaining bearings on radio beacons while at sea. However, in dry, calm weather conditions the range at which vessels can take bearings amounts to 100 miles, in the case of powerful coastal radio beacons it may be over 300 miles. Thus effective navigational aid can be given to boats trying to establish their positions.

Observations made so far must be considered as provisional. It remains to gather further experience.

(Signed) Peters.

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19 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 739 AB 6234)
U 278 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533)
U 425 AB 6644) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 965 AB 6678)
U 601 AB 6943)
U 737 ice reconnaissance Jan Mayen.

In port:

U 314, 716 Hammerfest,
U 636, 956, 957 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 277, 312, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, course Vaernes - AF 1248 - Vaernes. Route 60% covered. Enemy not sighted.
1 Ju 88 in sea area of the Faeroes. Enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Murmansk area: BO-boats Nos. 204, 206 with command station for boats; MO-boats Nos. 112, 113 with unidentified signal station in the Murmansk area.

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Tokanka area: guardships Nos. 20, 77, 80, 81, minesweepers Nos. 31, 53, 59, 61, 114.
Britain: no units or warships appeared.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" (6 boats) west of Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 737 (Brasack) on ice reconnaissance north of Jan Mayen.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

1. Short report from U 716 (Dunkelberg), first operation, (see Appendix II/2).

2. Short report from U 956 (Mohs), continuation of third operation, (see Appendix II/3).

VII. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

20 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 739 AB 6234)
U 278 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533)
U 425 AB 6644) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 965 AB 6678)
U 601 AB 6943)
U 737 ice reconnaissance Jan Mayen.

In port:

U 314, 716 Hammerfest,
U 636, 956, 957 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 277, 312, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

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(h) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 472 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel at 0345.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Fliieger Fuehrer North (East):

No operations reported.

Fliieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Fliieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AF 1667 - Vaernes. Enemy not sighted.
2 FW 200 on sea reconnaissance and reconnaissance of ice limit in Jan Mayen area as far as Denmark Straits. Route Trondheim - AA 9229 - AE 1274 - Trondheim - Vaernes. Enemy not sighted.
1 Ju 88 in Faeroes sea area. Enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See IV.b).

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russia: signal station Sosnovets (AW 2895) switched light off at 1900 and an unidentified signal station in the Ponoï area was to switch on light from 2100 to 2300. (Shipping movements in Gorlo Straits in northerly direction.)
Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
"7 22", "M 201" mentioned during the night of 19/20 January.
Iokanka area: guardship No. 77, minesweepers Nos. 31, 59, 62.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel: minesweepers Nos. 53, 114.
Britain: no units or warships appeared.
Radio traffic with Britain: very little Murmansk, no Archangel broadcast. At 0628 the Russian submarine "M 201" transmitted a most urgent radio message to the Staff of the Russian Northern Waters Fleet, Polyarno.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

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(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" (6 boats) west of Bear Island passage.

- - - - -

0340 Radio message 0120/722 from U 278 (Franze):

"In grid square 6256 thick periscope. No reply to sonic telegraphy recognition signal."

Whereupon, radio message 0422/733 was sent:

"Group "Isegrimm" report positions by short signal, in case "Franze" was sighting one of our own boats. Short signal "Yes" if further proofs of enemy submarine in own disposition."

No answer to this radio message, so that it must be supposed that there is an enemy submarine within our ranks.

Radio message 1425/778 to group "Isegrimm":

"1. From radio reconnaissance it appears probable that a Russian submarine is within our formation.

2. In addition to the present nine-hourly north- and southward movements, move attack areas at 0000 on 21 January 40 miles on course 240°, return at 1800, and so on every 18 hours, irregular courses. Thus at 1800 on 21 January all boats to be at northern limit of western attack areas."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 737 (Brasack) on ice reconnaissance north of Jan Mayen.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re IV.b):-

The urgent radio message of Russian submarine "M 201" could be connected with "Franze"'s sighting. In the past year the appearance of enemy submarines in our positions has frequently preceded the running of convoys. The shifting of our attack areas is intended to make it more difficult for the enemy to observe our disposition.

According to a G.I.S. station report, a convoy is to put out from Reykjavik on 20 January. A PQ convoy from there could be in the Bear Island passage in six days.

(Signed) Peters.

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21 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 739 AB 6234)
U 278 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533)
U 425 AB 6644) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 965 AB 6678)
U 601 AB 6943)
U 737 ice reconnaissance Jan Mayen.

In port:

U 314, 716 Hammerfest,
U 636, 956, 957 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 277, 312, 355, 387 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0015 U 472 put out from Kristiansand (South)
for Bergen.
1800 U 472 put in to Bergen.
2300 U 313 put in to Kristiansand (South)
from Kiel.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak.
Not exhaustive, nothing to report.
2 BF 109 on meteorological reconnaissance of area
Louchi - Boyarskaya - Engosero, nothing to report.
4 BF 109 on photographic reconnaissance of harbor
and airfield of Murmansk.
21 January: no sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, course
Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. Reconnaissance
area 60% covered, enemy not sighted.
1 FW 200 on reconnaissance of ice limit from
AE 1446 to southwest Denmark Straits, broken off.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Visual reconnaissance of Murmansk harbor
between Pinagori Point and Shavor Point:

5 merchant ships of 8,000 G.R.T. each,
10 merchant ships of 6,000 G.R.T. each,
5 warships, probably destroyers (aerial
photograph). Pinagori - Vaenga Bay,
10 merchant ships.

- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

1826

From a radio message to Naryan Mar (AU 1540) it appears that a minesweeper will reach the area of the Pechora Estuary about 20 January. A radio signal has confirmed air communications between Archangel and Belushya.
Norwegian polar coast: lively radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "M 201", "S 56" and "S 102" named. On the night of 20/21 January "S 56" and "S 102" each transmitted one most urgent message.
Murmansk area: MO-boats Nos. 114, 122.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: minelayer No. 53, guardships Nos. 615, 625.
Matochkin Straits area: 2 unidentified vessels, (0471, 0443) probably ice-breakers.
Britain: no units or warships appeared.
Slight Murmansk, no Archangel broadcast.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" (6 boats) patrol of Bear Island passage.

- - - - -

Radio message 1158/86 to U 737 (Brasack):

"After ice reconnaissance proceed to AB 64 at increased speed."

"Brasack" is to relieve U 360 (Becker) in group "Isegrimm", so that this boat can put in to Hammerfest for replenishing supplies.

- (c) Special operations by single boats:

No report yet from U 737 on the ice limit near Jan Mayen.

- (d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 312 (Nikolay):

1. Put out from Bergen on 22 January.
2. Proceed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast to AB 89. Observe current order

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No. 13 until reaching 64° N, then proceed at increased speed on the surface.

3. Operational Order No. 1; radio service "Anton"; after report of passing 67° N U-boat Northern Waters wave.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re III.b):-

The merchant ships observed in Murmansk harbor evidently belong to the last PQ convoy.

Re IV.b):-

Even though the replenishing of U 314 (Basse) and U 716 (Dunkelberg) is being speeded up, and three new boats U 312 (Nikolay), U 472 (v.Forstner) and U 313 (Schweiger) are about to arrive from the south, and U 956 (Mohs), U 957 (Schaar) and U 636 (Hildebrandt) are only having a brief overhaul at Narvik, it will not be possible to have the minimum number of nine boats, which is required before group "Isegrimm" can be moved further west, at readiness before 25 January.

(Signed) Peters.

22 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 739 AB 6234)
U 278 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533)
U 425 AB 6644) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 965 AB 6678)
U 601 AB 6943)

In port:

U 314, 716 Hammerfest,
U 636, 956, 957 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 277, 312, 355, 387, 472 Bergen,
U 313 Kristiansand (South),
U 703 Königsberg.

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(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1700 U 472 put out from Bergen for AB 89.
0935 U 313 put out from Kristiansand (South)
for Bergen.
1200 U 313 put in to Kristiansand (South) owing
to bad weather.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak.
Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Vaernes - AB 7759 - Vaernes. Reconnaissance area
50% covered. Enemy not sighted.
1 FW 200 on reconnaissance of ice limit from
AE 1446 to southwest, including Denmark Straits.
3 FW 200 on reconnaissance in the Jan Mayen sea
area against the PQ convoy which is presumably
under way. Enemy not sighted.
1 Ju 88 in Faeroes sea area, enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

1537 "Boston" reported attack on a submarine at
1005 (no positional details).
On the night of 21/22 January, short signal
traffic of first priority between 7026, 707,
7076, 7085 (all unidentified) and Pummanki.
On the night of 21/22 January several very
urgent radio messages from Polyarno to all
destroyers.
21 January: light at Korabelni Point (AW 2918)
switched on till 2000 (shipping movements in
Gorlo Straits).
Norwegian polar coast: lively radio traffic
to submarines in the operational area. "M 201"
named, "L 22" intercepted while transmitting.
At 2150 very urgent short signal followed by a
very urgent radio message, and at 225(?) by a
radio message of first priority from Polyarno
to all submarines. At 2236 a very urgent
short signal from "L 22" to Polyarno.
Murmansk area: MO-boat No. 136.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: minesweepers
Nos. 21, 31.

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Britain: no units or warships appeared.
Radio traffic with Britain: very little
Murmansk, no Archangel broadcast.

22 January: At 1153 a radio message of first
priority from Polyarno to destroyer "C".

22 January: From 1008 to 1104 Polyarno sent
one urgent radio message each to all destroyers
and submarines, and 2 more to destroyer "K".

At 1315 radio message of first priority from
Polyarno to all submarines in the operational
area.

0044 A bomber reported at 1130: Have made attacks
on enemy U-boats, am returning.

0557 21 January: At 2318, 2333 and 2348, 7026 and
7076 (both unidentified) in short signal radio
traffic of first priority with each other and
Pummanki.

0557 Sosnovets light (AW 2895) switched on at 2330
on 21 January (shipping movements in Gorlo
Straits).

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" (6 boats) west of Bear
Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 737 (Brasack) on ice reconnaissance north
of Jan Mayen.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing orders for U 472 (v. Forstner) and
U 312 (Nikolay), to put out from Bergen on
22 January.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re III.d):-

The urgent radio traffic with Russian submarines
and destroyers is connected with one of our own
convoys on the Norwegian coast reported by
Russian aircraft.

(Signed) Peters.

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23 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 739 AB 6234)
U 278 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533)
U 425 AB 6644) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 965 AB 6678)
U 601 AB 6943)
U 737 ice reconnaissance Jan Mayen.

In port:

U 314, 716 Hammerfest,
U 636, 956, 957 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 277, 312, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 313 Kristiansand (South),
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0830 U 472 proceeding from Bergen to AB 89.
U 313 put out from Kristiansand (South)
for Bergen.
1530 U 312 put out from Bergen for Narvik.
1415 U 973 put in to Kristiansand (South)
from Kiel.
1415 U 990 put in to Kristiansand (South)
from Kiel.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Fliieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Fliieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Fliieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance in Jan Mayen area, broken off, 40% covered. Enemy not sighted.
2 Ju 88 and 1 FW 200 on sea reconnaissance against suspected PQ convoy.
1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of ships' berths in Shetlands, broken off. Enemy not sighted.
Meteorological reconnaissance of Faeroes area. Enemy not sighted.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

1137 Russian aircraft reported at 0910 an east-bound convoy near Nordkyn (AW 7358). This information was passed on to Russian Northern Waters stations including submarines in the operational area.

1524 From 1008 to 1153, several very urgent radio messages from Polyarno to all submarines and destroyers.
Norwegian polar coast: lively radio traffic to submarines in the operational area, "S 14" and "S 15" were named.
Murmansk area: motorboat "PS 48".
Britain: no units or warships appeared.
Radio traffic with Britain: very little
Archangel, no Murmansk broadcasts.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrimm" (6 boats) patrol of Bear Island passage.

- - - - -

Radio message 1433/704:

"1. "Brasack" to relieve "Becker" in attack area AB 6533, depth of sweep 25 miles. Movements in attack area according to radio message 1425 of 20 January. Report meeting by time short signal.

2. "Becker" then to return to Hammerfest via SR 1 at increased speed. Replenish to capacity, 5 hours' readiness."

- (c) Special operations by single boats:

From 0928 U 737 (Brasack) has been reporting the course of the ice limit by short signals: Jan Mayen passage ice-free up to 10° W.
AA 934 - 935 - 936 - AB 711 - 723 - 497 - 496 - 571 - 548 - 573 - 549 - 554.
The boat concluded its reconnaissance on reaching 73° N.

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(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 957 (Schaar), see Appendix III/2.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

24 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 739 AB 6234)
U 278 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533)
U 425 AB 6644) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 965 AB 6678)
U 601 AB 6943)
U 737 proceeding from Jan Mayen to relieve
U 360 (Becker).

In port:

U 314, 716 Hammerfest,
U 636, 956, 957 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 973, 990 Kristiansand (South),
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 472 proceeding from Bergen to AB 89.
U 312 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
U 313 proceeding from Kristiansand (South)
to Bergen.
0915 U 957 put out from Narvik for AB 6644
via AB 6820.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Fliieger Führer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak.
Nothing to report. Route not exhaustively
covered.

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Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AF 1219 - Vaernes, broken off. Reconnaissance area 60% covered. Enemy not sighted.

2 FW 200 on sea reconnaissance against suspected PQ convoy in Jan Mayen area. Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered by radar. Enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 in Faeroes sea area. Enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

2203

Norwegian polar coast: lively radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "S 15" named.

Murmansk area: BO-boats Nos. 210, 212.

Iokanka area: guardships Nos. 20, 77, 80, minesweeper No. 31.

Britain: no units or warships appeared.

Radio traffic with Britain: little Murmansk, no Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Isegrim" (6 boats) patrol of Bear Island passage, 2 boats proceeding there as reliefs.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 737 (Brasack) reported the last portion of the ice limit at 73° N about half way along a line connecting Jan Mayen and Bear Island. That is about 150 miles further east than was estimated.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III.b) and IV.b):-

Our own air reconnaissance has not yet intercepted the probably approaching PQ convoy.

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If one assumes that it put out from Reykjavik on 20 January, as reported, it ought to arrive in the Bear Island passage on 25 or 26 January.

2. Re IV.c):-

The position of the ice limit is exceptionally far east. This is no doubt due to the displacement of large drift-ice fields by strong and continuous northerly winds. The rapid movement of these ice fields must be expected. In any case the patrol areas should not be based on the present ice position but should be further to the southwest in the direction of Jan Mayen.

3. At 1200 on 25 January teleprinter message, Most Secret 257, on the U-boat situation in Northern Waters, was sent to Group North/Fleet and for information of Naval War Staff, 1st Division:

(1) 6 boats in Bear Island passage: U 278 (Franze), U 601 (Hansen), U 737 (Brasack), U 739 (Mangold), U 957 (Schaar), U 965 (Ohling).

(2) At operational readiness: 2 boats at Hammerfest: U 314 (Basse), U 716 (Dunkelberg); 1 boat at Narvik: U 956 (Mohs).

(3) Approaching from the south: U 472 (v. Forstner) approximately AF 26, U 312 (Nikolay) approximately AF 57, U 313 (Schweiger) Bergen, U 973 (Päpenmöller), U 990 (Nordheimer) Kristiansand (South).

(4) a. For replenishing and short overhaul in Hammerfest: U 360 (Becker).

b. Returning from Bear Island passage to Hammerfest for replenishing and short overhaul: U 425 (Bentzien).

c. U 636 (Hildebrandt) in Narvik: change of commanders.

(5) Because of the altered ice situation and the increase in the number of boats available, it is intended to move the U-boat formation of nine boats to a line from AB 4970 (next to the ice limit) to AB 8857 at 2000 on 25 January.

(Signed) Peters.

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25 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 739 AB 6234)
U 278 AB 6268)
U 360 AB 6533)
U 425 AB 6644) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 965 AB 6678)
U 601 AB 6943)
U 737 proceeding from Jan Mayen to attack
area to relieve U 360 (Becker).

In port:

U 314, 716 Hammerfest,
U 636 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 973, 990 Kristiansand (South),
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1700 U 472 put out from Bergen for AB 93.
U 312 put out from Bergen for AB 93.
U 313 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand
(South).
U 957 proceeding from Narvik to AB 6644
via AB 6820.
0700 U 956 put out from Narvik for AC 47.
1300 U 314 put out from Hammerfest for the
operational area.
1300 U 716 put out from Hammerfest for the
operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No operations owing to weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance
Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. Reconnaissance
area 60% covered. Enemy not sighted. Jan
Mayen unoccupied.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See IV.a).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1840 Jan Mayen unoccupied. Northeastern and central regions of Jan Mayen examined for occupation. Approached Southeast Cape at a height of 3,000 meters and proceeded at a distance of 10 km. from the east coast to Northeast Cape, meanwhile reducing height to 50 meters. From Northeast Cape along the northwest coast at a distance of about 4 km. to Brielle Tower. At Brielle Tower a single permanent hut. From Walrus Gat, south of Neumayerborg, via South Lagoon to Vogt crater, from there to "President's Cliff" and then out to sea. North of Jameson Bay 2 single permanent huts, about 1 km. apart. At Run Bay (south of Vogt crater) 2 huts or fixed wooden buildings as on anti-aircraft sites. In the total area covered no inhabitants seen. No anti-aircraft fire. Sites were shelled.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1445 Russia: at 2000 on 24 January Sosnovets light (AW 2895), at 2200 Danilov light (AW 2944), and at 0100 on 25 January the light of a further unknown signal station was switched on. (Shipping movements in Gorlo Straits, direction northeast.)
Norwegian polar coast: lively and sometimes urgent radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Murmansk area: minesweepers Nos. 112, 115.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: minesweeper No. 53, guardships Nos. 610, 615, 625.
Britain: no units or warships appeared.
Radio traffic with Britain: normal Murmansk, very slight Archangel broadcast.
0226 According to radio traffic at 1725 on 24 January a PQ convoy (callsign "AP") is probably in the North Cape area.
Convoy received radio message from British Admiralty for the first time on 17 January.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

0313 Group "Isegrimm" was informed by radio message 0313/731 that it is assumed that a PQ convoy is approaching the Bear Island passage.

0342 The boats approaching from the south, U 472 (v.Forstner) and U 312 (Nikolay), received orders in radio message 0342/693 to proceed to AB 93 at maximum speed.

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- 0328 Teleprinter message sent to Hammerfest with orders to effect 1-hourly readiness for boats U 314 (Basse) and U 916 (Dunkelberg) as quickly as possible.
- Radio message 0408/733 sent to boats U 360 (Becker) and U 425 (Bentzien) with instructions to occupy attack areas AB 6630 and 6690 immediately they are relieved by U 737 (Brasack) and U 957 (Schaar). In this way group "Isegrimm" will be strengthened in depth.
- When 8 boats had thus been placed in waiting positions in the Bear Island passage against the expected PQ convoy and 4 other boats were approaching or in readiness, and in addition U 956 (Mohs) was proceeding at increased speed from Narvik to the north, radio message 0958/736 was received from U 965 (Ohling):
- 1015 "AB 6675. Enemy sighted."
- As a PQ convoy is expected, it was assumed that this inexact report could only refer to an eastbound convoy.
- 1045 Radio message 1021/737 from "Ohling":
- "Destroyer on easterly course, high speed."
- 1105 Also radio message 1046/738:
- "Convoy on easterly course, moderate speed, AB 6683."
- 1119 In reply, radio message 1119/741 sent:
- "1. Group "Isegrimm" to operate on report of "Ohling", convoy in AB 6683, easterly course.
2. "Brasack", "Schaar", U 956 (Mohs) to join group "Isegrimm"."
- 1104 At the same time radio message 1104/772 sent to U-boat base Hammerfest:
- "U 314 (Basse), U 716 (Dunkelberg) put out immediately at maximum speed, join group "Isegrimm"."
- Thus 11 boats will operate on the PQ convoy.
- 1130 Short signal 1122/740 received from U 425 (Bentzien):
- "At 1100 several smoke clouds in sight in AB 6686."
- 1320 After "Ohling" and "Bentzien", U 601 (Hansen) too obtained contact. He reported in radio message 1229/744:

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"Smoke clouds in sight, AB 6913."

1340 Further short signal 1339/745 from "Bentzien":
"Convoy in AC 4471."

According to the two reports from "Bentzien", the convoy is on a course of about 80°. "Hansen"'s position is about 40 miles further back.

U 472 (v.Forstner), who is proceeding at maximum speed towards the Bear Island passage, received orders in radio message 1335/746 to operate against the convoy with group "Isegrimm" as twelfth boat.

1415 "Bentzien" reported in short signal 1411/747:
"Enemy proceeding eastwards, speed 9 knots."

1500 U 360 (Becker), the fourth boat, reported contact in short signal 1455/749:
"Two destroyers in AB 6656."

This grid square lies 25 miles northwest of the convoy position reported by "Bentzien" more than one hour ago. In spite of the daily radio beacons, one must always allow for a certain margin of error in estimated positions.

1635 "Hansen" reported in radio message 1410/750:
"In AB 6931 fired T5 torpedo from stern on pursuing destroyer, explosion heard."

1645 Radio message 1105/755 received from "Ohling":
"Forced to submerge by 2 destroyers: last convoy position grid square 6683. Easterly course, speed 10 knots. Fired "Zaunkönig" at destroyer. Torpedo explosion."

U 956 (Mohs), putting out from Andfjord for the PQ convoy reported temporary speed limitation. This boat and "v.Forstner" will probably not be able to reach the convoy until the day after tomorrow.

1650 Another boat, U 737 (Brasack), reported contact in radio message 1615/756:
"Destroyer AC 4449 - eastwards."

1720 "Bentzien" gave F.A.T. warning.

1745 "Becker" again reported in short signal 1737/761:
"Enemy in AB 4441."

Further, in short signal 1939/764, he reported the convoy's position in AC 4456. The convoy

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appears to have taken an easterly course.

2012 U 278 (Franze), the sixth boat to make contact gave F.A.T. warning.

2024 Radio message 2024/766 sent to group "Isegrim":

"Expect convoy to put in to Murmansk. Hence short duration of attack, make full use of contact and weather at an early stage."

2105 "Becker" also gave F.A.T. warning.

2150 He reported by short signal 2143/769 that the convoy is in AC 4541.

2200 U 737 (Brasack) reported in radio message 1756/768:

"Grid square 4491 after T5 torpedo miss on approaching destroyer, was passed over by two destroyers and a steamer. Easterly course."

2235 Yet another boat, U 957 (Schaar), gained contact with 2 destroyers in AC 4541.

2355 In radio message 2303/772 he reported one of these as "careened".

"Becker" again reported in short signal 2322/771:

"Enemy in AC 4543, speed 10 knots."

According to "Becker"'s reports the convoy has been proceeding exactly due east at a speed of 10 knots since this afternoon.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 636 (Hildebrandt), who is getting ready to put out from Narvik as quickly as possible, will probably not be able to reach the PQ convoy. He is to take up a position in the Bear Island passage with U 313 (Schweiger), U 973 (Päpenmüller) and U 990 (Nordheimer), the boats recently brought from the south, to lie in wait for the QP convoy which may be running at the same time.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

On instructions from Group North/Fleet to hold a boat in readiness for meteorological reconnaissance around Jan Mayen for operation "Waldesruh", radio message 1915/604 was dispatched:

"U 312 (Nikolay) break off, proceed to AB 71 as weather boat, maximum speed. Avoid ice damage in reconnaissance area. Report probable time of arrival by short signal."

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(d) Miscellaneous:

1. Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs), see Appendix III/3.
2. Sailing order for U 636 (Hildebrandt), see Appendix III/4.

V. Reports of successes:

At 1410 U 601 (Hansen) reported explosion heard after stern T5 torpedo on pursuing destroyer, AB 6931.

At 1105 U 965 (Ohling) reported torpedo explosion after firing "Zaunkönig" at destroyer in AC 6683.

At 2303 U 957 (Schaar) reported one destroyer careened in AC 4541.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1. On the basis only of today's report at 0226 from the Supreme Command's radio intelligence, and without being in possession of the later convoy report of 1105, it was to be expected that a convoy was about to pass the Bear Island passage. With 6 boats in the operational area it was hardly likely that the convoy had passed it already. It is most unfortunate that the date on which the convoy received its first radio message from the British Admiralty was only passed on to us in today's report, although it is several days old.

I do not know whether the radio reconnaissance could have obtained and transmitted the information of an approaching convoy earlier than it actually did. (Today is 25 January, the convoy received its first radio message on 17 January.) In any case conditions for attacking the convoy would have been more favorable, if there had been proper air reconnaissance and if the boats had been moved further to the southwest.

2. Of the 12 boats operating against the convoy, six have so far made contact with the enemy. With the present favorable weather conditions it is to be hoped that contact will be maintained throughout the night. We have no reports yet on the composition of the convoy, apparently our boats have only contacted the escorts so far; these seem to be numerous. On the other hand no carrier or other air cover has been observed, nor are there any indications of a cruiser group. The convoy will take about three days from Bear Island passage to Murmansk, so that early attacks on the escort and full use of the favorable weather and the contact made are desirable as soon as possible.

(Signed) Peters.

26 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrim":

U 278)
U 314)
U 360)
U 425)
U 601)
U 716) all in AC 40.
U 737)
U 739)
U 965)
U 957)

In port:

U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 255, 313, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 973, 990 Kristiansand (South),
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 312 proceeding from Bergen to AB 71.
U 472 proceeding from Bergen to convoy.
U 956 proceeding from Narvik to convoy.
0000 U 636 put out from Narvik for AB 65.
0745 U 973 put out from Kristiansand (South)
for Bergen.
0745 U 990 put out from Kristiansand (South)
for Bergen.
1800 U 313 put out from Bergen for AB 68.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Fan reconnaissance against PQ convoy by 3 BV 138 and 2 Ju 88. BV had nothing to report. 2 Ju 88 on ice reconnaissance of Gorlo Straits - Dvina Estuary. West Fairway ice-free. Fast ice between the islands off Archangel, no navigable channel observed.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 FW 200 on meteorological reconnaissance in sea area north of Iceland and Denmark Straits.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. Enemy not sighted. Reconnaissance area 20% covered.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See under IV.a).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 1325 in AC 8989 convoy, course 310°, 8 knots, 8 ships, 7 escorts. By visual reconnaissance in AE 2674 convoy, course 30°, speed 8 knots, 17 merchant ships, each 8-10,000 G.R.T.

1051 At 1027 convoy in AC 4666.

1225 At 1139 in AC 4666 convoy, course 90° true, 8 knots.
10 merchant ships in double line abreast, 2 destroyers ahead, and 1 corvette left ahead. Starboard 1 guardboat, port 1 guardboat, astern 1 corvette, 1 destroyer, 1 corvette.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1414 Switching on and off of Sosnovets (AW 2895) and Danilov (AW 2944) lights on 24 and 25 January, indicating shipping movements on northeasterly course in the Gorlo Straits.

0930 25 January shipping movements Gorlo Straits: Nikodimski Point (AW 5215) reported light operating at 1330.

0500 On 26 January, 0132 British unit (A) in radio communication with Murmansk located from Hammerfest in 75°, and by Air Force D/F station Swansik in 345°. (Position northeast of North Cape.)

2200 On 26 January at 1245 a British unit or warship intercepted during radio traffic with Polyarno. At 1338 a first priority radio message from Belushya (staff base Novaya Zemlya, AT 7234) to Archangel.

2200 On 26 January Russian destroyer "H" at sea according to radio traffic. At 0811 she received a very urgent radio message from Polyarno.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

Further reports received on the operation against "PQ 25":

0030 Radio message 2312/773 from U 425 (Bentzien):

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"At 1719 in AC 4492, 2 T5 torpedoes on destroyer, 1 tube-runner, 1 torpedo explosion heard on hydrophones. Depth charges for 3 hours, 44 cu.m. Am pursuing."

0025 Of the 2 boats which put out from Hammerfest, U 716 obtained contact, and reported the convoy in AC 4552 in short signal 0025/775.

U 360 (Becker) gave F.A.T. warning in short signal 0026/776.

0150 Radio message 0112/777 from U 957 (Schaar):

"2220, fired T5 torpedo. Running-time 2 minutes longer than first one fired on 28 December (= 13 minutes), position 80. Parts of wreckage. AB 6889 and 69, 3 drifting mines."

0255 U 314 (Basse), the second boat from Hammerfest, reported contact in short signal 0246/780.

Apart from the 2 boats U 472 (v.Forstner) and U 956 (Mohs) approaching from the west, only U 739 (Mangold) has not yet made contact. That is an indication of good visibility conditions and very exact positions of the boats and it is to be hoped that many of them will be able to attack.

0320 In short signal 0252/781 "Basse" reported the convoy in AC 4618.

0345 Radio message 0303/782 from "Schaar":

"Suspect part convoy on westerly course AC 4562."

0400 U 278 (Franze) reported "flying weather".

0425 Radio message 2012/784 from "Franze":

"Convoy in grid square 4572, about 10 Liberty ships in 3 lines ahead. Portside 6 escorts. Sank 7,000 tonner with fan of three. 1 bow T5 torpedo missed corvette. Stern T5 torpedo waterlogged through jamming of bow cap. Query: expulsion for recharging. 85 cu.m."

0500 "Becker" reported enemy in AC 4646, course 100°, in short signal 0442/785. At this point then at least 3 boats have contact.

0620 Radio message 0147/786 received from "Becker":

"At 1830 in AC 4451, one T5 torpedo hit on destroyer, 3 T5 misses, at 0016 in AC 4529 F.A.T. fan of three on convoy, 3 hits. 30 cu.m."

0810 Radio message 0227/790 received from "Schaar":

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"Naval grid square 4562: T5 torpedo on steamer, position 60, loud explosion, smoke development, later on sighted wreckage. Finishing shot missed, am submerging."

0837 Radio message 0603/789 received from U 716 (Dunkelberg):

"At 0020 fan of three on overlapping steamers, 7,000 tons each, in grid square 4552, course 90°, speed 8 - 9 knots. One premature explosion, after about 4 minutes 2 definite hits. Forced under water - depth charge. 0145 sinking noises."

0905 "Becker" reported in radio message 0636/793:

"Have contact, probably with starboard side-escort. AC 4664, fix inaccurate."

0920 "Becker" in radio message 0325/794 reported on his destroyer hit:

"T5 torpedo explosion aft, list increasing. Finishing shot F.A.T. 1, missed. Withdrew from second destroyer. Afterwards saw nothing at scene of attack."

0931 Radio message 0250/795 received from "Basse":

"Grid square 4618 2 T5 torpedoes on destroyer, 1 explosion heard after 3½ minutes. Escort: 3 destroyers ahead and 4 destroyers ahead to starboard. Several steamers in column formation."

0938 "Becker" reported in radio message 0705/792:

"Contact with destroyers lost, searching in southeasterly direction."

1015 According to a "flying weather" report from "Bentzien" visibility has deteriorated, 50% rain showers.

1015 "Hansen" reported in radio message 0940/797:

"1 land plane (our own) on northerly course in AC 4693."

As contact seems to have been lost at about 0700, the report just received from air reconnaissance, that the convoy is in AC 4666, was transmitted to the boats in radio message 1107/800:

1125 "Basse" too reported in short signal 1118/799:

"Contact lost."

After the new report from the air shadower, radio message 1149/703 transmitted:

"1. Air reconnaissance reported at 1105 convoy in AC 4666. 12 merchant ships in line abreast. Escort all-round screen, ahead 3 destroyers,

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starboard 4 destroyers, port 1 corvette,
2 destroyers, astern 1 destroyer.

2. Air Force sending bearings on "Bruno".

1200 Radio message 1047/701 from "Schaar":

"Grid square 4562 Liberty ship of 7,000 tons
sunk at 0653. 2 seamen picked up.
Prisoners' statements: 15 ships, of which
3 are tankers, with aircraft, tanks,
automobiles and first aid equipment on board.
About 15 destroyers, 10 corvettes, no air-
craft. Left Scotland for Murmansk on
8 January. Lifeboats escaping to southwest."

1208 U 965 (Ohling) reported in radio message
0912/702:

"Pursued by search group with depth charges
for six hours in AC 4538. Q-ship probable."

1243 He reported in radio message 1158/704:

"In AC 4629 approached by own BV. Almost
shot down."

The corrected air report on the composition
of the convoy was transmitted to the boats in
radio message 1249/706.

1307 Radio message 1307/707 sent:

"Group "Isegrimm" to report bearing of air
shadower at about 1200."

No replies received, apparently none of the
boats is within bearing range.

1408 Short signal 1355/708 received from "Bentzien":

"Convoy AC 5483."

This convoy position varies by 40 miles on
110° from the position reported by the air
reconnaissance at 1139. That implies a
fix difference of about 25 miles.

1425 Radio message 1425/711 sent:

"Convoy position AC 5483 reported by
"Bentzien" at 1355 is accepted as probable.
Speed by dead reckoning 9 knots."

Since, with the available radio beacons the
boats would not be able to check their
positions until 1200, it seemed safer to let
them operate on "Bentzien"'s report which
seemed more reliable than those of the air
reconnaissance which are known from
experience to be inexact.

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- 1502 To ensure that contact, regained by "Bentzien", should not be lost during the hours of darkness, "Bentzien" was requested to send direction finding signals, especially as the other boats must be assumed to be in his neighborhood.
- 1535 Teleprinter message 1355/710 received:
"Group "Isegrimm": I am certain that you will continue to do your utmost: remember your comrades on the Eastern front. Dönitz."
- 1630 "Bentzien" reported in radio message 1529/713:
"Convoy lost in rain at 1415. Aircraft signal not heard here."
- 1637 In reply radio message 1637/714 sent:
"Probable convoy course approximately AC 5820 - 8380 - Murmansk. Report other clues at once."
- 1712 Radio message to group "Isegrimm":
"In the event of no further contact or clues, proceed to patrol line from AC 5996 to 8215 at 1900. Order: "Mangold", "Franze", "Brasack", "Schaar", "Ohling", "Hansen", "Basse", "Dunkelberg", "Bentzien", "Becker". Be there at 2400. "v.Forstner" and "Mohs" are to extend the patrol line to southwest on arrival."
- 1800 Receipt of first report from U 739 (Mangold) in radio message 1630/715:
"On 26 January at 0400 two and one misses on stopped destroyer and freighter in AC 4567, then forced to submerge by escort. Lost during day owing to poor visibility; search courses fruitless. Presume damaged vessels. 75 cu.m. 8 torpedoes."
- 1845 U 737 (Brasack) reported in radio message 1658/718:
"According to hydrophone bearing, convoy position AC 555 or 553. Visibility very poor."
Radio message 1934/719 was therefore sent to group "Isegrimm":
"If no further clues apart from "Brasack"'s 1658/718, patrol line from AC 6477 to 5871. Be there at 2400. Order as in radio message 1712/716, "v.Forstner" and "Mohs" correspondingly. Radio message 1712 cancelled."

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The first patrol line was based on the suspected convoy route to Murmansk.

"Brasack"'s hydrophone bearing does not give sufficient detail to let the boats operate on it straight away. The patrol line was therefore moved only to the extent that the convoy as intercepted by hydrophone was further north than the suspected convoy route.

2137 Radio message 1914/720 received from "Brasack":

"Position 5584 hydrophone bearing 30° to 55° true, definitely several destroyers and steamers. Visibility improved."

"Brasack" seems to be quite certain about his observation. In order to let group "Isegrimm" operate as far as possible together and as one unit, orders were given in radio message 2206/721:

"Operate on "Brasack"'s report."

"Brasack" was ordered to send direction finding signals as soon as he obtained contact.

U 739 (Mangold) reported in short signal 2237/722, that he was lying 75 miles behind and could not therefore comply with the order.

2355 "Brasack" reported in radio message 2301/725:

"No further bearings. Am proceeding to patrol line."

Radio message 2355/728 was therefore sent to group "Isegrimm":

"If no contact or indications of the convoy by 0200, proceed at increased speed to patrol line from AC 9155 to 8215, old order. "Mohs" and "v. Forstner" to join the western end of patrol line."

In radio message 2358/729 the boats were also given the limits of the operation as determined by the declared mined area in front of Murmansk.

This third patrol line corresponds approximately to the position of the convoy at 0500 on its originally assumed course to Murmansk. If the convoy has followed a more southerly course, it should be re-intercepted by the U-boats while on their way to the patrol line. From his losses to date, it is to be expected that the enemy will attempt to reach the protection of the Russian coast as soon as possible.

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(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) has been ordered to join the position in the Bear Island passage against the expected westbound convoy (QP).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 312 (Nikolay) proceeding to Jan Mayen as weather boat.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 313 (Schweiger), see Appendix III/5.

V. Reports of successes:

Apart from yesterday's successes of two hits on two destroyers and one destroyer sunk, the following successes were reported today:-

U 425 (Bentzien) at 0030 in AC 4492, after firing T5 torpedo on destroyer, 1 explosion heard on hydrophones.

U 278 (Franze) at 2012 in AC 4572 fan of three: 1 7,000 tonner sunk, 1 steamer torpedoed.

U 360 (Becker) at 1830 in AC 4451 1 T5 torpedo hit on destroyer; at 0016 in AC 4529 F.A.T. fan of three on convoy, 3 hits.

U 957 (Schaar) at 0227 in AC 4562 T5 torpedo on steamer; loud explosion, smoke development, wreckage sighted, 2 prisoners taken.

U 716 (Dunkelberg) at 0020 in AC 4552 2 hits on overlapping 7,000 tonners, sinking noises.

U 314 (Basse) at 0250 in AC 4618 after T5 torpedo on destroyer, explosion heard.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III.b):-

The convoy off the Murmansk coast is obviously a group of steamers for the next return convoy (QP). Shipping through the Gorlo Straits to the north is further proof that a QP convoy is in preparation.

2. Re IV.a) to c):-

Teleprinter message dispatched to Naval War Staff, 1st Division, and Group North/Fleet:

Position as on 26 January, 2100.

(1) Continual contact with the PQ convoy during the day. Towards evening contact broken

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at times, owing to deterioration in weather. From 1930 only hydrophone contact (accurate) by "Brasack". Boats ordered to AC 5584 on this report.

- (2) Further plans if contact is lost: patrol lines across the approaches to Murmansk, to re-intercept the convoy there, as this is assumed to be its port of destination.
- (3) After this PQ convoy will have put in, it is not intended to wait for the returning QP convoy, but to operate all available boats against a further PQ convoy reported by air reconnaissance north of Iceland, as this is considered more important.
- (4) All 10 boats operating on the PQ convoy were able to attack. Result to date: 2 steamers, 1 destroyer probably sunk. In addition possibly 1 or 2 steamers and 4 destroyers sunk. 2 prisoners taken from 1 steamer.
- (5) The early release of U 312 (Nikolay) from his special operation at Jan Mayen has been requested so that he can join the operation against the new PQ convoy.

(Signed) Peters.

27 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 739)
U 278)
U 737)
U 957)
U 965) in patrol line from
U 601) AC 9155 to 8215.
U 314)
U 716)
U 425)
U 472)
U 956)

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In port:

U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 973, 990 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 312 proceeding from Bergen to AB 71.
U 636 proceeding from Narvik to AB 65.
0230 U 360 proceeding from AC 58 to Narvik.
U 973 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand
(South).
0230 U 990 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand
(South).
1530 U 973 put out from Bergen for AB 68.
1530 U 990 put out from Bergen for AB 68.
U 313 proceeding from Bergen to AB 68.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance,
route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak.
Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

AC 4568 lifebuoy with tent-like structure on top
and 2 shipwrecked men. In AC 4551 type of motor-
launch, abandoned, 3 light anti-aircraft guns.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See under IV.a).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on convoy reconnaissance. In AC 8651
a convoy, course 190°, speed 10 knots.
10 merchant ships each about 7,000 G.R.T.
2 tankers each about 5,000 G.R.T. 18 escort
vessels, among them 9 destroyers. Merchant
ships in two lines-abreast. Ahead 7 destroyers,
2 corvettes. Starboard 2 corvettes. Port 1
destroyer and 1 corvette. Astern 1 destroyer
and 1 corvette.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of inshore waters off
Murman coast: In AW 2350, 1 freighter of 500
G.R.T. In AW 2361 3 coastal vessels.

4 BF 109 on meteorological and visual reconn-
aissance of Murmansk harbor. 2 large merchant
ships of more than 5,000 G.R.T. making fast at
quay-side. From Pinagori Point to Vaenga Bay
15 large merchant ships of more than 5,000
G.R.T. each, hove to.

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Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 Ju 88 on reconnaissance to re-intercept convoy. Convoy found in AE 3354 at 1215, course 30°, speed 10 knots. 12 merchant ships up to 5,000 G.R.T. 2 merchant ships up to 8,000 G.R.T. 7 escort vessels (among them possibly 1 cruiser) in all-round screen. Formation: 4 lines-ahead. The outer lines each of 3 ships, the two inner ones each of 4 ships. Escort vessels in all-round screen. 1 vessel 2 kilometers ahead, 2 vessels 1 kilometer ahead. Last report from shadower gave course 5°, speed 10 knots.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1553 Shipping in Gorlo Straits, according to radio traffic at sea.
Murmansk area: destroyers "V" and "H".
On the night of 25/26 January warships in very urgent radio traffic with Murmansk.
British radio traffic: slight Murmansk, no Archangel broadcast.

0520 At 1529 very urgent radio message from Polyarno to submarine "M 119".

1005 British radio traffic with Murmansk increased considerably.
At 1925 very urgent message from Polyarno to submarine "M 119".

1110 At 0811, 1412 and 2040 very urgent radio messages from Polyarno to destroyer "H".
Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "M 119" named.
Britain: on 26 January British units and warships sent partly urgent radio messages to Polyarno.
Russian radio traffic: moderate.
British radio traffic: slight Murmansk, no Archangel broadcast.

1425 Varlamova at 1223 to aircraft: at 1047, submarine in 72° 26' N, 35° 10' E, course 140°.

1825 On 27 January probable British unit and warships in lively radio interchange with Murmansk.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

0139 "Becker" reported in radio message 2357/741 collision with "Hansen" in AC 5821. Apparently not serious, "Hansen" clear. In radio message 0230/734 "Becker" was ordered to return to Narvik and group "Isegrimm" to adjust the patrol line accordingly.

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- 0510 "Becker" reported that he was returning by way of the convoy route.
- 0652 U 957 (Schaar) reported 1 independently routed vessel in AC 5981 on southerly course, moderate speed.
- 0907 He reported contact lost.
- 0930 Telephonic advance report received from Flieger Fuehrer North (East), that the convoy is in AC 8651.
- 0950 Thereupon group "Isegrimm" was ordered in radio message 0937/741 to proceed to a patrol line from AC 8669 to 8279 at high speed. However, this order could no longer be carried out. From the air report it emerged that the convoy had not yet broken up.

There seems little point in waiting in the patrol line for possible stragglers. It is more important to proceed against the new PQ convoy, reported yesterday afternoon to be northeast of Iceland, in order to meet it as far west as possible. Comments on the situation, received from Group North/Fleet, express the same opinion.

- 1053 Radio message 1041/742 was therefore sent to group "Isegrimm":

"Break off operation and proceed to AB 65 via AC 49 at high speed. Boats with less than 60 cu.m. fuel to report by short signal."

In reply, reports were received from U 425 (Bentzien): 30 to 40 cu.m., and U 965 (Ohling): 30 to 40 cu.m.

Both these boats as well as U 957 (Schaar) and U 278 (Franze), which used up the most torpedoes, received orders in radio message 1459/751 to proceed to Hammerfest at high speed to replenish fuel and torpedoes immediately. Their immediate return to the operational area is intended.

In radio message 1705/754, U 360 (Becker) asked permission to go to Hammerfest in order to try to get clear tubes 1 and 2 with the help of a working party available there.

In radio message 1730/750, the boat was given the necessary permission and informed that the air reconnaissance had sighted a drifting raft with two men in AC 4551. He is to try to pick them up on the way in to port, but is not to spend a long time over this, as Captain U-boats is anxious to have the boat at his disposal again as soon as possible.

In radio message 1850/760, the boats were informed of the reason for breaking off the operation.

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For action against the new PQ 26 a new group "Werwolf" was formed.

1554

Radio message 1505/752 dispatched by Captain U-boats:

1. U 956 (Mohs), U 472 (v. Forstner), U 716 (Dunkelberg), U 314 (Basse), U 601 (Hansen), U 737 (Brasack), U 739 (Mangold) are to form a new group "Werwolf" in that order.
2. On 29 January at 0600, form patrol line from AB 5651 to 9155."

All boats were informed by radio message 1455/753, that on 27 January at 1215 a convoy was identified by the air reconnaissance in AE 3351, consisting of 14 merchant ships and 7 destroyers, course Bear Island passage.

In order to let one of the U-boats obtain contact with the convoy at the earliest possible moment, U 636 (Hildebrandt), which is in a favorable position, is to be sent to meet it. It is planned to place the boat in a position where, upon receipt of tomorrow's air report (which will arrive about noon), the boat will be near enough to the convoy to attach itself to it as a shadower while the daylight lasts.

Accordingly U 636 (Hildebrandt) was ordered in radio message 1359/748 to proceed to AB 8180 and be there at 1200 on 28 January.

It is desirable to let the newly formed patrol line advance against the enemy as soon as possible, for the earlier that contact is gained the larger will be the area over which the U-boats can launch their attack.

The boats were instructed accordingly in radio message 1846/759, and "Brasack", who is expected to be the last to arrive in the patrol line, was ordered to report his arrival there by short signal. Other boats are only to report if they are later in reaching their position. This somewhat complicated order was made so that only one boat will have to make use of its radio.

In order that U 313 (Schweiger) may, if possible, also become available for the attack on PQ 26, the boat received radio message 1525/614:

"While maintaining all precautions, continue to proceed on the surface. Make for AB 92 at maximum speed. Must be reached by 0800 on 29 January. At 70° N send second passage report by short signal of latitude."

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(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

See IV.a).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

In consequence of a direction from Group North/Fleet, the weather boat U 312 (Nikolay) obtained radio message 0803/739 from Captain U-boats - to be decoded only by "Nikolay":

"Make for AE 32 and 35 at increased speed, from there transmit one short weather report both morning and night at irregular times. Report ice, if any. PQ convoy expected to be approaching from the north of Iceland. Remain submerged in your position as much as possible. Attack on independently routed vessels forbidden."

(d) Miscellaneous:

1. Sailing orders for U 973 and U 990, see Appendix III/6.

2. For the boats in the south radio message 0807/740 sent on 600 m. band "Ulli" and "Anton":

From Captain U-boats, to be decoded only by U-boats:

"Until further orders attack on independently routed vessels forbidden between 66° and 71° N west of Norway."

3. In radio message 2214/771 the boats were informed of the silhouette of the newly commissioned U 973 (Päpenmüller), the experimental boat with the new conning-tower 6.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. (a) Plans: None.

(b) Organizational:

U-boat base Hammerfest was instructed to make all preparations for the speedy re-equipment of the U-boats putting in there.

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. The following Emergency teleprinter message to Group North/Fleet and Naval War Staff, 1st Division was dispatched:

"Situation as on 27 January at 1030:
Operations against PQ broken off, as the air reconnaissance found that at 0900 the convoy was already in AC 8650, and was escorted by 15 destroyers; Plans: To transfer the boats at

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high speed to AB 61 via AC 49 to operate against the new PQ convoy which is now under way. Wherever necessary, fuel and ammunition are being replenished in Hammerfest. Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 309."

2. The air reports of yesterday indicated the assembly of a returning QP convoy at Murmansk. As, however, its sailing date is uncertain and may possibly not be for a few days, and as the new PQ convoy has the more important cargo, it is best to let all the available U-boats operate on it, although it means giving up our favorable position relative to the QP convoy.
3. The following short report on the operation against PQ 25 was dispatched in teleprinter message Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 324 A Ops. of 28 January:

- "(1) The convoy was intercepted at 0958 on 25 January in AB 6675 by group "Isegrimm" (6 boats); convoy's course east, speed 9 knots. A further 6 boats approaching from Narvik and Hammerfest were sent against it.
- (2) Seven boats gained contact by 2235 on 25 January, and three more by 0400 on 26 January. Contact was lost after night attack, owing to very poor visibility, at about 0930 in AC 4664.
- (3) According to prisoners' statements the convoy consisted of 15 ships, of which 3 were tankers, about 15 destroyers, 10 corvettes, no air cover. The convoy left Scotland on 8 January.
- (4) "Zaunkönig" torpedoes fired at destroyers:
25 January: "Ohling" at 1105 in AB 6683 - explosion. "Hansen" at 1410 in AB 6931 - explosion. "Brasack" at 1756 in AC 4491 - missed. "Becker" at 1830 in AC 4451 - 1 hit aft, 3 misses. "Franze" at 2012 in AC 4572 - corvette missed. "Schaar" at 2303 in AC 4541 - destroyer sunk. "Bentzien" at 2312 in AC 4492 - explosion.
26 January: "Basse" at 0250 in AC 4618 - explosion. Sinking of 6 destroyers possible.
- (5) Further torpedoes fired:
25 January: "Franze" at 2012 in AC 4572 fan of three, 1 Liberty ship sunk, 1 torpedoed.
26 January: "Becker" at 0016 in AC 4529 fan of three F.A.T. torpedoes on convoy, 3 hits. "Dunkelberg" at 0020 in AC 4552 fan of three on overlapping Liberty ships, 1 premature explosion, 2 explosions, sinking noises. "Schaar" at 0227 in

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AC 4562 "Zaunkönig" on Liberty ship, sank at 0653, 2 prisoners. "Mangold" at 0400 in AC 4567 fan of two and one miss on stationary freighter and destroyer, forced away, lost contact.
Total: 2 Liberty ships sunk, 1 torpedoed, 5 hits.

- (6) Air report 26 January. At 1027 convoy in AC 4666, 12 merchant ships, 10 destroyers. Air report 27 January. At 1012 in AC 8653 12 merchant ships, 9 destroyers. Further air report of 27 January, 9 merchant ships, 13 destroyers.
- (7) After losing contact, 3 patrol lines formed north of Murmansk, contact not regained. On 26 January at 1658 "Brasack" obtained definite hydrophone contact in AC 55, with steamer and destroyer, lost it about 2200, very poor visibility, rain. On 27 January at 0652 "Schaar" intercepted independently routed vessel in AC 5981 southerly course, lost at 0900 on account of poor visibility.
- (8) Operation broken off on 27 January at 1041 after the air reconnaissance reported the convoy off Murmansk (AC 8655), escorted by 9 destroyers, and 9 corvettes. U-boats drawn up against next PQ convoy.
- (9) Air reconnaissance on 27 January sighted on convoy route 1 vessel, probably corvette, about to sink, in AC 4551, 1 raft with 2 men. A U-boat on return passage ordered to bring in prisoners if possible.
- (10) Experiences to date:
 - (a) In good weather all boats came within range for firing torpedoes.
 - (b) After equipment with "Borkum" and "Naxos" no surprise locations by the enemy.
 - (c) No search groups sent ahead of the convoy, only air location on 9 and 14 January in Bear Island passage; on 20 January in AB 6256 apparently a Russian periscope.
 - (d) The speedy equipment of U-boats with "Zaunkönig" torpedoes has proved worthwhile: 7 hits out of 14 shots.
 - (e) After considerable deterioration in visibility contact was lost after the first night attack in the absence of own radar gear.

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- (f) The absence of enemy air forces made it easier for our boats to attack.
- (g) U 965 (Ohling) reported on 26 January at 0912 6 hours' depth charge pursuit by search group in AC 4538, and a probable Q-ship.
- (h) Only recently commissioned boats took part in the operation and for most of them this was their first convoy operation."

(Signed) Peters.

28 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Isegrimm":

U 314)
U 472)
U 601) from patrol line AC 8215 - 9155
U 716) to patrol line AB 5651 - 9155.
U 732)
U 739)
U 956)
U 636 from AB 65 to AB 8180.
U 312 weather boat in AB 32 and 35.

In port:

U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1840 U 360 put in to Hammerfest from AC 58
via AC 4551.
1710 U 278 put in to Hammerfest from patrol
line AC 8215 to 9155.
1100 U 425 put in to Hammerfest from patrol
line AC 8215 to 9155.
1710 U 957 put in to Hammerfest from patrol
line AC 8215 to 9155.
1530 U 965 put in to Hammerfest from patrol
line AC 8215 to 9155.
U 313 proceeding from Bergen to AB 92.
U 973 proceeding from Bergen to AB 68.
U 990 proceeding from Bergen to AB 68.

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II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance, Banak - Bear Island. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

3 BV 138 on reconnaissance against new PQ convoy. Enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance AB 7720, no report of enemy sighted.
2 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of shipping berths at Scapa and Lerwick. Scapa not examined because of lack of cloud protection. Lerwick one passenger ship and 10 to 15 fishing vessels.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See under IV.a).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

At 1500 convoy located in AB 8143. Owing to heavy cloud, only 3 large merchant ships and 1 destroyer identified, course 40°.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 Ju 88 to re-intercept the PQ convoy between 1000 and 1640. At 1330 convoy picked up in AB 8172. Contact maintained till 1400. In AB 8143 convoy consisting of 12 merchant ships up to 5,000 G.R.T. each, 2 merchant ships up to 8,000 G.R.T. each, 7 destroyers, 1 (probable) light cruiser. Cruising formation 3 lines-ahead, escort forces in all-round screen.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1201

During the day lively Russian air activity. Aircraft were probably detailed as convoy protection for approaching convoy. At 1223 Varlamova (AC 888) informed aircraft that at 1047 there was a U-boat hove to in 72° 26' N, 36° 10' E, course 140°. Britain: 27 January: morning till evening, lively, at times urgent, radio traffic between British units and warships and Murmansk. Radio traffic at sea: moderate. Britain: morning till evening, lively Murmansk, no Archangel broadcast.

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(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

1620 Two air reconnaissance messages received according to which the convoy was
in AB 8145 at 1330, and
in AB 8143 at 1500.
Course varying or 70°.

In radio message 1653/790 the U-boats were informed of this and were ordered to keep the patrol line occupied.

In radio message 1719/791 U 636 (Hildebrandt) was ordered to occupy attack area AB 8221, depth of sweep 15 miles.
The boat will thus be stationed on the assumed enemy course of 70°, and will have a chance of contacting the convoy already during the night (if necessary by hydrophone). The patrol line is to remain stationary for the time being as there is so far no confirmation as to whether all the positions have been filled.

1616 U 313 (Schweiger) reported passing 67° N. In radio message 1813/793 he was ordered to join group "Werwolf" as eighth boat and to proceed to AB 6850, such that AB 6880 will be passed at about 0800. Thus, at the time when it is assumed that the enemy will be contacted, he will be level with the patrol line and later on he will be behind it in a favorable position for attack.

1810 From Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

"Convoy 14 merchant ships, 1 cruiser, 7 destroyers, in all-round screen, concentration ahead."

This information was transmitted to the U-boats in radio message 1650/792.

2120 Radio message 2050/795 from "Hildebrandt":

"Radio message 1115/784 received at 1905. Proceeding to patrol line as ordered, southern position. Visibility very poor."

The meaning of this radio message is not clear. The quoted radio message contained a clear order. There is no obvious reason why it was not executed by "Hildebrandt". It must be noted that "Hildebrandt" did not receive the message for 7 hours.

As radio communications are very good, "Hildebrandt" must have remained submerged for quite some time without making sure of

reception of radio messages.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

See under IV.a).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

As up to now no weather reports have been received from weather boat "Nikolay" in AE 32 and 35, he was sent a reminder in radio message 1435/788. No answer has been received so far.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 973 (Päpenmöller) reported that his stability is not sufficient. The boat received orders to put in to port and reported that he would be off Bergen tomorrow morning.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The convoy's position has been established with fair accuracy, and even though we do not know its course for certain it may be hoped that it will be intercepted by the patrol line tomorrow morning at about 0800.

If we succeed in bringing up the boats which have put in to Hammerfest, there will be 14 boats available for the operation, to which U 990 (Nordheimer) might possibly be added as 15th boat the day after tomorrow.

(Signed) Peters.

29 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 956 AB 5651

U 472 AB 5683

U 716 AB 5931

U 314 AB 5963

U 601 AB 6771

U 737 AB 9116

U 739 AB 9155

U 636 AB 8221

U 312 weather boat in AE 32 and 35.

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In port:

U 278, 360, 425, 957, 956 Hammerfest,
U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 313 proceeding via AB 6880 to 6850 to
join group "Werwolf".
U 990 proceeding from Bergen to AB 68.
1530 U 973 put in to Bergen from AF 57.
1000 U 278 put out from Hammerfest for AB 6650.
0450 U 425 put out from Hammerfest for AB 6650.
1000 U 957 put out from Hammerfest for AB 6650.
0900 U 965 put out from Hammerfest for AB 6650.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88, on third operation, meteorological and
shipping reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear
Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance of
Jan Mayen. Enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See under IV.a).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

4 BF 109, on second operation, meteorological
and harbor reconnaissance of Kola inlet
between Polyarno and Kola.
Results: In Kola Bay 67 ships, including 30
of more than 5,000 G.R.T., at anchor.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

3 BV 138 with radar to re-intercept PQ 26.
Sighting report: in AB 6783 1 probable
guardboat, course east. Details inexact
owing to poor visibility. In AB 5397
16 merchant ships 8 - 10,000 G.R.T. each,
almost all of the same type. Five lines-
ahead, course 60°, 8 - 10 knots, 10
destroyers in all-round screen, 1 cruiser
or anti-aircraft cruiser within the all-
round screen, two of the destroyers 15 - 20
km. to southward. One destroyer dropped
depth charges at 1200. Heavy anti-aircraft
defenses. Photographs of convoy taken.

(c) By naval forces: None.

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(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: lively traffic of urgent messages in Murmansk area: destroyer "A".
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: destroyer "J".
Russian radio traffic: normal.
British radio traffic: very lively Murmansk, slight Archangel broadcast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

- 0345 U 737 (Brasack) reported "flying weather" by short signal.
- 0445 U 737 (Brasack) reported that he would be in position in the patrol line at 0645. Since no further messages were received, the whole patrol line must have been in position at that time.
- 0645 The same boat reported "flying weather" by short signal.
- 0940 U 956 (Mohs) by short signal reported convoy in AB 5651, easterly course. Thus the convoy has been re-intercepted by the boat at the northern end of the patrol line. Its speed by dead reckoning is 9 knots. It has gone very near to the ice limit.
- 1020 Radio message 0949/707 from Captain U-boats:
"Group "Werwolf" to operate on the report from "Mohs" that the convoy was in AB 5651 at 0934. Speed 9 knots by dead reckoning."
- 1000 U-boat base Hammerfest reported that the supplying of the boats has been delayed by heavy seas in the harbor.
The following have put out: U 425 (Bentzien) at 0450 and U 957 (Schaar), U 278 (Franze) and U 965 (Ohling) at about 0930.
These boats are to form group "Wiking".
U 360 (Becker), who will probably put out in the afternoon, is to join them.
U 636 (Hildebrandt) is to join group "Werwolf" as 9th boat. (Radio message 1133/72.)
- 1145 From Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:
"At 1045 convoy spotted in C7 East 9471 (AB 5651). Course northeast."

This report was transmitted to the boats in radio message 1149/713.

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The convoy position agrees with "Mohs"'s report.

1230 Radio message 1155/163 from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

- "1. At 1100 convoy in AB 5397.
2. At 1120 16 merchant ships, 10 destroyers 5 lines-ahead, enemy is laying smoke screen."

The reports of the convoy's strength are rather higher than previously.

The position and details were passed on to the boats in radio message 1409/719.

In radio message 1345/718 group "Wiking" was ordered to proceed to AB 6390.

1320 Radio message 1004/715 received from "Mohs":

"Gunfire from 2 destroyers. Forced to submerge, miss with "Zaunkönig". Hydrophone pursuit for 3 hours. Gyro-compass broken down."

The boat therefore lost contact.

1400 Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten reported that 1 anti-aircraft cruiser is with the convoy, general course northeast, concentration of escort forward and to the south.

1545 Short signal from "Mohs" reporting the convoy in AB 6421. The boat has therefore regained contact. The convoy's course now appears to be more to eastnortheast. Speed according to dead reckoning still 9 knots.

1715 "Mohs" was ordered in radio message 1703/723 to maintain contact at all costs until there are more boats up, and to send direction finder signals.

1745 Radio message 1654/724 from "v.Forstner":

"Surfaced after hydrophone pursuit in AB 5369. Convoy heard on hydrophone west of 70°."

This report is unclear. It gives a considerably different convoy position from "Mohs"'s. It is, of course, only based on a hydrophone bearing. A QP convoy (which might be possible from the report) is not expected for the moment.

1850 In radio message 1843/726 4 BV 138 were announced to the boats for 1900. It is hoped that this reconnaissance flight will

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clear up the position of the convoy, about which so far there is no certainty.

1930

From Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"At 1817 several vessels located in AB 6279."

This was reported to the U-boats in radio message 1931/728.

2010

"Mohs" reported in radio message 1916/729 that the convoy was in AB 6433 at 1718. During attack on starboard escort, premature explosion of T5 torpedo. Running time 25 seconds. Depth charges.

The positions given by the air reconnaissance and "Mohs" are appreciably at variance, this is probably due to fix differences.

2055

"Mohs" reported the convoy at 2047 in AB 6527. He was giving beacon signals.

2100

"Hansen" reported in short signal 2032/730 a destroyer in AB 6247 proceeding eastwards.

2105

U 472 (v. Forstner) reported in radio message 1740/732 that at 1740 2 destroyers were in 6147, gunfire, last hydrophone bearing 90°.

In view of the existing contact, and as U 425 (Bentzien) is nearing the battle area it seemed appropriate to give group "Wiking" freedom to attack.

This was done in radio message 2133/733.

2235

"Mohs" in radio message 2149/734 reported the convoy in AB 6529, course 90°, speed 9 knots.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

See under IV.a).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

Weather boat U 312 (Nikolay) has still not reported.

By radio message 1123/710 the boat was ordered on waves "Ulli" and "Anton" to report its position.

1406

He reported his position in AE 35, and is therefore in his ordered area. Some time later a very corrupt weather report was received from him. He was not asked to repeat it, as the matter is not urgent at the moment.

V. Reports of successes: None so far.

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VI. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III.b):-

The 67 ships observed in Kola Bay show that the expected QP convoy has not yet put out. It was therefore correct to direct our attention to the newly approaching PQ convoy.

2. The following U-boat situation as of 2200 was submitted to Naval War Staff, 1st Div. and Group North/Fleet by teleprinter message:

"Current contact with convoy. At times broken then regained. "Werwolf"'s contact was delayed, as the convoy was intercepted by the northern flank of the patrol line. Air reconnaissance is maintaining current contact. Last convoy position from U 956 (Mohs) at 2047 in AB 6527. So far, 13 boats in the operation ("Werwolf" 9, "Wiking" 4 boats)."

(Signed) Peters.

30 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 313)
U 314)
U 472)
U 601)
U 636) on the convoy.
U 716)
U 737)
U 739)
U 956)

Group "Wiking":

U 278)
U 425)
U 957) on the convoy.
U 965)
U 990)
U 312 weather boat in AE 32 and 35.

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In port:

U 360 Hammerfest,
U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 973 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0940 U 360 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance
Banak - Bear Island. In AC 4170, 1 large oil
patch from west to east.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance of the
Jan Mayen area, exhaustive, enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See under IV.a).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

3 BV 138 as convoy shadowers.
Flying route during shadowing between
AB 6545 - 6377 - 6661 and AC 4248.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1548 Britain: 3 units or warships intercepted in
very urgent radio traffic with Murmansk.
Russian radio traffic: moderate.
British radio traffic: slight Murmansk and
Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Reliable agent of G.I.S. Station, Denmark
reported on 28 January from Reykjavik:
a convoy of 8 ships put in to port on
24 or 25 January, one with a cargo of struc-
tural lumber. Darkness and blizzards rendered
observation more difficult.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

During the night the boats tried to reach the
convoy. U 601 (Hansen) and U 956 (Mohs) have
gained contact. The positions reported by

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"Mohs" lie about 25 miles further south than "Hansen"'s, which is considered to be due to the breakdown of the gyro-compass.

The following convoy positions were reported:

- 0200 From U 601 in radio message 0107/737, convoy in AB 6267.
0250 From U 601 in radio message 0244/743, convoy in AB 6292.
0252 From U 965 in radio message 2321/744, convoy in AB 6538.
0655 From U 737 in radio message 0532/756, convoy in AB 6397.

Also a large number of destroyers were reported:

- 0200 Radio message 0147/738: 1 destroyer reported by U 716 (Dunkelberg) in AB 6299.
0345 Radio message 0108/748: 1 destroyer in AB 6378 careened by U 737 (Brasack) with T5 torpedo.
0440 Radio message 0405/751: 2 destroyers in AB 6381 careened by U 957 (Schaar).
0240 U 636 (Hildebrandt) reported being followed by escort vessels (depth charges) till 0150. Port electric motor out of order. Starboard shaft is knocking.
In radio message 0320/747 it was left to his own discretion whether or not to break off his attack.
0245 U 278 (Franze) reported from AB 6625 star shells on 330°.
0237 U 636 (Hildebrandt) also reported star shells from AB 6555 on 40°.

Both bearings give a good clue as to the convoy's position.

As at times there was doubt as to the convoy's position,

- 0225 "Hansen" received orders to send beacon signals.
0432 In radio message 0408/750, the boats were informed that "Mohs"'s convoy position was inexact and that the convoy is about 25 miles further north.

As "Mohs" gave beacon signals at the same time, his false position by dead reckoning has probably not caused too much confusion.

- 0625 Radio message 0355/763 from U 601 (Hansen):

"At 0108 in grid square 6265 contact with convoy in drift-ice area. The convoy has split up into groups. Its southern part is outside the drift-ice limit. After 2 attacks F.A.T. miss on steamer group. AB 6292 contact lost, light fog, still 48 cu.m. My signal of 0107 was misunderstood, it should read: Convoy

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AB 6267, course east."

This confirms that the convoy is proceeding along the ice limit. "Hansen" has lost contact.

0640 U 737 (Brasack) reported in radio message 0532/756 a fan of two on overlapping steamers in AB, explosion after 2 minutes 27 seconds.

0710 U 990 (Nordheimer) received orders to join group "Wiking" as fifth boat in place of "Becker" and to operate against the convoy.

0740 U 965 (Ohling) reported contact with the convoy, but without giving grid position.

0848 U 636 (Hildebrandt) reported that he was at full operational readiness again.

0910 Radio message 0830/765 from U 278 (Franze):

"3 destroyers in AB 6357 at 0357. T5 torpedo fired. After 7 minutes, stern hit. After a further minute, blew up. Query: does time coincide with "Schaar". Hydrophone pursuit. Last radio message 753."

The times of firing torpedoes agree exactly, but not the positions, this however is no doubt due to fix differences. The matter can only be cleared up when the U-boat reports come in.

0945 U 278 (Franze), from AB 4172 on 70° and about 16 miles away, observed a BV 138, which was being shot at, presumably over the convoy.

1020 U 957 (Schaar) reported that he still has 1 - 3 torpedoes.

1021 U 425 (Bentzien) reported the convoy in AC 4168.

1100 "Bentzien" amplified this report as follows:

"Course east, speed 9 knots."

1028 U 278 (Franze) reported that he was being chased by 2 destroyers in 4173.

1029 Radio message 1021/101 from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"At 0930 convoy sighting report: 16 merchant ships, line abreast, 12 destroyers all-round screen, cruiser astern."

The number of merchant ships is the same as at the first sighting report, the number of destroyers has increased by two. Apparently the convoy has been met by Russian or British destroyers coming from Murmansk. The large number of destroyers sighted seems to confirm

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this assumption. Moreover, the enemy seems to have placed anti-submarine groups in the Bear Island passage.

1021 U 425 (Bentzien) reported convoy in AC 4168.

1107 U 965 (Ohling), on request, reported convoy in AC 4167.

1125 Radio message 1047/777 from Captain U-boats:

"Worsening of weather conditions expected during the night. Seize all opportunities for attack during the daytime."

1216 U 425 (Bentzien) reported the convoy in AC 4248.

1245 "Bentzien" reported course 70°, speed 10 knots.

1242 U 739 (Mangold) reported that he has been submerged from AB 6370 since 0230 on account of search group. 7 hours hydrophone pursuit. Still 45 cu.m. Is pursuing.

The boats seem to be greatly hampered by the search groups.

1332 U 425 (Bentzien) reported the convoy in AC 4251 and

1348 enemy is on course 90°, speed 9 knots.

1330 According to a report from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten, the air shadower on the convoy has had to break off because of deterioration of weather at the place of operations. This means that there are no air shadowers at present. Flieger Fuehrer North (West)'s aircraft cannot fly either, owing to bad weather. Flieger Fuehrer North (East) has no aircraft with radar, so that, with the present poor visibility, flights from there would be useless.

1452 U 314 (Basse) reported that he presumed from a hydrophone bearing that the convoy was in AC 4432, course 120°.

1447 U 956 (Mohs) reported contact with convoy (without giving grid square).

1455 U 425 (Bentzien):

"Enemy steering on course 90°, speed 10 knots."

1517 Radio message 1330/790 from U 957 (Schaar):

"In AB 6301 fired fan of three F.A.T. 1 torpedoes, depth charges after firing, no observations made. 0524 F.A.T. torpedo on 2 salvaging vessels, explosion and smoke

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after 4 minutes 45 seconds. 1 premature explosion. Hydrophone pursuit. Now in 4179."

1649 U 425 (Bentzien) reported convoy in AC 4344.

1710 Radio message 1629/794 from U 601 (Hansen):

"At 0600 in AB 6382 T5 torpedo on destroyer. Probable hit after 13 minutes. Afterwards nothing to be seen at scene of action. Hydrophone pursuit. Shall probably reach convoy position, as reported by "Bentzien", at 2000. Weather unchanged, up to now. 40 cu.m. 7 torpedoes."

It is hoped that the favorable weather will continue.

1740 U 425 (Bentzien) reported 2 destroyers in AC 4347, 130°, 12 knots.

I hope that this boat, which has had exceptionally good contact throughout the day, will not be forced away by these destroyers.

1820 Radio message 1700/796:

"During day attack on convoy located by 4 destroyers. Careened one with T5 torpedo. 4 hours of depth charges. Last convoy position by hydrophone bearing grid square 4193, course 80°, speed 9 knots. U 965 (Ohling)."

1840 U 716 (Dunkelberg) reported parachute flare from AC 4372 on 130° at 1800.

Two hours passed without a fresh report of the convoy. As it was no longer clear whether, and if so which, of the boats still had contact, the boats were ordered to report, who had definite contact.

1917 U 956 (Mohs) reported in radio message 1820/799, that he no longer had contact with the three destroyers and reported his position in AC 4342.

Contact is therefore finally broken. It is intended to regain it by means of a patrol line of 9 boats, spaced 12 miles apart, which is to straddle the presumed course of the convoy, that is to say, the approach routes to Murmansk which have been used in the past. 30 miles further back a second patrol line of 5 boats spaced 12 miles apart is to be drawn up as a U-boat group.

2100 Radio message 2035/701:

"In the absence of contact or definite clues, be in position in patrol lines in previous order at 0600: group "Werwolf" grid square

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5611 to 5722, group "Wiking" grid square
5674 to 5819, all AC. Expect 2 Ju 88
from dawn."

2130 It was reported that as a result of an air
attack the very long wave transmitter "Nauen"
has gone off the air.
This disturbance is very unfortunate at the
moment when, owing to lack of contact, the
U-boats were to be ordered to new positions.

From 2300 very long wave transmitter "Kootwijk"
will transmit routines on 17,850 meters.

2130 Several of the boats reported firing of star
shells; their large number gives rise to
suspicion.

In radio message 2049/711 the boats were warned
of this and directed not to let themselves be
diverted from making for the patrol line.

The following messages were also received:

2241 From U 965: "At 2204 2 destroyers in AC 4381."

2303 From U 601: "At 2237 4 destroyers in AC 4398."

2305 From U 957: "At 2256 3 steamers: lost contact
in AC 4359."

2336 From U 472: "At 2328 2 destroyers in AC 4632."

2345 From U 990: "At 2230 own position AC 4913."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

See under IV.a).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

As there has still been no weather report
from U 312, he was again ordered to transmit
his report and informed of the wavelengths to
be used. In reply he reported that he had
tried six times in vain to transmit weather
reports. They were not heard. At the same
time, the first weather report was received.

V. Reports of successes:

The following reports on torpedoes fired and
successes gained have so far been received:

U 956 (Mohs): 2 T5 torpedoes on destroyers.
Misses.
1 T5 torpedo on destroyer.
Premature explosion.

U 737 (Brasack): 1 T5 torpedo on destroyer:
careened.
Fan of 2 on overlapping
steamers: explosion after 2
minutes, 27 seconds.

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U 957 (Schaar): 1 T5 torpedo on destroyer. Sank amid smoke clouds. Running time 5 minutes.
1 T5 torpedo on destroyer. Blew up after 12 minutes.
3 F.A.T. 1 torpedoes on unidentified target, result unknown.
2 F.A.T. 2 torpedoes on two salvaging vessels: explosion, following smoke cloud, after 4 minutes 45 seconds, 1 premature explosion.

U 601 (Hansen): 2 F.A.T. torpedoes on steamer group: misses.
1 T5 torpedo on destroyer: probable hit. Running time 13 minutes (afterwards nothing to be seen at scene of action).

U 425 (Bentzien): 1 T5 torpedo on destroyer: miss.
3 F.A.T. torpedoes on 3 destroyers: misses.
1 T5 torpedo on destroyer: loud explosion, sinking noises, running time 2 minutes.

U 278 (Franze): 1 T5 on destroyer: stern hit, blew up 1 minute later (possibly 2 hits by "Schaar").

U 472 (v.Forstner): 1 T5 torpedo on destroyer: explosion after 150 seconds.

U 313 (Schweiger): 1 T5 torpedo on destroyer: torpedo explosion. Running time 8 minutes. Breaking noises.

U 965 (Ohling): 1 T5 torpedo on destroyer: careened.

Summary:

4 destroyers sunk, 3 hits on destroyers, 1 probably hit on destroyer, 2 hits on steamers, 1 possible hit on steamer.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1. This convoy presents a completely different picture from the earlier PQ 25. The enemy has apparently placed a greater number of anti-submarine groups in the Bear Island passage, which have prevented the U-boats from contacting the convoy beyond a line from Bear Island to North Cape. The destroyers have

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forced the U-boats to submerge again and again, and have pursued them with depth charges for long periods (up to 7 hours).

As the Bear Island passage presents unavoidable geographical restrictions to the enemy which do not permit him to exploit the superiority of his radar equipment in order to evade our U-boat positions, but more or less force him to pass right through them, it is to be expected that very strong anti-submarine groups will continue to be used in the future. It is regrettable that owing to the lack of surface forces and aircraft we are unable to deal with these groups so near to our coasts.

It is therefore up to the U-boats to fight their way through to the convoy and this will mean an increased use of T5 torpedoes.

2. The following reports on the U-boat situation were submitted to Naval War Staff, 1st Div. and Group North/Fleet, and sent for information of C-in-C U-boats, Ops.

As of 0800:

Contact with the convoy was maintained throughout the night. The approach of the U-boats was rendered more difficult by destroyers (partly with infra-red location). At about 0108 the convoy entered the drift-ice area in AB 6265. Later its most southerly part was outside the ice limit. Convoy divided into groups. Last convoy position reported at 0244 in AB 6292. At present one boat has contact, but has given no grid square. Definite successes: 3 destroyers sunk, an explosion after a fan of two on overlapping steamers. 3 T5 torpedoes missed, 1 T5 premature explosion, 1 fan of two on steamer, missed, and 1 fan of three on 3 destroyers, missed.

As of 2300:

Continuous contact with convoy up to about 1700. Approach of U-boats was hindered during the day by the strengthening of the escort forces with destroyers brought up from Murmansk (as observed by the air reconnaissance) and the presence of numerous anti-submarine groups of 2 or 3 destroyers each, both forward and 20 miles sideways from the convoy. Only two more opportunities to fire at steamers during darkness, in the morning a fan of two, one miss, one explosion after 2 minutes 27 seconds. Further fan of two on two salvaging vessels with explosion and smoke after 4 minutes 45 seconds, and one premature explosion. Numerous attacks on destroyer with T5 torpedoes.

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In all 12 T5 torpedoes fired. Result:
4 destroyers sunk, 3 hits, 1 probably hit,
1 premature explosion, 3 misses. The sinking
of 6 destroyers is presumed, a further one
possible. To re-intercept the convoy again
tomorrow morning 2 patrol lines, 30 miles
apart, have been ordered across the approaches
to Murmansk.

(Signed) Peters.

31 January, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Wiking":

U 956 AC 5611 center.
U 472 AC 5535 bottom right.
U 716 AC 5529 lower righthand corner.
U 314 AC 5552 lower lefthand corner.
U 601 AC 5549 lower edge center.
U 737 AC 5571 top edge center.
U 739 AC 5495 top right.
U 313 AC 5497 left edge center.
U 636 AC 5722 center.

Group "Werwolf":

U 425 AC 5674 center.
U 957 AC 5598 center.
U 278 AC 5823 right edge center.
U 965 AC 5825 left edge center.
U 990 AC 5819 center.
U 312 weather boat in AE 32 and 35.

In port:

U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 973 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1900 U 360 put in to Narvik from Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping
reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island.
Nothing to report.

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See also III.b).

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See IV.a).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters, Kola coast to Iokanka. Almost exhaustive. According to visual reconnaissance 2 merchant ships, each 10,000 G.R.T., 7 merchant ships, 5 - 10,000 G.R.T., 2 coastal vessels in Iokanka harbor.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance to re-intercept PQ 26. Convoy located in AC 5831. According to visual reconnaissance 20 vessels in 2 or 3 lines ahead, 13 large ships identified, 2 BV 138 on same task. 1 Ju 88 to relieve shadower. Owing to failure of radar shadowing broken off.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

0400 30 January at 2052 very urgent radio message from Polyarno to submarine "S".
0920 30 January at 2330 very urgent radio message to all submarines in the operational area.
1020 Norwegian polar coast: slight radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Britain: 1 unit or warship intercepted in very urgent radio traffic with Murmansk.
British radio traffic: very slight Murmansk, no Archangel broadcast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

0000 No clues at the moment as to convoy's position.
0130 U 990 (Nordheimer) reported his position in AC 4697 and sent various hydrophone bearings.
0235 U 278 (Franze) reported that he was forced to submerge by a hydrophone group, 3 hours' hydrophone hunt with depth charges. Position at 0145 AC 5145, 102 cu.m.
0335 U 965 (Ohling) reported starboard Diesel engine again out of order. Cannot reach patrol line at required time. Position at 0215 AC 4365, 112 cu.m.

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- 0400 U 278 (Franze) was in 5184 at 0311 and observed star shells in 124° true. He also reported no reception on very long wave.
- 0427 Radio message 0230/725 from "Bentzien":
"At 1540 in AC 4262 stern T5 torpedo missed approaching destroyer in spite of exact data. 1801 chased by 4 destroyers. Stern T5 torpedo, running time 1 minute, 58 seconds. Loud explosion, sinking noises, 6 hours' close depth charges. 117 cu.m. Position 4268, am advancing to southeast."
- 0640 Radio message 2358/729 from U 472 (v.Forstner):
"Convoy in AC 4636, course 90°. Fired at by starboard escort with star shells. Then depth charges. Radio message 2228 should read: apparently remote escort to starboard. Last message number....., etc."
- 0645 Radio message 0246/730 from U 737 (Brasack):
"Grid square 4638 3 destroyers, high speed, course northwest. Bow T5 torpedo on last approaching destroyer: after 10 minutes, 30 seconds, loud explosion, loud sinking noises, then only 2 destroyers audible. No details."
- 0822 Radio message 0601/733 from U 990 (Nordheimer):
"3 destroyers in AC 58. 1 T5 torpedo fired: explosion after 14 minutes. Subsequently passed over by destroyers several times."
- 0910 U 957 (Schaar) reported in radio message 1801/735, at 0433 in AC 5511 depth charges from search group, 2 boats attacking, one escorting.
- 1004 Radio message 0835/738 from U 957 (Schaar):
"The following was observed: After depth charges flame effect on pressure hull like phosphorous or sodium smell. Assumption: branding a surfaced boat or possibly a submerged boat (in the case of sodium)."

This may be a case of calcium carbide from a marking flare, such as the British drop to mark the point where a U-boat has dived.
- 0944 It was announced that a Ju 88 with radar started at 0904 from Bardufoss to re-intercept the convoy.

As no further reports on the convoy were forthcoming, it was necessary to form a new patrol line further south. Accordingly:-

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- 1000 Dispatch of radio message 0943/739 from Captain U-boats:
"Groups "Werwolf" and "Wiking" to form patrol line from AC 9115 to 8135 at maximum speed."
- 1043 U 313 (Schweiger) reported from AC 5480 hydrophone bearing on 332°. Snow showers, visibility 4 km.
- 1100 U 636 (Hildebrandt) reported anti-aircraft fire in AC 5734, and
1115 at 1108 in AC 5738 a smoke cloud.
It is still doubtful whether this is the convoy.
- 1120 U 313 (Schweiger) can only continue for another 8 miles.
- 1144 In radio message 1119/746, 2 BV 138, in the operational area from 1300, were announced to the boats.
- 1150 Air reconnaissance reported the convoy at 1120 in 5831, course east.
This was transmitted to the U-boats in radio message 1159/747, and they were ordered to operate on the convoy at maximum speed.
- 1237 U 636 (Hildebrandt) reported several smoke clouds in AC 5846. (Radio message 1226/748.)
This position does not correspond with the air report, differing by about 35 - 40 miles. But it seems to be certain that the convoy is already relatively far south. It has passed right through the two patrol lines; that it was not intercepted can only be due to the fact that the boats were held up by depth charge pursuits and could not reach their patrol lines in time.
- 1346 U 965 (Ohling) reported starboard crankshaft worn away, a big-end bearing broken. When running on Diesel engines, strong boat vibrations as a result of heavy depth charges. Maximum speed 10 knots, position grid square 5564.
As the boat is already considerably behind the convoy, it was left to its own discretion whether or not to continue the operation.
- 1353 U 636 (Hildebrandt) reported "No enemy sighted" with reference to the smoke clouds which he reported earlier.

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- 1415 Radio message 1349/752 from Captain U-boats:
"The operational area is limited to the south by a line from AC 8517 through 8565 to 8955. Make full use of all remaining opportunities to attack."
- 1500 Air reconnaissance reported the convoy in AC 5975 at 1400. That is too far ahead and to the south to be likely.
- 1505 Radio message 1425/position report/136 from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten. Addition to radio message 1149:
"Convoy is proceeding in 2 or 3 drawn-out lines ahead. 13 merchant ships identified, two of which are probably escort vessels, 9 destroyers in all-round screen. 20 km. further west, 2 destroyers, high speed easterly course, 1 aircraft overhead."
- 1524 U 472 (v. Forstner) reported tear in pressure pipe of cooling system. Only 10 knots. Repairs will take 3 hours. Position grid square 5826, withdrawing for welding.
- 1530 Air reconnaissance reported the convoy's course 170°. This was transmitted to the boats in radio message 1531/759.
- 1530 U 636 (Hildebrandt) reported no sign of convoy, AC 5858.
- 1715 U 965 (Ohling) reported his intention of making a thrust to the south and then to return to Narvik. He received orders to keep at least 50 miles from the coast.
- 1807 U 313 (Schweiger) reported himself again at operational readiness.
- 1710 From 1700 transmitter "Goliath" took over the very long wave (18.5 kc/s). Transmitter "Kootvijk" was unsuitable, as strong enemy jammers are being operated near the transmitting frequency.
- 1925 The boats were informed about the air shadowers and ordered to look out for beacon signals.
- 1926 Radio message 1841/765 from Captain U-boats:
"The convoy was presumed to have been in AC 8312 at 1800. Continuing via 8382 to Murmansk. Last point of interception, if no contact, AC 8682 to 8532. Concentration towards center."

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By assembling the boats once more just off the approaches to Murmansk it is hoped that they may have a chance to score some final successes.

- 2026 U 956 (Mohs) reported 1 destroyer in AC 8384 on southerly course.
- 2125 U 957 (Schaar) reported hydrophone bearings from grid square 5998 on 45° and 150°.
- 2139 U 472 (v. Forstner): "Am at operational readiness again, position AC 5978."
- 2203 U 956 (Mohs) reported from AC 8385 destroyers out of sight. Fix inaccurate, as gyro-compass is out of order.
- 2238 Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten reported shadowing abandoned due to weather conditions, last convoy position in AC 8347 at 2130.

This position was transmitted to the U-boats in radio message 2324/781.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

See under IV.a).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 312 (Nikolay) still operating in AE 35 as weather boat. No special reports.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 1060 (Brammer), see Appendix III/7.

V. Reports of successes:

Further reports:

1. From U 737 (Brasack) 31 January: "At 0246 in AB 4638 T5 torpedo on destroyer, loud explosion, loud sinking noises, running time 10 minutes, 30 seconds."
2. From U 990 (Nordheimer) 31 January: "At 0601 in AC 58 T5 torpedo on destroyer. Explosion after 14 minutes."

VI. Survey of the situation:

Owing to strong anti-submarine measures the U-boats did not again succeed in getting near the convoy. The convoy was re-intercepted only by the air reconnaissance. It appears that as a result of the numerous depth charge pursuits the U-boats were forced so far back that they were no longer able to reach their ordered patrol lines on time.

(Signed) Peters.

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APPENDIX II

Most Secret

Short reports

1. Short report from U 314 (Basse), first operation.
2. Short report from U 716 (Dunkelberg), first operation.
3. Short report from U 956 (Mohs), continuation of third operation.

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APPENDIX II/1

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 314 (Basse), first operation

- | | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| 14 December | Put out from Kiel for the Atlantic, refuelled at Kristiansand (South). |
| 18 December | Order to proceed to Northern Waters, placed under the command of Captain U-boats, Norway. |
| 21 December | Put in to Trondheim. Fitted out and periscope repaired. |
| 21 December | Put out from Trondheim for Northern Waters, 15 January put in to Hammerfest. |
| 24 December | Took up position in group "Eisenbart". |
| 25 December to
30 December | Operated on eastbound convoy. No contact with the enemy, since shadower could not maintain contact; 26 December broke off operation to search for "Scharnhorst" survivors. |
| 31 December to
14 January | In various patrol lines, reconnaissance lines and attack areas, Bear Island passage. |
| 14 January | Returned to Hammerfest. |

During the operation, 7 locations, 1 aircraft sighted, 1 drifting mine in AB 6230. No special experiences.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret
182 - A Ops.

APPENDIX II/2

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 716 (Dunkelberg), first operation

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| 11 December | Put out from Kiel, via Kristiansand (South) and Bergen. According to Operational Order No. 56 C-in-C U-boats, Ops. as far as AF 4552. From 9 January placed under the command of Captain U-boats, Norway. |
| 22 December | Put in to and out of Narvik. |
| 16 January | Put in to Hammerfest. In patrol line southwest of Bear Island with group "Eisenbart". |
| 25 December | At 1503 in AB 6574 sighted 1 destroyer, missed with T 5 torpedo from stern. Subsequently passed over by convoy. 1700 multi-unit hydrophone gear out of order. |
| 26 December | At 1700 in AC 4281 during poor visibility came up against escort twice after location. Own forces doubtful. Submerged, contact lost. |
| 27 December | Fruitless search for "Scharnhorst". |
| 28 December | Operated on report of 5 steamers. Then returned to patrol line and proceeded via position lines back to Bear Island passage. |
| 1 January | Did not operate on report of westbound convoy, as order to attack was received too late. No fix for days. |

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3 January

Operated briefly on report of small westbound convoy. Broke off after being ordered to new attack areas. From 3 January in attack areas southeast to southwest of Bear Island. No encounter with the enemy. Hindered by failure of hydrophone gear. Important reports continually delayed by considerable radio interference.

16 January

At 0000 started return passage from AB 6263. Enemy not sighted.

Captain U-boats, Norway - Most Secret -
185 A Ops.

APPENDIX II/3

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 956 (Mohs), continuation
of third operation

9 January	Put out from Narvik, 18 January put in to Narvik.
10 January	Attack area AB 6268, depth of sweep 25 miles.
10 January	Proceeded towards AB 2747 to salvage the meteorological survey ship "Hessen", 105 G.R.T.
12 January	With the "Hessen" in tow from AB 2884 return passage of 420 miles.
17 January	Handed over the "Hessen" to trawler in AB 9692.
17 January	Put in to Tromsø. Towing with towing wire around 4-pronged pedestal, steel hawser on sliphook, anchor chain long. One electrical motor half speed ahead. In radio bearings no sense-finding on account of icing of auxiliary aerial. Towing connection broke several times. Weather: Wind and sea from north- westerly direction, 3 - 5, partly from southwest, 6.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret
198 - A Ops.

APPENDIX III

Most Secret

Sailing orders

1. Sailing order for U 737 (Brasack).
2. Sailing order for U 957 (Schaar).
3. Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs).
4. Sailing order for U 636 (Hildebrandt).
5. Sailing order for U 313 (Schweiger).
6. Sailing order for U 973 (Päpenmüller).
7. Sailing order for U 1060 (Brammer).

APPENDIX III/1

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 16 January, 1944.

Most Secret

Sailing order for U 737 (Brasack)

1. Put out from Narvik on 16 January at 2200.
2. Proceed at increased speed through Westfjord. "Luchs 1", in accordance with special order, only on surface.
3. Determine the ice limit for convoys in the direction of Jan Mayen and northeastwards as far as 73° N. Report first three grid square numbers by short signal but not before reaching the last position. Then proceed to AB 49. Remain unobserved. Maintain radio silence except for important enemy reports or as instructed.
4. Operational Order No. 1. U-boats Northern Waters wave.
5. PQ and QP convoys expected in about fortnightly succession. The last PQ ran from 23 December to 31 December, 1943.
6. Our own forces:
Group "Isegrimm": U 739 (Mangold) AB 6534, U 278 (Franze) AB 6268, U 360 (Becker) AB 6333, U 425 (Bentzien) AB 6644, U 965 (Ohling) AB 6678, U 601 (Hansen) AB 6943, all depth of sweep 25 miles, regular movements to north and south within their attack areas.
U 956 (Mohs) proceeding from AB 52 to AB 9655, towing steam trawler.
Daily meteorological flights by Ju 88 to Spitsbergen. Operations of other aircraft will be announced.
7. The ice limit was reported by the air reconnaissance in AA 9669. Jan Mayen free to south.
8. U-boats which are near the enemy will transmit "flying weather" for the operation of the German Air Force by short signal, as follows:-
 1. The boat with the lowest fleet number will transmit

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without being requested between 0300 and 0400.
If it fails to do so, the next boat will.

2. Transmission on request.

Form of short signal: 2 three-figure groups.
The groups comprise: first figure, visibility
in miles, second figure, wind 1 (= NE) to 8
(= N), third figure, wind strength. Fourth
figure (second group), cloud base in 100 meters,
fifth figure, type of shower: 1 rain, 2 snow,
3 soft hail, sixth figure, incidence of showers
in 10 per cent.

Example:

941 equals "visibility 9 miles, wind south, 1".
126 equals "clouds below 100 m., snow showers 60%".
In case of low-lying fog the second group is
reduced to 2 figures.

Peters.

APPENDIX III/2

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 23 January, 1944.

Most Secret

Sailing order for U 957 (Schaar)

1. Put out from Narvik on 24 January, at 0900.
2. Proceed via Tjeldsund - Andfjord, from Lodingen to Harstad with district pilot.
3. Relieve U 425 (Bentzien) on northern limit of attack area AB 6644, depth of sweep 25 miles, on 25 January, at 1200. Approach via AB 6820. Nine-hourly movements to south and north within the attack area and 18-hourly transfer of attack area by 40 miles on 240° and back. Thus on 26 January at 0000 be at the northern limit of the western attack area. Irregular courses.
4. Operational Order No. 1. U-boats Northern Waters wave.
5. PQ, QP convoys are expected to run again shortly. Last PQ ran from 23 to 31 December, 1943.
6. Our own forces:
Group "Isegrimm": U 739 (Mangold) AB 6534, U 278 (Franze) AB 6268, U 360 (Becker) AB 6533, U 425 (Bentzien) AB 6644, U 965 (Ohling) AB 6678, U 601 (Hansen) AB 6943, all depth of sweep 25 miles, regular movements to north and south within the attack areas, and transfer of attack areas.
U 737 (Brasack) approaching from the west to relieve U 360 (Becker). Daily meteorological flights by Ju 88 to Spitsbergen. Further air activity will be announced.
7. Probable ice-limit: AB 3260 - 3660 - 3940 - 6330 - AC 1770 - 1950.
8. U-boats which are near the enemy will send "flying weather" for the operation of the German Air Force by short signal, as follows:-
 1. The boat with the lowest fleet number will transmit, without being previously requested, between 0300 and 0400. If it fails to do so, the next boat will.

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2. Transmission on request.

Form of short signal: 2 three-figure groups.
The groups comprise: first figure, visibility in miles, second figure, wind 1 (= NE) to 8 (= N), third figure, wind strength. Fourth figure (second group), cloud base in 100 meters, fifth figure, type of shower: 1 rain, 2 snow, 3 soft hail, sixth figure, incidence of showers in 10 per cent.

Example:

941 equals "visibility 9 miles, wind south, 1".
126 equals "cloud base below 100 m., snow showers 60%".
In case of low-lying fog the second group is reduced to 2 figures.

Peters.

APPENDIX III/3

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 25 January, 1944.

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Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs)

1. Put out from Narvik on 25 January at 0700.
2. Proceed via Tjeldsund - Andfjord, from Lodingen to Harstad with district pilot, at maximum speed to AC 47.
3. Operational Order for Northern Waters U-boats No. 1., U-boat Northern Waters wave.
4. According to radio reconnaissance a PQ convoy may be under way.
5. Our own forces:

Group "Isegrimm": U 739 (Mangold) AB 6234, U 278 (Franze) AB 6268, U 737 (Brasack) relieving U 360 (Becker) in AB 6533, U 957 (Schaar) relieving U 425 (Bentzien) in AB 6644, U 965 (Ohling) AB 6678, U 601 (Hansen) AB 6943, all depth of sweep 25 miles. Regular movements north and south within the attack areas every 9 hours and transfer of attack areas 40 miles on 240° and back every 18 hours. (Take up position on 25 January at 1200 at northern limit of eastern attack area.) "Becker" and "Bentzien" occupy attack areas AB 6630 and 6690. U 472 (v. Forstner) and U 312 (Nikolay) are approaching AB 93 from the south. Daily meteorological flights by Ju 88 as far as Spitsbergen. Further air activity will be announced.
6. Ice limit:
 - a) AA 934 - AB 723 - 554.
 - b) AB 362 - 398 - 633 - AC 178 - 244 - 339.
7. U-boats which are near the enemy will send "flying weather" for the operation of the German Air Force by short signal, as follows:-
 1. The boat with the lowest fleet number will transmit, without being previously requested, between 0300 and 0400. If it fails to do so,

the next boat will.

2. Transmission on request.

Form of short signal: 2 three-figure groups.
The groups comprise: first figure, visibility in miles, second figure, wind 1 (= NE) to 8 (= N), third figure, wind strength. Fourth figure, (second group), cloud base in 100 meters, fifth figure, type of shower: 1 rain, 2 snow, 3 soft hail, sixth figure, incidence of showers in 10 per cent.

Example:

941 equals "visibility 9 miles, wind south, 1".
126 equals "cloud base below 100 m., snow showers, 60%". In case of low-lying fog the second group is reduced to 2 figures.

Peters.

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APPENDIX III/4

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 25 January, 1944.

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Sailing order for U 636 (Hildebrandt)

1. Put out from Narvik 26 January at 0000.
2. Proceed via Tjeldsund - Andfjord, from Lodingen to Harstad with district pilot, to AB 65.
3. Operational Order No. 1., U-boat Northern Waters wave. Send non-priority short signals on waves "Anton" or "Bruno".
4. It is assumed that a QP convoy is running simultaneously with the present PQ convoy.

5. Our own forces:

Group "Isegrimm": U 278 (Franze), U 314 (Basse), U 360 (Becker), U 425 (Bentzien), U 472 (v. Forstner), U 601 (Hansen), U 716 (Dunkelberg), U 737 (Brasack), U 739 (Mangold), U 956 (Mohs), U 957 (Schaar), U 965 (Ohling), operating against PQ convoy.
U 312 (Nikolay) proceeding to AB 71 as weather boat. Expect own air reconnaissance by Ju 88 and BV 138.

6. Ice limit:

- a) AA 934 - AB 723 - 554.
- b) AB 362 - 398 - 633 - AC 178 - 244 - 339.

7. U-boats which are near the enemy will send "flying weather" for the operation of the German Air Force by short signal, as follows:-

1. The boat with the lowest fleet number will transmit, without being previously requested, between 0300 and 0400. If it fails to do so, the next boat will.
2. Transmission on request.

Form of short signal: 2 three-figure groups. The groups comprise: first figure, visibility in miles, second figure, wind 1 (= NE) to 8 (= N), third figure, wind strength. Fourth

figure (second group), cloud base in 100 meters, fifth figure, type of shower: 1 rain, 2 snow, 3 soft hail, sixth figure, incidence of showers in 10 per cent.

Example:

941 equals "visibility 9 miles, wind south, 1".
126 equals "cloud base below 100m., snow showers 60%". In case of low-lying fog the second group is reduced to 2 figures.

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APPENDIX III/5

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency 11th U-boat Flotilla.
2. Emergency for information of Group North/Fleet.

Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret:

Sailing order for U 313 (Schweiger)

1. Put out from Bergen on the afternoon of 26 January.
2. Proceed at a distance of 50 miles from coast as far as 64° N in accordance with Current Order No. 13, then at high speed to AB 68.
3. QP convoy expected to run simultaneously with present PQ convoy. Operating against PQ convoy, group "Isegrimm" consisting of 10 boats. U 636 (Hildebrandt) proceeding to AB 65. U 312 (Nikolay) AB 71 as weather boat. Own FW 200 and Ju 88 on meteorological flights and reconnaissance.
4. Operational Order No. 1., radio wave "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave, after report of passing 67° N, U-boat Northern Waters wave.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret 280 A Ops.

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APPENDIX III/6

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency 11th U-boat Flotilla.
2. Emergency for information of Group North/Fleet.

Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret

Sailing orders for U 973 (Päpenm^öller) and
U 990 (Nordheimer)

1. Put out from Bergen on the afternoon of 27 January.
2. Proceed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast as far as 64° N, in accordance with Current Order No. 13, then at maximum speed to AB 68. As far as possible proceed on the surface.
3. The approaching PQ convoy is northeast of Iceland. Group "Isegrimm" consisting of 10 boats is operating against it. The previous PQ convoy is off Murmansk. "Hildebrandt" is proceeding to AB 65. U 313 (Schweiger) is approaching AB 68. U 312 (Nikolay) as weather boat between AB 71 and AE 35. Our own FW 200, BV 138 and Ju 88 on meteorological and reconnaissance flights.
4. Until further orders attack on independently routed vessels forbidden between 66 and 71° N, west of the Norwegian coast.
5. Operational Order No. 1., radio wave "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave, after report of passing 67° N, U-boat Northern Waters wave.

Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret - 301 A 1.

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APPENDIX III/7

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 31 January, 1944.

Most Secret

Sailing order for U 1060 (Brammer)

1. Put out from Narvik 1 February at 0800. Proceed to Ramsund to take on torpedoes.
2. Put out from Ramsund on same day about 1400 via Westfjord. Separate sailing report to Captain U-boats, Norway only if time of sailing is delayed by more than 2 hours.
3. Expect U 360 to put out from Narvik in late afternoon or evening on transfer through Westfjord to Trondheim.
4. Proceed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast to Bergen. If possible report time of passing Hellisoe by short signal 36 hours in advance. Arrange escort with Admiral, West Coast.
5. In Bergen take on 2 T 5 torpedoes, then proceed according to directions of S.O. 11th U-boat Flotilla, who will give further escort.
6. Radio wave "Anton".
7. From AF 84 expect danger from aircraft and submarines.

Peters. .

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First Chart

Bekämpfung Geleitzug PQ 25 (27) vom 25. bis 27.1.44 =	attack on convoy PQ 25 (27) from 25 to 27 January, 1944.
Aufzulegen auf Karte 1903 G (Klein) =	to be laid on chart 1903 G (small).
Bären In. =	Bear Island.
Eis-Grenze =	Ice limit.
<u>Zeichenerklärung</u> =	<u>Legend.</u>
angenommener Geleitzugkurs =	assumed course of convoy.
Geleitzugstandort (U-Boots- meldung) =	convoy position (U-boat report).
Zerstörer =	destroyer.
Versenkung =	sinking.
Treffer =	hit.
eigenes Boote =	own U-boat.
" " mit Torpedoschuss =	own U-boat, firing torpedo.
Geleitzugstandort (Flugzeugmeldung) =	convoy position (aircraft report).
Beabsichtigter V.P.Str. lt. Ft. 0937/741 vom 27.1.44 =	planned patrol line as ordered in radio message 0937/741 of 27 January, 1944.
Luft =	air reconnaissance.
Hecksch. =	stern torpedo.
fehl =	miss.

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Second Chart

Bekämpfung Geleitzug PQ 26 (28) vom 28.1. bis 1.2.44 =	attack on convoy PQ 26 (28) from 28 January to 1 February, 1944.
Aufzulegen auf Karte 1903 G =	to be laid on chart 1903 G.
Bären In. =	Bear Island.
Eis-Grenze =	ice limit.
<u>Zeichenerklärung</u> =	<u>Legend.</u>
Geleitzugstandort nach U-Bootmeldung =	convoy position according to U-boat report.
Geleitzugstandort nach Flugzeugmeldung =	convoy position, according to aircraft report.
Zerstörer =	destroyer.
Dampfer =	steamer.
Versenkung =	sinking.
Treffer =	hit.
eigenes U-Boot mit Torpedoschuss =	own U-boat, firing torpedo.
eigenes U-Boot =	own U-boat.
Geleitzugkurs =	convoy course.
angenommener Geleitzugkurs =	assumed convoy course.
Standort fraglich =	position doubtful.
Luft =	air reconnaissance.
Gruppe "Werwolf" =	group "Werwolf".
Gr. "Wiking" =	group "Wiking".
1 tr. Mine =	one drifting mine.
1.2 beabsichtigt lt. F.T. 0943/739 vom 31.1.44 =	patrol line planned for 1 February, as ordered in radio message 0943/739 of 31 January.
1.2. - 0600 bis 1.2. - 1700 =	patrol line occupied from 0600 to 1700 on 1 February.
1.2. beabsichtigt lt. F.T. 1841/765 vom 31.1.44 =	patrol line planned for 1 February, as ordered in radio message 1841/765 of 31 January, 1944.

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WAR DIARY
OF
CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY
1 - 15 FEBRUARY, 1944
PG/31852

1911
MAY 10 1911
AM. ST. P. & O. CO.
ST. LOUIS, MO.

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1 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Groups "Wiking" and "Werwolf":

U 956)
U 472)
U 716)
U 314)
U 601) patrol line from
U 737) AC 8662 to 8258.
U 636)
U 425)
U 957)
U 990)

U 278) proceeding to patrol line
U 313) AC 8662 to 8258.

U 312 weather boat in AE 32 and 35.

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 973 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1600 U 360 put out from Narvik for Trondheim.
U 739 proceeding from AC 8351 to Narvik.
U 965 proceeding from AC 58 to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Enemy air activity:

16 Beaufighters in Stadlandet area bombed convoy,
1 submarine chaser sunk. 2 aircraft shot down.

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of coastal inshore
waters Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 9744 - 9736 - 8688 -
8438 - Vardø - Kirkenes, exhaustive. Kirkenes -
Vardø - AC 9778 - AW 2163 - AC 8988 - Vardø -
Kirkenes. Exhaustive, no observations.
1 Ju 88 with radar on fan reconnaissance Vardø -
AC 9445 - 9146 - 5794 - Vardø - Kirkenes.
Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered by radar
and visual reconnaissance, nothing to report.
Area covered by radar: AC 8498 - 9736 - 9467 -
9168 - 6777 - 5832 - 5781.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - Jan Mayen. 50% of reconnaissance area covered, no enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: See under IV. (a).
- (b) By air reconnaissance: See para. II.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

1201 Norwegian polar coast: normal radio traffic to submarines in the operational area, "M 105" named.
Naval air arm on polar coast: no air activity observed.
Murmansk area: 5 aircraft intercepted in the morning.
: Britain: on the afternoon and evening of 31 January and the night of 31 January/1 February British units or warships in brisk and sometimes urgent radio traffic with Murmansk, at 1418 Hammerfest obtained a bearing of 3° on "AZ", and of 71° on "AX".
Britain: lively Murmansk radio traffic.

1945 At 0223 on 1 February the Commodore of the PQ convoy ordered alteration of course at 0315 to 235°.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

0345 U 739 (Mangold) reported from AC 8351 that he had started on return passage because of various defects.

0347 U 957 (Schaar) reported from AC 8615 depth charges on a bearing of 90°.

0508 - At 0249 U 601 (Hansen) observed anti-aircraft fire from AC 5818, bearing 160°. Suspects convoy is in AC 8681.

The convoy must by now have passed the U-boat position drawn up for its interception. In view of the danger from aircraft the boats were ordered to form a new patrol line so as not to be too near the coast at daybreak.

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0522 Radio message 0436/788:

"Groups "Werwolf" and "Wiking" to form patrol line from AC 8682 to 8258 at 0600."

The boats will thus be spaced about 10 miles apart, and will not interfere with each other so much as in the closely-spaced interception position. It is intended to wait for stragglers.

0516 U 636 (Hildebrandt) reported at 0225 from 8621 that he was at the convoy's position as estimated by dead reckoning but could only hear weak Diesel noises and depth charges in the distance. He was withdrawing northwards.

0539 U 956 (Mohs) reported a T5 attack at 2356 on a destroyer group in 8652, probably a miss. Star shells. Depth charges for two and a half hours.

0544 U 278 (Franze) reported in radio message 0330/786 depth charges in AC 8625 for four hours. He estimated by an aircraft he observed that the convoy was on bearing 110° and considered it useless to pursue it any further. He was withdrawing northwards.

A number of boats reported that they did not reach their position in time. U 313 (Schweiger) and U 278 (Franze) arrived at 0930 and U 472 (v. Forstner) at 0857.

The morning air reconnaissance of the sea area off Murmansk brought no results. The convoy was no longer observed in this area. Operations were therefore broken off.

1640 Radio message 1549/800 from Captain U-boats:

"Discontinue operations. "Mohs", "Schaar", "Hansen", "Bentzien", "v. Forstner" and "Schweiger" proceed to Hammerfest at maximum cruising speed. "Mangold" put in to Narvik via Andfjord."

These boats must refuel and take on more torpedoes.

1932 Radio message 1857/705 from C-in-C U-boats to groups "Werwolf" and "Wiking":

"Well done! Results up to now on PQ 25 and 26:
1. Definitely sunk: 7 destroyers, 4 steamers.
2. Torpedoed, probably sunk: 3 destroyers.
3. Torpedoed: 6 steamers (sinking not observed).
4. Probably hit: 6 destroyers, 1 steamer.
Keep it up."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

After concluding the operation against PQ 26

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and after the U-boats had set off for Hammerfest to refuel, the boats remaining in the Murmansk area, U 716 (Dunkelberg), U 313 (Schweiger), U 737 (Brasack), U 278 (Franze) and U 990 (Nordheimer) were combined into a new group "Werwolf".

In order to intercept the QP convoy expected to put out from Murmansk, they were ordered into attack areas from AC 9148 to AC 8258, depth of sweep 25 miles, in radio message 1545/799.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 312 (Nikolay) as weather boat in AE 35.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1. "Brasack" reported in radio message 2158/712 that one of his radio ratings was seriously ill. He requested meeting with boat with M.O.
U 314 (Basse) and U 737 (Brasack) accordingly received orders for rendezvous at 1000 on 1 February in AC 5982 to transfer the M.O.
2. Tromsø G.I.S. substation sent an interrogation report from the two prisoners from the British steamer "Fort Bellingham" of PQ 25, brought in by U 957 (Schaar). See Appendix II to this War Diary.
3. Sailing order for U 360 (Becker) from Narvik to Trondheim and for U 973 (Päpenmøller) from Bergen to AB 69, see Appendix III/1, and War Diary of 2 February, para. IV (d).

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), first operation, see Appendix IV/1.

Short report from U 965 (Ohling), first operation, see Appendix IV/2.

Short report from U 278 (Franze), first operation, see Appendix IV/3.

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. It appears from the short reports received so far on PQ 25 and from the prisoners' statements (see Appendix), that at least 6 steamers of PQ 25 and probably more, were sunk. These considerable losses explain the complete change of tactics in the case of PQ 26, and the increased use of anti-submarine patrols in and east of the passage between Bear Island and North Cape.
2. In Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 403, of 1 February, the following short report on the operation against PQ 26 was dispatched:

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- "(1) The convoy was first intercepted by the German Air Force on 26 January in AE 2675 (northeast of Iceland).
- (2) Seven boats were sent towards it at increased speed after the operation against PQ 25 had been broken off in the area AB 56 to 91. These boats formed group "Werwolf" and their number was later increased to 9 by one boat from Narvik and one from the south. After quick replenishing of supplies at Hammerfest 4 more boats put to sea again within one night as group "Wiking". Later group "Wiking" was increased to 5 boats by a boat newly arrived from the south. Thus, in all, 14 boats took part in the operation.
- (3) The convoy was reintercepted by the German Air Force at 1500 on 28 January in AB 8145, course 70°. It consisted of 14 merchant ships, 1 anti-aircraft cruiser and 7 destroyers.
- (4) The U-boats gained contact for the first time at 0934 on 29 January through the most northerly boat of the patrol line from AB 5651 to 9155; the convoy was reported on an easterly course. The air reconnaissance intercepted the convoy at 1100 in AB 5397, they observed 16 merchant ships and 10 destroyers. Contact, though not continuous contact, was maintained until 1700 on 30 January.
- (5) On 29 January and the night of 29/30 January the boats of group "Wiking" operated against the convoy and had several opportunities of firing torpedoes both at steamers and destroyers.
- (6) On 30 January contact was well maintained, but lost in the evening when visibility deteriorated. The approach of the U-boats was hindered by a large number of anti-submarine groups, consisting of 2 to 4 destroyers, which operated on both sides of the convoy but were mostly concentrated to the south of it. The boats were forced to submerge for long periods. Determined depth charge attacks.
- (7) After contact had been lost, an attempt was made to regain it during the night of 31 January by a double patrol line. This however remained ineffective, although the convoy passed the patrol line, just as it passed the patrol line off Murmansk on 31 January and the final U-boat position hard by the declared mined area off Murmansk on the night of 1 February. This failure was due to the large number of anti-submarine groups which forced the boats back to such an extent, that frequently they were unable

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to reach the ordered patrol lines in time. So far 14 different depth charge attacks, lasting up to 7 hours, have been reported.

- (8) When it was obvious that the convoy had entered the declared mined area off Murmansk, the patrol line was moved at daybreak slightly to the north to intercept stragglers.
- (9) Operations were broken off about 1800 on 1 February after air reconnaissance had confirmed that the convoy was no longer in the sea area off Murmansk.
- (10) Successes were obtained mainly on the first night, still outside the area in which strengthened anti-submarine groups later appeared, south and west of a line between Bear Island and North Cape.
- (11) 17 "Zaunkönig" acoustic torpedoes have so far been reported as fired:

U 956 (Mohs)	3 misses, 1 premature explosion.
U 737 (Brasack)	1 hit on destroyer, careened. 1 hit on destroyer proceeding at high speed. Sunk (heavy explosion, loud sinking noises), running time 10 minutes 30 seconds, afterwards 1 destroyer less heard in hydrophones.
U 957 (Schaar)	1 hit on destroyer. Careened. Running time 11 minutes. 1 hit on destroyer. Exploded after a running time of 12 minutes. (This destroyer was probably hit in the stern by "Franze" just beforehand.)
U 601 (Hansen)	1 probable hit on destroyer. Running time 13 minutes. Later nothing more at place of attack.
U 425 (Bentzien)	2 misses on destroyer. 1 hit on destroyer: sunk. (Heavy explosion and sinking noises.) Running time 2 minutes.
U 278 (Franze)	1 hit on destroyer astern. Running time 7 minutes 24 seconds, 1 minute later blew up (time coincided with "Schaar"'s hit).
U 472 (v. Forstner)	1 probable hit on destroyer (explosion after 150 seconds).
U 313 (Schweiger)	1 hit on destroyer. Probably sunk (explosion after 8 minutes, loud banging noises).

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U 965 (Ohling) 1 hit on destroyer:
ship careened.
U 990 (Nordheimer) 1 probable hit on
destroyer (explosion
after 14 minutes).

Total: 6 sunk, 1 torpedoed, probably sunk,
3 probable hits, 1 probable
finishing shot, 5 misses,
1 premature.

(12) Other torpedoes fired: 9 torpedoes
(3 fans).

U 737 (Brasack) 1 fan of two on overlapping
steamers, 1 probable hit
(explosion), 2 minutes
27 seconds.

U 957 (Schaar) 3 F.A.T.1, missed.
2 F.A.T.2 on 2 salvaging
vessels of which 1 was
torpedoed (running time
4 minutes 45 seconds),
1 premature explosion.

U 601 (Hansen) 2 F.A.T.1 on group of
steamers, probably missed.

Total: 1 vessel torpedoed, 1 probable hit.

(13) According to the last air reconnaissance
report the convoy consisted of 13 merchant
ships, 2 of them probably escort vessels,
9 destroyers.

(14) Experiences gained to date:

(a) The enemy employed for the first time
strong anti-submarine groups which
apparently came from Murmansk to meet
the convoy. They operated in the sea
area of the Bear Island passage where
geographical conditions do not give the
enemy an opportunity to take advantage
of his location gear to evade and by-
pass our own positions.

(b) Once again new commanders and crews
have given good proof of their
capabilities.

(15) At a conservative estimate from radio
messages and short reports, seven days of
continuous fighting against PQ's 25 and 26
have resulted in the following successes:

Sunk: 7 destroyers, 4 steamers.
Probably sunk: 3 destroyers.
Torpedoed: 6 steamers (sinkings not
observed).
Probably hit: 6 destroyers, 1 steamer.

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In our opinion it is very probable that at least some of the torpedoed steamers later sank, especially as the statements of the two British prisoners of war, picked up by U 957 (Schaar), who were gunners on the leading ship, imply that of PQ 25 alone six steamers were sunk."

(Signed) Peters.

2 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 716 AC 9148.
U 314 AC 8367.
U 737 AC 8349.
U 278 AC 8269.
U 990 AC 8258.
U 312 weather boat in AE 32 and 35.

In port:

U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 973 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 739 proceeding from AC 8351 to Narvik.
U 965 proceeding from AC 58 to Narvik.
2145 U 636)
1745 U 425)
1745 U 313)
2115 U 957) put in to Hammerfest from patrol line
2115 U 956) AC 8662 to 8258.
2230 U 472)
2115 U 601)
1730 U 973 put out from Bergen for AB 69.
U 360 proceeding from Narvik to Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Bodø.
1 Ju 88 on strip reconnaissance Kirkenes -
AC 5734 - 5445 - 5197 - 6177 - 6459 - 6845 - 9123 -
5928. No locations.
1 Ju 88 Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 8134 - 9158 on

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special mission. No locations. (Area covered by radar: AC 8179 - 8143 - 5764 - 9145 - 9271 - 9428 - 8179.)

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - AB 7417 - Vaernes. Enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of sea area Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 9771 - 9788 - 9759 - 6572 - Vardø - Kirkenes. One unidentified submarine half submerged on northerly course in AC 8831. Submerged when aircraft approached. Otherwise nothing sighted.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters Kirkenes - Vardø - Iokanka - AC 9788 - Kiberg. In Iokanka 2 merchant ships 5,000 G.R.T. each, 6 coastal vessels 800-1,000 G.R.T. each. (After comparison with reconnaissance result of 31 January probably the same ships. The tonnage of the ships was overestimated in the report of 31 January.)

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russia - Britain: on 1 February British units "JZX", "KSW", "AJ" each transmitted one tactical 3-letter group signal to Murmansk.

At 0605 Polyarno transmitted 1 urgent radio message to destroyers "Gremyashchi", "C", "H", "J" and Bo-boats Nos. 201 and 210. At 1059, 1357, and 1529 destroyer "J" received a very urgent radio message from Polyarno.

Norwegian polar coast: some radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: destroyers "Gremyashchi", "C", "H", "J" - the last is probably proceeding eastward.

Britain: 1 February brisk transmission of radio messages from units or warships to Murmansk.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats on patrol line off Murmansk as in I.a.

In radio message 2335/740 the boats were ordered to carry out nine-hourly westward and eastward movements within their attack areas from 0600 on 3 February, steering irregular courses while surfaced.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

After completing his task, U 312 (Nikolay) received orders in radio message 1429/726/169 to break off operations as weather boat at 1700 and put in to Narvik at maximum cruising speed.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1. Sailing order for U 713 (Gösejakob):

- "(a) Put out from Trondheim on afternoon of 3 February.
- (b) Proceed to Narvik, at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.
- (c) Expect U 360 (Becker), proceeding to Trondheim, who put out from Ramsund at 0300 on 2 February.
- (d) Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave (at present station "Goliath"). Ascertain frequency and schedule of routines from flotilla.
- (e) Use passage through fjord for anti-aircraft training.
- (f) If you put in punctually during daytime proceed at once to Ramsund to take on 4 T5 torpedoes."

2. Sailing order for U 973 (Päpenmøller):

- "(a) Put out from Bergen on 2 February.
- (b) Proceed to 64° N, at a distance of 50 miles from the coast, in accordance with Order No. 13 then at maximum speed to AB 69.
- (c) A QP convoy is expected. Off Murmansk group "Werwolf" with 5 boats (numbers and disposition to be ascertained from 11th U-boat Flotilla). U 312 (Nikolay) as weather boat in AE 35. Our own FW 200, BV 138 and Ju 88 on meteorological flights and reconnaissance.
- (d) Operational Order No. 1, radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long

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wave, U-boats Northern Waters wave after passing 67° N."

3. U 1060 (Brammer) reported passing 67° N to southward at 0037.
4. In the course of the afternoon, boats "Schaar", "Hansen", "Mohs", "Bentzien", "v. Forstner", "Schweiger" and "Hildebrandt" put in to Hammerfest.

V. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), first operation, see Appendix IV/1.

Short report from U 965 (Ohling), first operation (part 1), see Appendix IV/2.

Short report from U 278 (Franze), first operation, see Appendix IV/3.

Short report from U 965 (Ohling), first operation (part 2), see Appendix IV/4.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The increasing volume of Russian radio traffic of first priority, which became apparent towards evening, may indicate the imminent departure of the expected QP convoy.

(Signed) Peters.

3 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 716 AC 9148.

U 314 AC 8367.

U 737 AC 8349.

U 278 AC 8269

U 990 AC 8258.

In port:

U 313, 425, 472, 601, 636, 956, 957 Hammerfest,

U 307, 354, 711, 713 Trondheim,

U 277, 355, 387 Bergen,

U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1515 U 739 put in to Narvik from AC 8351.
1330 U 965 put in to Narvik from AC 58.
U 974 proceeding from Bergen to AB 69.
1700 U 360 put in to Trondheim from Narvik.
U 312 proceeding from AE 32 and 35 to Narvik.
1400 U 713 put out from Trondheim for Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on fan reconnaissance Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 8592 - 5575 - 5494 - 8432 - Vardø - Kirkenes. No sightings and locations.

1 Ju 88 on special reconnaissance Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 8662 - 5697 - 5833 - 8316 - Vardø - Kirkenes. Exhaustive with radar, no locations. Area covered by radar: AC 8127 - 8597 - 9713 - 6471 - 5451.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters Kirkenes - Vardø - AW 2222 - Svyatoi Nos - AW 2136 - 2138 - 2134 - 2131 - AC 8856 - Vardø - Kirkenes. Exhaustive. In AW 2245 and AC 8586 patrol boat, hove to. 1 patrol boat in AC 8855.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Bodø - 75° N, 5° E - Bear Island - Banak. On Bear Island a man was observed in front of a hut, after recognizing the aircraft he went into the hut. Hut evidently newly erected, stands in the immediate neighborhood of Mjogsjahytte.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes, enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 in the sea area of the Faeroes, enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1642 On the afternoon of 2 February several very urgent radio messages from Polyarno to all surface forces of the Russian Northern Waters Fleet and all submarines in the operational area as well as to guardships. Norwegian polar coast: lively and at times very urgent radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

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Murmansk area: destroyer "J".
Britain: 1 unit or warship in radio traffic with Archangel.
Radio traffic with Britain: brisk Murmansk and Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 278 (Franze) was attacked in the patrol line off Murmansk by a Russian aircraft at 1100. This was learned both from the intercepted report of the Russian aircraft, which reported a German U-boat at 1100 in AC 8319, and also from "Franze"'s own signal (radio message 1100/747) reporting two attacks in grid square 8265 "driven off".

It is possible that the enemy has discovered the patrol line as a result of this sighting. In order to prevent the other boats from being intercepted, and so that the patrol line shall not be found to be still in position later on, the U-boats were ordered to remain submerged during the daytime. The disadvantage of poor visibility must be accepted.

Radio message 1307/748 to group "Werwolf":

"1 boat of patrol line spotted by Russian aircraft. Remain submerged in daytime but do not rely solely on hydrophones, make frequent observations at periscope depth. On no account allow enemy to observe the patrol line."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

1. Short report from U 360 (Becker), third operation, see Appendix IV/5.
2. It appears from a teleprinter message from Naval High Command, radio reconnaissance department, that the last two convoys were numbered PQ 27 and 28 there. This was learned too late here. In a reply teleprinter message it was suggested that the radio reconnaissance department of the Naval High Command should, if a convoy appears in the radio picture, announce the number as early as possible, so as to avoid different numbering.
3. The order issued on 27 January forbidding attacks on independently routed ships between 66° and 71° N has been cancelled, since the activities on account of which it was made have ceased by order of Naval War Staff, 1st Division.

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4. Three new boats have been allocated to the Northern area in Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops., Most Secret 644, dated 2 February. According to 5th U-boat Flotilla Most Secret 289, dated 2 February, they are U 288 (Mayer), U 316 (Zoller) and U 361 (Seidel). U 288 has been allocated to the 13th U-boat Flotilla, the other two to the 11th U-boat Flotilla.

VII. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

4 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 716 AC 9148.
U 314 AC 8367.
U 737 AC 8349.
U 278 AC 8269.
U 990 AC 8258.

In port:

U 313, 425, 472, 601, 636, 956, 957 Hammerfest,
U 739, 965 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1200 U 312 put in to Narvik from AE 32 and 35.
U 713 proceeding to Narvik from Trondheim.
U 973 proceeding from Bergen to AB 69.
0930 U 472 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.
0930 U 601 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.
0930 U 636 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - AB 3973 - Banak. Broken off because of engine trouble. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 on fan reconnaissance Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 8665 - 5697 - 5679 - 8319 - Vardø - Kirkenes.

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Exhaustively covered by radar, no locations.
Area covered by radar: AC 8154 - 8591 - 9713 -
6472 - 5454.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes -
AA 9660 - Orland. Reconnaissance area 90%
covered, enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See IV (b).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of coastal inshore
waters Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 8585 - 8883 -
8948 - Iokanka - AW 2293 - Vardø - Kirkenes.
All of Kola coast apart from AW 2119 covered.
In Iokanka harbor 2 merchant vessels 3-4,000
G.R.T. each, 4 small vessels, 1 tanker 4,000
G.R.T.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1945 British unit transmitted a radio message to
Polyarno.
At 1100 a Russian aircraft reported a German
U-boat in 71° 30' N, 35° E.
On 3 February the Russian destroyer "J" in
traffic in the afternoon and evening with
Polyarno.
Shipping movements in the Gorlo Straits.
Norwegian polar coast: lively, some very
urgent, radio traffic to submarines in the
operational area.
Russian radio traffic: brisk.
British radio traffic: moderate Murmansk and
Archangel traffic.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Patrol line off Murmansk as yesterday, see I.(a).

In accordance with our view of the situation
(see below) radio message 1817/763 was sent:

"Group "Werwolf" to proceed at 0000 at cruising
speed via position line AC 5553 to 5786 to new

attack areas AC 4153 to 4723, depth of sweep 22 miles. "Dunkelberg" to report passing 30° E by short signal. Replenishing of supplies for "Brasack" arranged for the near future."

2115 Short signal received from U 716 (Dunkelberg): "Enemy's position AC 9145."

2202 The uncertainty left by this short signal was removed through radio message 2121/772:

"3 destroyers, probably search unit, moderate speed, southerly course. "Dunkelberg"."

2240 "Dunkelberg" reported that he lost contact while in pursuit to southward.

In order to prevent any uncertainty as to whether the boats were to operate on these enemy vessels, they were ordered in radio message 2306/778 to continue on their way at 10 knots as previously ordered in radio message 1817/763.

The air reconnaissance was requested by Admiral Northern Waters in the following teleprinter message to Luftflotte 5:

"To ensure that the expected QP convoy will be spotted by air reconnaissance, it is requested to extend the reconnaissance further east, as it is possible that the convoy may first steer an easterly course. A reconnaissance of the following sea area is requested: Petsamo - along the Kola coast as far as Svyatoi Nos - 46° E 1989 - 47° E 1023 - 37° E 8323 - 37° E 0457 - Vardø - Petsamo."

(c) Miscellaneous:

1. Transfer order for U 965 (Ohling):

- "1. Put out from Narvik at 0002 on 5 February.
2. Proceed south to Bergen via Westfjord at a distance of 50 miles from the coast. From 64° N proceed in accordance with Order No. 13.
3. Expect U 973 (Päpenmøller), who put out from Bergen on 2 February and is proceeding towards you. "Päpenmøller" is a test boat for conning tower Mark 6 (3.7 on platform in front of tower).
4. Report arrival at Hellisøy by short signal in good time.
5. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

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2. Naval High Command, radio reconnaissance department, informed us in Reg. No. AC 0404 Most Secret, of 4 February, that the last convoys intercepted have been numbered PQ 27 and PQ 28 in agreement with Naval War Staff 3rd Division. The next PQ convoy, therefore, will be 29, the next QP convoy 25.
3. The following tribute from Group North/Fleet was passed on to the U-boats:

"C-in-C Naval Group North, C-in-C Fleet wires: To Captain U-boats, Norway, and the U-boats who took part in the attack on the last Murmansk convoys, I hereby convey my heartiest congratulations and sincere admiration in respect of the successes you have achieved. Credit is due to excellent and farsighted leadership and in particular to the eagerness, dash and efficiency of the Commanders and their loyal crews."

VII. Survey of the situation:

(Also sent by teleprinter message Reg. No. Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 474, of 4 February, to Group North/Fleet, and for information to Naval War Staff 1st Division and Naval War Staff 2nd Division.)

U-boat situation as on 4 February:

1. After one of the boats in the patrol line off Kola Bay had been attacked by a Russian aircraft, orders were given yesterday for all the boats to remain submerged during daytime so as to avoid, if possible, that the enemy should discover the whole patrol line.
2. So far the weather and the defenses have prevented the Air Force from carrying out a reconnaissance of Kola Bay. There is therefore no information about the expected QP convoy.
3. It is feared that after the interception of the patrol line the QP convoy will evade it by hauling off to the east and that possibly it will then not be intercepted by our aircraft either. The German Air Force has therefore been requested to extend its reconnaissance further east. Another point is that in unfavorable weather conditions the air reconnaissance will not operate.
4. Since, moreover, it is to be expected that near the ports of departure of convoys the enemy defenses are particularly strong, so that the boats might be forced underwater at the beginning of the operation and would thus not be able to carry out attacks, it is intended to withdraw the patrol at 0000 on 5 February and to place it again in the Bear Island passage.

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5. There the boats could at the same time be on patrol against a possible new PQ convoy, and yet they would be able quickly to intercept a QP convoy if it was first spotted by the air reconnaissance. If not, the QP convoy could be attacked west of Bear Island passage, where it is thought that the enemy will have fewer anti-submarine groups available.
6. U 425 (Bentzien) and U 957 (Schaar) are in Hammerfest at operational readiness.
7. U 312 (Nikolay), U 713 (Gosejakob) and U 973 (Päpenmöller) are on their way out.
8. Short dockyard overhaul
 - a. in Alta: U 313 (Schweiger), U 957 (Mohs) both at "Huascaran".
 - b. in dock at Narvik: U 601 (Hansen) and U 472 (v. Forstner).
9. Minor repairs in Narvik to U 636 (Hildebrandt) and U 739 (Mangold).
10. Proceeding to Bergen for dockyard overhaul: U 965 (Ohling).

In reply, teleprinter message Most Secret 0196 A1 was received from Group North/Fleet:

- "1. The U-boats were drawn up in their position off Murmansk at a time when it was assumed that the sailing of a QP convoy was imminent.
2. As the time of sailing of the QP convoy is now quite indefinite, and in the circumstances it is not certain whether it would be intercepted, Group North/Fleet concurs with the plans of Captain U-boats, Norway."

(Signed) U. Peters.

5 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 713 proceeding from AC 9148) via AC 5553 to
U 314 proceeding from AC 8367) 5786 to AC 4153
U 737 proceeding from AC 8349) to 4723, depth
U 278 proceeding from AC 8269) of sweep 22
U 990 proceeding from AC 8258) miles.

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In port:

U 425, 957 Hammerfest,
U 313, 956 Alta,
U 312, 739 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1115 U 713 put in to Narvik from Trondheim.
2000 U 472 put in to Narvik from Hammerfest.
2000 U 601 put in to Narvik from Hammerfest.
2000 U 636 put in to Narvik from Hammerfest.
U 973 proceeding from Bergen to AB 69.
0015 U 965 put out from Narvik for Bergen.
1600 U 713 put out from Narvik for AC 6950.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

2 BF 109 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance of Kola Bay between Polyarno and Murmansk. Kola Bay backwater not examined, otherwise nothing to report.

1 BV 138 on fan reconnaissance Billefjord - Vardö - AC 8684 - 8592 - 5569 - 5454 - Billefjord. Both sides of flying route covered to a width of 40 - 50 km. by radar, no locations.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance Kirkenes - Vardö - AC 8665 - 5665 - 5673 - 8613 - Vardö - Kirkenes. Exhaustively covered by radar, no locations.

Area covered by radar: 8671 - 8938 - 9485 - 6483 - 6417 - 5624 - 5592 - 8531.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Otherwise nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In AC 8599 convoy of 4 merchant ships 7,000 G.R.T. each, stopped, 2 lines ahead, 5 destroyers, 4 corvettes, 5 escort vessels. Escort forces steering zig-zag courses on mean course of 50°. Remarkably brisk flashing signal traffic. Parts of convoy found in AC 8856. 2 destroyers, 2 - 3 corvettes, 1 escort vessel, 2 merchant vessels 700 G.R.T. each, course 230°, speed not known.

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(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Murmansk area: destroyer "J", guardships Nos. 25, 80, minesweepers Nos. 17, 11, 114, 117. Bo-boats Nos. 201, 207, 210, motor vessel "PS 75".

Russian radio traffic: moderate to normal. On the evening of 4 February numerous Russian warships appeared in the Murmansk area. It seems probable that a convoy will shortly put out from Kola Bay.

Britain: slight Murmansk broadcast, none from Archangel.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

0920 Telephone message received from Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

"Aircraft reported convoy at 0904 in AC 8834."

Group "Werwolf", proceeding west, was therefore ordered as follows:

1015 "Group "Werwolf" turn about. Form patrol line from AC 6776 to 8228 at maximum cruising speed."

Although there is as yet no clear information on nature and course of the reported convoy, it nevertheless seemed right to stop group "Werwolf" from moving off and to draw up the boats in a favorably situated patrol line. The boats were informed of the convoy in radio message 1035/781.

0945 The following amplifying report was received by teleprinter message from Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

"Aircraft reported at 0910 convoy in AC 8837, course 50° true, 4 merchant ships 5,000 G.R.T. each in two lines ahead. Escort vessels forming all-round screen. Ahead: 2 destroyers and 2 corvettes. Starboard: 1 corvette, 1 guardboat and 1 destroyer. Port: 1 destroyer, 1 guardboat and 1 corvette. Astern: 3 guardboats, 1 destroyer. Aircraft are maintaining contact. Beacon signals transmitted only on request."

The convoy is unusually well protected for only 4 steamers and is perhaps only a part convoy or a decoy.

1058 Telephone message received from Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

"At 1028 convoy hove to in AC 8858. Escort vessels on varying courses. We assume that the 0904 report concerned a preliminary convoy and that the main part is now following."

According to this the convoy is in fact, at least at present, still in two groups.

The boats lying ready in Hammerfest, U 425 (Bentzien) and U 957 (Schaar) received orders to put out immediately after carrying out necessary torpedo exchange and to make for AC 54.

U 713 (Gosejakob) is to get ready at increased speed and to put out from Narvik at 1500 this afternoon, and make for AC 4550.

U 973 (Päpenmüller) was ordered to report his position.

The repairs to the boats in Alta and Narvik are to be speeded up.

1230 Telephone message from Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

"Southern aircraft reported at 1200: convoy still hove to in AC 8858, is filling up further south. Aircraft now on return flight. Shadower only on northern escort. Another aircraft will take off this afternoon for convoy in Kola inlet."

1256 Radio message 1159/M/190:

"Most Immediate. Aircraft "U" reported at 1200 from AC 8858 convoy breaking up in southerly direction."

This evidently refers to the southern part of the convoy. So far the situation is not at all clear.

1413 Telephone message received from Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

"All messages transmitted today referred to one and the same convoy (including the report of 0904). Convoy is putting in to port. Nothing at sea. Harbor was not reconnoitered. The same reconnaissance is planned for tomorrow."

This gives an entirely different picture of the situation. We have here not the expected QP convoy but probably a part convoy coming from the east.

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The emergency measures immediately introduced by us, and which caused considerable disturbance and affected the U-boat repairs which were in progress, were therefore unnecessary.

In a conversation with Admiral Northern Waters he promised to ask the German Air Force to eliminate such false alarms in future if at all possible.

The order to U 957 (Schaar) and U 425 (Bentzien) to put out from Hammerfest has been cancelled. and the repair ships were ordered to continue work according to plan.

U 713 (Gosejakob) is nevertheless to put out as early as possible in order to relieve U 737 (Brasack).

Group "Werwolf" was ordered in radio message 1505/787 to proceed at 10 knots to the ordered attack areas near Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 713 (Gosejakob), see Appendix III/3.

V. Plans:

With reference to the laying of meteorological buoys, Reg. No. 235/44 Head of Naval Meteorological Service VI, was received from Naval High Command:

- "1. Because of ice conditions transfer the proposed position of meteorological buoy No. 126, transmitting frequency 5155 kc/s, at Jan Mayen to 66° N (six six), 12° W (one two), Iceland, depth less than 300 meters. If the position recommended is impossible because of the enemy situation, then transfer meteorological buoy No. 125 to about 72° N (seven two), 50° E (five zero), Novaya Zemlya.
2. The position of meteorological buoy No. 127, transmitting frequency 4215 kc/s (Barents Sea), remains unaltered."

Because of the convoys running at present, and the consequently strained U-boat situation, it will not be possible to take out the meteorological buoys for the time being.

VI. Survey of the situation: See under IV.b.

(Signed) Peters.

6 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 716 proceeding from AC 9148) via AC 5553 to
U 314 proceeding from AC 8367) 5786 to AC 4153
U 737 proceeding from AC 8349) to 4723, depth of
U 278 proceeding from AC 8269) sweep 22 miles.
U 990 proceeding from AC 8258)

In port:

U 313, 956 Alta,
U 425, 957 Hammerfest,
U 312, 472, 601, 636, 739 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 713 proceeding from from Narvik to AC 6950.
U 973 proceeding from Bergen to AB 69.
U 965 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen.
2015 U 312 put out from Narvik for AC 4950.
2100 U 313 put out from Alta for Hammerfest.
1510 U 425 put out from Hammerfest for AC 54.
1510 U 957 put out from Hammerfest for AC 54.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 BV 138 on fan reconnaissance, route Billefjord - AC 7657 - Billefjord. Broken off because of weather conditions after reaching reconnaissance area.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 8597 - 8856 - 8916 - 8973 - 9771 - 8539 - Vardø - Kirkenes. Only part of reconnaissance area covered because of showers, no sightings.

1 Ju 88 route Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 9815 - 9848 - 8937 - 9879 - AW 2343 - Vardø - Kirkenes. Not exhaustive because of heavy showers, no sightings.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - AB 7653 - Vaernes. 60% covered, enemy not sighted.
2 FW 200 to intercept enemy convoy. Routes:
1. Trondheim - AB 7984 - AA 9984 - 9921 - AB 7931 - Trondheim.

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2. Trondheim - AF 1417 - AE 2537 - 2264 -
AF 1151 - Trondheim.
Enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance
Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak.
Not exhaustive. In AB 6589 to 6597 long
drawn-out convoy of 38 merchant ships of more
than 5,000 G.R.T. each and at least 17
destroyers. Course probably 90°. Contact
made again from 1235 to 1308. Merchant ships
drew closer together in AB 6833, destroyers
steering to outside. Defenses: light anti-
aircraft fire from naval forces, no losses.

1 Ju 88 on fan reconnaissance Kirkenes - Vardø -
AC 8665 - 5693 - 8613 - Vardø - Banak.

Exhaustively covered by radar. 3 targets
located 20-30 km. away in AC 8357. After
approach of aircraft targets disappeared.
Apparently submarines, otherwise nothing to
report. Area covered by radar: AC 8832 -
9713 - 6455 - 6415 - 5526 - 5247 - 5431 -
5445 - 5713 - 5727 - 8422.

1 BV 138 as shadower on convoy, route Bille-
fjord - AB 6835 - Billefjord. In AB 6835 the
convoy was reckoned by radar to be 40 km. away.
Position of convoy AB 6588. Convoy consisted
of 2 groups. Broken off because of icing and
enemy interference with radar.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic at sea:
Norwegian polar coast: some radio traffic to
all submarines in the operational area.
Murmansk area: in the morning destroyer "J",
minesweeper No. 114.
Britain: no units or warships appeared.
Russian radio traffic: brisk in the evening,
otherwise little radio traffic.
Britain: normal Murmansk, no Archangel
broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1220 According to telephone message from Flieger
Fuehrer North (West) convoy is in AB 6588.

CONFIDENTIAL

This convoy comes as a complete surprise. It is an indication of the deplorable weakness of our air forces that it was not spotted by air reconnaissance long ago. The convoy has already come a large part of the way and is just off the Bear Island passage. The period for our attack is therefore limited. At any rate the return of group "Werwolf" to the Bear Island passage has quickly proved to be correct.

The following measures were taken immediately:

1. U 957 (Schaar) and U 425 (Bentzien) received orders to put out from Hammerfest immediately and make for AC 4580.
2. U 313 (Schweiger) was ordered to take on supplies quickly and put out again, after reaching Hammerfest from Alta.
3. U 713 (Gosejakob) received orders to make for AC 4750 at maximum speed.
4. U 312 (Nikolay) in Narvik received orders to put to sea quickly.

1300 Exact air report received in radio message 1214/197:

"Meteorological Reconnaissance Staffel 6 reported at 1200 38 merchant ships of 5,000 G.R.T. each in AB 6589, 15-17 escort vessels, course 90°."

1358 In radio message 1244/796 group "Werwolf" was informed of the convoy's position and in radio message 1409/798 of the convoy's strength.

Since it appears that this time the convoy is proceeding on a more southerly course, and so as not to have the wings of the patrol line too far off, the distance between the boats in the patrol line was reduced to 17 miles and the whole line was moved a little further south.

1413 Radio message 1307/797 was therefore sent:

"Group "Werwolf" to form patrol line from AC 4188 to 4755 at maximum speed."

1505 Flieger Fuehrer North (East) informed us that the meteorological aircraft had contact until 1320. At 1325 a BV 138 took off for the same purpose, it should reach the convoy at about 1515. This aircraft is to remain with the convoy until 2300.

1620 The Air Force reported the convoy in AB 6585. That is the same place as that reported by Meteorological Reconnaissance Staffel. This may be due to differences in the fix taken by the two aircraft.

1730 U 425 (Bentzien) and U 957 (Schaar) will pass SR 1 at 1800 after putting out from Hammerfest.

1850 The following teleprinter message was received from the German Air Force:

"Because of complete icing-up shadowing aircraft had to break off operations at 1600. Radar aeri-als completely iced. Impossible to transmit messages. Aircraft landed at about 1800. Full report from crew still being obtained and will come through at about 2000. Fog in Kirkenes and Banak and danger of icing-up right down to ground level. Impossible for further aircraft to take off this evening."

Meanwhile the patrol line has been formed. In order to intercept the enemy as early as possible, it seems best to let the patrol advance to meet the convoy. This will also make it more difficult for the enemy to by-pass the patrol line.

1907 Radio message 1846/703:

"Group "Werwolf" from Captain U-boats: From 2000, course 270°, speed 7 knots."

2020 Radio message from the Air Force:

"At the time of breaking off contact about 1545 convoy was still on course east. Merchant ships close together. Almost all the escort vessels were to the east and southeast of convoy. Further flights by aircraft before dawn on 7 February are not to be expected. In accordance with orders from Luftflotte 5 either Flieger Fuehrer North (East) or Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten will take over air reconnaissance, depending on weather conditions."

2054 The boats were informed accordingly in radio message 2054/708:

"At 1545, when air contact broke off, convoy was continuing on easterly course. Merchant ships were moving closely together. Almost all of escort east and southeast of convoy. Northern side favorable for attack."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 312 (Nikolay), see Appendix III/4.

V. Organizational:

A protest from the battle group against the use of "Huascaran" by 2 U-boats, addressed to Captain U-boats, Norway for information. In reply it was stated that, according to a previous directive from Naval High Command, the repair ship at Alta is intended for this purpose.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1. For survey of the situation regarding the convoy

reported by the German Air Force, see para.IV.b.

2. At noon the following U-boat situation was sent to Group North/Fleet and for information Naval War Staff, 1st Division and Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, Reg. No. Most Secret 503:

"U-boat situation at 1200 on 6 February. New PQ convoy of 38 merchant ships and 15 to 17 escort vessels was sighted in AB 6588 by meteorological aircraft. Group "Werwolf", consisting of 6 boats, is at present available to operate against it. Two other boats, U 957 and U 425, are putting out from Hammerfest at increased speed. Further, this evening U 312 will put out from Narvik and U 313 (Schweiger) from Hammerfest. Through the late interception of the convoy on the part of the German Air Force and the limited number of U-boats at operational readiness, the prospects for an effective attack are not too great. At 2000 the patrol line was in position AC 4188 to 4755."

3. The following Emergency teleprinter message Most Secret 504 A1, addressed to Group North/Fleet was received from Admiral Northern Waters:

"The large PQ convoy sighted today in the Bear Island passage proves once more the necessity for increased reconnaissance as requested in Most Secret 69 para.4 of 7 January (see Appendix IV of War Diary 1-15 January, 1944). The request is repeated most urgently. The unusually large supplies for Russia seem to indicate the preparation of a large-scale offensive on the Russian front to be started simultaneously with the expected invasion in the west. For this reason it is thought here that the allocation of more U-boats and bomber squadrons to the Northern area is not only justified but essential, in order to exploit fully the good opportunities of successes in Northern Waters which now exist for strong German forces."

(Signed) Peters.

7 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 278)
U 314)
U 713) patrol line from AB 4189 to 4755,
U 716) proceeding east at a speed of 9 knots.
U 737)
U 990)

In port:

U 313 Hammerfest,
U 956 Alta,
U 472, 601, 636, 739 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 973 proceeding from Bergen to AB 69.
U 965 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen.
U 312 proceeding from Narvik to AC 4950.
U 425 proceeding from Hammerfest to AC 4385.
U 957 proceeding from Hammerfest to AC 4385.
0920 U 313 put out from Hammerfest for AC 5738 via
AC 4680.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 BV 138 on fan reconnaissance Billefjord -
AC 8645 - 5895 - 5736 - 5495 - 8563 - Billefjord.
No locations. Area covered by radar: AC 5846 -
5276 - 2473 - 2446 - 1355 - 1291 - 4891.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

2 BV 138 on reconnaissance against the enemy convoy.
Flying route Tromsø - Ingøy - AC 4942 - 4533 -
1882 - 1875 - 4531 - 4838 - Tromsø. No locations.
Flying route Tromsø - Ingøy - AC 4822 - 4516 -
4275 - 4168 - 4136 - 1792 - 4122 - 4465 - 4842 -
Tromsø. German U-boat in AC 4159.
1 BV 138 (radar) on route Tromsø - AC 4836 - 4295 -
1795 - 4143 - 4514 - 4817 - Tromsø. No locations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes -
Jan Mayen - Vaernes. Enemy not sighted.

CONFIDENTIAL

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

At 0530, 7 February:
Britain: no units or warships appeared.
Russian radio traffic: moderate.
Britain: slight Murmansk and Archangel broadcasts.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

The patrol line advancing against the enemy had not made contact at 2400. So that it should not pass the enemy, it was halted in radio message 2359/712:

"To group "Werwolf": If no contact - stop."

0200 The boats had still not made contact. There is a danger that they will fall behind the convoy. Therefore they were ordered in radio message 0215/713 to steer on course 90°, speed 9 knots, from 0400.

In this way the patrol line will move at about the same speed and in the same direction as the convoy.

If the air report was correct, the patrol line should have intercepted the convoy unless it made a sharp turn to the north.

0700 In order to adapt our own disposition to a possible northeasterly convoy course, the boats of group "Werwolf" were ordered in radio message 0724/714 to steer on course 50° from 0800.

0747 "Schaar" and "Bentzien" received orders to make for AC 4385 at increased cruising speed.

0800 U 312 (Nikolay) reported passing Harstad at 0680 on his passage out to sea.

0900 Radio message 0849/715:

"From 0930 expect 2 BV 138 in the operational area."

CONFIDENTIAL

So far the boats did not succeed in making contact. Complete uncertainty prevails regarding the movements and whereabouts of the convoy. Everything depends on the air reconnaissance.

1055 Telephone message from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:
"BV 138 reported convoy at 1039 in AC 4158."

The order to the U-boats to operate on this message was just being prepared when the same aircraft reported at 1050 that the radio message of 1039 was wrong.

Apparently the aircraft had located the ice limit. When later the two aircraft out on operations reported that they were about to return, it became clear that no results could be expected from the air reconnaissance for the moment. Pending further information it must be assumed that the convoy has hauled far off to the north. A new patrol line was ordered to intercept it.

1145 Radio message 1130/718:
""Bentzien", "Schaar" and group "Werwolf" to form patrol line AC 1982 to 4658 at maximum speed."

1225 In radio message 1148/718 U 313 (Schweiger) was ordered to make for AC 4680 and U 973 (Päpenmöller) for AC 4950 at maximum speed.

1345 "Bentzien", "Schaar" and "Schweiger" were added to group "Werwolf".

The extensive afternoon air reconnaissance also remained without result. It covered an area of more than 110 miles wide west of the patrol line and according to Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten was exhaustive.

2200 In radio message 2137/728 the order of group "Werwolf" was rearranged: "Bentzien", "Schaar", "Dunkelberg", "Basse", "Brasack", "Franze", "Nordheimer", "Gosejakob", "Schweiger".

In radio message 2143/729, "Nikolay" and "Päpenmöller" were ordered to make for AC 5750 and report by short signal on passing 25° E.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports: None.

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. For current situation survey see under IV.b.

2. The following U-boat situation report was sent at 1400 to Group North/Fleet, and for information to Naval War Staff, 1st Division and Naval War Staff, 2nd Division C-in-C U-boats, Ops.:

"U-boat situation at 1400 on 7 February. The PQ convoy reported yesterday by air reconnaissance has not yet been intercepted by either the U-boats or this morning's air reconnaissance. It is believed that the convoy has evaded our patrol line by hauling off to the north as far as the ice limit. A new patrol line of 8 boats has been ordered from AC 1982 to 4658, positions will be taken up at about 1800. Two BV 138 took off at 1300 to reintercept the convoy. U 313 (Schweiger) will have joined the patrol line by 2200."

3. At 2200 the following report on the U-boat situation was sent to the same addressees:

"(1) Convoy not yet intercepted by either aircraft or U-boat patrol line. According to the opinion of the Air Force, based on today's reconnaissance results, the convoy is definitely not in the area reconnoitered by aircraft with radar. (Between 21° and 27° E.)

(2) There are the following possibilities:

- a. The convoy, after spotting the shadower on 6 February, took evasive action northwards, west of Bear Island in order to await the arrival of anti-submarine search groups.
- b. The convoy has taken evasive action northwards, east of Bear Island and is proceeding close to the ice limit or through drift-ice to the east.
- c. The air observation of 6 February was erroneous and the convoy was in fact going west.
- d. Today's air reconnaissance has not intercepted the convoy in the sea area east of Bear Island.

(3) Our plans: To move the patrol line this evening at 2400 to AC 5389 to 5738 so as not to fall to leeward on any account.

(4) The Air Force has been requested to carry out reconnaissance on 8 February in the area between 20° and 40°."

(Signed) Peters.

8 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 425)	to AC 5389
U 957)	to AC 5621
U 716)	to AC 5618
U 314) proceeding from	to AC 5563
U 737) patrol line	to AC 5367
U 278) AC 1982 to AC 4658	to AC 5582
U 990)	to AC 5579
U 713)	to AC 5814
U 313)	to AC 5738.

In port:

U 956 Alta,
U 472, 601, 636, 739 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 312 proceeding from Hammerfest via
AC 5750 to AC 5738.
U 973 proceeding from Bergen to AC 5750.
U 965 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen.
1620 U 636 put out from Narvik for Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - AB 2890 - Bardufoss. Nothing to report.
2 BV 138 on reconnaissance of sea area between 18° and 27° E, and from the coast as far as 71° 20' N. Operation broken off in Porsangerfjord because of heavy snow showers and icing-up.
1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 8721 - 8546 - 8558 - 8882 - 8832 - 8866 - 8256 - 8554 - 8254 - Vardø - Kirkenes. No sightings.
1 Ju 88 on strip reconnaissance Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 8225 - 5825 - 5734 - Vardø - Nautsi. Broken off in AC 5825 because of a technical defect. No location.
3 BV 138 with radar on strip reconnaissance of sea area AC 7362 - AB 9454 limited in the north by the ice limit and aircraft's range. 2 aircraft broke off operations in Porsangerfjord because of snow showers and icing-up.
All operations without anything to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

4 BV 138 on sea reconnaissance between 17° and 4° E as far as the ice limit.
All aircraft returned without anything to report.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - AA 9660 - Vaernes. No enemy sighted.
3 FW 200 and 2 Ju 88 with radar on sea reconnaissance to intercept enemy convoy traffic bound for Russian Arctic ports.
In AF 1351 5 ships, including warships, presumably destroyers, and 3 merchant ships. Course and speed not known. Reconnaissance broken off because of weather conditions and breakdown of radar.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Britain: no units or warships appeared.
Britain: very little Murmansk broadcast, no Archangel broadcast.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Since we had to work on the most unfavorable possibility, the patrol line had to be moved further east in accordance with yesterday evening's considerations, in order at all costs to let the boats remain ahead of the convoy.

Radio message 2133/727:

"Group "Werwolf" to proceed at 2400 at maximum speed to new patrol line AC 5389 to 5738."

Towards morning, reports were received from U 990 (Nordheimer) and U 278 (Franze) to the effect that they were unable to maintain their speed because of seaway and would reach the patrol line late. It will be the same with the other boats.

Air reconnaissance is planned:

- a. by Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: 4 aircraft with radar in sea area AB 9397 - 9723 - 3867 - 5546;

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- b. by Flieger Fuehrer North (East): 2 aircraft between 18° and 27° E as far as 71° 20' N.
3 aircraft on strip reconnaissance AC 7362 - AB 9351 and northward as far as the ice limit.
1 aircraft between 27° and 25° E on reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters as far as 71° 20' N.
1 aircraft on strip reconnaissance in sea area AC 8266 to AC 7362 as far as the ice limit.

The air reconnaissance is of decisive importance. An increase has been requested through Naval War Staff, 1st Division. (Cf. today's "Survey of the situation".)

1600

The air reconnaissance has remained without result. The majority of aircraft had to break off operations because of the weather. Radio and location gear broke down because of icing-up.

In order to intercept the convoy, in case it has hauled off to the northeast, the patrol line was moved in such a way that it would cover all routes to Murmansk so far known to have been used during the winter. It has also been increased in strength by 2 boats.

Radio message 1035/742:

- "1. U 312 (Nikolay) and U 973 (Päpenmüller) to join group "Werwolf" as boats Nos. 10 and 11.
2. Group "Werwolf" to form patrol line AC 6751 to 6763.
Set off at 1800 at maximum speed that weather permits."

1541

Flieger Fuehrer North (West) reported for 1035:

"5 ships, including 2 probable destroyers, in AF 1343, course and speed not made out because of weather."

The question remains open whether this refers to a new eastbound convoy or an approaching search group. It is also possible, that the air report of the day before yesterday may have been a smaller westbound group. In that case the number of ships was considerably overestimated at the time, or the convoy has been dispersed by the weather.

No more messages were received in the afternoon or evening.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous: Nothing to report.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Transfer orders for U 636 (Hildebrandt), see Appendix III/2.

Short report from U 956 (Mohs), see Appendix IV/6.

Short report from U 957 (Schaar), see Appendix IV/7.

Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), see Appendix IV/8.

Short report from U 472 (v. Forstner), see Appendix IV/9.

Short report from U 636 (Hildebrandt), see Appendix IV/10.

Short report from U 739 (Mangold), see Appendix IV/11.

Short report from U 313 (Schweiger), see Appendix IV/12.

Organizational:

Sea Defense Commandant Kristiansand (South) and Admiral, West Coast have been requested to assist the passage of U 362 (Franz) and U 674 (Muss) to Bergen at increased speed. The 11th U-boat Flotilla has been instructed to ensure a speedy briefing and departure of the boats.

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. The following survey of the situation in Northern Waters was received from Group North/Fleet in Most Secret 0211 A1:

"a. The last three PQ convoys passed Bear Island passage at intervals of about one week, PQ 25 (according to the numbering given at the time) on 6 February according to dead reckoning. The first two convoys were relatively small (about 15 steamers) and together corresponded roughly to the strength of earlier PQ convoys while the last convoy, both as regards the number of steamers and the light escort forces, corresponded to earlier convoys. A returning QP convoy has not been observed since 25 January.

b. The purpose of the enemy's changed convoy tactics is not evident, there are the following possibilities:

1. As a result of agreements reached and a planned large-scale offensive which would consume great quantities of material, the delivery of supplies to Russia is to be

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speeded up, and the period of darkness in Arctic waters exploited to the full.

2. The enemy intends, by a quick succession of convoys, to exhaust our forces both as regards manpower and boats available, so that our power to attack will be lessened with each successive convoy.
 3. Owing to Russia's urgent need for supplies, the first convoy sailed earlier than was originally intended and was really meant to form one large convoy together with the second one.
- c. We must still expect that PQ convoys and corresponding QP convoys will continue to run at short intervals."

2. Operations by the German Air Force and U-boats:

- a. Luftflotte 5 has done everything to comply with the requests of the Navy for reconnaissance flights against PQ convoys and - so far as was necessary - against QP convoys. The fact that, of the last three convoys, the first was intercepted by U-boats only on reaching the Bear Island passage, the second by a meteorological aircraft, and the third by another meteorological aircraft about half a day's run west of Bear Island passage, shows that air reconnaissance with the available forces does not ensure the early interception of convoys - the last two successes were merely a lucky chance.
- b. So long as air interception of convoys is not certain, the main burden of reconnaissance remains with the U-boats. This implies that at any given time there would always have to be at least six boats in the Bear Island passage, and if, as is desirable, the patrol line were to be moved further to southwest, the number required would be correspondingly greater. Apart from the boats at sea, a large number of boats in port, at operational readiness, would be needed to ensure successful attacks against the frequently running convoys.

3. Conclusions:

- a. A further increase in Northern Waters U-boats is considered necessary. Attention is drawn to the fact that combat strength would not rise in direct proportion with an increase in boats, as the maintenance capacity in Northern Waters would soon be exhausted, so that long passages for repairs in home ports would become necessary.

- b. It is requested to apply to the C-in-C of the Air Force, Operational Staff, for the reinforcement of Luftflotte 5 so that convoy reconnaissance may be extended.

I U 3849/44 Most Secret, Naval War Staff, 1st Division gives the following survey of the overall situation and the need, arising therefrom, for increased air reconnaissance:

Subject: Reconnaissance of Northern Waters.

- "1. At 1200 on 6 February a meteorological aircraft sighted a new PQ convoy 120 miles southwest of Bear Island in AB 6588. (38 merchant vessels and 15 to 17 escort vessels.) Six U-boats were in patrol line from AC 4188 to 4755 at about 2000. Three more boats in Hammerfest and one boat in Narvik, are putting out to join the U-boat formation as soon as they are ready.
2. The convoy is already so far east that there are only 440 miles left to Murmansk, which at a day's run of approximately 200 miles corresponds to 55 hours until the convoy will reach its destination. The boats therefore have only a limited time available for attack. This will not allow them first to scatter the destroyer escort, and then to concentrate on the merchant ships, which are spread out over a wide area, and to succeed in sinking a decisive number of them.
3. The situation was the same with PQ convoy 25 (25/26 January, 1944). In the case of PQ 26, however, previous radio reconnaissance led to early operations by the Air Force and the early interception of the convoy. Consequently, a greater number of boats were able to make successful attacks between 29 January and 1 February, 1944.
4. In the period from 26 January to 6 February three eastbound convoys passed Bear Island. Every steamer that succeeds in passing our Northern Waters position undamaged, will discharge at Murmansk or Archangel large quantities of war material that must presently be destroyed by our Army and Air Force in hard fighting on the eastern front. For this reason the number of U-boats operating in Northern Waters is, in accordance with the Führer's orders, to be increased up to the limit of the capacity of our bases (at present 25, shortly 32). The successful battle against the convoys, which is regarded by the Naval War Staff as a common task for all the armed forces, can only be expected if the convoys are intercepted by aircraft early enough for the U-boats, when acting

on their reports, to begin operations, roughly off Jan Mayen. To achieve this increased air reconnaissance, expressly for this purpose, in the area east of Iceland and south of Jan Mayen is absolutely indispensable. Naval War Staff therefore requests that Luftflotte 5 be put in a position where it will definitely be possible to carry out such reconnaissance at all times."

U-boat situation as of 2000 on 8 February:

1. Convoy not intercepted today by either U-boats or aircraft. The latter were greatly hampered by weather and icing conditions, especially in the sea area east of Bear Island passage, reconnaissance partly broken off.
2. At 1035 5 ships, 2 of them probably destroyers, intercepted by aircraft in AF 1343, without details of course or speed. Further details could not be obtained because of the weather. The position corresponds roughly to 2 days' run of the convoy since 6 February.
3. Uncertainty regarding the position of the convoy reported the day before yesterday continues. There is a possibility, arising from a new sighting, that this is a westbound convoy. In that case, either the number of ships reported was grossly overestimated at the time, owing to inaccurate sighting, or the convoy has been dispersed by the weather.
4. Further, it is possible that the convoy took the most northerly route along the ice limit and hauled off to the east. In that case it is probable that it bypassed our patrol line from AC 6751 to 5763.
5. Intention: to leave group "Werwolf", which now consists of 11 boats, in its present patrol line until there is some certainty whether we are dealing with a PQ or QP convoy.
6. The boats' progress is delayed by the weather. Allowance must therefore be made for irregularities in the disposition.

(Signed) Peters.

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9 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 425 AC 6751.
U 957 AC 6741.
U 716 AC 5962.
U 314 AC 5953.
U 278 AC 5943.
U 990 AC 5941.
U 713 AC 5861.
U 313 AC 5852.
U 312 AC 5843.
U 973 AC 5763.

In port:

U 956 Alta,
U 572, 601, 739 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387 Bergen,
U 362, 674 Kristiansand (South),
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1200 U 636 proceeding to Trondheim from Narvik.
U 965 put in to Bergen from Narvik.
U 737 proceeding from AC 5951 to Hammerfest.
1245 U 362 put out from Kristiansand (South)
for Bergen.
1245 U 674 put out from Kristiansand (South)
for Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters.
In Iokanka harbor 3 merchant vessels about 5,000
G.R.T., 1 merchant vessel 3,000 G.R.T., 9 coastal
vessels 1,000-1,500 G.R.T. In AW 2294 1 merchant
ship 2,000 G.R.T., 1 guardship. 1 patrol vessel
in AW 2295.

1 Ju 88 spotted 1 ship, 800 G.R.T., probably anti-
submarine vessel, in AC 8993.

1 Ju 88 on fan reconnaissance Nautsi - AC 8665 -
5698 - 5913 - 8342 - Kirkenes.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance Banak - Vardø - AC 8139 -
5496 - 5585 - 8312 - 8356 - 8339 - 8653 - 8396 -
Vardø - Kirkenes.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

2 BV 138 on reconnaissance against the vessels
sighted on 8 February. No locations.

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Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, enemy not sighted.

3 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 with radar on sea reconnaissance to intercept enemy convoy traffic.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Reconnaissance areas not exhaustively covered because of partial icing-up of radar, no enemy sightings. In AF 4595, enemy convoy of 36 merchant vessels, 4,000-8,000 G.R.T. each, in 10 lines abreast. Escort, in all-round screen, of 15 destroyers and 8 guardships or corvettes, course 240°, speed about 8 knots. Defense by medium and heavy anti-aircraft fire - no losses.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to all submarines in the operational area. Britain: no units or warships appeared. Russian radio traffic: very moderate. Britain: normal Murmansk broadcast traffic, no Archangel traffic.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

0434 "Brasack" received orders to put in to Hammerfest to replenish supplies. The other boats of group "Werwolf" are to adjust the patrol line accordingly.

1156 U 973 (Päpenmüller) reported by short signal that he was only at limited operational readiness.

1230 Flieger Fuehrer North (West) reported that at 1003 36 merchant ships and 23 escort vessels, course 250°, speed 8-9 knots, were sighted in AF 4644.

This proves conclusively that the convoy reported on 6 February was in fact westbound and that the course originally given by the Air Force rested on an error. It is amazing that during several hours' observation the Air Force was unable to establish the convoy's course correctly and yet was able to give such

precise details as "escort almost exclusively ahead and to south", which caused Captain U-boats on his part to point out the northern side as the most favorable for attack. The maneuvers carried out at high speed and the transfer of the patrol line eastwards as far as the Barents Sea were therefore entirely superfluous.

It now becomes necessary to draw up the boats against newly approaching eastbound convoys. The boats are therefore first to occupy a patrol line in the Bear Island passage and from there to advance southwest to a new line in the Jan Mayen area.

1407

Accordingly radio message 1347/755 was sent:

- "1. Group "Werwolf" to set off at a speed of 10 knots to new patrol line AB 6896 to 6245.
2. "Päpenmöller" to report particulars.
3. Further transfer of patrol line southwestwards is planned."

The boats were further informed that the convoy reported has been confirmed as sailing westward. "Basse" was ordered to report his fuel position by short signal.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

U-boat situation as of 1500 on 9 February:

1. After it was confirmed at 1000 today, by the reconnaissance of Flieger Fuehrer North (West), that the convoy sighted on 6 February in AB 6580 was proceeding west, the U-boat patrol line was ordered to proceed westwards.
2. The formation of a new patrol line west of Bear Island passage from AB 6245 to 6896 has been ordered. From there the patrol line will advance southwestwards as far as a line from AB 7356 to 8885.
3. It is intended that 9 to 10 boats should occupy the patrol line off Jan Mayen. Three boats, ready for operations at short notice, are lying clear at Hammerfest.
4. The patrol line west of Bear Island passage will be occupied approximately at 0600 on 11 February, and the patrol line off Jan Mayen approximately at 0800 on 12 February.
5. Since the patrol line off Jan-Mayen is not definitely based on the ice limit, and there is a danger that convoys may circumnavigate it,

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continuous air reconnaissance will be necessary.

6. A returning QP convoy apparently put out from Murmansk on the morning of 3 February, and evaded our patrol line (5 boats from AC 9148 to 8258) by hauling off to the east.

(Signed) Peters.

10 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 425 proceeding from AC 6751)
U 957 proceeding from AC 6741)
U 716 proceeding from AC 5962)
U 314 proceeding from AC 5953) to patrol line
U 278 proceeding from AC 5943) from AB 6696
U 990 proceeding from AC 5941) to AB 6245
U 713 proceeding from AC 5861) (speed 10 knots).
U 313 proceeding from AC 5852)
U 312 proceeding from AC 5843)
U 973 proceeding from AC 5763)

In port:

U 956 Alta,
U 472, 601, 739 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1120 U 636 proceeding to Trondheim from Narvik.
0800 U 737 put in to Hammerfest from AC 5951.
0800 U 362 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand
(South).
0800 U 674 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand
(South).
1830 U 674 put out from Bergen for AF 22.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Fliieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on shipping and ice reconnaissance.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E. Nothing to report.

Fliieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance Vaernes - Jan Mayen -
Vaernes, no enemy sightings.
2 FW 200 on sea reconnaissance of convoy routes.
No enemy sightings.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In Iokanka harbor 2 merchant ships 5,000 G.R.T.
each, 3 merchant ships 2,000 G.R.T. each,
4 merchant ships 1,000 G.R.T. each, 1 merchant
ship 800 G.R.T. entering the harbor.

In AC 8868 two destroyers, course 100°, high
speed. Kola from Murmansk to Kola bend about
15 - 20 merchant ships 3,000 - 5,000 G.R.T.
each, hove to. From Kola bend to Shavor Point
3 merchant vessels totaling 18,000 G.R.T.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian Commandant of Novaya Zemlya base (who
is called Major Lakovinkov) is at present in
Archangel. Flying back to Belushya (AT 7234),
weather permitting, on 10 February.

Radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast:
very little radio traffic to all submarines in
the operational area.

Britain: no units or warships appeared.

Russian radio traffic: very moderate.

Britain: average Murmansk, no Archangel
broadcast traffic.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Werwolf" is advancing westwards, and is
to proceed via a patrol line west of Bear Island
to a second patrol line east of Jan Mayen, which
however has not yet been specified. To keep a
check on the progress of the boats, U 425
(Bentzien) who is likely to be furthest behind,
was ordered to report by short signal on passing
20° E.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 973 (Päpenmüller), the trial boat testing the
Mark VI conning tower, reported at 0150:

"Because of lack of stability in heavy seas have shipped large quantities of water. Ballast pump not sufficient. Experience report: wind, bridge protection normal. Little spray. Time required for crash-diving lengthened. Depth-keeping made more difficult. Unrestricted use of gun only in light seas. 3.7 cm. clear."

He received the following radio message 1104/768:

"Weather conditions in last few days particularly unfavorable, caused difficulties also for other boats. Continue tests if at all possible. Report by short signal "Yes" if absolutely necessary to put in to Hammerfest."

1630 Radio message 1153/711 received from "Päpenmøller":

1. As compensating tank drained by redistribution of ballast, in case of heavy intake of water, no ballast reserves for emergencies. Submerged with 11 tons of water in bilges, 6 tons in compensator.
2. Because of stability, no tactical freedom to maneuver in seas of more than 5 to 6.
3. Consider verbal report to Captain U-boats necessary."

1755 "Päpenmøller" received orders in radio message 1739/774 to put in to Narvik via Andfjord.

As U 314 (Basse) has not answered yesterday's request to report fuel stocks by short signal, the request was repeated.

In the course of the evening a message was received stating that in an air raid on the "Tirpitz" in Altafjord six high-explosive bombs were dropped from a great height and fell into the mountains around the ship.

Sailing order for U 674 (Muss) from Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 588:

1. Put out from Bergen on the evening of 10 February.
2. Proceed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast as far as 64° N in accordance with Order No. 13, then at 12 knots to AF 22. Group "Werwolf" at present in Bear Island passage, will proceed to a patrol line from about AB 8855 to 7356. Details of composition from 11th U-boat Flotilla. Own FW 200, BV 138 and Ju 88 on meteorological flights and reconnaissance in this sea area.

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3. Operational Order No. 1, radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave. Report by short signal when 65° N passed. From then on U-boats Northern Waters wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 601 (Hansen), ninth operation, see Appendix IV/13.

VII. Survey of the situation:

The air attack reported under IV (c) indicates the danger from this quarter to the U-boat bases at Hammerfest and Narvik. The only effective counter-measure is a dispersal of the boats, as effective shelter against air raids (U-boat bunkers) is not available. However, the danger is not yet considered so great that this dispersal will have to take place now.

The following comments on yesterday's situation were received from Group North/Fleet in Most Secret 0225 A1, of 9 February:

- "1. Fundamentally in agreement with your plans according to reference, but the following points should be checked:
 - a. The patrol line off Jan Mayen must reach up to the ice limit and be drawn up in such a way that it will cover all possible convoy approach routes.
 - b. Reconnaissance by U-boats must be complete even without supplementary air reconnaissance.
2. The ice limit must therefore be continuously patrolled and the patrol line moved correspondingly. If the conditions of para.1 cannot be fulfilled with the planned disposition, the patrol line must not be moved so far southwards.
3. See also teleprinter message Group North/Fleet Most Secret S.O.s only 44/44 A1, of 17 January."

In reply Captain U-boats, Norway dispatched the following comments on the situation and report of his plans in Most Secret 590:

"In reply to Group North/Fleet Most Secret 0225 A1 of 9 February:

1. The present pack-ice limit off Jan Mayen runs approximately from AA 9960 to AB 7510 - 4890 - 4640. At the moment there are loose drift-ice fields with ice-free patches between them in AB 77 - 73 - 57 - 55. It is known from experience that these ice fields may be shifted

rapidly and unpredictably by wind and seaway, so that there is no guarantee that they will at all times form a protective flank for the patrol line. It is not possible to let the U-boats operate inside the drift-ice fields and immediately adjoining the pack-ice limit, as the danger of considerable ice damage is far too great.

2. As the pack-ice limit veers to the southeast off Jan Mayen and then turns north again, it is best to let the patrol line adjoin the ice limit at this point. With the present ice position, any movement back in the direction of the Bear Island passage would make conditions less favorable, in that the patrol line could be more easily bypassed.
3. The demand of Group North/Fleet for the complete effectiveness of the U-boat patrol, even without air support could be fulfilled with favorable ice and weather conditions. But there can be no absolute guarantee of this.
4. The early interception of the convoy, as our experience with PQ 28 has shown, is of extreme importance if the convoy is to be successfully attacked before passing the Bear Island passage. For this reason, too, it would be unfavorable to move the patrol line back in the direction of the Bear Island passage. A convoy would take 3 days from Northern Scotland to reach the patrol line, and $2\frac{1}{2}$ days from the northern tip of Iceland.
5. For the above reasons, air reconnaissance is considered necessary. Since Luftflotte 5, in Ia 1064/44 Most Secret, dated 9 February, has issued orders that Flieger Fuehrers North (East) and (West) are to fly an exhaustive reconnaissance of a convoy's daily run until further notice, this will at least cover the need for reconnaissance of the sea area northeast of Iceland. The sea area around the Faeroes remains uncovered."

(Signed) Peters.

11 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 312 AB 6245.
U 313 AB 6276.
U 713 AB 6521.
U 990 AB 6552.
U 278 AB 6582.
U 716 AB 6589.
U 957 AB 6837.
U 425 AB 6868.
U 314.

In port:

U 956 Alta,
U 737 Hammerfest,
U 472, 601, 739 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 362, 387, 965 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 973 proceeding from AB 63 to Narvik.
U 674 proceeding from Bergen to AF 22.
0000 U 636 put in to Trondheim from Narvik.
0834 U 737 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

2 BF 109 on meteorological, shipping and airfield reconnaissance.

From Murmansk to the Kola bend about 10 merchant ships, 6,000 - 8,000 G.R.T. each, 10 merchant vessels, 1,000 - 3,000 G.R.T. each.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 of Meteorological Reconnaissance Staffel Vaernes - AA 9630 - Vaernes, no enemy sightings.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1 Ju 88 reported by radio:

At 1525 in AF 7654 enemy formation, 1 aircraft carrier, 1 battleship, 3 cruisers, 7 destroyers,

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1 flying boat, course 210°, speed 30 knots. Aircraft carrier in the center, battleship astern to starboard, all-round screen of destroyers, line-abreast formation, shadowed until 1645.

1 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance to re-intercept the reported enemy formation with radar, located three shipping targets at a distance of 18 km. in AF 7895, type of ships, course and speed not determined.

- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Werwolf" on its westward passage has now approximately reached the Bear Island passage. As it is doubtful whether "Basse" is still with the group, "Dunkelberg", "Schaar" and "Bentzien" were ordered to move up one position further north in the patrol line.

1157 Radio message 1123/788:

"1. Group "Werwolf" to proceed in new order, "Bentzien", "Schaar", "Dunkelberg", "Franze", "Nordheimer", "Gosejakob", "Schweiger", "Nikolay", at 1600 from present patrol line to new patrol line AB 8842 to 7356, speed 10 knots.

2. Avoid damage from ice. Drift-ice limit believed to be AB 4640 to 5760 to 7350."

1452 U 425 (Bentzien) reported by short signal that he has passed 20° E.

This shows that the boat is even further behind than believed. Group "Werwolf" therefore received orders in radio message 1528/797 not to leave the patrol line at 1600 but to wait until 2400.

The German Air Force reported at 1549: in AF aircraft carrier, battleship, 3 cruisers, 7 destroyers, course 210°, line abreast, speed 30 knots.

This report was sent to "Muss" in radio message 1730/649/65. He received orders to continue his voyage north.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The enemy formation reported by air reconnaissance off the west coast of southern Norway may be the escort of the recent QP convoy, which, after completing its task, is carrying out a sweep on the Norwegian coast. It might also be an operation against the Norwegian coast and our own convoy traffic, or just a practice run. In any case, it may be concluded from the southwesterly course that this formation does not indicate the running of a new PQ convoy. Possibly this is just an exercise.

(Signed) Peters.

12 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 312 proceeding from AB 6245.
U 313 proceeding from AB 6276.
U 713 proceeding from AB 6521.
U 990 proceeding from AB 6552.
U 278 proceeding from AB 6582.
U 716 proceeding from AB 6589.
U 957 proceeding from AB 6837.
U 425 proceeding from AB 6868.
U 314.

In port:

U 956 Alta,
U 472, 601, 737, 739 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 636, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 362, 387, 965 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1845 U 973 put in to Narvik from AB 63.
0630 U 737 put in to Narvik from Hammerfest.
U 674 proceeding from Bergen to AF 22.
1500 U 956 put out from Alta for Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Not exhaustive

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because of weather conditions. Nothing to report. 2 BF 109 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance Motovski Bay - Kola Bay. In Kola Bay from Murmansk to Vaenga 10 merchant ships approximately 4,000 - 6,000 G.R.T. each, 15 merchant ships approximately 1,000 - 2,000 G.R.T. each, hove to.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 FW 200 on radar reconnaissance to intercept convoy traffic to Soviet Arctic ports. Routes: Trondheim - AB 8629 - 8491 - 8144 - 9146 - Trondheim - AB 6876 - 5892 - 5595 - 6578 - 6876 - Trondheim. Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered by radar, no enemy sighted. 2 Ju 88 on same mission. Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered, no enemy sighted. 1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance of the Jan Mayen area, no enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: No enemy sightings.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

From radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Britain: no units or warships appeared.

Russian radio traffic: little traffic.

Britain: very little Murmansk broadcast, no Archangel broadcast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Werwolf" is advancing southwestwards from Bear Island passage. U 674 (Muss) is approaching from the south and passed 65° N at 0813. The patrol line was rearranged accordingly.

1354 Radio message 1316/716:

"Group "Werwolf" to proceed in new order: U 674 (Muss), "Bentzien", "Schaar", "Dunkelberg", "Franze", "Nordheimer", "Gosejakob", "Schweiger", "Nikolay" to patrol line AB 8881 to 7356 at ordered speed."

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This line will be reached by the boats at about 2400 today.

It has been considered whether to let the boats remain submerged in the daytime so that they will not be sighted by enemy air reconnaissance which is mainly to be expected during the day. As it was feared, however, that the boats' opportunities to make observations would thereby be too greatly restricted, so that a convoy might pass unnoticed, the surface positions were retained for the present. In order to protect the boats from being discovered, radio message 2113/720 was sent to group "Werwolf":

2134

"In order to remain safe from discovery:

1. maintain radio silence except for important tactical reports,
2. if located submerge in all cases, unless you are operating against the enemy."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Since U 314 (Basse) did not reply to yesterday's request for a position report and since it is known from U 737's verbal report that he did not appear at the rendezvous ordered on 2 February to transfer the M.O., the boat must be presumed missing. This was reported in Most Secret 614 of 12 February. The boat took part in the operations against PQ 27 and PQ 28 and on 26 January reported by radio message at 0250 that he had fired 2 T5 torpedoes at a destroyer in AC 4618. Explosion heard after 3 minutes 30 seconds. Last radio message 1402/788 dated 30 January:

"At 1300 in grid square 4145 hydrophone bearing noise band 120° to 130° true. Suspect convoy grid square 4432, course 120°."

Two requests to report fuel on 9 and 10 February remained unanswered. It is assumed that he was destroyed on 30 January by one of the numerous anti-submarine groups with PQ 28.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

13 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 425 AB 8842.
U 957 AB 8733.
U 716 AB 8494.
U 278 AB 8455.
U 990 AB 8419.
U 713 AB 8177.
U 313 AB 7392.
U 312 AB 7356.
U 674 AB 8881.

In port:

U 956 Hammerfest,
U 472, 601, 737, 739, 973 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 636, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 362, 387, 965 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E. Almost exhaustive, nothing to report.
2 BF 109 on meteorological, shipping and airfield reconnaissance of Motovski Bay - Kola Bay area.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 FW 200 (AL and EL) on reconnaissance to intercept enemy convoy. Trondheim AB 8994 - AA 6981 - 9921 - AB 9711 - Trondheim. Trondheim AF 1441 - AE 2531 - 2231 - AF 1155 - Trondheim, enemy not sighted.
2 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance - AA 9819. Enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

2 BF 109 in Kola Bay as far as due south of Murmansk, 10 merchant ships 3,000 - 5,000 G.R.T. each.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russia: from radio traffic at sea:
Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Britain: no units or warships intercepted.
Russian radio traffic: little traffic.
Britain: no Murmansk or Archangel broadcasts.
One short radio message at 0923 on 13 February from Admiralty to stragglers probably of PQ 29 which also received a radio message at 2052 on 8 February.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Agent Jacob Ingby radioed that he has learnt from a reliable source that 2 submarines of unknown nationality were sighted on Saturday 5 February off the approaches to Mafjordhamn.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

The boats have been in position in the patrol line ordered since 0000. In order to obtain information regarding the ice situation, U 312 (Nikolay) was questioned about ice hindrance. He reported at 1645: "No ice."

So as to leave no gap between the ice limit and the northwestern wing of the patrol line, radio message 1906/735 was sent:

"At 0800 on 14 February proceed to new attack areas from AB 8842 to 7324. Nine-hourly movements from northwest to southeast within the attack areas, beginning at 1400 at the northwestern limits. At 2300 in southeast, etc. Irregular courses. Report ice hindrance by short signal (page 25 of handbook.)"

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 362 (Franz):

1. Put out from Bergen on the evening of 14 February.
2. Proceed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast to 64° N in accordance with Order No. 13, then to AF 23 at 12 knots.
3. Group "Werwolf" at present on patrol line AB 8881 to 7356. Details of formation from 11th U-boat Flotilla. Our BV 138, FW 200 and Ju 88 on meteorological and reconnaissance flights in the sea area.

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4. Operational Order No. 1, radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave. Report passing 65° N by short signal. From there on U-boats Northern Waters wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 737 (Brasack), fourth operation, see Appendix IV/14.

Short report from U 973 (Päpenmöller), first operation, see Appendix IV/15.

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re III.e):-

It is not clear whether the report about PQ 28 refers to a convoy which has already passed unnoticed or whether it indicates a newly approaching convoy. Further developments must be awaited before any measures can be taken. I assume that it refers to the last QP convoy.

(Signed) Peters.

14 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 674 AB 8881.
U 957 AB 8733.
U 425 AB 8842.
U 716 AB 8494.
U 278 AB 8455.
U 990 AB 8419.
U 713 AB 8177.
U 313 AB 7392.
U 312 AB 7356.

In port:

U 956 Hammerfest,
U 472, 601, 737, 739, 973 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 636, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 362, 387, 965 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

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(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1515 U 362 put out from Bergen for AF 22.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - AA 9629. Jan Mayen area exhaustively covered. Enemy not sighted.

2 FW 200 with radar on sea reconnaissance.

Routes: Trondheim - AB 7982 - AA 9981 - 9921 -

AB 7931 - Trondheim. Trondheim - AF 1418 -

AE 2531 - 2264 - AF 1129 - Trondheim. Enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Shipping in Kola Bay:

1 large destroyer in floating dock, 2 destroyers in dry dock.

32 freighters, approximately 144,000 G.R.T.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Britain: no units or warships appeared.

Russian radio traffic: little traffic.

Britain: no Murmansk or Archangel broadcasts.

At 0211 one operational radio message from Murmansk to Whitehall.

At 0510 another radio message for Meteorological Office.

British tanker "San Adolfo" (7365).

Operational convoy reported, was intended for the Clyde, therefore must have run with PQ convoy making for Murmansk at the end of November.

Pan tanker "Nordlys" (9892) with PQ convoy to Murmansk on 21 November.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic

9 U-boats in patrol line northeast of Jan Mayer (cf.I.a).

U 716 (Dunkelberg) reported by short signal that he has still 20 cu.m. fuel.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs):

1. Put out from Hammerfest on the morning of 15 February.
2. Proceed to AB 8820 at 12 knots.
3. Operational Order No. 1, U-boats Northern Waters wave.
4. Boat to join group "Werwolf". Details of formation and position from U-boat base."

2300

Radio message received concerning air attack on Hammerfest by about 5 enemy aircraft between 1825 and 1947. High-explosive and incendiary bombs dropped. Bomb damage in the town, two packet steamers sunk. No damage to U-boat base.

As a precaution the U-boat base at Hammerfest received the following orders:

"If it has not yet done so, "Black Watch" is to move as rapidly as possible to new berth "Nissenpier". By arrangement with Naval Harbor Master, "Carl Hering" is to be allocated a new berth less vulnerable to air attacks, if necessary outside Hammerfest. Establish radio communication with "Carl Hering" by routine program. Report measures taken."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re IV.d):-

The air attack on Hammerfest shows the danger which threatens this base. It is intended to have "Carl Hering" lie outside the harbor in a neighboring fjord as long as it is not required to fit out U-boats. Should the air attacks be repeated it will have to be considered whether similar measures for "Black Watch" will have to be taken.

Teleprinter message Most Secret, S.O.s only 460/44, was received from Naval War Staff, 1st Division:

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"Subject: Operation of U-boats in case of enemy landings in the Skagerrak/Jutland area.

1. War game "Leuthen" has shown that U-boats would have good opportunities for attacking enemy landing forces and supply convoys. It is of decisive importance for the successful prevention of landings that the U-boats should commence operations against the approaching enemy as early as possible.
2. In the event of a landing in the Jutland/Norway area Northern Waters boats are to be sent at increased speed to the threatened area. However, they would not be able to reach it for 2 or 3 days. C-in-C of the Navy, after consultation with Group North/Fleet, therefore ordered on 11 February that 10 Atlantic boats should always be kept at operational readiness in Norwegian ports.
3. The provision and current relief of these boats to be in the hands of Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops. Allocation to ports by Group North/Fleet (Captain U-boats, Norway). Ports regarded as suitable are Kristiansand South, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim.
4. In the event of a landing the boats will be under the command of Group North/Fleet (Captain U-boats Central) for operations. Operational orders to be drawn up in advance. Naval War Staff."

The following teleprinter message was sent by Captain U-boats, Norway in Most Secret S.O.s only 11/44:

Clear as multiple address message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. Naval High Command, Norway.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (postagram).

Most Secret. S.O.s only, by hand of officer only.

"Subject: Use of U-boats in the event of enemy landings in the Skagerrak/Jutland area.
Reference: Naval War Staff, 1st Division 460/44
S.O.s only, dated 13 February, 1944.

The following is submitted in reply to the above reference:

1. Of the 10 Atlantic U-boats to be provided the following can be accommodated in the bases at the disposal of Captain U-boats, Norway: in Bergen: at least 6 boats, unprotected; in Trondheim: bunker protection for 3 boats, another 2 boats unprotected.

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2. No information here regarding Kristiansand (South) and Stavanger. Stavanger is considered unsuitable because of the considerable danger of air raids.
3. The repair capacity of Bergen and Trondheim is already being used to the full owing to the recent increase of boats in Northern Waters. Repairs to Atlantic boats will therefore be possible only on a very small scale."

(Signed) Peters.

15 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 674 AB 8842.
U 425 AB 8733.
U 957 AB 8494.
U 716 AB 8455.
U 278 AB 8419.
U 990 AB 8177.
U 713 AB 7356.
U 312 AB 7324.

In port:

U 956 Hammerfest,
U 472, 601, 737, 739, 973 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 636, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen,
U 703 Königsberg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 362 proceeding from Bergen to AF 22.
U 956 put out from Hammerfest at 1030
for AB 8820.
U 703 put out from Königsberg at 0630
for Kiel via Neufahrwasser, put
in to Hela at 1900.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance
Banak - Bear Island - Hope Island (special
operation) - Banak. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 FW 200 on sea reconnaissance to intercept enemy convoy traffic. Routes: Trondheim - AB 7982 - AA 9981 - 9921 - AB 7931 - Trondheim. Trondheim - AF 1418 - AE 2534 - 2264 - AF 1129 - Trondheim. Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered by radar, no enemy sightings.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes, no enemy sightings.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

From radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Murmansk area: destroyer "J".
Britain: no units or warships appeared.
Russian radio traffic: little radio traffic.
Britain: no Murmansk or Archangel broadcasts.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

9 boats in attack areas northeast of Jan Mayen (see I.a).

1608 Radio message 1521/756:

"From Captain U-boats:

1. "Dunkelberg" to return to Hammerfest for refuelling at 0600 on 16 February.
2. "Schaar", "Bentzien" and "Muss" to move up one position further northwest at the same time. Position No. 1 to remain unoccupied.
3. U 956 (Mohs) now approaching will join group "Werwolf" as boat No. 1 and is to occupy attack area AB 8842, depth of sweep 20 miles."

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes:

Commander of U 957 (Schaar) has been awarded the "German Cross" in gold.

VI. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

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APPENDIX II

COPY

S.O.s only, by hand of officer only.

Secret

G.I.S. substation Tromsø wired in Reg. No. 222/44 Secret concerning the interrogation of the two prisoners brought in by U 957 (Schaar):

"British prisoners of war Robert Macallan and Eric Haycock, both gunners on the British steamer "Fort Bellingham", a new Canadian-built ship of 7,000 G.R.T., were transferred to Tromsø G.I.S. substation on 30 January.

Macallan, Scottish, 22 years old, reliable, stated:*

- Re
1. Russian convoys normally sail from lochs on the west coast of Scotland via Iceland.
 2. America and Britain where American material is reloaded.
 3. Lochs in western Scotland.
 4. The "Fort Bellingham", after loading, set off alone from London via Newcastle and through Pentland Firth to Loch Ewe opposite the Hebrides, which she reached on 6 or 7 January and where she joined a convoy of 14 ships of similar tonnage which had already arrived there. Of the 15 ships, 3 were British, 1 Norwegian, and the remainder were sailing under the American flag. The "Fort Bellingham" was the leader ship and had the Commodore on board. The cargo consisted of aeroplane parts in crates on deck and below deck, American medium tanks, 12 of which were on deck; flour in sacks, machinery and spare parts, and Red Cross material. Cargo of remaining ships unknown but all heavily laden. 2 motor launches

* Translator's note:

This report is evidently arranged in the form of answers to routine questions, the questions themselves not being included in the text.

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(small M.G.B.s) were seen as deck cargo on one ship. The convoy sailed from Loch Ewe on 8 January in 5 lines abreast, each line consisting of 3 ships. Escort of 6 British destroyers, speed 10 knots, course direct to Reykjavik. Because of bad weather, time of journey 6 days. The convoy was dispersed, only 8 ships arrived off Reykjavik, cruised for 2 days along southern coast of Iceland, apparently tried to put in to Reykjavik to restow cargo, but after the weather improved, continued voyage east to Akureyri where they joined up again with the other 7 ships. The complete convoy totaled 21 ships. Continued to Murmansk. Formation 3 lines abreast, each of 5 ships, escorted by 7 destroyers, 3 corvettes, possibly by further escort, not visible, consisting of destroyers and cruisers. Speed of convoy 10 knots, course northeast, direction Spitsbergen, passed east of Jan Mayen, after 4 days altered course to southeast, kept to south of Bear Island.

5. Regular intervals of 4 or 5 weeks between convoys: Scotland - Iceland - Russia. Same rhythm back from Russia.
6. Cruising formation of convoy maintained during U-boat attacks.
7. Archangel, Murmansk, during winter time mainly Murmansk.
8. Independent sailing to Russia was the practice 8 months ago, then discontinued because of insufficiency.
9. Returning convoys carry mainly timber cargoes, supplementary freight ore or similar material as ballast. At 1900 G.M.T. on 25 January first alarm was given as the leading destroyer apparently suffered a torpedo hit. The center of the convoy slowed up. At 2100 a British steamer of the Empire class was hit by a torpedo, sank after one hour. At midnight a second ship, at the starboard wing of the first line was torpedoed, and sank immediately. 5 minutes later four more ships, including the "Fort Bellingham", were torpedoed. Two of these sank at once, 2 drifted but were later observed sinking. Both prisoners were picked up by a U-boat from a drifting raft on the morning of 26 January.

Eric Haycock, aged 22, was interrogated today. Statements credible but not very experienced as this was his first convoy. His statement agreed essentially with Macallan's. It contained the

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following discrepancies or amplifications:

Re

2. Part convoys of about 12 ships, mostly Liberty ships, are running from America to western Scotland.
4. The "Fort Bellingham" convoy also included 2 tankers sailing under the British flag. The "Bellingham"'s cargo also included ammunition type 3.0 and fairly large quantities of canvas, also steel-cutting lathes. Small river motor gunboats, fitted with 3 one-inch guns, seen as deck cargo on 2 of the steamers. Apparently two and three respectively. Length of boats about 30 feet.
5. Intervals between PQ convoys fortnight to a month, depending on how dispatched convoys get through to their destinations.
6. Course frequently altered but not the convoy's cruising formation.
7. Murmansk or Polyarno for the "Bellingham"'s convoy. The "Fort Bellingham"'s armament: 6 1-inch Oerlikons, 1 4-inch twelve-pounder, 1 4-inch quick-firing gun, 1 Beaufort Army quick-firing gun of latest type. 2 rocket-firing devices for anti-aircraft steel-wire barrage. The "Bellingham" sank immediately after one torpedo hit her amidships on the port side, apparently close to the boiler room.

The prisoners were the only survivors of the "Bellingham", drifted for 8 hours on a raft with the ship's bo'sun, who fell into the water and drowned while trying to board the U-boat. While drifting close to the place of sinking they saw only one lifeboat with survivors from another ship; they do not know what became of it.

APPENDIX III

Sailing and transfer orders

- No. 1. Transfer order for U 360 (Becker).
2. Transfer order for U 636 (Hildebrandt).
3. Sailing order for U 713 (Gosejakob).
4. Sailing order for U 312 (Nikolay).

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APPENDIX III/1

COPY

Captain U-boats,
Norway.

On board, 1 February, 1944.

Most Secret

Transfer order for U 360 (Becker)

1. Put out from Narvik at 1500 on 1 February.
2. Hand in 1 T5 and 4 F.A.T. I torpedoes at Ramsund.
3. Continue immediately through Westfjord and on to Bergen keeping 50 miles from the coast.
4. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave.

p.p. Eckerman.

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APPENDIX III/2

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 8 February, 1944

Most Secret

Transfer order for U 636 (Hildebrandt)

1. Put out from Narvik - Westfjord on the afternoon of 8 February for transfer to Trondheim via inner leads.
2. From Bodøⁱⁱ in convoy according to Sea Defense Commandant's instructions.
3. Radio service "Anton".

Peters.

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APPENDIX III/3

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 5 February, 1944.

Most Secret

Sailing order for U 713 (Gosejakob)

1. Put out from Narvik on 5 February as soon as ready.
2. Proceed through Tjeldsund - Andfjord, from Lødingen to Harstad with district pilot.
3. Make for AC 6950 to operate on reported QP convoy which was in AC 8834 at 0900.
4. Operational Order No. 1. U-boats Northern Waters wave.
5. Own forces: Group "Werwolf" in the following order: U 716 (Dunkelberg), U 314 (Basse), U 737 (Brasack), U 278 (Franze), U 990 (Nordheimer); U 973 (Päpenmüller) approaching from the south. This boat has an experimental conning tower Mark VI with a 3.7 cm. gun on an emplacement in front of the conning tower. Look out for silhouette.
6. Presumed ice limit: AB 3260 - 3660 - 3940 - 6330 - AC 1770 - 1950.
7. U-boats which are near the enemy will send "flying weather" for the operation of the German Air Force by short signal, as follows:-
 1. The boat with the lowest fleet number will transmit, without being previously requested, between 0300 and 0400. If it fails to do so, the next boat will.
 2. Transmission on request.

Form of short signal: 2 three-figure groups. The groups comprise: first figure, visibility in miles, second figure, wind 1 (= NE) to 8 (= N), third figure wind strength. Fourth

figure (second group), cloud base in 100 meters, fifth figure type of shower: 1 rain, 2 snow, 3 soft hail, sixth figure, incidence of showers in 10 per cent.

Example:

941 equals "visibility 9 miles, wind south, 1". 126 equals "cloud base below 100 m., snow showers 60%". In case of low-lying fog the second group is reduced to 2 figures.

Peters.

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APPENDIX III/4

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 6 February, 1944.

Most Secret

Sailing order for U 312 (Nikolay)

1. Put out from Narvik at approximately 1700 on 6 February as soon as you are ready.
2. Take on torpedoes in Ramsund, then proceed through Tjeldsund and Andfjord. From Lodingen to Harstad with district pilot. Report passing Harstad.
3. Make for AC 4950 at maximum speed to operate against the reported PQ convoy which was in AB 6588 at 1200.
4. Operational Order No. 1, U-boat Northern Waters wave.
5. Own forces: Group "Werwolf":
 1. U 716 (Dunkelberg),
 2. U 314 (Basse),
 3. U 737 (Brasack),
 4. U 278 (Franze),
 5. U 990 (Nordheimer),
 6. U 713 (Gosejakob).

U 425 (Bentzien) and U 957 (Schaar) are approaching from Hammerfest. Further, U 313 (Schweiger) will put out this evening. U 973 (Päpenmoller) is approaching from the south.

6. Presumed ice-limit: AB 3260 - 3660 - 3940 - 6330 - AC 1770 - 1950.
7. U-boats which are near the enemy will send "flying weather" for the operation of the German Air Force by short signal, as follows:-
 1. The boat with the lowest fleet number will transmit, without being previously requested, between 0300 and 0400. If it fails to do so, the next boat will.

2. Transmission on request.

Form of short signal: 2 three-figure groups.

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The groups comprise: first figure, visibility in miles, second figure, wind 1 (= NE) to 8 (= N), third figure wind strength. Fourth figure (second group), cloud base in 100 meters, fifth figure, type of shower: 1 rain, 2 snow, 3 soft hail, sixth figure, incidence of showers in 10 per cent.

Example:

941 equals "visibility 9 miles, wind south, 1". 126 equals "cloud base below 100 m., snow showers 60%". In case of low-lying fog the second group is reduced to 2 figures.

Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX IV.

Short reports.

1. Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), first operation.
2. Short report from U 965 (Ohling), first operation.
3. Short report from U 278 (Franze), first operation.
4. Short report from U 965 (Ohling), first operation, Part 2.
5. Short report from U 360 (Becker), third operation.
6. Short report from U 956 (Mohs), fourth interrupted operation.
7. Short report from U 957 (Schaar), second operation.
8. Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), second (interrupted) operation.
9. Short report from U 472 (v. Forstner), first operation.
10. Short report from U 636 (Hildebrandt), sixth operation.
11. Short report from U 739 (Mangold), first operation.
12. Short report from U 313 (Schweiger), first operation.
13. Short report from U 601 (Hansen), ninth operation.
14. Short report from U 737 (Brasack), fourth operation.
15. Short report from U 973 (Päpenm^öller).

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APPENDIX IV/1

Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), first operation

- 28 December Put out from Bergen, put in to Hammerfest on 28 January. Proceeded via AF 2839 to attack area AB 5763, AB 6678. Varying attack areas between Bear Island and North Cape. No sighting up to 24 January.
- 25 January Convoy in AB 6675 traveling to Murmansk. At 1720 fired two T5 torpedoes at destroyer, one tube-runner, one torpedo explosion heard on hydrophones. Depth charges for three hours.
- 26 January At 1355 convoy sighted briefly in AC 5483. No further contact with convoy. At 1100 on 27 January, broke off operations for quick replenishing of supplies at Hammerfest.
- 28 January Put in to Hammerfest.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret 409.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX IV/2

COPY

Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 965 (Ohling), first
operation (PQ 25)

- | | |
|------------|---|
| 1 January | Put out from Bergen; in patrol line in Bear Island passage until 24 January. |
| 25 January | At 0958 enemy sighted (destroyers) in AB 6675, later plumes of smoke. Stern torpedo fired underwater at destroyer. Torpedo explosion after 10 minutes, 1 of 2 hydrophone bearings disappeared. Splashing and grinding noises in the hydrophones, probably sunk, contact lost. |
| 27 January | Broke off convoy operation (at 1236). |
| 28 January | Put in to Hammerfest at 1600 for quick refuelling. |

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 408.

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APPENDIX IV/3

COPY

Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 278 (Franze), first operation

- 8 January Put out from Bergen, put in to Narvik on 12 January, put out from Narvik on 13 January, proceeded via AB 6540 to attack area AB 6268.
- 16 to 23 January No sightings.
- From 25 January Operated on PQ convoy.
- 25 January At 1949 convoy in AC 4572, 14 ships and 25 escort vessels course 90°, 9 knots.
- At 2013 fan of three F.A.T. torpedoes on overlapping steamers. One hit observed on each of 2 7,000 tonners. Sinking noises heard. T5 torpedo missed a corvette, three hours of depth charges and hydrophone pursuit.
- 28 January Put in to Hammerfest for refuelling.

Captain U-boats, Norway. 410.

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APPENDIX IV/4

COPY

Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 965 (Ohling), first operation, Part 2.

- 29 January Put out from Hammerfest, put in to Narvik on 3 February.
Operated on reported convoy.
At 2310 starboard Diesel engine out of action, re-ground big-end bearing 1.
- 30 January At 0705 clear again.
At 0730 contacted convoy.
At 1141 submerged for underwater attack.
Pursued by 2 search groups of 2 destroyers each.
At 1256 bow "Zaunkönig" fired at a destroyer, explosion after 5 minutes 6 seconds, loud sinking noises, then heavy depth charges for 4 hours at a safe depth.
At 2133 2 destroyers sighted, chasing another boat, avoided them on northerly course.
- 31 January At 0005 starboard big-end bearing 3 leaking, piston suspended, maximum speed 12 knots, pressed on, no further contact.
At 2300 operation discontinued, returned to Narvik.

Additional note by Captain U-boats, Norway, after personal report from Commander:

1. The boat reported numerous "Borkum" locations.
2. Four destroyers of one search group, after picking up the boat, stopped for some time at about 3,000 meters and lay broadside on to the sea.

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At first no move to attack although the U-boat had clearly been recognized in a calm sea. Finally one destroyer approached, but was hit by "Zaunkönig" torpedo and careened. Only then did the remaining destroyers attack, presumably they believed that the U-boat had only one torpedo of this type clear. 62 depth charges, some in groups.

3. Starshells again fired in deliberate attempts to cause confusion.
4. Location. Bluish - white light (like a dimmed signal box). First wavering then steady. Only then infra-red light. Both high on the mast. Bluish - white light can be seen as far as 2 - 3 miles away.
5. Asdic and location by explosive soundings with exactly the same appearance of noises as in the case of experiments with the same boat off Arendal.
6. Forward escort particularly strong. An attempt to drift into the convoy was not successful even though all transformers etc. had been switched off.
7. The Commander suspects that noise boxes were laid by the enemy for deception to keep the U-boats submerged after depth charge attacks had been discontinued, since in three cases the source of the noise could not be seen in the vicinity after surfacing.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 479 A 1.

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APPENDIX IV/5

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Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 360 (Becker), third
operation

27 December	Put out from Narvik, 29 December put out from Hammerfest, 28 January put in to Hammerfest.
From 31 December	Attack area AB 5971.
1 January	Proceeded to new attack area AC 4187.
3 January	At 0446 Naxos location, then hydrophone bearing on 3 vessels, high speed, pursued them, driven off by destroyers, depth charges, no damage, contact lost.
4 January	At 2340 in AB 7356 took up position in reconnaissance line.
From 6 January	Attack area AC 4454.
From 8 January	Attack area AB 6644.
25 January	At 1015 operated on enemy report from "Ohling": at 1435 two destroyers in AB 6656, easterly course. At 1621 fired T5 torpedo at destroyer, missed, at 1709 in AC 4441 shadowed convoy on easterly course, 9 knots. At 1827 fired T5 torpedo at destroyer,

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miss, at 1833 fired T5 torpedo and hit destroyer, probably sunk.
At 1833 F.A.T. 1 torpedo as finishing shot on destroyer, missed, at 2114 fired T5 torpedo at destroyer, missed.

- 26 January At 0017 F.A.T. fan of three on port column of convoy, 3 hits observed on 3 different steamers.
At 0847 lost contact, not regained.
At 2357 collided with "Hansen". Tubes 1 and 3 not clear, bow dented.
- 27 January Returned along convoy route to grid square 4523, raft sighted, no survivors. Oil patch in grid square 4528.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 449.

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APPENDIX IV/6

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Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 956 (Mohs), fourth
(interrupted) operation

- 25 January Put out from Narvik, 2 February put in to Hammerfest. Operated on convoy PQ 27 in AB 6683, easterly course.
- 26 January Drifting mine in AC 4944. In patrol line from AC 6477 to 5871. Operated on report from U 737 (Brasack) in AC 5584, hydrophone bearing 30°.
- 27 January In patrol line AC 9155 to 8215, broken off. Proceeded to new patrol line.
- 29 January In position in patrol line AB 5651 to 9155. Convoy sighted in AB 5651, easterly course. Gunfire from two destroyers. At 1016 in AB 5656 underwater attack on destroyer, T5 torpedo missed, 2 hours of depth charges. At 1718 night surface attack on destroyer, T5 torpedo exploded prematurely after 31 seconds, at 2319 surface attack on destroyer with T5 torpedo from stern tube, missed. 1½ hours of depth charges.
- From 0218 on 29 January to 1015 on 30 January no contact.
- From 1854 on 30 January to 1830 on 31 January no contact.

31 January

Patrol line AC 5611 to 5722. Operated on aircraft report of convoy in AC 5831. At 1830 made contact with two destroyers. At 2356 attacked destroyer, fired T5 torpedo, missed. 3 hours of depth charges. Half of patrol line from AC 8662 to 8285. Broke off operations at 1656. Returned to Hammerfest.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 509 A.

APPENDIX IV/7

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Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 957 (Schaar), second operation

- | | |
|------------|---|
| 24 January | Put out from Narvik, operated against convoy PQ 27. |
| 25 January | 3 drifting mines in AB 6869. At 2203 attacked search group in AC 4457, short searching location, approached and fired one T5 torpedo, loud explosion after 13 minutes, wreckage, fuel oil and cutter at place of sinking, pressed on. |
| 26 January | At 0150 fired T5 torpedo at ship with superstructure aft (probably tanker), possibly in part convoy, range 400 meters, explosion after 13 minutes, thick smoke surrounded target, wreck sighted later. Finishing shot on wreck, missed, further operational contact with two vessels, hauled ahead. At 0653 T5 torpedo in AC 4462, range 1200 meters, observed explosion after 12 minutes, target heeled over, sunk with finishing shot on stern (Liberty ship). Two survivors rescued. Pressed on overnight. |
| 27 January | Received orders to put in to Hammerfest. |
| 28 January | Put in to Hammerfest at 1715. Refuelled and took on torpedoes. |

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- 29 January Put out from Hammerfest at 0935.
Operated on PQ 28.
- 30 January At 0346, approached search group in
AB 3638, fired T5 torpedo, smoke
developed after 12 minutes, torpedo
explosion, cloud from explosion,
afterwards no sign of destroyer.
At 0354 fired T5 torpedo at large
"comma-shaped" destroyer, blew up
after 12 minutes. At 0420 F.A.T.
fan of three on 2 escorting corvettes,
explosion after 4 minutes. Probable
hit, smoke developed. At 0524 F.A.T.
2 torpedo fired at destroyer, explosion
after 5 minutes, 43 seconds, thick
smoke developed. Observation at 0550.
One destroyer blew up. At 0602
premature explosion, pursued by 5 escort
vessels, submerged, hydrophone pursuit,
no depth charges.
- 30 January At 1135, miles of oil patches in
approximately AC 6389, pieces of
wreckage.
- 31 January 16 depth charges dropped by approaching
destroyers with radar, AC 5439, no
damage, surfaced with flames appearing
on upper deck, echo sounding gear
out of action.
- 1 February Put in to Hammerfest.

Additional note by Captain U-boats, Norway.

1. A young, energetic Commander deserving special mention.
2. The destroyer at 0354 on 30 January was fired at simultaneously by U 278 (Franze).

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 511. A.1.

APPENDIX IV/8

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Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), second
(interrupted) operation

- 29 January Put out from Hammerfest at 0400, made for AB 6650. Joined group "Wiking" and made for AB 6390 at maximum speed.
- 30 January At 0431 fired T5 torpedo at destroyer in AB 6391, miss, AB 6391, at 0451 fan of three missed anti-submarine group of 3 destroyers (one T3 and two F.A.T.2). AB 6394 tube 1 tube-runner, shot fell 5 seconds later with mine discharge. Several infra-red locations. 1021 to 1740 shadowed convoy. Mean course easterly, speed 9 to 10 knots. Sent shadower reports currently. At 1540 stern T5 torpedo on destroyer in AC 4262, miss, destroyer probably stopped. At 1801 stern T5 torpedo on approaching destroyer. AC 4349 gunfire and starshells. Range 1200 meters. Pursued by three more destroyers. Very loud torpedo explosion after 1 minute 58 seconds running time, sinking noises and breaking of bulkheads heard. Depth charges dropped by three, later by two, destroyers. Hydrophone pursuit and depth charges, discharged wreckage decoy.
- 31 January Pressed on south and took up patrol line position. No enemy sightings.
- 1 February Took up position in patrol line. AC 8662 to 8258. Varying courses. Nothing sighted. Used radar without results.

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1 February

Broke off operations, put in to
Hammerfest.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 513 A1.

APPENDIX IV/9

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Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 472 (von Forstner) first operation

- | | |
|------------|--|
| 22 January | Put out from Bergen, put in to Hammerfest on 2 February. Proceeded via AB 89 to AB 93. |
| 25 January | Report of convoy PQ 27 in AC 5483, no contact. In position in various patrol lines. |
| 27 January | Operations broken off, proceeded via AC 49 to AB 5655 (patrol line). |
| 29 January | Operated on PQ 28 AB 5651. Shadowed destroyers. At 1710 machine-gun fire from destroyer. |
| 30 January | At 0357 in AB 6297 fired stern T5 torpedo at 2 destroyers, submerged, heard explosion in hydrophones. Running time 150 seconds. After hearing sinking noises for 11 minutes in multi-unit hydrophones, only one bearing left. Depth charges for one hour. From 2300 contact with two destroyers, penetrated to convoy, destroyers fired starshells, submerged. Depth charges for 3 hours until end of operation. |
| 1 February | No contact from 1600. Orders to put in to Hammerfest. |

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Additional note by Captain U-boats, Norway

Hit on destroyer simultaneously with "Schaar" and
"Franze".

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 507 Al.

APPENDIX IV/10

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Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 636 (Hildebrandt),
sixth operation

- 26 January Put out from Narvik, put in to Hammerfest on 5 February.
- 27 January At 1730 made for AB 8180. Because of temporary breakdown of boiler had to remain submerged for several hours thereby reaching operational area late. Proceed to ordered patrol line AB 5641 to 9155.
- 28 January At 1511 "Borkum" location continuous note at even pitch of about 800.
- 29 January At 1000 operated on "Mohs"'s report of a convoy east of AB 5651. At 1257 sighted seaplane (AB 6759) far off (BV 133 ?). At 1600 in AB 6456 operated on moderately loud depth charges. At 1814 in AB 6554 came under starboard escort of the convoy. Depth charges. Port electric motor out of action. Stuffing boxes leaked considerably.
- 30 January At 0153 withdrew for repairs. At 0800 AB 6825 overhaul completed. Proceeded east at maximum speed. Took up position in patrol line ordered AC 5722.
- 31 January At 1030 to ordered position line; made for AC 5722. At 1108 turned towards smoke cloud, bearing 100°, (AC 5762) at maximum speed.

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At 1226 2 faint smoke clouds.
At 1242 drifting mine in AC 5847.
At 1600 operated on convoy reported by
aircraft. Smoke clouds proved to
have been an illusion.

- 1 February At 0324 in AC 8357 broke off operation
because had fallen too far astern and
water in lubricating oil.
At 0955 in AC 8327 commenced return
passage to H ammerfest. Port Diesel
out of action.
- 2 February At 1432 coastal inshore waters, exchanged
recognition signals with German U-boat.
At 2035 put in to H ammerfest.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret 535. Al.

APPENDIX IV/11

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Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret

Short report from U 739 (Mangold), first operation

- | | |
|---------------------|--|
| 8 January | Put out from Bergen, put in to Narvik on 3 February. Proceeded from AB 6850, via AB 6270 to AB 6234. Short location by M.T.B.s, which then passed over the boat. |
| 14 to 25
January | In attack area, no sightings. |
| 25 January | Operated on convoy in AB 6675 after "Ohling"'s sighting report. Held up by stopped vessels (salvage group?), fired two and one T3 torpedoes, misses. Convoy not reached again. |
| 27 January | Discontinued operations on PQ 27. Took up position in AB 56 as most southerly boat of group "Werwolf". |
| 29 January | Operated on the new convoy PQ 28, forced to submerge because of escort, hydrophone pursuit for 7 hours, convoy not reached again. |
| 1 February | Discontinued operation because of leaky battery hatches and muffler valve. Drifting mine in AF 87. |

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 519 A1.

Section 1

Text block 1

Text block 2

Main body of text, first paragraph

Text block 3

Text block 4

Main body of text, second paragraph

Text block 5

Main body of text, third paragraph

Text block 6

Main body of text, fourth paragraph

Text block 7

Text block 8

APPENDIX IV/12

COPY

Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 313 (Schweiger), first operation

- 26 January Put out from Bergen, proceeded at maximum speed to AB 92 to operate on PQ 28.
- 29 January No sightings. AB 6532 drift-ice limit turning south.
- 30 January At 0616 escorting destroyer in AB 6644. At 0628 fired T5 torpedo at destroyer. Torpedo explosion after 8 minutes, loud sinking and cracking noises. 2119 in AC 4350 ship's motorboat or small searching sweeper.
- 31 January In AC 5810 at 1611 short location on 225 cycles. No enemy sightings until 2 February.
- 2 February Put in to Hammerfest.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 506 Al.

APPENDIX IV/13

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Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 601 (Hansen), ninth operation

- | | |
|----------------------------|--|
| 10 January | Put out from Narvik. 2 February put in to Hammerfest. |
| 10 January | Proceeded via Andfjord to AB 6943 to join group "Isegrim". |
| 11 - 25
January | Patrolled attack area according to plan. No sightings. |
| 25 - 27
January | Operated on PQ 27. |
| 29 January -
1 February | Operated on PQ 28. |
| 25 January | Operated on "Ohling"'s report of eastbound convoy in AB 6683. At 1229 smoke cloud sighted in AB 6913, hauled ahead. At 1400 destroyer in AB 6931. At 1410 fired T5 torpedo from stern at destroyer while surfaced, then submerged. Explosion heard. Running time 12 minutes 48 seconds. Loud destroyer hydrophone bearing not heard again. Probable hit. Hydrophone pursuit by 4 approaching destroyers for 2 hours. 6 inaccurate depth charges (deterrent depth charges?). After surfacing operated on "Becker"'s convoy report. Convoy east of AC 4441. Anticipatory maneuver. |

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- 26 January At 0000 sinking steamer in AC 4553. Surprised by 2 destroyers. Hydrophone pursuit for 2 hours, 12 inaccurate depth charges. After destroyers had made off, heard noise box. Steamer had sunk. Pressed on after convoy. At 1300 operated on aircraft report of convoy in AC 4666, without success. Operated on "Bentzien"'s report of convoy in AC 5483 at 1355. After "Bentzien" had lost contact at 1529 continued to search on southeasterly courses. At 1100 in collision with U 360. Starboard propeller damaged. At 1900 proceeded to patrol line AC 5863. At 2245 operated on "Brasack"'s report in AC 5584.
- 27 January At 0000 took up position in patrol line AC 5363. At 0200 proceeded to attack area AC 8345. At 1300 operation discontinued. Proceeded to AC 65 at high cruising speed.
- 29 January Reached attack area AB 6772. 1000 operated on "Mohs"'s report east of AB 6156. At 1245 operated on aircraft report of convoy in AB 5651, course northnortheast. At 2030 destroyer in AB 6247, shadowed it. Port forward escort. From 2100 to 2330 heard beacon signal from aircraft.
- 30 January From 0100 to 0400 shadowed convoy. At 0100 entered drift-ice with convoy. At 0233 left ice, fired fan of two F.A.T.1 torpedoes at group of steamers, missed. Range 2500, inexact firing data. Presently lost contact at the ice limit in slight fog. Transmitted beacon signals on wave "Bruno" between 0300 and 0330.
- 30 January At 0600 fired T5 torpedo from stern tube at destroyer, while surfaced. Bearing 90°, range 2000, AB 6382, running time 13 minutes 45 seconds. Torpedo explosion heard. Near the attacked destroyer, a second destroyer which blew up 1 minute after firing. Internal explosion or explosion after previous hit by another boat. After 30 minutes nothing could be seen at place of explosion except oil and pieces of wreckage. Probable hit. At 0935 smoke plumes from convoy in AC 4175. At 0940 destroyer, submerged for underwater attack, which did not materialize as the boat broke through surface ahead of destroyer. Pursued by 3 destroyers with hydrophones for 3 hours.

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At 1300 operated on "Bentzien"'s report of convoy in AC 4251. At 2237 4 destroyers in AC 4398. Search group.

- 31 January At 0000 proceeded to patrol line AC 5549. At 1200 operated on aircraft report that convoy was in AC 5973 at 1400. Advanced as far as last interception position ordered.
- 1 February At 0000 courses along interception position from AC 8682 to 8532. At 0100 proceeded to AC 8624 in patrol line. At 1715 operation discontinued. Returned to Hammerfest.
- 2 February Put in to Hammerfest at 2100.

Additional notes:

1. Only aircraft sightings BV 138 and Ju 88. 1 four-engined land plane, type not identified, in AC 4693, course north, at 0940 on 26 January.
2. Mines in AC 4185, type not identified, not overgrown.
3. Locations: none heard or seen.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 583 A1.

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APPENDIX IV/14

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Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 737 (Brasack), fourth operation

- | | |
|---------------------|---|
| 16 January | Put out from Narvik, 10 February
put in to Hammerfest. |
| 21 to
23 January | Ice reconnaissance in sea area between
Jan Mayen and 73° N. No traffic.
No patrols observed. |
| 24 January | Proceeded to ordered attack area
AB 6533 to relieve U 360 (Becker). |
| 25 January | Convoy operations with group "Isegrimm"
on PQ 27, as reported by "Ohling".
At 1754 fired T5 torpedo at attacking
destroyer, missed. After torpedo was
fired, destroyer turned away and dropped
4 depth charges. (Defense against
torpedoes?) Then no further contact. |
| 27 January | Took up last interception position off
Murmansk. |
| 27 to
29 January | Proceeded to new position in AB 65. |
| 29 to
31 January | Took part with group "Werwolf" in
attack on PQ 28 sighted by "Mohs". |
| 30 January | At 0108 in AB 6378 sank destroyer with
one funnel at the ice limit (visual
observation). Tongue of flame 100
meters high. AB 6397 fan of two on |

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overlapping steamers, one hit, probable explosion heard. At 2246 in AC 4638 sank attacking destroyer, running time 10 minutes 30 seconds. Destroyer first approached the boat at high speed. After torpedo was fired the U-boat first withdrew and then crash dived. The destroyer apparently sank while still under way. Very loud explosion close by. Very loud sinking noises audible throughout U-boat, dwindling away below.

- 31 January Took up interception position off Murmansk.
- 1 to
4 February Stood off and on in waiting position in AC 83. Nothing sighted.
- 5 to
6 February Proceeded to new attack area AC 41.
- 7 to
9 February Took part with group "Werwolf" in operation against PQ convoy reported by aircraft. No contact.
- 9 February Return passage to Hammerfest.
- 10 February Put in to Hammerfest.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 620 A1.

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APPENDIX IV/15

COPY

Teleprinter message

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 973 (Päpenmüller).

22 January	Put out from Kiel. 12 February put in to Narvik. Continued to Kristiansand.
23 January	Put in to Kristiansand.
26 January	Put out from Kristiansand - with escort to Bergen.
27 January	Put in to Bergen in the forenoon. Put out from Bergen. Proceeded to the operational area AB 69 according to operational orders. Great difficulties with stability due to conning tower VI.
28 January	Received radio message from C-in-C U-boats to put in to port.
29 January	Put in to Bergen.
31 January	Docked, ballast redistributed.
2 February	Put out from Bergen. Proceeded to AB 65 according to operational orders. Boat now rode the sea much better.
5 February	AF 2833 "Wanze" locations on 180°, 200°, 225°, 210°, 230°.
6 February	Passed 67° N.
8 February	In AC 4922, sea 7-8. Boat shipped 11 tons of water because of seaway. Only 6 tons in compensating tanks. Safety

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of boat in case of alarm endangered.
Stability still insufficient.

10 February Joined group "Werwolf".

11 February Discontinued tests.
 Proceeded to Narvik.
 1800 made fast in Narvik. Detailed
 report on testing operation follows.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 622. A1

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WAR DIARY
OF
CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY
16 - 29 FEBRUARY, 1944
PG/31853

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16 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 674 AB 8733.
U 425 AB 8494.
U 957 AB 8455.
U 278 AB 8419.
U 990 AB 8177.
U 713 AB 7392.
U 313 AB 7356.
U 312 AB 7324.

In port:

U 472, 601, 737, 739, 973 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 636, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen,
U 703 Hela.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 956 proceeding from Hammerfest to AB 8820.
U 362 proceeding from Bergen to AF 22.
U 716 proceeding from AB 8455 to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - AG 7835 -
AC 4796 - Bardufoss. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. No enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic at sea:
Norwegian polar coast: very little radio
traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Britain: no units or warships intercepted.
Russian radio traffic: slight.

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Britain: 2 broadcast messages each from Murmansk and Archangel.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

9 boats in attack areas northeast of Jan Mayen.

0123 Radio message 2252/16/60 received from U 362 (Franz):

"Have passed 65° N to the north."

0012 Radio message 1356/16/654 sent by 11th U-boat Flotilla:

"U 362 (Franz), with conning tower V, is in the operational area. Silhouette: in front of standard conning tower IV in disguised gun mounting, twin-mounting in "wash tub"."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

(a) The following teleprinter message was received from Admiral Commanding U-boats in Most Secret S.O.s only 13/14:

"Most Secret S.O.s only 21120 groups 173, of 15 February, 1702.

Reference: Naval War Staff, 1st Div., 460/44 Most Secret of 13 February.

1. In order to decide on ports in accordance with para. 3 of the above-mentioned reference, an officer of the 11th U-boat Flotilla is to examine Mandal, Arendal, Kristiansand, Kristiansand (South) and Stavanger for suitability as regards berths, accommodation, garrison and supplies of provisions for short waiting periods, and wire results. Admiral Commanding U-boats is expecting individual U-boats to stay in their respective ports for about 14 - 21 days and then possibly to replenish supplies once more at Bergen.

2. Until the above point has been clarified, Bergen is to be occupied by 5 boats at operational readiness. Further details follow. Begin preparations."

(b) The following teleprinter message was received from Group North/Fleet in Most Secret S.O.s only 121/44 AU:

"Most Secret. S.O.s only, by hand of officer only.

In answer to Naval War Staff, 1st Div. 460/44 S.O.s only, of 13 February, and Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats, Ops., 61 A2 S.O.s only, of 14 February:

The following ruling is proposed in agreement with Admiral Commanding U-boats:

1. The 10 boats in readiness in the south Norwegian area are to be known as "U-boat group Central".
2. For the present, while the survey of facilities at Stavanger, Kristiansand (South), Mandal and Arendal is in progress, 5 boats are to be kept at Bergen. The final allocation of the boats is to take place after the results of the survey have been received.
Allocation planned: Bergen 4, other ports 2 each.
3. In the first instance the number of boats at Bergen is to be increased by the type VII C boats putting out from Kiel on 22 February (Northern Waters boats excepted).
4. Boats of "U-boat group Central" are to be additionally equipped with general order and communications order according to operation "Wallenstein".
5. Execution:
 - (a) The 5th U-boat Flotilla will report to Group North/Fleet type VII C boats for "U-boat group Central" which are ready to put to sea.
 - (b) Group North/Fleet will order ports at which boats are to be in readiness.
 - (c) 5th U-boat Flotilla will insert the port of readiness in the sailing orders. (Distribution according to addressees of the present teleprinter message, Group North/Fleet and F.O.I.C. Defenses.)
 - (d) After arrival report 11th U-boat Flotilla will take over the boat.
6. When "U-boat group Central" has been made up to 10 boats, relief will be arranged as follows:
 - (a) See para. 5. (a).
 - (b) Group North/Fleet will indicate the boat to be relieved as well as the port of readiness.
 - (c) The sailing order of the 5th U-boat Flotilla will contain port and boat to be relieved (see also para. 5. (c)).
 - (d) After the relieving boat has reported arrival at the port of readiness, 11th U-boat Flotilla will see that the relieved U-boat gets to Bergen (e.g. provide escort) unless the relief takes

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place in Bergen itself. It seems practical to direct the relieved boats via Bergen, as this will allow extensive decentralization of the boats, which might otherwise make communications too difficult. Moreover, it is considered necessary that the 11th U-boat Flotilla should give the boats their final instructions after their stay in the Norwegian area.

- (e) Naval War Staff, 2nd Div. gives Atlantic sailing orders to 11th U-boat Flotilla, which releases the boat for the Atlantic.

7. All radio traffic of "U-boat group Central" is to be cleared on U-boat coastal radio service "Karl - Otto" until the receipt of key-word order "Wallenstein". Admiral Commanding U-boats takes over briefing of Group North/Fleet. Others concerned are to keep watch on this wave.

8. Footnote for Naval War Staff, 2nd Div. C-in-C U-boats, Ops.: Confirmation is requested."

VII. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

17 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 956 AB 8842)
U 674 AB 8733)
U 425 AB 8494)
U 957 AB 8455)
U 278 AB 8419) depth of sweep 20 miles.
U 990 AB 8177)
U 713 AB 7356)
U 312 AB 7324)
U 313 AB 7356)

In port:

U 472, 601, 737, 739, 973 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 636, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen.

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(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0600 U 703 put out from Hela for Kiel.
U 362 proceeding from Bergen via AB 8477
to 8419.
U 716 proceeding from AB 8455 to Hammerfest.
1330 U 601 put out from Narvik for AB 8510.
1330 U 366 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel.
1330 U 673 put out from Kristiansand (South)
for Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance of Bear Island, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

3 BV 138 on fan reconnaissance. No sighting report.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 FW 200, 1 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance with radar to intercept enemy traffic.
1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance - Jan Mayen. No enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic at sea:
Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Britain: no units or naval vessels appeared.
Russian radio traffic: normal.
Britain: no Murmansk or Archangel broadcasts.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

9 boats in patrol line east of Jan Mayen.

0900 Radio message 0833/172 from Captain U-boats:

"Franz" to make for attack area AB 8419 via AB 8477 to relieve "Franze" at 0800 on 18 February. "Franz" to join group "Werwolf" as boat number 5. "Franze" return journey via Narvik - Andfjord."

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(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 601 (Hansen), see Appendix IV/1.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

18 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 956 AB 8842)
U 674 AB 8733)
U 425 AB 8494)
U 957 AB 8455)
U 362 AB 8419) depth of sweep 20 miles.
U 990 AB 8177)
U 713 AB 7392)
U 313 AB 7356)
U 312 AB 7324)

In port:

U 472, 737, 739, 973 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 636, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0930 U 703 proceeding from Kiel to Königsberg.
U 716 put in to Hammerfest from AB 8455.
U 278 proceeding from AB 8419 to Narvik.
1500 U 601 proceeding from Narvik to AB 8510.
1500 U 366) put in to Bergen from Kristiansand
1735 U 673) (South).
U 315 put in to Kristiansand (South) from
Kiel.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75° N, 10° E - Banak. Almost exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. No enemy sighted.
2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 with radar on reconnaissance to intercept enemy convoy traffic. Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered, enemy not sighted.
Flying routes: Trondheim - AF 2793 - AE 3891 - AE 3597 - AF 2813 - Trondheim. Trondheim - AB 8973 - 7791 - 7731 - 8932 - Trondheim. Trondheim - AF 2538 - AE 3453 - 3556 - AF 2345 - Trondheim.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Visual reconnaissance: in Kola Bay from the town of Kola to Kola inlet 12 merchant vessels of 5,000 G.R.T. each. 20 merchant vessels about 2-3,000 G.R.T. each.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic at sea:
Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. From 0200 to 1200 on 18 February aircraft movements from Belushya (AT 7234) to Ponoï (AW 2914).

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

9 boats in patrol line northeast of Jan Mayen (see I.a).

U 601 (Hansen) reported at 0051 by short signal that he had put out from Andfjord.

1928 U 957 (Schaar) reported that he has fuel in battery 2, that the boat is making two tons of water per hour through the exhaust pipe and that he has very loud submarine noises.

2142 Radio message 2048/791 from Captain U-boats:

"Hansen" to relieve "Schaar" at 0800 on 19 February in attack area AB 8455. Depth of sweep 20 miles. "Schaar" to put in to Narvik via Andfjord."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1. Sailing order for U 366 (Langenberg) and U 673 (Sauer), see Appendix IV/2.
2. Transfer order for U 973 (Päpenm^uller):
 - "1. Put out from Narvik at 0700 on 19 February.
 2. Proceed through Westfjord, keeping 50 miles from the coast, via Frohavet to Trondheim.
 3. Report arrival at point HA 1 well in advance.
 4. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The following teleprinter message was received from Naval War Staff, 1st Div. I Ops. in Most Secret S.O.s only, 541/44:

"Further to Naval War Staff, 1st Div. I Ops. 369/44 S.O.s only, of 12 February:

1. The situation in the East requires that forces at operational readiness should be available in the eastern Baltic. A capital ship and destroyers, ready to go into action, are indispensable.
2. The formation of such a unit is possible only at the expense of our strength in Northern Waters.
3. The "Prinz Eugen" will therefore remain in the Baltic, attached for the time being to the Fleet Training Unit.
4. Decisions about changes in command procedure and instructions for naval bases in the Northern area and the employment of the "Hipper" will follow separately."

(Signed) Peters.

19 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 956 AB 8842)
U 674 AB 8733)
U 425 AB 8494)
U 601 AB 8455)
U 362 AB 8419) depth of sweep 20 miles.
U 990 AB 8177)
U 713 AB 7392)
U 313 AB 7356)
U 312 AB 7324)

In port:

U 716 Hammerfest,
U 472, 737, 739, 973 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 636, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 366, 387, 673, 965 Bergen,
U 315 Kristiansand (South).

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1730 U 703 proceeding from Kiel to Königsberg.
1700 U 278 put in to Narvik from AB 8419.
1300 U 315 put out from Kristiansand (South)
for Bergen.
U 973 put out from Narvik for Trondheim.
U 957 proceeding from AB 8455 to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75° N, 10° E -
Banak.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 with radar on exhaustive
reconnaissance to intercept enemy convoy traffic.
Flying routes: FW 200: Trondheim - AB 8973 -
7791 - 7731 - 8932 - Trondheim.
Trondheim - AF 2538 - AE 3453 - 3156 - AF 2345 -
Trondheim. Exhaustively covered, enemy not sighted.
Trondheim - AF 2793 - AE 3891 - 5397 - AF 2813 -
Trondheim. Enemy not sighted.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Vaernes - AA 9610 - Vaernes. Enemy not sighted.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

4 BF 109 in Kola Bay: from Kola town to Cape Pinagori 18 merchant vessels each 5-7,000 G.R.T. 8 of these ships hove to at the "Schwurfinger".

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic at sea:
Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

9 boats in patrol line northeast of Jan Mayen (see para. I.a).

At 0800 U 957 (Schaar) began his return passage, after having been relieved by U 601 (Hansen).

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1. Putting to sea of U 673 (Sauer) and U 366 (Langenberg) from Bergen has been postponed for one day.

2. Trials report from U 973 (Päpenm^{ll}öller), which was put into operation in Northern Waters as an experimental boat with a 3.7 cm. forward of the conning tower, is attached in Appendix III.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

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20 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 956 AB 8842)
U 674 AB 8733)
U 425 AB 8494)
U 601 AB 8455)
U 362 AB 8419) depth of sweep 20 miles.
U 990 AB 8177)
U 713 AB 7392)
U 313 AB 7356)
U 312 AB 7324)

In port:

U 716 Hammerfest,
U 278, 472, 737, 739 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 636, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 366, 387, 673, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2000 U 703 proceeding from Königsberg to Kiel.
U 957 put in to Narvik from AB 8455.
U 973 proceeding to Trondheim from Narvik.
1000 U 315 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand
(South).
1700 U 366 put out from Bergen for GR 1.
1700 U 673 put out from Bergen for AB 7660.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Banak - Bear Island - Hope Island - Banak.
Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Vaernes - AA 9660 - Vaernes. No enemy sighting
reports.

2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance with
radar to intercept enemy convoy traffic.

Flying routes: Trondheim - AB 8973 - 7791 -
8932 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AF 2538 - AE 3453 - 3156 - AF 2345 -
Trondheim.

1 Ju 88 Trondheim - AF 2793 - AE 3891 - 5397 -
AF 2813 - Trondheim.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic at sea:
Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Britain: no units or naval vessels appeared.
Russian radio traffic: normal.
Britain: very few Murmansk and no Archangel broadcasts.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
9 boats in patrol line northeast of Jan Mayen (see para. I.a).
- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:

In radio message 2325/749 the attention of the boats was drawn to the outward bound U 673 (Sauer). Boat has conning tower VI. 3.7 forward on undisguised gun mounting, likewise 3.7 aft.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 716 (Dunkelberg), second operation, see Appendix V/1.

VII. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

21 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 956 AB 8842)
U 674 AB 8733)
U 425 AB 8494)
U 601 AB 8455)
U 362 AB 8419) depth of sweep 20 miles.
U 990 AB 8177)
U 713 AB 7392)
U 313 AB 7356)
U 312 AB 7324)

In port:

U 716 Hammerfest,
U 278, 472, 737, 739, 957 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 636, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 315, 355, 387, 965 Bergen,
U 703 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1600 U 315 put out from Bergen for AF 22.
0800 U 739 put out from Narvik for AB 8510.
U 366 proceeding from Bergen to GR 1.
U 673 proceeding from Bergen to AB 7660.
1300 U 973 put in to Trondheim from Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75° N, 10° E - Nautsi. Not exhaustively covered owing to measurements made and weather conditions, nothing to report. So far no further operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AA 9346 - 9583 - Vaernes. Route 50%, Jan Mayen 90% covered. No enemy sighting report.
2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance with radar to intercept enemy convoy traffic. Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered, no enemy sighting report.
Flying routes: FW 200: Trondheim - AB 8973 - 7791 - AA 9992 - 9932 - AB 7731 - 8932 - Trondheim. Trondheim - AF 2538, - AE 3453 - 3156 - AF 2345 - Trondheim.

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Ju 88: Trondheim - AF 2793 - AE 3891 - 3597 -
AF 2813 - Trondheim.

1 Ju 88 in the sea area around the Faeroes, no
enemy sighting reports.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic at sea:
Norwegian polar coast: very little radio
traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Britain: no units or naval vessels appeared.
Russian radio traffic: normal.
Britain: very few Murmansk and no Archangel
broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

9 boats in patrol line northeast of Jan Mayen
(see para. I.a).

1207 U 312 (Nikolay) received orders to make a
reconnaissance thrust northwestwards to
reconnoiter the ice limit.

By midnight no report had yet been received
from him.

1248 In radio message 1211/757 the boats were
reminded of their regular movements to north-
west and southeast within the patrol line.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 315 (Zoller), see
Appendix IV/4.

Sailing order for U 739 (Mangold), see
Appendix IV/3.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

22 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 956 AB 8842)
U 674 AB 8733)
U 425 AB 8494)
U 601 AB 8455)
U 362 AB 8419) depth of sweep 20 miles.
U 990 AB 8177)
U 713 AB 7392)
U 313 AB 7356)
U 312 AB 7324)

In port:

U 716 Hammerfest,
U 278, 472, 737 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 636, 711, 973 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen,
U 703 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0700 U 957 put out from Narvik via Ramsund
for Bergen.
U 315 proceeding from Bergen to AF 22.
U 739 proceeding from Narvik to AB 8510.
U 366 proceeding from Bergen to GR 1.
U 673 proceeding from Bergen to AB 7660.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
Bear Island - South Cape - 75° N, 10° E - Banak,
almost exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. Reconnaissance
area 50%, Jan Mayen exhaustively covered, no enemy
sighting.

2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance with
radar to intercept enemy convoy traffic to Russian
Arctic ports. Reconnaissance areas exhaustively
covered, no enemy sighted.

Flying routes: FW 200: Trondheim - AF 2538 -
AE 3443 - 3156 - AF 2345 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AB 8973 - 7791 - 7731 - 8932 - Trondheim.

Ju 88: Trondheim - AF 2793 - AE 3891 - 3597 -
AF 2813 - Trondheim.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Radio traffic: no units or naval vessels intercepted.
Britain: a few Archangel, no Murmansk broadcasts.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

9 boats in patrol line east of Jan Mayen.

0109 U 312 (Nikolay) reported by short signal that the ice limit is in AB 4868.

Group "Werwolf" was therefore ordered in radio message 0146/764 to transfer attack areas by 20 miles on 315°. In this way the gap between the wing of the patrol line and the ice limit will be reduced.

1125 Radio message 1057/787 from Captain U-boats:

"Mangold" to relieve "Nordheimer" at 0800 on 23 February in attack area AB 7392. Approach via AB 8150. "Nordheimer" to return to Hammerfest at increased cruising speed for quick replenishing."

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 957 (Schaar):

- "1. Put out from Narvik at 0700 on 22 February to hand in torpedoes at Ramsund. Then proceed onwards through Westfjord to Bergen via Fejeosen keeping 50 miles from the coast.
2. From 64° N proceed according to Order No.13.
3. Report departure from Ramsund and arrival off Hellisøy by radio message or short signal.
4. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

- V. Reports of successes: None.
- VI. U-boat reports:
Short report from U 278 (Franze), see Appendix V/4.
Short report from U 957 (Schaar), see Appendix V/2.
Supplement to short report from U 957 (Schaar), see Appendix V/3.
- VII. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

23 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 956 AB 8733)
U 674 AB 8494)
U 425 AB 8458)
U 601 AB 8419)
U 362 AB 8411) depth of sweep 20 miles.
U 739 AB 7392)
U 713 AB 7356)
U 313 AB 7324)
U 312 AB 4978)
U 990 proceeding from AB 7392 to AB 8435.

In port:

U 716 Hammerfest,
U 278, 472, 737 Narvik,
U 307, 354, 360, 636, 711, 973 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen,
U 703 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 957 proceeding from Narvik to Hammerfest.
U 315 proceeding from Bergen to AB 6750.
U 673 proceeding from Bergen to AB 6750.
1530 U 366 put in to Trondheim from Bergen.
1000 U 307 put out from Trondheim for Ramsund.
1615 U 361 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel.
2045 U 959 put out from Kristiansand (South) for Bergen.
2030 U 716 put out from Hammerfest for AB 8315.

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II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75° N, 10° E - Banak. Not exhaustively covered because of measurements.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. Enemy not sighted.
2 FW 200 on exhaustive reconnaissance with radar from 0645 to 1633 to intercept enemy convoy traffic to Russian Arctic ports.

Flying routes: (ML) Trondheim - AB 8972 - 7791 - AA 9931 - AB 7731 - 8933 - Trondheim.

(OL) Trondheim - AF 2562 - AE 3453 - 3156 - AF 2345 - Trondheim.

Reconnaissance areas exhaustively covered by radar, no enemy sighting report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1 Ju 88 on exhaustive reconnaissance with radar from 0756 to 1513 to intercept enemy convoy traffic.

Flying route: Trondheim - AF 2796 - AF 1873 - then flew round convoy from AF 1841 - 1843 - 1847 - 1849 - 4389 - 1874 and back to Trondheim.

Result: signs of enemy shipping formation located by radar from a distance of approximately 40 km. At 1035 in AF 1848 enemy convoy on course 60° - 70°.

Composition: 40 merchant vessels averaging 5,000 G.R.T. 7 lines ahead, next to one another. Escort 15 destroyers in all-round screen. Shadowed until 1145, broke off in AF 1846.

1 FW 200 as shadower from 1332 to 2328. In AF 1739 the convoy was located by radar from a distance of 50 km. After visual interception shadowing taken up, mean course 70°, speed approximately 8 knots. Composition not established because of low visibility, oncoming darkness, and strong, widely dispersed, destroyer escort.

1 FW 200 as shadower relief, take-off 1844.

1 FW 200 (EL) as shadower relief, take-off 2358. The operation continues.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian radio traffic: very little.

Britain: a few Murmansk and Archangel broadcasts.
Britain: no units or warships appeared.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1220

The following telephone message was received from Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

"In AF 1848 at 1053 convoy of 40 merchant ships, course 70°, speed 8 knots. Loose cruising disposition, 7 lines ahead. 15 destroyers in all-round screen."

The PQ convoy (PQ 30) expected at this time has thus been intercepted.

The following measures were taken immediately:

1. The boats en route, U 307 (Herrle), U 673 (Sauer) and U 350 (Zoller), received orders to make for AB 6750 at maximum speed.
2. U 990 (Nordheimer), which began its return passage today at 0800 from the patrol line, was directed to attack area AB 8435, depth of sweep 20 miles.
3. U 366 (Langenberg), who put in to Trondheim this morning for the repair of a periscope, was ordered to put to sea again as quickly as possible and to make for AB 6950 at maximum speed.
4. U 716 (Dunkelberg), at present in Hammerfest at twelve hours' readiness during repair work, received orders to put to sea as quickly as possible and to steer for AB 8310 at maximum speed.

The convoy, which evidently comes from England, not from Iceland or America, is rather far east. Its course - reported as 70° - is improbable, as it would lead to the Lofotens. It is assumed that the actual course lies further north. But this too would cut the U-boat disposition in its easternmost part, and the attack areas have therefore been transferred 40 miles to the southeast.

1400

Radio message 1342/710:

"Group "Werwolf" with the exception of "Nordheimer" to move attack areas at 1800 40 miles on course 137°, speed 10 knots."

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1351 The boats were informed of the approaching convoy in radio message 1332/709.

1425 U 312 (Nikolay) reported by short signal that there are drift-ice fields in AB 4977.

1500 The following received from Luftflotte 5:

- "1. It is of decisive importance for the operation of our U-boats that constant contact should be maintained with the PQ convoy which was intercepted at 1035 on 23 February in 16 West 2744.
2. For this purpose the following are being transferred to Bardufoss:
 - a. operationally ready Ju 88's with radar of General Commanding the German Air Force in Finland,
 - b. in connection with tomorrow's (February 24) reconnaissance, Ju 88's of Flieger Fuehrer North (West) at Vaernes.
3. Upon arrival at Bardufoss the aircraft will be operationally under the command of Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten.

Luftflotte Command 5, Fuehrer Division I,
No. 1485/44 Most Secret."

This support may prove to be most helpful for the U-boats' operations.

1705 The German Air Force reported that the position of the convoy at 1631 was AF 1739.

The small number of position reports received so far does not provide a very clear picture. In particular, reports about the convoy's course are lacking.

No further reports on the convoy's position or course were received for the time being.

1930 The 13th U-boat Flotilla reported that U 307 (Herrle) had only 5 torpedoes on board (equipment with T5 torpedoes was scheduled in Hammerfest).

As, moreover, the boat reported that it had no cipher material, it received orders to proceed at maximum speed to Ramsund for speedy equipment.

U 957 (Schaar), who was proceeding to Bergen for urgent overhauls, reported that he had turned about and set course towards Hammerfest. He requested to be allowed to fit out there in order to take part in the convoy operation. The boat was permitted to do so, but only on condition that it should first be submitted to conscientious tests to show whether it was fit to go into action.

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2230 The German Air Force reported by telephone that the convoy's position at 2000 was AF 1579, mean course 75°, speed 8 knots; shadower broke off at 2130.
That gives a rough opposite course of 50°, enemy speed 8 knots.

2332 In order to let the boats advance towards the enemy, radio message 2256/719 was sent:

"The German Air Force reported that at 2000 the convoy was in AF 1579, speed 8 knots. As from 2400 group "Werwolf" and "Nordheimer" course 210°, speed 7 knots. Stop at 0800, form patrol line."

2400 Radio message 2345/720:

"As the period of daylight in the operational area is already about 12 hours, an aircraft carrier or auxiliary carrier as convoy escort must be taken into account."

The German Air Force has, it is true, constant contact, but is extremely sparing with reports of the enemy's position.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

U-boat position at 1500 on 23 February:

- "1. 9 boats in attack areas AB 8733 to 4977.
U 990 (Nordheimer) who has been relieved, has been ordered to occupy attack area AB 8435.
2. 3 boats in the sea area off Trondheim, were ordered to make for AB 6750 at maximum speed.
3. U 716 (Dunkelberg) will put out from Hammerfest about 0200 on 24 February and make for AB 8310, U 472 (v. Forstner) will put out from Narvik at 1200 on 24 February via Andfjord for the operational area.
4. At 1800 today patrol line moved 40 miles to the southeast. Further measures will be taken in accordance with the air shadower reports.
5. 15 boats will probably be available to operate against the convoy."

(Signed) Peters.

24 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 956)
U 674)
U 425)
U 601) proceeding from patrol line AB 8857
U 362) to AB 7356 to patrol line AB 2525
U 739) to AB 7686.
U 713)
U 313)
U 312)
U 990 proceeding from AB 8721 to AB 8768.

In port:

U 716 Hammerfest,
U 278, 472, 737 Narvik,
U 354, 360, 636, 711, 973 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen,
U 703 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 957 proceeding from Narvik to Hammerfest.
U 315 proceeding from Bergen to AB 6750.
U 673 proceeding from Bergen to AB 6750.
0052 U 366 put out from Trondheim for AB 6955.
U 307 proceeding to Ramsund from Trondheim.
1600 U 361 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand
(South).
1600 U 959 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand
(South).
0500 U 716 put in to Hammerfest on its passage
to Alta.
0800 U 703 put out from Kiel for Narvik.
1600 U 472 put out from Narvik for PQ 30.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75° N, 10° E -
Banak. Nothing to report. Almost exhaustive.
1 Ju 88 on shipping, harbor and ice reconnaissance
with shortened flying route because of weather,
not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. Area 70%
covered. No enemy sighting report.

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1 He 111 westwards as far as AM 3110. Route 80% covered. No enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1 FW 200 continued uninterrupted shadowing of PQ convoy. According to visual reconnaissance, enemy convoy in AF 1363 course 40-50°. Speed 8 knots. Convoy consists of about 40 merchant vessels in lines abreast. Three lines. About 20 destroyers in all-round screen. Convoy widely spaced, length 20 km., width 15-18 km. 1 "Catalina" as air cover. Aircraft carrier of about 20,000 G.R.T. observed at the center of the formation.

1 FW 200 shadowing convoy. Convoy located in AB 8879. Composition not recognized owing to poor visibility. Last position AB 8892. Air battle with two Martlets, hit on own aircraft not observed. Enemy aircraft turned away with smoke plume.

1 FW 200 shadowing convoy. Convoy located in AB 8859. Course 50°-60°. Details not recognized owing to darkness. Assignment broken off in AB 8973 because of lack of fuel. 1 FW 200 took off at 2223. Broke off prematurely because of engine trouble.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russia: since 21 February, lively repeat transmissions broadcast to submarines in the operational area. Traffic leads to the suspicion that there is a Russian submarine in a remote operational area (west of Barents Sea?). At 1149 and 1301 Polyarno broadcast a radio message of highest priority from Archangel to all naval forces.

According to radio traffic at sea:

Norwegian polar coast: a few transmissions and several repeats to submarines in the operational area.

Britain: no units or warships appeared.

At 0345 on 24 February 1 operational meteorological message from Spitsbergen (GQO) to Portsmouth (GYD 2).

Russian radio traffic: normal.

Britain: very few Murmansk and no Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

0308 U 673 (Sauer) reported passing 65° N.

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- 0440 Message from Flieger Fuehrer North (West):
"Shadowing broken off at 0325 in AF 1648."
As this convoy position lies very far east, the patrol line was transferred southeastwards.
- 0613 Radio message 0540/727:
"Group "Werwolf" to occupy patrol line AF 2525 to 7686 at 1000, "Nordheimer" attack area AB 8760."
- 0730 The Air Force reported that a shadower has been with the convoy since 0530.
But so far no reports have been received from this shadower.
- 0805 Message from Flieger Fuehrer North (West):
"Convoy course 360° at 0705."
This report, too, does not give the convoy's position. Reports in this form have little meaning and make the expense of constant shadowing useless.
At present there is great obscurity about the convoy.
- 1015 U 315 (Zoller) reported passing 65° N.
- 1043 Short signal received from U 425 (Bentzien):
"Two destroyers in AF 2162."
This gives us a fairly reliable clue which confirms former assumptions. Apparently these destroyers are the convoy's vanguard.
Short signal from U 425 (Bentzien):
"Contact lost."
- 1150 Message from Flieger Fuehrer North (West):
"At 1030 convoy in AF 1363, course 70°, speed 8 knots."
- 1217 This position was passed on to the boats in radio message 1159/733.
- 1224 From Flieger Fuehrer North (West):
"Shadowing aircraft reported fighters at 1147."
This report confirms the presence of enemy air forces, probably based on an aircraft carrier or auxiliary carrier.
- 1310 Radio message 1208/735:
"Contact with destroyer in grid square AF 2126, course north. Wind NW 7, seaway 6, snow coming up. - Hansen."

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The weather is deteriorating, but this will also impede the enemy's air forces.

1340 From Flieger Fuehrer North (West) radio message 1311/M/101:

"FW 200 (CL) is breaking off flight. Aircraft damaged. Fighters at the target, aircraft carrier."

From the reports by "Bentzien" and "Hansen" as well as from the last position report of the German Air Force it can be deduced with some degree of certainty that the convoy is facing the center of our patrol line. It therefore seems correct to draw the wings of the patrol line closer towards the center without further waiting.

1445 Radio message 1431/740 was therefore sent:

"From Captain U-boats. "Nikolay", "Schweiger", "Gosejakob", "Mohs" to operate on convoy position by dead reckoning. Take course to be 55°."

1450 Short signal from "Mangold":

"3 destroyers in AF 2113",

1507 and short signal from "Mangold":

"Enemy steering course 30°, moderate speed."

1542 Radio message 1425/743 from "Bentzien":

1. Forced to submerge several times by carrier-borne aircraft and flying-boat.
2. Only one twin mounting still clear. "Naxos" aerials and attack periscope out of action."

This report shows how much more difficult the task of the U-boats is made by the presence of enemy air protection.

1630 According to dead reckoning the enemy should now have reached the patrol line, or may even have passed it. Although the convoy itself has not yet been contacted, it seems correct to alter the patrol line. This is admissible because the position of the convoy is sufficiently certain.

1718 Radio message 1643/746 was therefore sent:

1. "Sauer", "Langenberg", "Zoller" and "Nordheimer" to form group "Hartmut" in that order.
2. Groups "Werwolf" and "Hartmut" to operate on convoy's position by dead reckoning.

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Last position AF 1363 at 1030. Suspected mean course 40°. Speed 8 to 9 knots."

1700 Short signal from U 362 (Franz):

"Two destroyers in AB 8793."

1700 Telephone call from Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

"At 1550 shadowing resumed in AB 8879. Position inaccurate. Aircraft sending beacon signals."

If this position is even approximately correct, the convoy has already passed the patrol line.

The same report was received in radio message 1629/M/108:

"Most Immediate. 1 FW 200, landed at 1500: on convoy from 1030 in 06 East 2944 till 1150 in 06 East 2943. Convoy of 40 merchant vessels, 3 lines abreast, 1 aircraft carrier of 20,000 G.R.T., about 20 destroyers in all-round screen 5 km. distant. 1 Catalina, 3 Martlets, 4 attacks. Weather: wind 7-10, 10/10 cloud base at 600 m., visibility 5-20 km., surface wind 60-30 km./hour, atmospheric pressure 1019 millibars."

1731 The Air Force reported that the convoy was in AF 2229 at 1640. In accordance with the previous telephonic report of 1700 radio message 1737/747 was sent:

"The German Air Force reported position of convoy at 1550 as AB 8879, inaccurate, all-round destroyer screen at a distance of about 5,000 m. Also one carrier."

1801 U 713 (Gosejakob) reported his position as AB 8758 and bearing 126°.

U 990 (Nordheimer) reported his position as AB 8794, bearing 105°.

Because of the acute angle formed by these two bearings it is not possible to recognize the enemy's position from them, although it is evident that he is proceeding in an easterly direction.

Two bearings from shadowing planes, of AF 2229 at 1709 and AF 2611 at 1822, are completely off the mark, apparently they refer to an approaching or departing aircraft.

1940 The German Air Force reported in radio message 1917/M/114:

"Most Immediate. Shadower (HL) at 1745 with convoy. Observation of convoy's composition

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impossible. Fighters at the target. One cruiser with the convoy."

2145 Short signal from U 362 (Franz):

"Have lost contact. My position is AB 8793."

This is the grid square in which the boat reported 2 destroyers at about 1700, apparently they forced it to submerge.

2215 Message from Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

"Position of convoy at 1836 AB 8883 course about 60° - 70°."

This is quite a reasonable position. It would make the mean course about 50°.

Radio message 2234/757 sent to the U-boats:

"According to latest air report the convoy was in AB 8883 at 1836. Course about 60° - 70°. Captain U-boats expects mean course to be 50°. Operate singly on convoy."

2210 Radio message 2146/754 from "Hansen":

"At 2110 in AF 2132 heavy depth charges for 7 hours. Am pursuing."

2318 The German Air Force reported the convoy's position as AB 8883 (inaccurate) at 2150.

There is no difference between this report and the one of 1836. The report increases the uncertainty about the convoy. Although an air shadower is constantly with the convoy and is transmitting beacon signals, unfortunately it does not send reports on the position of the convoy. The Air Force has informed us that this is due to bad weather conditions and technical faults as a result of which radio communications have been interrupted and reports are received only after the aircraft has landed. Consequently, reports on the convoy's position may arrive as much as 6 hours late, and are of no more than historical value.

2328 In radio message 2307/759 the boats were once more reminded that the air shadowers are maintaining contact during the night, and are sending beacon signals.

2338 In radio message 2309/760 U 472 (v. Forstner) was allotted to group "Hartmut" as 5th boat. The U-boats are now operating independently on the convoy. It is to be hoped that they will obtain contact during the night.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

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(d) Miscellaneous: No reports.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

U-boat positions at 2200 on 24 February.

1. So far the convoy has only been intercepted by the German Air Force. It seems to have passed our patrol line at its center approximately in AF 2130. Some of the boats have had temporary contact with destroyer groups. Some boats were forced to submerge by enemy air activity.
2. The German Air Force has established the presence of an aircraft carrier with the convoy, in addition, flying boats are being used.
3. At 1730 the patrol line was dissolved and the boats are now operating from north and south on the assumed convoy position based on a mean course of 40°.
4. The Air Force intends to maintain contact during the night and to send beacon signals. Take-off (Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten) on 25 February doubtful because of weather conditions.
5. If contact is not obtained during the night it is intended to re-intercept the convoy by means of a new patrol line.
6. The weather continues unfavorable. Wind strength NW 7, snow showers. Slightly calmer weather is expected during the night.
7. Group "Werwolf", consisting of 9 boats, is operating on the convoy, and group "Hartmut", consisting of 4 boats, is closing in from the south (including U 990 "Nordheimer").
8. Boats putting to sea:
 - a. U 472 (v. Forstner) from Narvik at 1600 on 24 February via Andfjord;
 - b. U 307 (Herrle) about 0800 on 25 February via Andfjord;
 - c. U 957 (Schaar) from Hammerfest about 1400 on 25 February.
9. 14 boats will probably be available to attack the convoy on 25 February.

(Signed) Peters.

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25 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 956)
U 674)
U 425)
U 601) operating on PQ 30 in
U 362) AB 86 and 94.
U 739)
U 713)
U 313)
U 312)

Group "Hartmut":

U 673)
U 366) operating on PQ 30 in
U 315) AB 86 and 94.
U 990)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 307 Ramsund,
U 278, 737 Narvik,
U 354, 360, 636, 711, 973 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 361, 387, 959, 965 Bergen.
U-boat group Central: U 365 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0800 U 957 put in to Hammerfest from Narvik.
1630 U 361 put out from Bergen for AB 69 (PQ 30).
1630 U 959 put out from Bergen for AB 69 (PQ 30).
1840 U 703 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel.
2220 U 703 put out from Kristiansand (South) for
Narvik.
U 472 proceeding from Narvik to PQ 30 (group
"Hartmut").
0500 U 307 put in to Ramsund from Trondheim.
2230 U 307 put in to Harstad from Ramsund.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Banak - Bear Island - Hope Island - Banak.
Not exhaustive.
1 Ju 88 on shipping and ice reconnaissance
Kola coast. Broken off in AC 8973 because of
weather.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

2 Ju 88 on reconnaissance to re-intercept PQ 30.
Flying route aircraft number 1:
Convoy intercepted at 1510 in AB 9179, course 65°, speed 8 knots. According to visual reconnaissance, 20 escort vessels, mostly destroyers, in all-round screen. 22 merchant vessels up to 6,000 G.R.T. each, 1 aircraft with the convoy, type not recognized. Convoy in 2 or 3 lines ahead. Shadowing broken off at 1626 because of weather conditions.

Flying route aircraft number 2:
Assignment broken off, radar gear not working. Heavily iced-up.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 FW 200 (FL), take-off at 0415, shadowing PQ convoy.
At 1000 in AB 8689, 5 destroyers together with aircraft carrier. 5 km. further back to port 10 merchant vessels in irregular cruising formation. 6 destroyers in all-round screen round merchant vessels. Mean course 60°, speed 8 - 10 knots. Further positions: at 1130 AB 8694, at 1245 AB 8666.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See IV.a.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Convoy located at 1425 in AB 8663. According to visual reconnaissance, total of 51 ships, among them 8 - 10 destroyers, 1 aircraft carrier. Formation: merchant vessels in 5 lines ahead. Destroyers in all-round screen at a distance of 3 to 5 km.

Aircraft carrier in first third with 4 - 5 destroyers. Formation 25 km. long and 8 - 10 km. wide. Course at first 60°, from 1630 10°, speed 8 - 10 knots. Last position AB 9145. At 1525 a Martlet swooped down on the aircraft's tail. No fight developed.

1 FW 200 (OL) took off at 1605.

Convoy located at 2125 in AB 9167.

Composition not made out because of darkness. Course 40°. Last position AB 9215.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russia: at 1327 on 24 February bearing of about 271° obtained from Hammerfest on British unit sending urgent radio message to Cleethorpes. Bearing of 265°, inaccurate, on further units in AK 1343 and of 261° in AL 1850. According to radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast: lively and increasing traffic to submarines in the operational area.

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Britain: no units or naval vessels appeared.
Russian radio traffic: normal.
Britain: very few Murmansk or Archangel
broadcasts.

(e) G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

0039 Radio message 2342/M/119 from Flieger Fuehrer
North (West):

"Convoy located by radar from 1541 to 1945 in
AB 8879 to AB 2293 (?) and intercepted partially
by visual reconnaissance. Visibility 5 km:
one aircraft carrier of the "Illustrious" class
and one heavy cruiser with 3 funnels 3 km.
astern. Convoy 4 - 5 lines ahead, destroyers
in all-round screen 5 - 8 km. away, course 60°,
speed 8 - 10 knots."

The last convoy position contained in this report
is inaccurate and is again 5 hours out of date.
As, however, this report fits in with earlier
positions, no further measures are necessary.

0057 U 366 (Langenberg) reported passing 67° N.

0208 U 472 (v. Forstner) reported leaving Andfjord.

0315 U 673 (Sauer) reported passing 70° N.

0614 Radio message 0531/M/122 from Flieger Fuehrer
North (West):

"1 FW 200 (LL) shadowed convoy by radar from
2140 in AB 8883 until 0100 in AB 8915. 1 FW
200 (BL) broke off at 0245 because radar broke
down."

This position report, too, was 5 hours old when
it arrived here.

Since there is no longer sufficient clarity
about the enemy's position, and since at the
moment we do not know whether there is a new
shadower with the convoy, and since, finally,
owing to bad weather we cannot reckon with
further reconnaissance flights from Flieger
Fuehrer Lofoten for the time being, it is no
longer advisable to leave the U-boats to search
individually. This method has prospects of
success only if a good measure of certainty
about the enemy's movements either already
exists or can be expected in the near future.
In order to place the boats once more in an
orderly disposition, 2 new patrol lines are to
be formed, one behind the other, in such a way
that they will cover the mean course directions
from 25° to 75° from the last convoy position.

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The average interval between the boats will be 12 miles. The second line will be behind the center of the first, so that the disposition will also have a certain depth.

0746 Radio message 0704/769 was therefore sent:

- "1. Last convoy position according to the German Air Force was AB 8915 at 0100.
2. If no contact or reliable clues, occupy patrol lines at maximum speed that weather permits:- "Werwolf" AB 9466 to 8333, "Hartmut" AB 9275 to 9137."

0748 U 990 received orders to break off the operation and to proceed to Hammerfest for quick replenishing.

"v. Forstner" to move up to number 4 in group "Hartmut".

0800 Short signal from U 362 (Franz):

"One destroyer in AB 8543."

This position lies very far north and does not fit in with our present information. It may be supposed that this was a single destroyer of a remote escort or cover group.

0955 Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten reported that, owing to weather conditions, reconnaissance is impossible for the time being.

1310 Message from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"Position of convoy AB 8682 at 1000. Contact being maintained."

This is the first position report for 12 hours. It lies along the assumed course but very far back. Presumably this is due to the rough weather.

Since the U-boats will have been similarly held up, it would no longer be correct to have them spread out widely in patrol lines. Rather, they should be concentrated on the enemy.

1350 Radio message 1331/776 was therefore sent:

"The German Air Force reported the convoy in AB 8682 at 1000, shadower is sending beacon signals. Operate on convoy."

1320 U 315 (Zoller) reported in radio message 1158/975:

"One Diesel out of action for about 3 hours, position AB 8955."

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- 1346 Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten reported that at 1245 2 Ju 88 took off to re-intercept the convoy.
- 1420 U 362 (Franz) reported in radio message 0900/777 that he was forced to submerge by 2 destroyers in AB 8527 and has lost contact.
- 1400 Flieger Fuehrer North (West) reported:
"Aircraft "FL" reported convoy in AB 8694 at 1130, course 80°, speed 8 knots. Estimated at 10 merchant ships. Probably one carrier, 5 destroyers. Observations not reliable because of heavy anti-aircraft fire from all armament over target. Broken off at 1245 in AB 8668 because limit of range had been reached."
- 1512 This information was passed on to the U-boats in radio message 1445/778.
- 1523 Flieger Fuehrer North (West) via Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:
"At 1430 convoy in AB 8631."
This position is too far north and seems unlikely. It was corrected to AB 8692 at 1604 by radio message 1505/M/134.
- 1535 Short signal from U 990 (Nordheimer):
"Carrier-borne aircraft in AB 8634."
- 1538 "Nordheimer" reported a bearing of 175° which however is not helpful. The reliability of his own fix is open to doubt.
- 1607 Short signal from U 313 (Schweiger):
"Order to operate on convoy cannot be carried out as distance is too great. My position is AB 8922. Fuel 60 cu. m."
- 1626 Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:
"Convoy in AB 9415 at 1510."
This was passed on in radio message 1613/784:
"According to air report, convoy in AB 9414 at 1510. Position seems accurate. Boats to operate on convoy at maximum speed."
- 1716 Radio message 1610/785 from U 990 (Nordheimer):
"Hydrophone bearing in AB 8635 110° true, strength 2 - 3, 65° true, strength 1 - 2. Am pursuing."
- 1732 By telephone from Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

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"Aircraft reported convoy in AB 9412 at 1530, course 60°, speed 8 knots. Shadowing will be continued during the night."

1800 Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten informed us by telephone that he cannot fly a shadower because of the weather. Early tomorrow morning he will fly a new reconnaissance in accordance with the convoy's position by dead reckoning.

1845 U 312 (Nikolay) reported in radio message 1500/787:

"Forced to submerge by 2 destroyers in grid square 9418. 37 cu.m. Main ballast pump not in full working order."

1850 Telephone message from Flieger Fuehrer North (West): Reconnaissance reports:

"Convoy in AB 9412 at 1530, course 60°, speed 8 knots. 31 merchant vessels, aircraft carrier, 3 shipborne aircraft. Visibility 25 km., cloud base 1000 m. At 1700 50 merchant ships and naval vessels."

Supplementary report from aircraft "FL" after landing:

"Correction of position at 1000: 07 E 9023; at 1130: 17 E 0177; at 1240: 17 E 0181. Beacon signals for U-boats could not be given as trailing-wire aerial was lost. When sighted at 1000, the aircraft carrier was accompanied by 5 destroyers. 10 merchant ships 5 km. on port quarter, cruising formation irregular but widely spaced. 6 destroyers in all-round screen round the merchant ships. Mean course 60°, speed 8 - 10 knots."

1839 Use of shadower's signal buoy 3 ordered.

1922 Radio message 1843/L/143 from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"Further to radio message of 1830. Convoy course 65°, 20 escort vessels, mostly destroyers, all-round screen. 22 merchant vessels of up to 6,000 G.R.T. in 2 or 3 lines ahead, 1 aircraft with the convoy, type not recognized. Anti-aircraft fire from some of the destroyers."

2110 Radio message 2038/794 from U 990 (Nordheimer):

"Convoy in AB 9425. Course 50°, speed 8 - 10 knots."

2144 Radio message 2137/796 to "Nordheimer" from Captain U-boats:

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"Important to maintain contact in order to bring up the other boats."

2117) "Nordheimer": "Watch out for shadower's
2159) signal buoy."

2308 U 956 (Mohs) gave F.A.T. torpedo warning.

2345 Radio message 2311/M/149:

"Most Immediate. Aircraft (OL) on convoy at 2130, position inaccurately located as 17 East 3259, course 40°, speed unknown. Am shadowing enemy naval forces. 1 FW 200 (KL) took off as shadower at 2255. Flieger Fuehrer North (West)."

2325 U 990 (Nordheimer) reported a hydrophone bearing of 15° on convoy in AB 9197.

The operation continues.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing orders for U 361 (Seidel), U 959 (Weitz) and U 1061 (Hinrichs), see Appendix IV/5.*

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 2300 on 25 February:

1. As the air reconnaissance during the night produced no definite information on the convoy's position, and since, owing to weather conditions no reconnaissance by Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten was at first possible, the U-boats were ordered in the morning to form a patrol line.
2. On receipt of the shadowing aircraft's report on the convoy at 1330 the U-boats were ordered to operate on the convoy.
3. Constant shadowing from the air; from midday convoy positions were punctually reported.
4. At 2038 U 990 (Nordheimer) contacted the convoy.
5. Boats were partly held up by depth charge attacks and their advance impeded by the weather.
6. At present 14 U-boats are taking part in the operation.
7. Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten reported no operations during the night. Flieger Fuehrer North (West) is trying to keep up shadowing from Trondheim.

(Signed) Peters.

* Note: Not included in this War Diary.

26 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 956)
U 974)
U 425)
U 601) operating on PQ 30 in
U 362) AB 92 and 68.
U 739)
U 713)
U 313)
U 312)

Group "Hartmut":

U 673)
U 366)
U 315) operating on PQ 30 in
U 472) AB 92 and 68.
U 990)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 957 Hammerfest,
U 278, 737 Narvik,
U 354, 360, 636, 711, 973 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen.

U-boat group Central:

1600 U 365 Bergen,
U 970 put in to Bergen from Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0530 U 365) proceeding from Bergen
0815 U 959) to AB 69 (PQ 30).
0420 U 703 proceeding from Kristiansand (South)
to Narvik, put in to Egersund,
put out from Egersund.
U 307 put out from Harstad for the operational
area (PQ 30).

II. Air reconnaissance:

Fliieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75° N, 5° E -
Banak, nothing to report. Not exhaustive because
of measurements and weather.

Fliieger Fuehrer Lofoten: See III.b.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88, 1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AB 7785 - Vaernes, route 60% covered, enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance westward as far as AE 6779, no enemy sighting report.

1 FW 200 took off at 1445, landed at 2325. Enemy not sighted, no locations. Radio partly broken down, trailing-wire aerial torn, no radio communications.

1 FW 200 took off at 2104 to re-intercept and shadow convoy. Operation in progress.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See IV.a.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 FW 200 shadowing PQ convoy. Take-off 0215. At 0301 aircraft wished to break off assignment because radio had broken down, no enemy observed.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance to re-intercept PQ 30. Convoy intercepted in AB 6898, course 70°, speed 10 knots. Located by radar and partly by visual reconnaissance. 20 merchant ships, 1 aircraft carrier, 3 light cruisers, 2 heavy cruisers, 15 destroyers, 5 corvettes, merchant ships in 4 lines ahead next to one another, destroyers in all-round screen, anti-aircraft fire from cruisers and destroyers, several attacks by probable Spitfire. Broken off at 1255 on account of heavy anti-aircraft fire and lack of cloud cover.

1 BV 138 as shadower relief. Broke off at 1233 in AB 9656. Forward gun out of action.

1 BV 138 with radar as shadower relief.

Result: several vessels located in AB 6936.

At 1515 sighted the following, but only partly because of shower: 1 aircraft carrier, 12 merchant ships, 8 destroyers recognized, course 70°, 10 knots. Destroyers in all-round screen.

Distance away from convoy 5 - 6 miles, no cruisers observed. Attacked by 4 fighters.

Own aircraft hit twice, no casualties.

Definite hit observed on 1 enemy fighter.

Broken off at 1630 in AC 4742 because of weather.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 0530 on 27 February Russia: at 2111 on 26 February highest priority radio message from Polyarno to all submarines in the operational area.

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According to radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast: brisk and partly urgent traffic to submarines in the operational area.

"L 20" named.

Murmansk area: destroyers "E", "H" (latter probably proceeding eastward).

Britain: no units or naval vessels appeared.

Russian radio traffic: lively and partly urgent transmissions from Iokanka to guard vessels.

Other radio traffic normal.

Moderate number of Murmansk and Archangel broadcasts, mostly urgent.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

0045 Radio message 2247/M/248 Most Immediate from Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

"Aircraft "EL" landed at 2047. From 1425 in 17 East 0148 until 1800 in 17 East 1281, shadowed convoy of 51 ships with 8 - 10 destroyers, one aircraft carrier, merchant ships in 5 lines, carrier and 4 - 5 destroyers on port quarter, course at first 60°, after 1630 10°, speed 8 - 10 knots, heavy defenses."

0132 Radio message 2055/704 received from U 990 (Nordheimer):

"AB 9423, destroyer sunk by bow T5 torpedo after 2 minutes, 16 seconds. Rear of convoy screened by 6 destroyers in close escort."

0341 Short signal received from U 990 (Nordheimer):

"Look out for shadower's signal buoys."

0415 Radio message 302/708 received from U 990 (Nordheimer):

"Bearing 95° true, volume 3, obtained on convoy in AB 9163. Look out for beacon signals."

0603 Radio message 0032/711 received from U 956 (Mohs):

"At 0007 with the help of radar attacked 2 destroyers astern of convoy in snow squall. Attacked with anti-aircraft fire at 200 m. Stern T5 torpedo fired. Heavy depth charges. Single explosion after 13 minutes."

Later during the night the Air Force had to give up shadowing. U 990 maintained contact up to 0300. After that no further reports were received.

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Only U 990 (Nordheimer) and U 956 (Mohs) seem to have been able to attack, as far as can be seen from the reports to date.

This may be partly due to the very unfavorable weather. U 312 (Nikolay) reported at 0600 wind northeast 6, cloud base 300 m., 40% snow showers, visibility 3 miles. Some of the boats have also been held up by anti-submarine groups ("Bentzien", "Franz", "Hansen", "Mohs") and by engine trouble ("Schweiger").

1410 Message from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"At 1055 convoy in AB 6899, course 70°, speed 10 knots."

This was passed on in radio message 1151/719.

1140 Radio message 0745/716 received from U 315 (Zoller):

"Submerged because of destroyer and 2 aircraft. Convoy heard on hydrophone in AB 9314. Still 105 cu.m."

1206 Radio message 1137/718 sent to groups "Werwolf" and "Hartmut":

1. Continuous shadowing from the air.
2. It is important for the boats to advance and gain contact during the day, so that the night may be used for attack.
3. There are still 2 days in which attacks can be made on this extremely important and strong convoy."

1301 Radio message 0005/720 received from U 990 (Nordheimer) in which he reported breaking off shadowing because of lack of fuel. Convoy in AB 9224, course 60°, speed 8 knots, submerged because of starshells and depth charges.

This skillful shadower, who performed his task extremely well, is thus unfortunately eliminated for the time being.

1420 In radio message 1405/722 the boat received orders to proceed to Hammerfest at maximum speed and to put to sea again immediately after replenishing.

1328 The Air Force reported that at 1125 the convoy was in AB 6978, course 60°, speed 10 knots.

This was passed on to the boats in radio message 1359/721, but without the speed, which seemed too high.

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- 1527 Radio message 1512/L/164 received from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:
"Several vessels located at 1450 in AB 6936."
This position lies about 30 miles north of the supposed enemy position. The type of the vessels located was not observed. They must either be a carrier group or a covering group, or a part-convoy.
- 1622 The boats were informed in radio message 1607/725:
"Several vessels located from the air at 1450 in AB 6936. Footnote: Part-convoy or carrier group possible."
- 1530 "v. Forstner", "Hansen", "Gosejakob", "Mangold" and "Mohs" were requested to report their positions by short signal.
- 1938 The same request sent to "Muss", "Bentzien", "Schweiger", "Herrle", "Franz", "Sauer".
- 1545 Radio message 0846/723 received from U 366 (Langenberg):
"Convoy in AB 6858 course 60°, surfaced, fired T5 torpedo on 2 destroyers. Explosion heard on alarm. Only one hydrophone bearing. Depth charges. 110 cu.m., 716 431."
- 1704 Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten reported that the shadower broke off in AB 6933 at 1620, and that a FW 200 will probably continue shadowing from 1900.
The last position report from the German Air Force was made at 1125, and is therefore 6 hours out of date. It became known only at 2030, through a telephone inquiry, that this aircraft was actually with the convoy until 1620 when it had to break off shadowing. This information alters the situation considerably and it would have been of vital importance to receive it earlier. For up till now it was thought that the aircraft was shadowing something like a carrier group, and consequently the boats were not ordered to operate against it.
- 1800 Radio message 1159/730 received from U 312 (Nikolay):
"At 0800 in grid square 6865, 163 cm. location; dived to 40 m., 2 aircraft bombs then depth charges for 3 hours and 4 hour hydrophone hunt."
Positions were reported as follows:
- 1735 U 956 (Mohs) in AB 9376 at 1720.
1730 U 472 (v. Forstner) in AB 4775 at 1715.
1735 U 739 (Mangold) in AC 4777 at 1708.
1810 U 312 (Nikolay) in AB 6865 at 0800.

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2025 U 313 (Schweiger) in AC 9369 at 2008.
2040 U 307 (Herrle) in AB 9387 at 2026.
2022 U 674 (Muss) in AC 4725 at 2021.
2135 U 366 (Langenberg) in AB 6694 at 2115,
1 destroyer.
2318 U 362 (Franz) in AB 4745 at 2318.

As a result of the change in the situation as revealed by Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten's telephone report, it seems proper to let all the boats operate on this information. Otherwise there is a danger that the attack of the independently operating boats would be too widely scattered.

2219 Radio message 2157/738 was therefore sent:

"Captain U-boats assumes convoy in AC 4497 at 2200, course around 75°, speed 7.5 knots. All boats to operate on this."

2300 Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten's daily report informed us that as early as 0915 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers and 15 destroyers, 5 of the aircraft carrier's corvettes and 20 merchant ships were observed by the shadower in AB 6998.

It is incomprehensible why this important information has only now been passed on to me.

(Pencilled marginal note: It would be far more important to know whether, and if so what, measures were taken in consequence.)

The operation is proceeding.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

See para. IV.a.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes:

1. U 990 (Nordheimer): 1 destroyer sunk at 2055 on 25 February in AB 9423.
2. U 956 (Mohs): Probable hit on destroyer at 0007 on 26 February.
3. U 366 (Langenberg): 1 destroyer torpedoed at 0846 on 26 February in AB 6858.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The following U-boat situation as of 2300 was sent in Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 823 A1 to Group North/Fleet, for information Naval War Staff, 1st Div., for information Naval War Staff, 2nd Div. C-in-C U-boats, Ops., and Admiral Northern Waters:

- "1. U 990 (Nordheimer) broke off shadowing of convoy at 0600 because of lack of fuel. Since then no U-boat has had contact.

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2. The German Air Force intercepted the convoy at 0915 in AB 6898 and shadowed it throughout the day. Towards evening contact interrupted once or twice. Reports gave a clear picture of the situation until about 1100, then uncertainty about the enemy's position arose as a result of interrupted communications and discrepancies in the reported positions.
3. The position reports from the U-boats show that towards evening the boats were widely scattered, and in part considerably to the south of the convoy. This is due to the weather, depth charge and hydrophone pursuits and enemy air activity.
4. Weather unfavorable. Wind northeast 6, heavy seaway, visibility 1 - 3 miles, occasionally more. Snow showers up to 40%.
5. As from 2300 U-boats operated on convoy position as assumed by Captain U-boats. (At 2200 in AC 4487, course around 75°, speed 7.5 knots.)
6. Successes to date: One destroyer sunk by "Nordheimer" in AB 9423. Running time 2 minutes 16 seconds. One destroyer torpedoed by "Langenberg" in AB 6858 (surface shot on two destroyers, explosion heard during alarm, then only one hydrophone bearing). One probable hit by "Mohs" (single explosion after running time 13 minutes)."

(Signed) Peters.

27 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 956)
U 974)
U 425)
U 601)
U 362) operating on PQ 30 in
U 739) AC 46 and 49.
U 713)
U 313)
U 312)

Group "Hartmut":

U 366)
U 315) operating on PQ 30 in
U 472) AC 46 and 49.
U 990)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 957 Hammerfest,
U 278, 737 Narvik,
U 354, 360, 636, 711, 973 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen.

U-boat group Central:

U 365, 970 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 361) proceeding from Bergen to AB 69.
U 959)
U 703 proceeding from Egersund to Trondheim.
U 307 proceeding from Harstad to the operational
area (PQ 30).
U 673 put in to Narvik at 2215 from the
operational area (PQ 30).

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on shipping and ice reconnaissance, route Alakurtti - southern side of Kola Peninsula - southern side of West Fairway - Dvina Bay (if possible inspection of ports of Archangel and Molotovsk). Search for ships reported yesterday. Ships no longer there.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

1 FW 200 with radar as shadower relief with PQ 30. Take-off 0358 from Nautsi, landing 0530, operation broken off because of engine trouble.
1 Ju 88 with radar as shadower relief, take-off 0820 from Bardufoss, landing 1504 at Kirkenes. At 1415 air battle with 2 single-engined aircraft. Oxygen cylinder exploded as a result of a hit on fuselage of own aircraft. Shadower relief by 1 FW 200 with radar. Take-off 1340. Radar set in order, but no echo, probably because of extreme cold (below 50° C).
3 BV 138 on reconnaissance against QP convoy which might have put to sea. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. No enemy observed.
1 Ju 88 in the sea area around the Faeroes. No enemy observed in area traversed.
1 FW 200 with radar on reconnaissance of shipping movements in Northern Waters, no enemy observed.

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Flying route Trondheim - AF 1281 - AB 8542 - AB 8195 - AF 1138 - Trondheim.

1 Ju 88 with radar on reconnaissance of shipping movements in Northern Waters. Flying route Trondheim - AF 1682 - AB 8865 - 8598 - AF 1538 - Trondheim. Exhaustive, no results.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance with radar of enemy convoy routes to the Russian Arctic ports. Flying route Trondheim - AF 1778 - 1373 - 1343 - AB 8781 - AF 2244 - AF 4223 - Trondheim. Result: at 1150 2 destroyers located from AF 1343 55 km. off, course 40°, moderate speed. Destroyers clearly made out by visual reconnaissance. Large searching circles flown in the area. No further impulses.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See under IV.b.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 1140 convoy located by radar in AC 4926, convoy in shower, eastwards of shower 2 destroyers, course east. At 1218, 40 km. southwest of convoy two zigzagging destroyers dropping depth charges. At 1300 convoy outside shower. 40 merchant ships 5-8,000 G.R.T. each. Formation of ships not recognizable, one aircraft carrier in the middle of the merchant ships, convoy course 140°, speed 8 knots. Escort forces placed in all-round screen up to 40 km. away from merchant ships, 3 destroyers ahead, 7 destroyers to starboard, 4 destroyers to port, 4 destroyers astern.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast: brisk radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. Britain: Murmansk/Archangel area no naval vessels or warships intercepted. At 1753 bearing of about 254° obtained on unit or naval vessels "AJ", and of 255° on "AL" 105 from Hammerfest (probably not connected with PQ convoy). Russian radio traffic: very brisk radio traffic on the evening of 25 February and night of 25/26 February. Britain: very few Murmansk or Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

The last position reports from the air shadowers no longer gave a clear picture of the situation from midday yesterday. In order to prevent the U-boats from searching at random in the sea area, radio message 0013/742 was sent:

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"Captain U-boats assumes position of convoy will be AC 4674 at 0800. If no contact or definite clues boats to operate accordingly."

0130 Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten reported that between 1900 and 2300 nothing was seen nor located in the sea area where the convoy should have been according to dead reckoning. The next shadower would be in the sea area from 0100 onward.

0332 Telephone message received from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"At 0230 convoy in AC 4597."

This report approximately confirms our estimate of the situation as put forward at midnight.

0435 In radio message 0415/747 this position was passed on to the boats and instructions given to operate on it at maximum speed.

0358 Flying weather from Nikolay: Wind NE 5, visibility 4 miles, 30% snow showers.

0618 Telephone message from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"At 0540 convoy in AC 4679."

0655 This was passed on to boats in radio message 0642/750.

0800 U 362 (Franz) reported in radio message 0600/751 that his ability to dive was endangered as owing to his experimental conning tower he had no bilge water. Position AC 4588. The boat reported the weather as wind NE 3, seaway 1, cloudy, visibility 4 miles.

In radio message 1146/758 the boat received instructions to proceed to Hammerfest. The unloading of 2 torpedoes, provisions and 1/3 munitions is scheduled.

1015 Radio message 0945/754 from Captain U-boats:

"Attention is again drawn to the need for constant watch on beacon wave "Bruno" to correct differences in fixes. Report by short signal of "L r H" in case aircraft beacon signals cannot be heard by boats near the convoy."

1046 Radio message 0955/756 from "Mangold":

"AC 4864, submerged at 0630 because of aircraft 3,000 m. away. Defense not possible. All armament iced up. Also radar interception gear. Assume same conditions for other boats."

This report shows clearly how difficult defense conditions are for the boats. In order not to endanger them needlessly while there are no prospects of daytime attack,

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1331 radio message 1250/759 was sent by Captain U-boat:

"If enemy air defenses too strong and icing-up of armament too severe, haul ahead during daytime at a safe distance for the sake of night attacks. Captain U-boats presumes convoy will proceed via AB 5730 - 5840 - 8220. Presumed position at 1800 AC 5876."

1100 Radio message 1012/M/192 from Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

"1 FW 200 (HL) with radar shadowed convoy from 0230 till 0345 in AC 4597, and from 0540 in AC 4679 till 0620 in AC 4688. According to visual reconnaissance merchant ships in 3 lines ahead. Destroyers in all-round screen, aircraft carrier and one heavy cruiser astern of convoy, course 80°, speed 8.5 knots."

1250 Telephone message from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"At 1145 convoy in AC 4923."

This position lies somewhat south of the supposed convoy route and was at first considered improbable. It was therefore not passed on to the U-boats.

1400 U 307 (Herrle) at 1257 reported having heard in AC 5741 single piston and turbine noises and several depth charge explosions on hydrophone.

1443 Radio message 1157/762 from "Zoller":

"At 1240 on 26 February attacked by carrier-borne aircraft with rocket bombs. Naval grid square AB 9311. No damage. Defense weak owing to icing-up. Aerials were out of order until now."

The enemy has apparently put into operation on this convoy all the most modern means of defense at his disposal. As against this, the U-boats' defensive capacity is more and more reduced because of increased icing-up as they advance eastwards.

1430 Radio message 1330 on Air Force reconnaissance wave:

"At 1330 convoy in AC 4963, course 140°, speed 8 knots. 40 merchant ships, escort forces in all-round screen; 3 destroyers ahead, 7 to starboard, 4 to port, 4 astern. One aircraft carrier in the center."

This report shows that the convoy position of 1145 was, after all, correct. The convoy is already steering a southeasterly course. It has, in so doing, approached as near to the Norwegian coast as could possibly be expected.

The weakness of our Air Force is therefore just as well known to the enemy as that of our naval forces, and is treated as a well-known fact to be utilized in his dispositions.

1619 In radio message 1510/765 the boats were informed of the new enemy position and instructed to operate upon it:

"The German Air Force reported the convoy in AC 4963 at 1330, course 145°, speed 8 knots. 40 merchant vessels, 18 destroyers in all-round screen, carrier in the center. Operate on this. Endeavor to be in position ahead of convoy at the beginning of the night."

1528 Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten altered the course given in the 1330 report to 150°, later to 145°. Radio message 1510 was correspondingly altered.

1610 U 362 (Franz) reported clouds of smoke sighted at 1550 in AC 4943 and
1627 convoy in AC 4954 at 1627.

As compared with the aircraft report, this position was considered to be too far westward.

The boats were informed of this in radio message 1720/768:

"Franz's convoy report is considered too far westward. "Franz" to shadow, and give beacon signals."

1700 Radio message 1635/767 from Captain U-boats:

"Groups "Werwolf", "Hartmut": Remain at least 20 miles off the coast. Do not cross line AC 8517 - 8565 - 8955 to the south."

1837 Radio message 1058/770 received from "Langenberg":

"In AC 4674 2 destroyers, miss with T5 torpedo on destroyer. Range of target 4 times, "Gamma" 50. Enemy speed 16 knots. Failure because of premature deep diving. Depth charges. 814-423."

1853 Radio message 1840/771 sent by Captain U-boats:

"Groups "Werwolf", "Hartmut": Exploit all chances to attack during the night. Break off operation tomorrow morning."

2056 Radio message 1935/772 from U 362 (Franz):

"At 1634 fired T5 torpedo at nearest of 3 pursuing destroyers. Angle on the bow 0°, range 5,000 m., torpedo explosion after 4 minutes, 13 seconds. After submerging, depth charges from one, then two destroyers. AC 4954,

inaccurate. Suspect port wing escort of convoy. Noises on bearing 120°, true. After surfacing, driving snow, no contact."

In radio message 2136/775 the boat received orders to continue its homeward journey to Hammerfest unless it gained contact by 2400.

2157 Radio message 1700/774 from U 312 (Nikolay):

- "1. Yesterday in grid square 4479, at 2300 forced to submerge by starshells fired by destroyer, depth charges.
2. Today in grid square 4588, at 1035 while surfaced fired T5 torpedo at destroyer, single explosion after 9 minutes, 34 seconds. Sinking not heard, later depth charges. Destroyer made off westwards."

2359 Radio message 2215/777 from "Franz":

"No contact, single hydrophone bearing from AC 4982 120° true, faint, every 15 minutes deterrent depth charges. Return journey because of diving condition and loud underwater noises, direction finder apparatus out of order."

During the course of the evening the German Air Force had to give up shadowing because of unfavorable developments in the weather. This is regrettable as the last attack of the boats, which have used the daytime to haul ahead of the convoy, will now depend merely on chance.

The operation continues. It is intended to break it off tomorrow morning at 0600, as, according to dead reckoning, the convoy should be south of the limit set for our U-boats by 0400.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 737 (Brasack):

- "1. Put out from Narvik at 0000 on 28 February for Ramsund to take on 2 cm. anti-aircraft twin-mounting at Torpedo Command alongside "Anna Rheder". Torpedo Command Ramsund has been informed.
2. Then proceed onwards to Tromsø via Tjeldsund with district pilot from Lødingen.
3. To Hammerfest from Tromsø with escort and without pilot. Escort for whole voyage requested from Admiral Polar Coast for 1500 on 28 February.
4. During transfer radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters' very long wave.

5. 5 hours' readiness at Hammerfest."

V. Reports of successes: See para.VI.9.

VI. Survey of the situation:

U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 2300
on 27 February:

1. The air reconnaissance confirmed the convoy's route of advance as suspected by Captain U-boats, except that it was rather further back than had been estimated by Captain U-boats for 0800.
2. At first the U-boats did not gain contact. Just before dark U 362 (Franz) gained contact briefly, position inaccurate. Contact lost as the boat was forced to submerge for 4 hours by search group.
3. Convoy course from noon 145°, making straight for entrance to Kola Bay, close under the Norwegian coast.
4. The German Air Force shadowed continuously from 0230 until darkness. Last report about convoy at 1330, in AC 4963. Last observation 1415.
5. The U-boats were attacked several times by destroyers and aircraft. Icing-up of all anti-aircraft armament impeded defense or rendered it impossible. One boat reported rocket bombs.
6. As a result of strong defenses and of the hopelessness of approaching by day, the boats were ordered to haul ahead for night attacks. It is hoped that single boats may be able to attack during the present night.
7. Weather at times rather better than on previous day. At night wind still NE 6, falling off to 4 in the afternoon, 30% driving snow. Increase in clouds and driving snow towards evening so that further Air Force operations during the night, and probably tomorrow, will be impossible.
8. Plans: to break off operation at 0600. Withdraw boats from the immediate neighborhood of inshore waters to a patrol line on 29° E.
9. Further successes: destroyer torpedoed by "Franz" in AC 4954. Torpedo exploded after 4 minutes, 13 seconds. One destroyer probably hit by "Nikolay" in AC 4588, single explosion after 9 minutes, 34 seconds. Later depth charges.

(Signed) Peters.

28 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Werwolf":

U 956)
U 974)
U 425)
U 601) proceeding from PQ 30 in AC 85 on course
U 739) 325° true as far as 29° E.
U 713)
U 313)
U 312)

Group "Hartmut":

U 366)
U 315) proceeding from PQ 30 in AC 85 on course
U 472) 325° true as far as 29° E.
U 307)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 957 Hammerfest,
U 278, 673 Narvik,
U 354, 360, 636, 711, 973 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen.

U-boat group Central:

U 365, 970 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 361)
U 959) proceeding from Bergen to AB 69.
U 703 proceeding from Egersund to Trondheim,
put in to Trondheim at 2200.
U 737 put out from Narvik at 0000 via Ramsund
for Hammerfest.
U 362 put in to Hammerfest at 1400 from the
operational area.
U 990 put in to Hammerfest at 1115 from the
operational area.
U 288 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel
at 0820, put out from Kristiansand
(South) at 1720 for Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 9° E - Banak, not
exhaustive, nothing to report.

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2 BF 109 on shipping reconnaissance against PQ 30 in the sea area north and northeast of Fisher Peninsula. At 1045 convoy sighted 80 - 100 km. northeast of the northeastern tip of Fisher Peninsula. Composition not recognized because of bad weather and haze.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

1 FW 200 on reconnaissance to re-intercept PQ 30. Take-off Nautsi. Assignment broken off because of radar breakdown in AB 8456.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. No enemy sighting report.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AE 9270 - Vaernes. Reconnaissance area 95% covered. No enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

2 Ju 88 on reconnaissance off the east coast of Scotland between Pentland Firth and Firth of Forth in area between Fraserburgh and Stonehaven 7 merchant vessels totaling about 28,500 G.R.T.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

XB-report on PQ 30.

Radio name "BR" received the following radio messages from the British Admiralty:

1. At 2345 on 22 February: at 0800 on 23 February convoy to alter course to new position (K) on bearing $(81)^{\circ}$ 105 miles from (J), then to new position (L) on bearing 333° , 122 miles from (F). Then route "green". Straggler route (2 groups missing).
2. At 0331 on 27 February: (5 groups missing, probably alteration of convoy route) position (M) on bearing 254° 34 miles from (G) then to position (3 groups missing). Straggler route (2 groups missing).
3. At 1230 on 27 February: Altered ports of destination for several members of convoy.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

0139 When it could be seen that at 0400 this morning the convoy would enter the area closed to U-boats radio message 0110/780 was sent by Captain U-boats:

1. Break off operation at 0600. Move away to 29° E on course 325°.
2. Boats with less than 60 (cu.m.) and with serious damage to report.
3. "Bentzien", "Hansen", "Gosejakob" to report positions.
4. Do not report before 1000."

0223 "Langenberg" reported that at 0005 he heard a hydrophone bearing from 6 destroyers in AC 5786.

0400 "Nikolay" reported flying weather: Wind north-east 5, visibility 4 miles, cloud base 500 m., 20% snow showers.

1120 Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten reported the position of the convoy as AC 8593 at 1045.

1305 Radio message 1234/M/131 from Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

"Enemy convoy in AC 8595 at 1130, course 200°, speed 9 knots, 37 merchant vessels in 9 lines ahead. Ahead 3 destroyers, 2 escort vessels. Starboard 5 destroyers. Port 4 destroyers, 1 aircraft carrier, 3 destroyers and 2 escort vessels."

The operation against PQ 30 is concluded with this report.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

After the conclusion of the convoy operation the boats reported the following casualties and damage:

1. U 312 (Nikolay): one petty officer with broken arm, still 25 cu.m.
2. U 956 (Mohs): muffler valves leaky, ship's side valve for cooling water ditto. Upper part of radar set out of order. Still 56 cu.m.
3. U 366 (Langenberg): 3 T5 torpedoes fired. One T3 failure discharged. Still 90 cu.m.
4. U 674 (Muss): "Naxos" and "Wanze" broken down, one petty officer with broken fibula, still 54 cu.m.

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5. U 362 (Franz): require hydroplane motor forward, two input bars for series winding on main electric motors A.E.G., "Jumbo" stage 3, "Naxos" aerial. Loud knocking of port shaft with inclination, large variation from center.
6. U 313 (Schweiger): port muffler valves leaky. After jumping wire out of order. Upper part of radar set broken down. Requires "Naxos" finger and all-round dipole head. Still 48 cu.m.

Accordingly, the following radio messages were sent:

1517 Radio message 1453/706:

- "1. "Mangold", "Herrle", "Zoller", "v. Forstner" to form group "Boreas" in this order and to occupy attack areas AC 4388 to 4928. Depth of sweep 25 miles. Report taking up position by time short signal:
2. "Bentzien", "Hansen" and "Gosejakob" to report position by short signal."

1504 Radio message 1450/705:

"To put in to port at high cruising speed:

1. Hammerfest: "Nikolay", "Langenberg", "Muss".
2. Via Hammerfest to Alta to "Huascaran": "Schweiger", "Mohs".
3. Narvik-Andfjord: "Bentzien".
4. Narvik with escort: "Franz"."

Group "Boreas" reported arrival at positions as follows:-

U 472 (v. Forstner)	1915,
U 739 (Mangold)	2100,
U 307 (Herrle)	2200,
U 315 (Zoller)	0230 (29 February).

1528 Radio message 1515/707 to group "Boreas":

"Two destroyers coming from the west were off Jan Mayen yesterday. According to dead reckoning they should have reached 29° E by 1600 today."

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 673:

- "1. Put out from Narvik at 1400 on 29 February via Westfjord for Bodø.

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2. Proceed on to Trondheim via inner leads with escort from Admiral North Coast.
3. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

In Captain U-boats, Norway 843 A1, of 28 February, the following Most Immediate teleprinter message was sent to U-boat base Hammerfest and auxiliary warship "Huascaran" for U 716:

- "1. "Dunkelberg" to make for Hammerfest at increased speed and re-equip. Put out to sea again immediately, make for AC 4560. Report time of probable readiness and departure by Most Immediate teleprinter message.
2. U 362 (Franz) to transfer to Narvik via inner leads. Boat to take on 4 of the T5 torpedoes handed in by "Dunkelberg", if necessary hand in 2 F.A.T.2 and 1 F.A.T.1 torpedo at Ramsund.
3. U 737 (Brasack) to put out immediately after replenishing torpedoes. Make for AC 4560.
4. Because of danger from air raids boats at Hammerfest to be spaced as far apart as possible."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report on the operation against PQ 30, see Appendix II.

VII. Survey of the situation:

The following considerations determined the disposition of the new patrol line as given in IV.b:

1. The approach of a QP convoy in the near future is to be expected, and this was the first consideration in placing the patrol line.
2. In view of the strong coastal defenses it seemed appropriate to withdraw the boats from the inshore waters of Kola Bay.
3. Any patrol line placed immediately off Kola Bay or slightly further out to sea in a west - east direction would necessarily have to extend very far east in order to prevent the enemy from by-passing it. But if then the enemy were to pass through its center, or, worse still, if he should steer a northwesterly course, a large proportion of the boats would from the first be left astern of the convoy.

4. The patrol line now chosen has the following advantages: in view of the low temperature of the water it has been placed in a somewhat warmer area so that the danger of icing-up has been reduced, and further, none of the U-boats will be placed astern of the enemy when the convoy approaches the patrol line.

(Signed) Peters.

29 February, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Boreas":

U 739)
U 307)
U 315) in attack areas from AC 4388 to 4928,
U 472) depth of sweep 25 miles.
U 601)
U 713)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 362, 366, 737, 956, 957, 990 Hammerfest,
U 278, 673 Narvik,
U 354, 360, 636, 703, 711, 973 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen.

U-boat group Central:

U 365, 970 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 366) 0320 put in to Hammerfest from the
U 956) operational area.
U 737 put in to Hammerfest from Narvik at 0050.
U 673 put out from Narvik for Trondheim at 1200.
U 425 put in to Hammerfest from the operational
area at 0800.
U 312 put in to Hammerfest from the operational
area at 0930.
U 313 put in to Hammerfest from the operational
area at 0930.
U 674 put in to Hammerfest from the operational
area at 0930.
U 361)
U 959) proceeding from Bergen to AB 69.
U 362 put out from Hammerfest at 0915 for
Narvik.

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- U 957 put out from Hammerfest at 0915 for Bergen.
- U 288 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand (South) at 1200.
- U 716 put out from Hammerfest for the operational area.
- U 737 put out from Hammerfest for the operational area.
- U 703 put out from Trondheim for the operational area (AC 5460) at 1515, put in to Trondheim at 1915 because of bad weather.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

- 1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.
- 1 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance with radar, route Kirkenes - AC 7334 - 8337 - 4994 - Kirkenes. Covered exhaustively by radar. No locations. Area covered by radar: AC 7383 - 8683 - 9419 - 9143 - 5994 - 4938 - 4973.
- 1 Ju 88 (Kirkenes) on shipping, harbor and ice reconnaissance along the Kola coast, inspection of Iokanka harbor.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

- 1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AB 7760 - Vaernes. Route 50% covered. No enemy sighted.
- 1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AF 7812 - AE 9155 - Vaernes. Route 80% covered. No enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 1040 convoy in AW 2915, course 210°, speed 4 knots, consisting of 8 merchant vessels of 5,000 G.R.T. each, 2 lines ahead.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic in the sea area, a Russian vessel in AC 8824. At 1315 Russian destroyer "J" received a very urgent radio message from Polyarno.
According to radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast: brisk radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Britain: several units or naval vessels appeared in the Murmansk area, in partly urgent radio traffic.

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Russian radio traffic: normal.
Britain: increasing, partly urgent, Murmansk broadcasts. Very few Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 959 (Weitz) passed 70° N at 0848, U 361 (Seidel) at 0725.

1149 In radio message 1115/745 both boats were ordered to join group "Boreas" as numbers 6 and 5 and to approach it via AC 4950.

2333 When towards evening, it was estimated by dead reckoning that both the boats must have arrived near the patrol line, radio message 2313/751 was sent to group "Boreas" from Captain U-boats:

"At 0800 on 1 March, new attack areas from AC 4358 to 4955 with 6 boats, depth of sweep 20 miles.

From 1200 regular 9-hourly north - south movements, beginning at the southern limit, arriving at the northern limit at 2100, and so on."

By means of this new disposition it has been made possible to contract the attack areas to 20 miles and to extend the line somewhat at both ends.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 973 (Päpenmüller):

1. Put out from Trondheim via Frohavet on the afternoon of 1 March.
2. Proceed to Narvik - Ramsund via Westfjord keeping 50 miles from the coast. Exchange old "Zaunkönig" torpedoes at Ramsund. Further orders follow.
3. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

APPENDIX II

COPY

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Teleprinter message:

1. Most Immediate Group North/Fleet.
2. Admiral Northern Waters (postagram).
3. Most Immediate Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
4. Most Immediate Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
5. Emergency. For information Admiral Commanding U-boats.
6. Immediate. For information Naval Chief Command Norway.
7. Immediate. For information Luftflotte 5.
8. Immediate. For information Commanding Officer, German
Air Force, Finland.
9. Immediate. For information Flieger Fuehrer North
(East).
10. Immediate. For information Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten.
11. Immediate. For information Flieger Fuehrer North
(West).

Clear as multiple address message.

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Short report on the operation against PQ 30 from
23 - 28 February, 1944

1. The convoy was first intercepted by the German Air Force at 1035 on 23 February in AF 1848 (eastnortheast of Iceland).
2. Strength about 40 merchant vessels, 18 destroyers and corvettes, one aircraft carrier. Presence of covering forces not definitely proved. An air report on 26 February reported 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers. However, they were not intercepted again. Possibly a mistaken report.
3. At the start, there were 10 U-boats in a patrol line from AB 8733 to 4977 whose wing was based on the ice limit. The line was moved forward, in accordance with reports on the enemy, from AF 2522 to AB 7686. Including the boats which put to sea later on, a total of 15 U-boats took part in the operation.
4. At noon on 24 February first contact by 3 boats with destroyers slightly south of the center of the patrol line. Boats forced to submerge. Apparently the convoy passed over our own disposition at this point.
5. The German Air Force kept up continuous shadowing with only a few short interruptions. Their efforts in

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this operation are especially worthy of praise. The transmission of air reports was adversely affected by icing-up and atmospherics, so that in some instances there were considerable delays. Initial difficulties with reporting technique and transmission decreased during the course of the operation.

6. The convoy was strongly defended
 - a. by destroyers, which operated in groups, particularly at the rear of the convoy, and held up our U-boats by protracted depth charge attacks and hydrophone pursuits;
 - b. by carrier-borne aircraft, several flying boats, and apparently also heavy land planes (up to 18 bombs from one aircraft). Rocket bombs used.
7. At 2038 on 25 February U 990 (Nordheimer) contacted the convoy in AB 9425 and shadowed it until 0605 on 26 February, when he had to break off the operation in AB 9224 because of lack of fuel. Very skillful shadowing; shadower signal buoys used. At 0840 on 26 February U 366 (Langenberg) gained temporary contact with the convoy in AB 6858 and at 1556 on 27 February U 362 (Franz) obtained brief contact in AC 4954. Both boats were forced to submerge and held up by the escort forces. Contact lost.
8. From the afternoon of 26 February there was uncertainty about the convoy's position owing to the non-arrival or long intervals between air reports as well as delays in transmission caused by the weather. From 0230 to 1300 on 27 February information on the enemy was once more satisfactory.
9. Efforts were made to help the U-boats to obtain contact with the convoy by means of the prompt transmission of air reports and shadower's beacon signals.

It was planned to form the U-boats into two patrol lines one behind the other to re-intercept the convoy on the morning of 26 February, since there was no longer any clear knowledge of the convoy's position and air reconnaissance could not be expected owing to the weather. This was the only morning on which this method was attempted. It was given up, however, when it was found that the air shadower was again with the convoy at noon, and was giving reports. Captain U-boats considers closer and more systematic control of the U-boats by means of closely defined patrol lines to be more efficient for re-intercepting the convoy, as this method has produced good results in the past.

With the methods used this time, of letting the boats operate and carry out searches individually, it was found that they were at times widely scattered over the sea area.
10. The last air report on the convoy was made at 1330 on 27 February when the convoy was in AC 4963. At 1556 U 362 reported its position as AC 4954.

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During the last night the U-boats were ordered to operate along the presumed convoy route as estimated by dead reckoning.

11. As a result of the severe icing-up of anti-aircraft armament reported by the U-boats, and the strong anti-submarine measures by aircraft and destroyers in the vicinity of the convoy, which made it impossible for the boats to approach the convoy by day, operational control decided to order the boats to haul ahead at a safe distance during the daytime on 27 February in order to be in a favorable position for a night attack on the following evening.
12. The operation was broken off at 0600 on 28 February when, according to dead reckoning, the convoy must have reached the immediate inshore waters of Kola Bay. The boats were withdrawn to 29° E or for replenishing.
13. So far U 425 (Bentzien), U 601 (Hansen) and U 713 (Gosejakob) have not reported on request.
14. Torpedoes fired and successes gained to date:
 - (a) U 990 (Nordheimer): T5 torpedo on destroyer. Running time 2 minutes, 16 seconds. Sunk.
 - (b) U 366 (Langenberg): T5 torpedo fired at 2 destroyers, 1 explosion, then only one hydrophone bearing. Torpedoed. 2 T5 torpedo misses, one T3 torpedo failure (deep diving).
 - (c) U 362 (Franz): 1 T5 torpedo fired at 3 destroyers. Torpedo explosion after 4 minutes, 13 seconds. Torpedoed.
 - (d) U 956 (Mohs): 1 T5 torpedo on 2 destroyers. Single explosion after 13 minutes. Probable hit.
 - (e) U 312 (Nikolay): T5 torpedo fired at destroyer, single explosion after 9 minutes, 34 seconds. Hit probable.
- Summary: 1 destroyer sunk, 2 destroyers torpedoed, 2 destroyers probably hit.
15. The weather during the whole operation was very unfavorable. Wind at first NW 7, later NE 6. Corresponding seaway. Up to 50% snow showers, visibility variable, mostly very poor. The commander of one of the boats which has put in reported that frequently visibility was only 50 - 100 m; at times his own foredeck was not visible.

16. Summary and experiences:

The unsatisfactory result of this operation is ascribed to the following circumstances:

- (a) The convoy was particularly heavily escorted by destroyers, carrier-borne and land-based aircraft and flying boats. During the daytime, the boats were mostly forced to submerge, defense against enemy aircraft was not possible as armament was iced-up. Search groups, partly led on by aircraft, forced the boats to submerge for as much as 7 hours. Severe depth charge attacks, which caused the boats to drop far behind. Occasionally the boats suddenly came upon destroyers at close quarters in dense driving snow. Great difficulty was experienced in making headway against the seas.
- (b) The extremely unfavorable weather (see para. 15), had a decisive influence on the operation. The commander of the first boat to put in to port reported that he was twice in the immediate vicinity of the convoy without sighting anything. He was forced to submerge by destroyers, and the convoy passed overhead. It is assumed that the other boats had similar experiences.
- (c) A concerted attack by the U-boats on the basis only of air shadower reports did not succeed in the prevailing weather conditions. A change of tactics, to the formation of regular patrol lines for re-intercepting the enemy, was afterwards no longer possible as the boats were widely scattered and the lines would have remained incomplete.
- (d) The breakdown of numerous "Naxos-Borkum" sets due to icing-up and seaway rendered the interception of enemy radar more difficult or impossible. Own "Gema" sets (GEMA = Electro-acoustic and Mechanical Apparatus Company, Berlin-Köpenick) were partly put out of action by breakdowns.
- (e) The weather severely hampered the boats in trying to obtain ships' positions.
- (f) The difficult conditions of battle imposed a severe test on the inexperienced boats, 7 of which were operating against the enemy for the first time. The experimental boats U 362 and U 673 had to break off the operation prematurely because of the adverse conditions. Offensive action by our own Air Force could have given the U-boats substantial support - if it had been available. 3 older boats, U 601, U 713, U 425, were apparently eliminated early during the operation. The 4 boats approaching from the south arrived very late for the operation on account of the weather.

The crews gave of their best.

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On 1 March teleprinter message sent to all offices concerned:-

Clear as single address message.

Most Secret

Addition to Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 846 A1 of 29 February.

Reference: Short report on attack on PQ 30.

Late report, to be added to para. 13: U 425

(Bentzien) has meanwhile put in to Hammerfest.

Radio had broken down completely.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 846-A1
Second Issue.

APPENDIX III

COPY

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Teleprinter message - Clear as multiple address message:

1. Most Immediate. Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
2. Most Immediate. German Naval High Command - KIU.
3. Most Immediate. German Naval High Command, Naval
War Staff Quartermaster AU.
4. Most Immediate. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Most Secret

Report on trial of conning tower VI from U 973
(Papenmüller)

- A. Put out from Bergen on 27 January. Proceeded into the operational area. Course 300°, seaway 6 - 7, wind west 6 - 7, freshening to 8. Sea coming 30° from port thus course favorable. Both engines, later one engine "slow ahead". Condition of boat: Permanent list to starboard of 20° - 30°, materially increased by starboard armored chest. Boat did not return to zero position. Therefore impossible to pump out bilges. Altered course by 60° to port in order to pump them out. Oil ran out of crankshaft. Because of oblique position no look-out on the weatherside. Boat heeled over more than 60°, took two to three seas in that position without righting itself. Impossible to engage in tactical operations. Return passage to Bergen.
- B. 30 January. Put in to Bergen. Re-distributed ballast, compensating fuel tank dry, 8 tons of ballast in the keel, handed in one torpedo, compensating tanks 6 tons, twin tank aft 2400 liters, forward 1200 liters.
2 February put out from Bergen.
With a moderate swell from approximately 150°, according to ship's bearing, and almost no wind, boat heeled over strongly to port. Boat righted itself very slowly, so that it was covered by the second and third swell and retained a permanent list of about 60°. This made difficult and limited tactical freedom of movement. On 8 February wind 8 - 9, sea 7 - 8, 30° - 40° from port. One engine "slow ahead". Heeling up to 70°. Boat only righted itself slowly. Hereby increased intake of water through conning tower hatch and Diesel air-intake shafts. Approximately 11 tons of water in the boat. Submerged, boat could only be controlled

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at "both engines fast speed ahead". 6 tons of water in compensating tanks before submerging, therefore no reserve capacity. In case of "alarm" safety of boat endangered. Return passage.

C. General.

Conning tower VI satisfactory while proceeding on the surface, so long as the boat can adjust its speed to the seaway. Gun worked well, even after it had not been attended to for 4 - 5 days. With seaway 5 or more from abeam to forward, the boat had a list of more than 60°. Operational capacity severely curtailed. When proceeding at increased cruising speed against the sea, gun useless from seaway 3 or 4 onwards, and endangered by the impact of the waves. Spray has become less. Sight impeded when the gun shields are in position. The locking mechanism for the gun shields will have to be further strengthened as otherwise the shields will be knocked back by the seas and the training axles bent. Stronger locking mechanisms available at Bergen have been found satisfactory. Time required for crash-diving in calm sea increased by 5 - 7 seconds, and more in heavy seas. Depth-keeping very difficult.

Footnote by Captain U-boats, Norway: Proposals: Dismantle armored chests without bridge armor. Replace quadruple mounting by twin mounting, set ammunition container deeper by letting into forward platform, compensate by keel ballast, then further tests.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 636 MU.

APPENDIX IV

Sailing orders

1. Sailing order for U 601 (Hansen).
 2. Sailing order for U 366 (Langenberg).
 3. Sailing order for U 739 (Mangold).
 4. Sailing order for U 315 (Zoller).
 5. Sailing orders for U 361 (Seidel), U 959 (Weitz)
and U 1061 (Hinrichs).
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APPENDIX IV/1

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 17 February, 1944.

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Sailing order for U 601 (Hansen)

1. Put out from Narvik at 1400 on 17 February.
2. Proceeded via Tjeldsund-Andfjord, from Lødingen to Harstad with district pilot, then to AB 8510.
Speed 12 knots.
3. Operational Order No. 1, U-boats Northern Waters wave.
4. Boat scheduled as relief for U 990 (Nordheimer).
5. Own forces: group "Werwolf":

U 956 AB 8842.
U 674 AB 8733.
U 425 AB 8494.
U 957 AB 8455.
U 278 AB 8419.
U 990 AB 8177.
U 713 AB 7392.
U 313 AB 7356.
U 312 AB 7324.

6. Presumed ice limit:

AE 238 - AA 995 - AA 966 - AB 713 - AB 494 -
AB 524 - AB 243.

Peters.

1. Introduction

2. Methodology

3. Results

4. Discussion

5. Conclusion

6. References

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9. Author Biographies

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11. Glossary

12. Bibliography

13. Figures

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16. Index

17. Glossary

18. Bibliography

19. Figures

20. Tables

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APPENDIX IV/2

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency 11th U-boat Flotilla.
2. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
3. Emergency for information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret

Sailing orders for U 366 (Langenberg) and
U 673 (Sauer)

1. Put out from Bergen on the afternoon of 19 February.
2. Proceed northward, keeping 50 miles from the coast, in accordance with Order No. 13, as far as 64° N.
3. "Sauer" then to proceed to AB 7660 at 12 knots.
4. "Langenberg" to steer for Trondheim approaches (GR 1). Give up 7 "Wanze" & 2 torpedoes with accessories to escort vessel, then continue outward journey. After passing 64° N steer for AF 22 at 12 knots.
5. Group "Werwolf" at present in patrol line AB 8881 to 7356. Inquire composition from 11th U-boat Flotilla. Own BV 138, FW 200 and Ju 88 on meteorological flights and reconnaissance in the sea area.
6. Operational Order No. 1. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave. Report passing 65° N by short signal. Northern Waters wave from then onwards.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret 681 - A1.

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APPENDIX IV/3

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 20 February, 1944.

Most Secret

Sailing order for U 739 (Mangold)

1. Put out from Narvik at 0800 on 21 February.
2. Proceed via Tjeldsund-Andfjord, from Lodingen to Harstad with district pilot, then to AB 8510. Speed 12 knots.
3. Operational Order No. 1, U-boats Northern Waters wave.
4. Boat is scheduled as relief for U 990 (Nordheimer).
5. Own forces: group "Werwolf" in attack areas depth of sweep 20 miles.

U 956 (Mohs)	AB 8842.
U 674 (Muss)	AB 8733.
U 425 (Bentzien)	AB 8494.
U 601 (Hansen)	AB 8455.
U 362 (Franz)	AB 8419.
U 990 (Nordheimer)	AB 8177.
U 713 (Gosejakob)	AB 7392.
U 313 (Schweiger)	AB 7356.
U 312 (Nikolay)	AB 7324.

6. Nine-hourly movements from northwest to southeast and back within the attack areas. 22 February. Be at southeastern limit at 1100.
7. Presumed ice limit:
AA 966° - AB 713° - AB 494° - AB 524° - AB 243°.

Peters.

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APPENDIX IV/4

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency 11th U-boat Flotilla.
2. Emergency Group North/Fleet.

Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret

Sailing order for U 315 (Zoller)

1. Put out from Bergen on the evening of 21 February.
2. Proceed, keeping 50 miles from the coast, to 64° N according to Order No. 13, then to AF 22 at 12 knots.
3. Group "Werwolf" in patrol line AB 8881 to 7356. Inquire composition from 11th U-boat Flotilla. Own BV 138, FW 200 and Ju 88 on meteorological flights and reconnaissance in the sea area.
4. Operational Order No. 1, radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave.
5. Report passing 65° N by short signal. Northern Waters wave from there onwards.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret 713 - A1.

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APPENDIX IV/5

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency 11th U-boat Flotilla.
2. Emergency Group North/Fleet.


Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret

Sailing orders for U 361 (Seidel), U 959 (Weitz)
and U 1061 (Hinrichs)

1. Put out from Bergen on the forenoon of 25 February.
2. "Seidel" and "Weitz" to proceed to 62° 30' N keeping 50 miles from the coast, "Hinrichs" to 65° according to Order No. 13.
3. "Seidel" and "Weitz" then to make for AB 69 at high cruising speed (12 knots), "Hinrichs" to go to Narvik.
4. Groups "Werwolf" and "Hartmut" at present operating on PQ 30. Inquire composition and present positions from 11th U-boat Flotilla.
5. Operational Order No. 1, radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave.
6. Report passing 65° and 70° N by short signal.
7. "Seidel" and "Weitz" U-boats Northern Waters wave after passing 65° N.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret 797 - A1.



APPENDIX V

Short reports

1. Short report from U 716 (Dunkelberg).
 2. Short report from U 957 (Schaar).
 3. Short report from U 957 (Schaar).
 4. Short report from U 278 (Franze).
-

APPENDIX V/1

Most Secret

Teleprinter message: Clear as multiple address message.

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 716, second operation

- 15 January Put out from Hammerfest to operate on PQ 27 convoy.
Contacted convoy same night.
Broke through starboard advance escort of 3 destroyers.
- 26 January At 0020 in AC 4542 ran off three torpedoes on three overlapping steamers, each 7,000 tons. After 3 minutes, 56 seconds and 4 minutes, 2 seconds distinct torpedo explosions, sinking noises. Then 4½ hour depth charge pursuit by 2 destroyers. Contact not regained.
- 30 January Brief contact with starboard escort.

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- 4 February At night search group of 3 destroyers sighted 800 m. away. Enemy speed 15 to 18 knots. Group lost sight of after one hour while pursuing southwards. No special observations during depth charge pursuit, no special damage. Radio beacons very useful.
- 16 February Homeward passage.
- 18 February Put in to Hammerfest.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret 709 - A1.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX V/2

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 957 (Schaar), third operation

- 6 February Put out of Hammerfest, put in to Narvik on 20 February. Proceeded to AC 4580, operated on convoy reported by Air Force. Attack areas on 7 February AC 4322 and further southeastwards. Air Force confirmed that the convoy was proceeding westwards.
- 11 February AB 6837.
- 13 February Moved up to AB 8733. No enemy air activity or sightings.
- 19 February Return voyage because of rent in fuel tank and other damage.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret 727 - A1.



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APPENDIX V/3

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Immediate. Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Immediate. Naval War Staff, 2nd Div. C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Immediate. Group North/Fleet.
4. Immediate. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Immediate. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Clear as single address message.

Most Secret

Supplement to short report from U 957 (Schaar),
verbal report. (Reference: Captain U-boats,
Norway Most Secret 511 A1 of 8 February)

- 26 February At 0150 torpedoed tanker destroyed.
In the end only stern still above
water.
- 30 January With reference to the large "comma"-
shaped destroyer. Very large vessel,
possibly cruiser, one funnel, no
destroyer island made out. Supposition
that it was a cruiser is supported by
the circumstance that after the hit
many escort vessels came up, apparently
to its rescue, and no longer took any
heed of the U-boat, so that it was able
to torpedo a corvette and another
escorting destroyer. The destroyer
seen blowing up at 0550 must have been
the escorting destroyer which until
then had only been reported as
torpedoed.

Thus "Schaar"'s total successes with PQ's 27 and 28
were: 4 destroyers sunk, one of them possibly an
anti-aircraft cruiser, 1 tanker sunk, one 7,000
G.R.T. Liberty freighter sunk, 1 corvette torpedoed,
1 motor launch with 2 guns destroyed by ramming and
light anti-aircraft fire.

Further, "Schaar" reported loosely drifting torpedo
net with many floats, like fishing net. He
presumes that such nets are fixed to raking spars
forward of the steamer and float loosely alongside.

When the boat surfaced after the depth charge
attack on 31 January, large flames developed on

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the after deck under the planks of the upper deck. They disappeared temporarily when the after deck was awash. Development of flames like that of light container of a practice torpedo. Could be seen easily in the darkness. Phenomenon lasted about one and a half hours, then washed off. Small cylinder of greenish cardboard found on upper deck, later washed overboard. Commander suspects that this is a process employed for identification of U-boats surfacing at night, dropped at the same time as, or in, depth charges.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 511 - A1.

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APPENDIX V/4

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message: Clear as multiple address message.


1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Red - Most Secret

Short report from U 278 (Franze), second operation
(groups "Wiking", "Werwolf")

- 29 January Put out from Hammerfest, put in to
Narvik on 19 February.
Convoy operation PQ 28.
- 30 January At 0357 in AB 6383 T5 torpedo fired
at destroyer. After 7 minutes hit
on stern, explosion after one more
minute. Sunk.
3 depth charge pursuits while trying
to by-pass enemy escort.
- 1 - 4
February In attack area AC 8269.
- 3 February Two run-in attempts by an aircraft
type similar to "SU 2". Driven off
twice. No "Borkum" location.
- 6 - 9
February Operated on convoy falsely reported
by the German Air Force.
- 10 - 13
February Various patrol lines.
- From 14
February Attack area AB 8451. Drifting
mine in AC 8349.

Captain U-boats. Norway. Most Secret 743 - A1.



APPENDIX VI

Track chart of operation against PQ 30

Operation gegen PQ 30 = Operation against PQ 30
23.2. - 27.2.44 from 23 February to
27 February, 1944.

PQ 30

40 H.-Schiffe	=	40 merchant ships.
15 Zerstörer	=	15 destroyers.
1 Flugzeugträger	=	1 aircraft carrier.
Island	=	Iceland.
Jan Mayen	=	Jan Mayen.
Bäreninsel	=	Bear Island.
Nordkap	=	North Cape.
Gruppe "Werwolf" 9 Boote im Angriffsraum 7686 AB bis 2525 AF vom 23.II. 0800 bis 24.II.	=	group "Werwolf", nine boats in attack areas from AB 7686 to AF 2525 from 0800 on 23 February until 24 February.
Flugelboote 24.II. 1430 auf Geleit operieren	=	boats on wing of patrol line operate on the convoy at 1430 on 24 February.
Gruppe "Hartmut" 4 Boote im Angr. Raum	=	group "Hartmut" four boats in attack areas.
K	=	course.
Zerst.	=	destroyer(s).
Ost	=	east.

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WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

1 - 15 MARCH, 1944

PG/31854

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1 March, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Boreas":

U 739 AC 4358)
U 307 AC 4388) depth of sweep 20 miles,
U 315 AC 4628) 9-hourly north-south
U 472 AC 4682) movements.
U 361 AC 4922)
U 959 AC 4955)
U 601.
U 713.

In port:

U 312, 313, 366, 425, 674, 716, 737, 956,
990 Hammerfest,
U 278 Narvik,
U 354, 360, 636, 703, 711, 973 Trondheim,
U 277, 288, 355, 387, 365 Bergen.

U-boat group Central:

U 365, 970 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1700 U 673 proceeding from Narvik to Trondheim.
U 362 put in to Narvik from Hammerfest.
U 957 proceeding from Hammerfest to Bergen.
0930 U 956 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.
1015 U 716 put out from Hammerfest for AB 4560.
1015 U 737 put out from Hammerfest for AB 4560.
0915 U 703 put out from Trondheim for AC 4810.
1600 U 973 put out from Trondheim for Narvik via
Ramsund.
1700 U 288 put out from Bergen for AC 47.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on shipping reconnaissance (radar), route
Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 5474 - 5438 - 8292 - 8595 -
Kirkenes. Exhaustive, no locations.
1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters,
route Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 8546 - 8597 - 8855 -
8864 - 8973 - AW 2271 - 2333 - 2687 - 2347 - 2193 -
AC 8586 - Vardø - Kirkenes. Exhaustive to a width
of 20 km. along the route, Iokanka not covered,
nothing to report.

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1 Ju 88 with radar on shipping reconnaissance, route Kirkenes - Vardö - AC 8698 - 8392 - 8329, then broken off because of engine trouble. Sea area exhaustively covered by radar to a width of 50 km., no locations.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 5° E - Banak. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 on shipping and ice reconnaissance, Alakurtti - West Fairway South - Dvina Bay. At 1320 in AW 5246 two ice-breakers with steam up, 2 tankers, 7 freighters of 5,000 - 7,000 G.R.T. each, course 160°, beset by ice (aerial photograph).

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 He 111 and 1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AA 9625 (Jan Mayen) - Vaernes. No enemy sightings.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AF 7812 - AE 9473 - Vaernes. Area 90% covered, enemy not sighted.

1 FW 200 took off at 0719, landed at 1646. Probing reconnaissance with radar of PQ convoy. Flying route Trondheim - AF 1777 - AB 8785 - AF 2245 - 4222 - Trondheim. Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered, set in order, enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats:)
- (b) By air reconnaissance:)
- (c) By naval forces:) None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:)
- (e) By G.I.S. stations:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1407 6 boats in patrol line on 27° 30' E (see Ia). "Dunkelberg" and "Brasack" reported passing SR 1 after putting out from Hammerfest.

1639 Radio message 1545/758 from Captain U-boats:

"U 716 (Dunkelberg) and U 737 (Brasack) to form group "Taifun" and occupy attack areas

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AC 4566 and 4596 lower center, depth of sweep 20 miles.

9-hourly north and southward movements within the attack areas.

At 2100 be at northern limit, at 0600 on 2 March at southern limit of attack areas, etc."

1743 U 703 (Brünner) which put out from Trondheim at noon today received orders in radio message 1724/761 to make for AC 4810 at 12 knots and to report by short signal on passing 70° N.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1. "Hansen" and "Gosejakob" have still not reported.

In radio message 1507/757 they again received orders to report their position by short signal or, in case their radio and emergency sets were out of action, to put in to Hammerfest.

2. Sailing order for U 288 (Meyer), see Appendix II/1.

3. Sailing order for U 354 (Sthamer), see Appendix II/2.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

1. Short report from U 673 (Sauer), see Appendix IV/1.

2. Short report from U 990 (Nordheimer), see Appendix IV/2.

3. Short report from U 362 (Franz), see Appendix IV/3.

VII. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

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2 March, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Boreas":

U 739 AC 4358)
U 307 AC 4388)
U 315 AC 4628) depth of sweep 20 miles,
U 472 AC 4682) 9-hourly north-south movements.
U 361 AC 4922)
U 959 AC 4955)

Group "Taifun":

U 716 AC 4566) depth of sweep 20 miles, 9-hourly
U 737 AC 4596) north-south movements.

U 601.
U 713.

In port:

U 313, 425 Alta,
U 312, 366, 674, 990 Hammerfest,
U 278, 362 Narvik,
U 354, 360, 636, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen.

U-boat group Central:

1200 U 365, 970 Bergen,
U 276 put in to Bergen from Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1455 U 673 put in to Trondheim from Narvik.
U 957 proceeding from Hammerfest to Bergen.
1545 U 956 put in to Narvik from Hammerfest.
U 703 proceeding from Trondheim to AC 4810.
U 973 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik
via Ramsund.
U 288 proceeding from Bergen to AC 47.
1540 U 354 put out from Trondheim for AC 47.
1230 U 425 put out from Alta for Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters
from 0641 to 1119.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance from 0632
to 1141 Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 15° E - Banak.
Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

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1 Ju 88 on shipping reconnaissance (radar) from 0656 to 1138. Flying route: Kirkenes - Vardö - AC 8591 - 5512 - 5912 - 8546 - Kirkenes. Route exhaustively covered with radar to a width of 50 km. on either side. At 1020 in AC 5753 one German U-boat, course 170°, medium speed, otherwise no locations or sightings.

1 Ju 88 on shipping reconnaissance (radar) from 0642 to 1244. Flying route: Kirkenes - Vardö - AC 9478 - 6412 - 5533 - 8689 - Vardö - Kirkenes. Sea area exhaustively covered with radar from 8675 - 9729 - 6189 - 5279 - 8675, no locations.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance from 0620 to 1228 in Jan Mayen area, enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance from 0824 to 1505 in Faeroes area, enemy not sighted.

1 FW 200 on probing reconnaissance of PQ convoy routes from 0730 to 1453. Flying route: Trondheim - AF 4112 - 1533 - Trondheim. Broken off at 1200.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats:)
- (b) By air reconnaissance:) None.
- (c) By naval forces:)
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Britain: on the morning of 1 March one unit or warship intercepted in procedure message traffic with Murmansk.

Russian radio traffic: moderate.

Britain: few Murmansk and Archangel broadcasts.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Group "Boreas" (6 boats) and group "Taifun" (at present 2 boats) in attack areas approximately on 26° E (see para Ia).

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(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Since U 601 (Hansen) and U 713 (Gosejakob) have still not reported, they must be presumed lost. The following report of the losses was sent in Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 906, dated today:

"U 601 (Hansen) and U 713 (Gosejakob) are missing, both boats took part in the attack on PQ 30. The last radio message from "Hansen" was received on 24 February, radio message 2146/754: "At 2110 in AF 2132 7 hours of determined depth charge attacks. Am pressing on - Hansen." The last signal from "Gosejakob" was also received on 24 February, short signal 1821/748: "My position is AW 8758. Bearing 126° - Gosejakob." Neither boat was heard of again during the course of the operation. Orders to report positions were given on 26 February in radio message 1517/723, on 28 February in radio messages 0110/780 and 1453/706, and on 1 March in radio message 1507/757. As they remained unanswered, we must presume that both boats are lost. There is no definite information regarding the causes of their loss. The boats might have been sunk by enemy destroyers or enemy aircraft."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The following review was sent to Group North/Fleet and Admiral Northern Waters in Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 905:

"Subject: U-boat dispositions.

1. The present disposition of the U-boats along 27° E was ordered exclusively with a view to a possible operation against a QP convoy. If a new PQ convoy were suddenly intercepted it would not be possible to shift the patrol line southwestwards, say to 1° E, in time.
2. It therefore becomes necessary to decide:-
 - (a) how long the present disposition is to be maintained;
 - (b) whether, with the shipping space now available to the enemy, attacks on QP convoys are considered important enough to commit the U-boats to protracted operations which would take them as far as the coastal inshore waters of Iceland or the Faeroes.

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It must be borne in mind that every operation involves material damage or losses, so that with the small total of boats available and a limited dockyard capacity the number of boats that could be kept in readiness for operations against PQ convoys would, of necessity, be correspondingly reduced.

3. Captain U-boats is of the opinion that all our forces should be concentrated primarily on PQ convoys and that the free passage of QP convoys, without being attacked or damaged, must, if necessary, be accepted.
4. As there is no certainty that a QP convoy will sail within the next few days, and for the reasons given in para 2, above, it is planned in agreement with Admiral Northern Waters, to move the U-boat disposition at 0000 on 5 March back to about 15° E and from there further southwest on 9 March."

(Signed) Peters.

3 March, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Boreas":

U 739 AC 4358)
U 307 AC 4388)
U 315 AC 4628) depth of sweep 20 miles,
U 472 AC 4682) 9-hourly north-south movements.
U 361 AC 4922)
U 959 AC 4955)

Group "Taifun":

U 716 AC 4566)
U 737 AC 4596) depth of sweep 20 miles,
U 601) 9-hourly north-south movements.
U 713)

In port:

U 313 Alta,
U 312, 366, 674, 990 Hammerfest,
U 278, 362, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 636, 673, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen.

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U-boat group Central:

U 276, 365, 970 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 354 proceeding from Trondheim to Ramsund.
U 288 proceeding from Bergen to AC 47.
U 703 proceeding from Trondheim to AC 4810.
U 957 proceeding from Hammerfest to Bergen.
1900 U 973 put in to Narvik from Trondheim via
Ramsund.
1230 U 425 put in to Narvik from Alta.
U 278 put out from Narvik for Hammerfest.
0600 U 312 put out from Hammerfest for Alta.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

2 BF 109 from 0910 to 0953 (Petsamo) on meteorological, shipping and airfield reconnaissance Motovski - Kola Bay. 31 merchant ships, 7 of them of less than 3,000 G.R.T., the remainder 3,000 - 5,000 G.R.T. each, in Kola Bay from Murmansk to Polyarno.

1 BV 138 with radar on sea reconnaissance from 0924 to 1600. Flying route Billefjord - AC 7367 - 8665 - 8394 - 8254 - 5884 - 8235 - 7358 - Billefjord. Exhaustively covered with radar, no locations. Area covered by radar: AC 8543 - 8699 - 5993 - 5871.

2 BF 109 from 1136 to 1148 on photographic reconnaissance of Kola Bay. Task not carried out because of engine trouble.

1 Ju 88 from 0628 to 1142 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 He 111 and 1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance from 0619 to 1300 in the area west of the Faeroes, and from 0647 to 1500 in the Jan Mayen area. Areas covered, no enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:)
(b) By air reconnaissance:) None.
(c) By naval forces:)

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(d) By radio intercept service:

From radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast: average radio traffic with submarines in the operational area. Britain: no units or warships intercepted. Russian radio traffic: little naval traffic, in the morning lively aircraft traffic. Britain: few Murmansk or Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

8 boats in attack areas along 23° E (see para. Ia).

1007 "Brunner" reported by short signal that he has passed 70° N.

2258 In radio message 2223/798 he received orders to join group "Taifun" as boat no. 1, and to occupy attack area AC 4536 upper center, depth of sweep 20 miles.

"Dunkelberg" and "Brasack" are boats Nos. 2 and 3 of the group.

2130 Telephone message received from Flieger Fuehrer Arctic reporting that 2 captured Russian flying officers (lieutenants) stated that a QP convoy put to sea at 1400 yesterday (2 March). The report seems possible but is not certain enough to take further action. The boats were informed.

2251 Radio message 2221/797:

"According to a hitherto unconfirmed report a QP convoy is supposed to have sailed from Kola Bay on the afternoon of 2 March. If the report is true the convoy should reach the patrol line this evening."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1024 1. In radio message 1003/792 "Sthamer" received orders to proceed at maximum cruising speed to Ramsund in order to replenish torpedoes, and to report by short signal when reaching Vl.

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2. A request for the setting up of a T5 testing station in Hammerfest was dispatched in Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 930 A1.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 313 (Schweiger) first operation (continued), see Appendix IV/4.

VII. Survey of the situation:

In reply to yesterday's review of the situation, teleprinter message Most Secret O339 A1, dated 3 March was received from Group North/Fleet:

"Subject: Disposition of U-boats in the Northern area.

Reference: Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 905 (not to Naval War Staff).

1. The most important objects for attack are the cargo-carrying eastbound convoys to Russia.
2. The present disposition along 27° E is correct for the time being since after the large PQ 30 and the preceding PQ 28 and PQ 29 it is more probable that there will now follow a westbound convoy rather than another eastbound one.
3. The force of this argument will weaken as time passes without there being any definite indications of a westbound convoy.
4. Group North/Fleet agrees to the planned movement of the patrol line on 5 March to about 15° E and the further southwestward movement on 9 March, provided there are no signs of a westbound convoy.
5. In case of a surprise approach of a westbound convoy, an attack from the new disposition would still be more effective than an attack from the present position on a convoy bound for Russia.
6. If a westbound convoy should be running at the same time, or immediately before an eastbound convoy, an attack on the latter takes precedence. However, so long as the only known object for attack available is a westbound convoy an all-out attack with all available boats should be launched against it. It seems best to carry such an operation as far as the eastern edge of the large naval grid square AE."

(Signed) Peters.

4 March, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Boreas":

U 739 AC 4358)
 U 307 AC 4388) depth of sweep 20 miles,
 U 315 AC 4628) 9-hourly north-south movements.
 U 472 AC 4682)
 U 361 AC 4922)
 U 959 AC 4955)

Group "Taifun":

U 703 AC 4536)
 U 716 AC 4566) depth of sweep 20 miles,
 U 737 AC 4596) 9-hourly north-south movements.

In port:

U 312, 313 Alta,
 U 366, 674, 990 Hammerfest,
 U 278, 362, 425, 956, 973 Narvik,
 U 360, 636, 673, 711 Trondheim,
 U 277, 355, 387, 965 Bergen.

U-boat group Central:

U 276, 365, 970 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

	U 354 put in to Ramsund from Trondheim.	
	U 354 put out from Ramsund.	
	U 288 proceeding from Bergen to AC 47.	
1735	U 957 put in to Bergen from Hammerfest.	
1700	U 425 put out from Narvik for Bergen.	
0930	U 973 put out from Narvik for the) QP 26.
	operational area	
1030	U 278 put out from Narvik for the	
	operational area	
1300	U 366 put out from Hammerfest for the	
	operational area	
1100	U 674 put out from Hammerfest for	
	the operational area	
1300	U 990 put out from Hammerfest for	
	the operational area	

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 shadowed QP convoy from 1146 to 1748.
 Route Kirkenes - Vardo - AC 4255 - AC 4346 -

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AC 4258 - AC 4555 - AC 4514 - North Cape - Kirkenes. At 1418 in AC 4515, convoy, course 250° - 260°, speed 9 - 10 knots, consisting of 30 merchant ships of 6,000 - 8,000 G.R.T. each in 10 lines ahead, aircraft carrier in the center, 2 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 4 corvettes, escort forces in all-round screen, at a distance of 10 - 15 km. from the convoy. Last convoy position at 1605 was AC 4413.

1 Ju 88 as shadower on QP convoy from 1507 to 1940. Operation not completed because of breakdown of radar. Convoy intercepted at 1632 in AC 4434. Course 250°, speed 8 - 10 knots. Its composition could not be distinguished because of the weather and approaching darkness. Because of failure of radar left convoy at 1725 in AC 4425.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

3 BV 138 on reconnaissance against QP convoy from 0521 to 1458.

Routes:

1. Tromsø⁰ - AB 9256 - 3112 - 3256 - 9612 - Tromsø⁰.
 2. Tromsø⁰ - AB 9327 - 3673 - 3668 - Tromsø⁰.
 3. Tromsø⁰ - AC 4677 - 1479 - 1498 - 7124 - Tromsø⁰.
- No reports of enemy sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the Jan Mayen area from 0638 to 1333. Route 50% covered, no enemy observed.

1 Ju 88 in the sea area around the Faeroes from 0551 to 1351. No enemy observed.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Main photographic reconnaissance report,
3 March

Kola Bay: 1 destroyer in dry dock.
2 destroyers, apparently Genvni class.
1 freighter about 7,000 tons.
26 freighters 6,700 tons each.
1 freighter approximately 3,700 tons.
1 freighter approximately 3,000 tons.
1 freighter approximately 2,500 tons.
1 freighter approximately 2,000 tons.
2 freighters 1,800 tons each.
3 freighters 1,400 tons each.
36 freighters totaling approximately
200,200 G.R.T.

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1 tanker approximately 8,500 tons.
1 freighter approximately 2,100
G.R.T. in dry dock.
1 freighter approximately 1,200
G.R.T. in floating dock.

On 29 February 13 freighters, totaling about 79,400 tons, lay in the open parts of Kola Bay.

Polyarno naval base: 1 destroyer, Genvni class.
3 submarines, probably "S" class.
1 submarine, probably "P" class.
1 submarine, probably "Schtsch" class.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russia: At 0945 on 3 March urgent radio message from British unit or warship "AY" to Cleethorpes.
At 2125 Hammerfest obtained a bearing of 314° on "AQ" which was transmitting a very urgent radio message.
From radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast: normal radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Britain: no units or warships intercepted.
Russian radio traffic: little.
Britain: few Murmansk - Archangel broadcasts.
From radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast: brisk radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
"L 22" at 2213 on 4 March.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

0610 U 472 (v. Forstner) reported in a not entirely clear short signal: "1 destroyer in AC 46..."

The following short signals were received in succession from the same U-boat:

0647 "Am being attacked by land plane" and
0658 "Cannot submerge."

0720 War distress signal:

"Boat severely damaged. Boat sinking, grid squares 4683."

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- 0735 Thereupon radio message 0728/704 was sent on wave "Ulli":
- "Zoller", "Seidel" at once to go to the assistance of "Forstner".
- And on Command Waves (German Air Force - Navv) 1 and 2:
- 0752 Radio message 0731/L/188:
- "Forstner" reported that he has been attacked by land plane, unable to submerge. Boat can only last a short time."
- Further a request was made by telephone to Flieger Fuehrer Arctic for sea-rescue aircraft to take off, and was granted.
- 0807 U 307 (Herrle) reported in radio message 0740/705:
- "Circling carrier-borne aircraft and clouds of smoke in grid square 4618."
- 0821 Radio message 0756/708 sent:
- "Suspect QP convoy from "v. Forstner"'s sighting report. Operate on it."
- The fate of "v. Forstner"'s boat shows once again the great danger to which U-boats are exposed, especially when their anti-aircraft guns are iced-up.
- 0810 Radio message 0743/L/707 was therefore sent:
- "If anti-aircraft guns ice-up, haul far out and get ahead of convoy during the daytime in order to attack at night."
- 0834 U 716 (Dunkelberg) reported:
- "At 0825 carrier-borne aircraft in AC 4566."
- 0846 Short signal 0827 from U 739 (Mangold):
- "At 0430 convoy, speed 8 - 10 knots, steering southwest. Position AC 4359."
- 0930 U 288 (Meyer), who, on his way from Bergen, is in the southern part of the Northern Waters area received instructions to make for AB 67 at maximum cruising speed and to switch on to wave "Ulli" at once.
- U 366 (Langenberg), U 674 (Muss) and U 990 (Nordheimer) lying in Hammerfest at 5 hours' readiness, received orders to put out immediately and U 278 (Franze) and U 973 (Päpenmoller) were ordered to put out immediately from Narvik.

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U 354 (Sthamer) was ordered to proceed at maximum speed to Ramsund to take on torpedoes.

0922 Radio message 0827/195 from Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

"Aircraft "A" reported at 0745 in 27 E 8452, convoy, course 270°, speed 10 knots."

Accordingly radio message 0943/714 was sent:

"Aircraft reported 0830 convoy in AC 4631, 270°, 10 knots."

0949 "Zoller" and "Seidel" were informed in radio message 0935/712 of the presence of sea rescue aircraft.

In view of the evidently very strong enemy air cover, it does not seem advisable to allow the boats to operate against the enemy during daytime. They would only be exposed to increased danger without much prospect of success. Conditions for attack are most favorable during the night when, according to our experiences to date, carrier-borne aircraft are not to be expected.

1031 Radio message 1023/716 from Captain U-boats:

"In case of strong enemy air activity merely haul ahead during daytime, attack at night."

1124 Radio message 0825/715 from "Mangold":

"Stern T5 torpedo fired at leading sweeper, explosion after 12 minutes, definitely sunk, no depth charges. Boat unable to submerge, proceeding to Narvik at maximum speed. Making water through pressure water leads, 4 tons an hour. Master blow leaking. Request 2 T5 torpedoes, still 80 cu.m."

This is the first success. Unfortunately it coincides with the elimination of a further U-boat from the operation. In order to avoid if possible that the U-boat should accidentally run into the convoy, the boat received instruction in radio message 1109/718 to give the convoy area a wide berth on its return passage.

1116 Radio message 1025/M/199 from Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

"Most Immediate. To all:

At 0915 according to estimate, 1 aircraft carrier, 35 merchant ships some up to 10,000 G.R.T. each, 20 escort vessels. All round

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screen, broad formation, 4 lines ahead, heavy anti-aircraft defenses. Weather: 9 - 10 cloud base 800 meters, visibility 20 km., wind 120° 30 - 40 km. p.h., seaway 2 - 3."

1150 This was passed on in radio message 1137/719.

1241 "Langenberg", "Muss" and "Nordheimer" were formed into group "Orkan" and received orders to make for AB 6680 at maximum speed.

1300 "Herrle" reported that he lost contact at 1202, depth charges. Last convoy position at 0830 AC 4563.

1320 Radio message 1135/M/102 from Flieger Fuehrer Arct:

"Most Immediate. To all:

At 1025 composition of convoy 4 tankers, 26 merchant ships up to 10,000 G.R.T. each, 8 destroyers, 13 escort vessels including cruisers, 1 aircraft carrier. At 1100 convoy's position 27 E 6465."

1350 This position, with the addition "seems exact", was transmitted to the U-boats. (Radio message 1323/724.)

1350 In order not to let the boats haul ahead without a definite plan but to coordinate their movements, radio message 1229/723 was sent:

"Captain U-boats presumes convoy's position at 1800 approximately AC 4437, according to dead reckoning. The German Air Force continues shadowing."

1443 "Zoller" and "Seidel" were requested to report whether they had found any survivors from "Forstner".

1529 "Zoller" answered "No".

1537 "Seidel" answered "No".

1507 "Nordheimer" reported aircraft attack. The boat must still be just off Hammerfest. In radio message 1545/732 he amplified the report by stating that he was attacked by a "Boston" with torpedoes. The accompanying R-boat reported ground-runners.

1602 Radio message 1544/733 from Captain U-boats:

"Group "Taifun" and "Herrle" to report positions by short signal and bearing if air shadower can be heard. Attention is drawn

to Northern Waters Instruction No.8."

- 1636 Radio message 1603/734 from Captain U-boats:
"It is vital for a night attack that the boats should contact the convoy again at dusk. Make use of beacon signals from the air shadower."
- 1642 In radio message 1613/737 it was announced that shadower's signal buoy 3 is to be used.
- 1713 In radio message 1618/740 "Zoller" and "Seidel" received orders to continue the search until 2000, to look out for light signals, and then to break off if no definite clues had been found and to haul ahead in order to join the operation against the convoy.
- 1716 Radio message 1625/736 from "Brasack":
"Position AC 4572. No beacon signals, at 1100 nothing sighted in grid square of sinking except "Seidel" and aircraft."
- 1740 Aircraft reported convoy at 1418 in AC 4515 with addition "inexact",
1810 at 1445 in AC 4517,
1846 at 1605 in AC 4439, course 255°.
- These positions give a clear picture and would seem to be accurate.
- 1858 One position, reported as AC 4424 at 1632, seemed unlikely and was therefore not transmitted to the boats. Because of radar breakdown contact was broken off at 1632.
- 2055 Radio message 2024/745 from "Brüner":
"According to dead reckoning convoy should be in AB 6667 at 2400, in AB 6831 at 0500. Aircraft at present has no contact. Group "Orkan" has permission to attack."
- 2220 Radio message 2200/L/121 from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:
"Most Immediate.
Because of weather conditions relief of shadower of QP convoy undertaken by Flieger Fuehrer Arctic."
- 2249 Radio message 2239/749 from Captain U-boats to all boats:
"At dawn withdraw from convoy. Haul out to a safe distance from convoy and advance for attack during following night."

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(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 425 (Bentzien), see Appendix III/1.

V. Reports of successes:

U 739 (Mangold) 1 destroyer probably sunk.
U 703 (Brunner) 1 destroyer probably hit.

VI. U-boat reports:

The following intermediate report was dispatched at 0844 to Naval War Staff, 1st Division and Group North/Fleet:

"At 0555 "v. Forstner" reported a destroyer in AC 46 and at 0647 aircraft attack. Finally war distress signal, boat sinking in AC 4683. "Herrle" reported at 0740 carrier-borne aircraft and clouds of smoke in AC 4618. At 0530 3 BV 138 took off on reconnaissance. U-boats have orders to haul ahead of convoy, for night attack in case their anti-aircraft guns are iced-up. 9 boats in the operational area, 3 boats putting out from Hammerfest at approximately noon, 2 boats in Narvik - Andfjord."

VII. Survey of the situation:

U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 2200 on 4 March.

- "1. The escort was intercepted at 0600, and the convoy itself at 0800, by the northern wing of the U-boat disposition. Shadowing was not successfully maintained as the U-boats were forced to submerge and three of them took part in the "v. Forstner" rescue operation.
2. At 0702 U 472 (v. Forstner) sent a war distress signal after aircraft attack. Boat sinking. Search action in which sea rescue planes also took part, was unsuccessful and broken off at 2000.
3. The German Air Force shadowed the convoy continuously from 0745 to 1632. Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten could not take over shadowing because of weather conditions. The air reports give a clear impression of the convoy's route.
4. Because of the enemy's defenses (strong air cover) the boats have been ordered to haul out to a safe distance and get ahead of the convoy during daytime for the purpose of night

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attacks. So that the boats may coordinate their movements, they were informed of the convoy's probable position of AC 4437 at 1800. This position has been confirmed.

5. 2 boats put out from Narvik, and 3 from Hammerfest. They will reach the convoy about 0300. Therefore 13 boats are now taking part in the operation (not counting "v. Forstner"), and 6 of these are near the enemy so far as can be ascertained. One boat ("Mangold") has broken off the operation as it is unable to submerge.
6. Successes to date: 1 destroyer probably sunk ("Mangold"). 1 destroyer probably hit ("Brüner").
7. Plans for tonight and tomorrow: boats near the enemy are to attack, those further behind are to advance on the convoy. At dawn the boats are to withdraw from the convoy and haul ahead to be in a position to attack the following night.
8. Weather: E to SE 4, seaway 3.
9. Attack by torpedo-carrying aircraft on U-boat as it put out from Hammerfest."

(Signed) Peters.

5 March, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Boreas":

U 307)
U 315) Operating on QP 26 in AB 68.
U 361)
U 959)

Group "Taifun":

U 703)
U 737) Operating on QP 26 in AB 68.
U 278)
U 973)

Group "Orkan":

U 366)
U 674) Operating on QP 26 in AB 68.
U 990)
U 288)

In port:

U 312, 313 Alta,
U 354 Ramsund,
U 362, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 636, 673, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 957, 965 Bergen.

U-boat group Central:

U 276, 365, 970 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

	U 425 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen via Trondheim.
	U 716 proceeding from AC 4358 to Narvik.
1630	U 354 put out from Ramsund.
1900	U 354 put in to Narvik.
1020	U 739 put in to Harstad from AC 45.
1800	U 739 put out from Harstad.
2400	U 739 put in to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on convoy reconnaissance and shadowing from 0444 to 0926. Flying route Kirkenes - AC 7277 - AB 9235 - 6926 - 6915 - 9228 - 9235 - 6926 - 6922 - 6986 - Kirkenes. Exhaustive radar reconnaissance, no locations.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance from 0636 to 1137 Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance to re-intercept convoy and shadow it, from 1205 to 1839.

Route: Kirkenes - Tromsø - AB 9141 - 9114 - 8337 - Ingøy - Banak.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes from 0632 to 1417. Route 30% covered, Jan Mayen exhaustively covered. Enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 from 0630 to 1333 in the sea area around the Faeroes. No enemy sighting.

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2 FW 200 took off at 0700. Sea reconnaissance with radar on enemy convoy traffic.

Routes: Trondheim - AB 8973 - 7791 - 7497 - 8923 - Trondheim.

Second flying route: Trondheim - AF 2538 - 3429 - 3156 - 2345 - Trondheim, exhaustively covered, enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 took off at 0753, route Trondheim - AF 2795 - AE 3891 - 3597 - AF 2579. Area exhaustively covered, enemy not sighted.

1 FW 200 on reconnaissance with radar, from 1020 to 2017, to re-intercept the QP convoy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 1517 in AB 9114 convoy, course 270°, speed 10 knots, consisting of 25 merchant ships of up to 10,000 G.R.T., 4 tankers, 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 8 corvettes. Merchant ships in 5 lines ahead. Escort forces in all-round screen.

Not exhaustively reconnoitered because of weather conditions. Contact until 1655. Last position AB 8337.

At 1530 convoy located in AB 5962.

Subsequently observed by visual reconnaissance. Course 240°. Speed 10 knots. 8 destroyers 10 merchant ships, each about 8,000 G.R.T. widely spaced. Destroyers on the outside. Owing to weather conditions no further details. Shadowed from 1530 to 1700. Last position AB 5956.

Sent beacon signals for U-boats from 1640 to 1655.

2 Ju 88 on photographic reconnaissance from 1530 to 2151 of shipping anchorages in the northern Scottish Islands. 1 aircraft did not return from the operation. Second aircraft reported: at Scapa at least 3 aircraft carriers, 3 battleships, 1 passenger ship about 25,000 G.R.T., approximately 30 landing craft and ships, destroyers and 30 - 40 small to medium naval vessels. In AM 3466 smoke plumes of a large convoy.

At least 30 - 40 merchant ships judging by the plumes of smoke, course 30° to 50°. Approached convoy. Not made out clearly because of weather conditions.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

From radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines

in the operational area. At 1909 a British unit "AC" on bearing of 281° inexact from Hammerfest; at 2005 "AY" on 285°, inexact.
Russian radio traffic: Moderate.
Britain: few Murmansk or Archangel broadcasts.

0106 U 307 (Herrle) reported at 0013 in AB 6655 hydrophone bearing on grinding and turbine noises in 250°.

0126 "Mangold" reported a destroyer firing starshells aimlessly in AC 7233, course 150°, 12 knots.
This is improbably near the coast (possibly far off lightning without thunder).

0145 From Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"Shadower reported at 0101 convoy located in AB 6927. Continuing shadowing."

0225 Radio message 0207/766 from Captain U-boats:

"German Air Force reported at 0100 convoy located in AB 6927 and is being shadowed. Watch out for beacon signals."

Air contact has therefore been re-established, although the position reported seems to lie rather far south.

0150 U 959 (Weitz) reported at 0105 from AB 6681 noise band in 315°.

0244 U 990 (Nordheimer) at 0236 in AB 6927 bearing of shadower is 310°.

0242 U 366 (Langenberg) reported at 0232 1 destroyer in AB 6915.

0250 U 703 (Brunner) observed starshells at 0237 in AB 6599.

0305 U 959 (Weitz) corrected his 0105 position to AB 6673 (incorrect short signal).

From all these reports it seems that the convoy is proceeding along the expected route. The boats however have not succeeded in getting through to it. From that point of view it is to be regretted that during the crucial period from 1600 yesterday until 0100 today there was no air shadower with the convoy.

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- 0327 Radio message 0054/766 from "Dunkelberg":
- "At 0830 in AC 4539 carrier-borne aircraft driven off. 5 hours of close depth charges, 8 hours of hydrophone pursuit. Tube 5 out of action, am withdrawing."
- 0335 U 307 (Herrle) reported his position at 0251 AB 6593 and noise bearings beyond the northeasterly horizon.
- 0528 Flying weather from U 307 (Herrle):
NW6, visibility 1 mile, 20% snow showers.
- 0610 Radio message 0433/770 from "Dunkelberg":
- "Depth charge damage to upper deck, very strong vibrations in after part of ship when cruising on the surface. Bow-cap of tube 5 will not open. AC 4358. Am pressing on."
- The boat received orders in radio message 0647/773 to put in to Narvik.
- 0625 "Zoller"'s position at 0600 was AC 4776. The boat still has 60 cu.m.
- 0725 U 366 (Langenberg) sent correction of short signal of 0215 which was not clear at first. Position AB 6928, bearing 311^o.
- At dawn boats were again attacked by aircraft:
- 0743 U 703 (Brünner) aircraft attack in AB 6838.
- 0821 U 703 (Brünner) carrier-borne aircraft attack in AB 6827.
- 0833 U 307 (Herrle) bombs from carrier-borne aircraft in AB 6587.
- The boats again received orders to withdraw during daytime.
- 0958 Radio message 0935/778 to all boats:
- "In accordance with orders haul out to a safe distance and get ahead during daytime. Convoy's course believed to be 235^o, position further north than reported by the Air Force at 0100.
Reconnaissance today by our own aircraft."
- In order to allow for the various changes which have occurred,
1019 radio message 0939/719 was sent:
- "From Captain U-boats:
- New arrangement of groups:-

"Boreas": "Herrle", "Zoller", "Seidel",
"Weitz".
"Taifun": "Brasack", "Brüner", "Franze",
"Päpenmüller".
"Orkan": "Langenberg", "Muss", "Nordheimer",
"Meyer".

All haul ahead the convoy for night attack."

The German Air Force reported that they will not be able to carry out any reconnaissance today because of the weather.

Since the U-boats did not succeed last night in getting near the convoy, the system of two patrol lines, one behind the other, is to be employed once more during the coming night.

1245 Radio message 1139/784:

"The following patrol lines to be occupied by 1800:

Groups "Boreas" and "Taifun", AB 8354 to 9451.

Group "Orkan" AB 8624 to 8667."

1424 To improve the U-boats' navigation radio message 1413/788 was sent to all boats:

"Make position check when taking up position in patrol line. Radio beacons will operate also from 1530."

The following reports were received from the boats:

1443 U 703 (Brüner) not in position before 1900.
1451 U 361 (Seidel) position AB 6858.
1548 U 674 (Muss) not in position before 2100.
1640 U 315 (Zoller) not in position on time; position at 1500 AB 9229.
1640 U 674 (Muss) AB 9153, bearing 295°.
1653 U 737 (Brasack) AB 9136, bearing 288°.
1702 U 959 (Weitz) AB 9144, bearing 301°.
1710 U 307 (Herrle) AB 5932, beacon signals 190°, 90° and 10°.
1727 U 990 (Nordheimer) AB 9148 bearings 245°, 260°.
1740 U 703 (Brüner) AB 9156, bearing 300°.
2130 U 307 (Herrle) AB 5932. Cannot reach position in time.

1545 Telephone message from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"Convoy intercepted at 1517 in AB 9114, course 270°, speed 10 knots. Intercepted by radar, partly by visual reconnaissance. Contact maintained, aircraft sending beacon signals."

1606 Telephone message from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"At 1530 convoy intercepted by aircraft of Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters in 07 E 9314 (5681). Details lacking as to whether it was located or sighted. Position is doubtful. Perhaps covering force. Aircraft had to break off in area of northern Norway because of weather, as otherwise they would not have been able to land. AL has agreed to ask Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters to continue shadowing."

Captain U-boats also inclines to the view that this refers to a remote covering force. The U-boats were informed of the convoy itself.

1642 Radio message 1613/795 from Captain U-boats:

1. Aircraft reported convoy at 1517 in AB 9114, speed 10 knots, course 270°, doubtful. Contact maintained, sending beacon signals.
2. "Boreas", "Taifun", "Orkan" alter ordered position to 310°. "Weitz" and "Taifun" to move up one place to northwest. "Seidel" to occupy the most southeasterly position in the patrol line."

1815 Aircraft reported on reconnaissance wave:

"Am maintaining contact. Position of convoy 17 E 0238, course 260° true, speed 10 knots."

The enemy therefore seems now to be steering a westerly course. He will presumably alter course towards evening.

For tomorrow's air reconnaissance which, owing to weather conditions and lack of forces will have to operate under the most unfavorable conditions and from alternative bases, it has been agreed with Luftflotte 5:-

- a. that shadowing of QP convoy has priority over reconnaissance against a new PQ convoy;
- b. that as shadowing cannot be carried out continuously, it will be necessary to concentrate on certain points of time, namely noon and the evenings. (At noon, to remain informed of the convoy's whereabouts, the evening to help the boats to close in.)

Since the enemy is now on a westerly course the patrol lines ordered will have to be moved accordingly.

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- 1920 Radio message 1728/M/155 from Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:
- "Most Immediate.
- FW 200 (HL) reported: at 1610 in AB 5962 convoy, course 240°, speed 10 knots. The following were observed, though not clearly: 8 destroyers, 10 merchant ships, visibility poor."
- Unless one assumes that the observation of the merchant ships is a mistake, this must be a part convoy. It cannot be connected with the group, assumed to be a covering force, reported still further north at 1530. The distance between the two groups is too great for that.
- 2022 Radio message 2003/708 was sent to inform the U-boats:
- "Aircraft reported at 1610 convoy, course 240°, speed 10 knots, in AB 5962. 8 destroyers, 10 merchant ships observed in poor visibility. Significance of this group not yet clear. Part convoy possible."
- In order to adjust our disposition to the westerly course of the enemy, the patrol lines were moved further northwest.
- 1907 Radio message 1851/706:
- "From Captain U-boats: groups "Boreas", "Taifun" and "Orkan" move to patrol lines at maximum speed 30 miles further in the direction of 310°."
- 2220 U 703 (Brunner) reported starshells at 2148 and position AB 8355.
- 2305 Radio message 2220/711 from "Nordheimer":
- "2 destroyers in AB 8379, presumably head of convoy. Hydrophone band 180° true."
- 2313 "Zoller" and "Herrle" received orders to exchange their allotted positions so that there will be no gap in the patrol line due to "Zoller"'s lagging behind.
- 2400 Radio message 2215/M/163 from Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:
- "Most Immediate.
- Re radio message 1036: 1 FW 200 (HL) landed at 2017. Shadowed convoy from 1530 in AB 5965 to 1700 in AB 5956. In the convoy the following were identified:

10 merchant ships, approximately 8,000 G.R.T. each and 8 destroyers, course 240°, speed 10 knots.
From 1645 to 1655 air battle with 2 fighters of "Martlet" type."

It therefore appears that there is only one group further north, and that it is a part convoy. Perhaps it is a group of ships or steamers whose speed varies from that of the other convoy, and which are proceeding directly to America.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 1061 (Hinrichs):

- "1. Put out from Narvik at 0800 on 5 March to take on torpedoes at Ramsund.
2. Continue to Bergen on the morning of 6 March via Westfjord and as far as Fejeosen at a distance of 50 miles from the coast. Report by short signal 24 hours before reaching Hellisøy.
3. After taking on torpedoes put out from Bergen for Kiel.
4. From 64° N proceed in accordance with Order No. 13.
5. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 2300 on 5 March

- "1. During the night of 4/5 March aircraft shadowed convoy from 0100. The U-boats repeatedly obtained bearings on the shadower or hydrophone bearings on the convoy or escort. However, no attack made as the enemy's position was not at first certain owing to a break in air shadowing between 1600 and 0100 due to bad weather.
2. At dawn the boats were again attacked by the strong air cover.
3. During the day the boats were ordered to withdraw from the convoy and to haul ahead for attacks on the following night. To re-intercept the enemy a double patrol line

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was ordered for 1800 ahead of the enemy's route of advance. This was not reached in time by all the boats. There was no air shadower with the convoy in the morning. Aircraft resumed shadowing at 1515 until dusk.

4. At 1600 a second group, in addition to the convoy in grid square 8330, was sighted and located in AB 5960 (apparently a part convoy). A third group, possibly a covering force, was observed in AB 5680. 12 U-boats are taking part in the operation.
5. Weather conditions have developed most unfavorably. In the morning, wind NW 6, visibility 1 mile, 20% snow showers.
6. Plans for the night:
 - a. If the enemy is intercepted by the patrol lines all the boats are to attack, if not, the patrol lines will have to be moved accordingly.
 - b. During the daytime the boats are to haul out and get ahead of the convoy for night attack. On account of its limited forces the German Air Force will abandon further reconnaissance against PQ convoys at present and concentrate on shadowing the QP convoy at noon and in the evening."

(Signed) Peters.

6 March, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Boreas":

U 307)
U 315) operating on QP 26 in 85/88.
U 361)
U 959)

Group "Taifun":

U 703)
U 737) operating on QP 26 in 85/88.
U 278)
U 973)

Group "Orkan":

U 366)
U 674) operating on QP 26 in 85/88.
U 990)
U 288)

In port:

U 312, 313 Alta,
U 362, 354, 739, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 636, 673, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 957, 965 Bergen.

U-boat group Central:

U 276, 365, 970 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 425 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen
via Trondheim.
U 716 proceeding from AC 4358 to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance from 0930 to 1517, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Almost exhaustive. At 1125 in AB 3987 a drifting raft without identification markings, otherwise nothing to report.

2 BF 109 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance from 1035 to 1117, route Motovski - Kola Bay. From the town of Kola as far as Kola bend 19 merchant ships including 12 of 4 - 5,000 G.R.T. each, the remainder 1,000 - 2,000 G.R.T.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

Late report of 5 March:

1 FW 200 (KL) took off at 2005 from Vaernes. Flying route Vaernes - Trondheim - AB 8651 - 5857 - 5874 - 8644 - 8558 - 8123 - 8128 - 8551 - Vaernes.

Convoy located in AB 8551. Course 230°. Speed and details not made out. Shadowed until 0420. Broken off because of failure of radio.

1 FW 200 (BL) took off at 0212 to re-intercept and shadow QP convoy. Broke off at 0325 because of technical trouble.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: see para. IV a).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1 FW 200 (CL) from 0447 to 1653 to re-intercept and shadow QP convoy. At 1045 in AB 8491 two pairs of destroyers observed by visual reconnaissance, course 240°, speed 10 - 15 miles. 10 km. astern 2 surfaced U-boats in line ahead, probably our own.

At 1130 convoy spotted by visual reconnaissance in AB 8448, course 240°, speed 10 knots. Composed of 8 destroyers, 15 merchant ships of 5,000 - 10,000 G.R.T. each in 3 lines ahead.

1 aircraft carrier ahead between destroyer and convoy. Last position AB 7695.

At 1310 and 1350 1 aircraft, probably "Gladiator" type. From 1315 to 1330 escorting destroyer on port side dropped depth charges.

2 Ju 88 and 1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance from 0716 to 1814.

1 FW 200 (LL) took off at 2015. Landed at 0320 (7 March). Shadowed PQ convoy.

Flying route: Trondheim - AF 1358 - 1538 - 1244 - 1538 - Trondheim.

Convoy located at 2340 in AF 1538.

Position accurate. Course, speed and individual units not made out.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk or Archangel areas.

Hammerfest obtained an inexact bearing of 230° on unit "AD" at 1000, and a bearing of 252° to 253° on unit "AK" at 1046.

Russian radio traffic: very little.

Britain: very few Murmansk and no Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

0230 U 990 (Nordheimer) at 0100 reported hydrophone bearings on 195° and 285° from AB 8539.

- 0255 U 959 (Weitz) at 0146 reported moderate noise band on 200° from AB 8286.
- 0212 1 FW 200 of Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters took off to re-intercept the convoy.
- 0325 The aircraft broke off the operation because of technical trouble. In order not to fall behind the convoy,
- 0313 radio message 0236/720 from Captain U-boats:
"If no contact or more exact information, start at 0330 on course 220°, speed 12 knots."
- 0345 "Brunner" reported illuminant rockets at 2148 in AB 8373, and that he assumed that "Nordheimer"'s report referred to the convoy.
- 0355 Radio message 2119/721 from "Franze":
"T5 torpedo fired from stern at pursuing destroyer. Explosion after 5 minutes. Then no more propeller noises. Depth charges dropped by anti-submarine group. While it was doing so several steamer noises heard close by one hour later. Loud whirring noises from 3 destroyers, presumably towed noise buoy. Messages nos. 792, 795 from 710 missing."

From this message it must be assumed that the convoy has already passed both patrol lines. It is very unfortunate that this message arrived 7½ hours late.

The conclusions which must be drawn from this message were passed on to the U-boats in radio message 0456/724 from Captain U-boats:

"Convoy presumably passed "Franze" at about 2200. Believed to be in AB 8564 at 0500, course 230°. Press on at maximum speed in reconnaissance line."
- 0524 Orders for daytime were given in radio message 0509/725 from Captain U-boats:

"When contact is made again haul ahead at increased speed, so that boats will definitely lie ahead when night falls."
- 0419 "Weitz" sighted low-flying enemy aircraft in AB 8519.
- 0645 U 990 was attacked by aircraft in AB 8820.
0720 The same boat reported for U 703:

"Enemy steering 210°, speed 10 knots."

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It may be assumed that U 703 is in the vicinity of the convoy.

0820 Telephone message from Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

"Convoy's position at 0315 AB 8524. Shadowed until.0420."

0846 This message was also received much too late. The reason for this emerged from radio message 0807/M/181 from Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

"FW 200 (KL) landed at 0707. Convoy located at 0315 in AB 8524. Shadowed until 0420, then abandoned operation as radio communications were severed by icing-up. Transmitter unserviceable."

The picture of the situation as formed by this report and from the messages of the U-boats was summarized and transmitted to the boats as follows:-

0943 Radio message 0931/729 from Captain U-boats:

"Captain U-boats believes the convoy will be in AB 8840 at 1000, course 220°, speed 10 knots."

1043 U 703 (Brünner) reported aircraft in AB 8847.

1151 U 737 (Brasack) reported carrier-borne aircraft and destroyer in AB 8580.

1147 U 361 (Seidel) reported two destroyers on westerly course in AB 8583.

With the situation as it is at present it seems correct to let the boats form a new reconnaissance line to intercept the convoy in the evening.

1234 Radio message 1159/735 from Captain U-boats:

"Groups "Boreas" and "Taifun" occupy patrol lines AF 1385 to 2456, group "Orkan" AF 1651 to 1693 by 2000. Order according to radio message 0939/779 dated 5 March."

1355 Radio message 1308/M/191 from Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

"FW 200 (CL) reports: position of convoy at 1130 AB 8448, 250°, 10 knots, all-round screen of destroyers, aircraft carrier, 15 merchant ships of up to 10,000 G.R.T. observed. Shadowing enemy naval forces."

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This message was at first not transmitted to the U-boats. The position fits in well with that obtained by dead reckoning, but it is not clear whether this is a part convoy and the original convoy is still within the reach of the boats, or whether this is the complete convoy. The number of ships reported seems to indicate a part convoy (course Denmark Straits). It therefore seemed imprudent to risk splitting up the U-boat formation merely on the basis of this report.

- 1345 U 737 (Brasack) reported carrier-borne aircraft in AB 8549.
- 1413 U 361 (Seidel) reported at 1155 contact with destroyer, lost in AB 8584 (inaccurate). Course southwest, high speed.
- 1429 Radio message 0652/737 from "Franze":
"Carrier-borne plane or planes in AB 8549."
- 1450 Telephone message from Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:
"Position of convoy at 1401 AB 7699, course 230°, 10 knots. Aircraft breaking off operation, further shadowing not possible at present because of weather conditions."
- This report confirms the assumption that the message of 1355 referred to a part convoy which is further northwest. It is regrettable that this shadower too had to break off operations because of the weather. This part convoy is too far west and also too far ahead for the U-boats to operate on it.
- 1517 U 959 (Weitz) reported at 0620 convoy in AB 8493, course 220°.
- This is the first shadower report from a U-boat. It is likely that, discounting the difference in fix, this position corresponds to the aircraft report of 0315, which was AB 8524. Further clarifications must be awaited. This message was very much delayed.
- 1524 Radio message 1452/M/194 from Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:
"FW 200 (CL) reported: convoy in AB 7699 at 1401, course 230°, 10 knots."

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This report corresponds to the aircraft report of 1130. Nevertheless it is still not certain whether or not this is the part convoy reported by "Weitz".

1540 Radio message 1315/740 from "Nordheimer":

"Forced to submerge by 4 carrier-borne aircraft and 3 destroyers, depth charges, no damage, last position of convoy at 0744 AB 8854, 210°, 10 knots. Last message number 728."

This report definitely confirms the fact that the enemy convoy is sailing in at least 2 parts. The message was also remarkably late.

The U-boats were therefore disposed in one long line so as to be effective against both parts of the convoy if possible.

1620 Radio message 1608/743 from "Seidel":

"Will not reach position in patrol line until 2130. My position AB 8758. 70 cu.m."

1648 Radio message 0629/745 from "Weitz":

"In AB 8571 fired T5 torpedo at escorting destroyer astern. Definitely sunk. When I surfaced 2 destroyers at place of sinking. Carrier-borne aircraft attacked with rockets, depth charges one hour later, no damage. Still 67 cu.m."

Several boats reported that they could not reach the patrol line in time, others that they were being attacked by aircraft towards evening.

In detail:

1709 U 703 reported aircraft attack in AF 2131.

1633 U 361 reported that he could not be in position until 2130. At 1600 in AB 8758.

1758 U 737 (Brasack) reported aircraft attack in AB 8736.

1809 U 959 (Weitz) reported that he could not be in position on time. Position 8731.

1840 Radio message 1753/749 from "Brasack":

"Attacked by "Sunderland", 8 depth charges 10 m. from port side, apparently no major damage. Cannot reach position ordered."

1912 Message from "Brasack":

"Depth charge damage, am withdrawing for repairs."

1800 Radio message 0324/741 from "Meyer":

"AB 8611, course 220°, speed 9 - 10 knots. Fired torpedo from stern tube V at leading starboard destroyer. Explosion after 14 minutes. Fan of four T3 torpedoes on convoy, missed, depth charges, convoy with escort 40 vessels, wide formation, escort NRHEP. 98 cu.m. Messages nos. 717 to 723 missing."

1912 U 278 (Franze) in position at 2230.

2257 Radio message 2150/756 from "Brunner":

"At 1705 in AB 8798 attacked by carrier-borne aircraft with rockets. 2 dead, 1 seriously wounded (condition critical), 3 slightly wounded, am making for Westfjord."

2100 Radio message 1844/1859/M/102/103 from Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

"FW 200 (CL) landed at 1653. At 1045 in AB 8491 2 sub-divisions of destroyers, course 240°, speed 10 - 15 knots, 2 surfaced U-boats in line ahead 10 miles astern. From 1130 in AB 8448 to 1400 in AB 7699 convoy, course 240°, speed 10 knots, 9 destroyers in all-round screen. 1 aircraft carrier ahead, 15 merchant vessels of 5,000 - 10,000 G.R.T. each in 3 lines ahead, 2 aircraft probably "Gladiator" type. From 1145 to 1400 beacon signals for U-boats. From 1315 to 1330 port destroyers dropped depth charges."

Unless there is a deviation in fix, this report would confirm the presence of a third part convoy.

2353 In order to make the necessary adjustments after the elimination of "Brasack" and "Brunner", "Franze" and "Papenmoller" received orders in radio message 2327/759 to move up one position farther north.

It must be assumed that one or two U-boats are still lagging behind, but by and large they should now have reached their positions. So far the enemy has not been intercepted by the patrol line, but it is assumed that this may still occur. It is planned to let the patrol line remain stationary since it is intended to break off the operation tomorrow at 0600 and there is therefore no time left

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for effective maneuvers with a patrol line.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 739 (Mangold):

- "1. Put out from Narvik at 1000 on 7 March for Trondheim.
2. Proceed through Westfjord and via HA 1 (Frohavet) at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.
3. Report arrival at assembly point of convoy (HA 1) in good time.
4. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

V. Reports of successes:

3 boats fired T5 torpedoes at destroyers. "Weitz" sank one, "Franze" torpedoed one, "Meyer" probably hit one.

VI. Survey of the situation:

U-boat situation at 2400 on 6 March:

1. During the night of 5/6 March several boats came close to the convoy or escort. 3 boats fired T5 torpedoes at destroyers ("Weitz" sank one, "Franze" torpedoed one, "Meyer" probably hit one). Continuous shadowing of the convoy was not achieved during the night and only for a short time in the morning, apparently by "Nordheimer". During "Franze"'s attack on the destroyer, the escort forced him to submerge and several steamers passed over him. Therefore his report was considerably delayed.
2. The German Air Force reported once at night and twice during the day convoy positions which varied considerably from our calculations. No further reports were received as operations were severely restricted by the weather. U-boat reports on the convoy: "Weitz" at 0420 in AB 8493, course 220° (reported at 0620 and not received until 1507), and "Nordheimer" at 0744 in AB 8854 (not received until 1530), apparently both boats were forced by anti-submarine groups to remain submerged. From these reports it would seem that the convoy is split into at least two parts, a southeasterly part

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with course 210°, and a northwesterly part with course 220°. In order to intercept both parts if possible, the U-boats were ordered to form a patrol line at 2000.

3. Several air attacks were made on the U-boats by carrier-borne aircraft and "Sunderlands", in some cases with depth charges and rockets. This caused 2 dead, several slightly wounded and 1 seriously wounded on "Brunner". The boat is putting in to port. "Brasack" was damaged by depth charges and had to withdraw for repairs.
4. Plans: Interception of the part convoys by patrol lines. It is intended to break off the operation at 0600 tomorrow morning as the enemy would by then be approaching the area between Iceland and the Shetlands where there is great danger from aircraft.
5. Weather conditions are unfavorable especially for hauling ahead. Southwest 6.

(Signed) Peters.

7 March, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Boreas":

U 307.
U 315.
U 361.
U 959.

Group "Taifun":

U 737.
U 278.
U 973.

Group "Orkan":

U 366.
U 674.
U 990.
U 288.

In port:

U 312, 313 Alta,
U 362, 354, 739, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 636, 673, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 957, 965 Bergen.

U-boat group Central:

U 276, 365, 970 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 425 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen
via Trondheim.
U 703 proceeding from AB 8798 to
Narvik.
1015 U 716 put in to Harstad from AC 4358.
1055 U 716 put out from Harstad for Narvik.
1600 U 716 put in to Narvik.
0900 U 313 put out from Alta for
Hammerfest.
1310 U 313 put in to Hammerfest.
1000 U 739 put out from Narvik for Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance
from 0606 to 1127, route Banak - Bear
Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Not exhaustive,
nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 FW 200 (EL) with radar carried out
exhaustive reconnaissance against enemy
convoy traffic from 0647 to 1730.
Flying route: Vaernes - Trondheim - AF 2537 -
AE 3453 - 3155 - AF 2345 - Vaernes.
1 FW 200 (HL) on same task from 0652 and
1652. Flying route Vaernes - Trondheim -
AB 8973 - 7795 - 7731 - 8923 - Vaernes.
Both reconnaissance areas exhaustively
covered by radar, no enemy sighted.
1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance
from 0600 to 1420, route Vaernes - AA 6855 -
Vaernes, no enemy sighted.
1 Ju 88 from 0456 to 1748 westwards as far
as Denmark Straits, no enemy sighted.
2 Ju 88 from 0706 to 1513 on reconnaissance
of harbors, bays and fjords along the east
coast of Iceland. Not exhaustive owing to
weather conditions. At 1130 in AE 5583 two
merchant ships of approximately 10,000 G.R.T.
each, in Seydisfjordur a net barrage. Anti-

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aircraft fire from ships and shore batteries.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See para IV (a).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Radar reconnaissance against enemy convoy traffic.

Flying route: Vaernes - Trondheim - AF 2796 - AE 3894 - 3597 - AF 2813 - Vaernes. Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered by radar. About 25% covered by visual reconnaissance. At 1027 impulses from enemy ships. At 1045 convoy located in AF 1764, course 240°, speed 10 knots. 30 ships of up to 10,000 G.R.T. were made out (owing to bad visibility it was not possible to distinguish warships from merchant ships). 7 destroyers in all-round screen, shipping formation in 3 or 4 lines abreast.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

From radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast: brisk, at times urgent, radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Britain: no units intercepted.

At 1247 Hammerfest obtained an inexact bearing of 269° on an allied unit "V 592" and at 1315 a bearing of 240° on a British unit "AC".

Russian radio traffic: slight at first, brisk in the afternoon.

Britain: no Murmansk and very few Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

Captain U-boats decided to break off the operation at 0600 for the following reasons:

1. As the boats would have to haul ahead again during daytime, contact with the enemy would not be re-established until roughly the Faeroes - Iceland area, which is strongly patrolled by enemy land-based aircraft and anti-submarine groups. The prospects of successes under these conditions are too slight to make it worth while to let the U-boats continue the operation.

2. At approximately noon today they will reach the eastern limit of the large naval grid square AE, which has been laid down by Group North/Fleet as the approximate limit of operations.
3. It appears that the U-boats have already fallen behind the convoy, to such an extent that it is very doubtful whether the majority would be able to catch up with it.

0148

Radio message 0115/762 from Captain U-boats was therefore sent:

- "1. Break off operations at 0600. Then report position by short signal as soon as possible, also fuel if stocks are below 60 cu.m. and "yes", in case damage necessitates putting in to port.
2. From dawn proceed submerged, course 25°, ensure very long wave reception at calling-times.
3. Surface again at 1930."

0545

Radio message 0413/M/112 from Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

"Most Immediate.

FW 200 (LL) landed at 0320. Located convoy at 2340 in AF 1538, East 0815. Position accurate. Shadowed until 0040, broke off operation because radio set broke down. Sent no beacon signals."

According to this the convoy (or part convoy) had already passed the position of the ordered patrol line at about 2000 without being observed. Either, therefore, the boats were not in position on time or there were gaps in the patrol line.

0527

The boats were informed in radio message 0454/746 from Captain U-boats:

"According to a supplementary report, the air reconnaissance seems to have located a part convoy at 2340 in grid square AF 1538. According to this, the convoy should have passed our patrol line at about 2000. Beacon signals not transmitted because of failure of radio."

1225

The German Air Force reported the convoy at 1000 in AF 1764, course 240°, speed 10 knots.

The reasons for breaking off the operation

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at 0600, as set out above, have therefore been proved correct.

0600 Operations against QP 26 broken off.

Of the boats which took part in the operation "Dunkelberg", "Brüner", "Brasack" and "Zoller" will put in to port.

1646 Radio message 1610/785 for the new disposition:

"New attack areas, depth of sweep 20 miles, from AB 7654 to AF 2248: "Päpenmüller", "Herrle", "Seidel", "Weitz", "Franze", "Muss", "Nordheimer", "Meyer", "Langenberg". During daytime proceed submerged except for one fix. Keep watch for very long wave calls. At 2000 on 8 March, starting from the northwestern limit, 9-hourly movements to southeast and northwest within the attack areas."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 472 (v. Forstner) has been missing since 4 March. The boat put out from Narvik on 24 February. At the beginning of operations against QP 26 the boat reported by short signal at 0647 on 4 March that he was being attacked by a land plane. At 0658 the boat reported by short signal "am unable to submerge". At 0720 a war distress signal was received:

"Boat severely damaged, boat sinking. Grid square 4683."

No further reports were received from the boat. The nearest two boats in the patrol line, U 361 and U 315, were ordered to the place of sinking. Other boats in the vicinity also passed over and searched the area. Nothing was found.

It is assumed that there was a further attack at 0720 of which the boat became a victim without being able to make use of rescue apparatus. The search was discontinued at 2000 because of the operation in progress.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 366 (Langenberg),
Short report from U 674 (Muss),
Short report from U 312 (Nikolay),
Short report from U 956 (Mohs),
Short report from U 425 (Bentzien),
see Appendix IV/5-9.

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VII. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

8 March, 1944

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 973)
U 307)
U 361)
U 959) proceeding from AF 10 to attack
U 278) areas from AB 7654 to AF 2248
U 674) (depth of sweep 20 miles).
U 990)
U 288)
U 366)

In port:

U 312 Alta,
U 313 Hammerfest,
U 354, 362, 703, 716, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 636, 673, 711 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 957, 965 Bergen.

U-boat group Central:

U 276, 365, 970 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1830 U 425 put in to Bergen from Narvik.
2030 U 739 put in to Trondheim from Narvik.
U 315 proceeding to Narvik from AF 10.
1200 U 737 put in to Narvik from AF 10.
0530 U 703 put in to Narvik from AF 10.
2230 U 354 put in to Narvik from AF 22.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance from
0537 to 1153, route Banak - Bear Island -
75° N, 5° E - Banak. Almost exhaustive,
nothing to report.
4 BF 109 broke off operations, not exhaustive.
1100 in Kola Bay from Murmanski Channel to
Murmansk 6 merchant ships of 6,000 - 8,000

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G.R.T. each, 6 merchant ships of 2,000 - 3,000
G.R.T. each.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance from
0558 to 1246, route Vaernes - Jan Mayen -
Vaernes. Route 80% covered, Jan Mayen area 40%.
No enemy sighted.

1 Ju 88 from 0600 to 1434 in the sea area west
of the Faeroes. Reconnaissance area exhaustively
covered, no enemy sighted.

2 FW 200 with radar on reconnaissance against
enemy convoy traffic from 0640 to 1648.

Flying routes: Vaernes - Trondheim - AF 2537 -
AE 3429 - 3156 - AF 2355 - Vaernes.

Vaernes - Trondheim - AB 8973 - 7792 - 7731 -
8923 - Vaernes.

1 aircraft on radar reconnaissance until 1325,
then visual reconnaissance. Area exhaustively
covered, no enemy sighted.

2 aircraft with radar, reconnaissance area
exhaustively covered, no enemy sighted.

1 Ju 88 on same task from 0751 to 1452. No
reports of enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russia: Russian radio traffic (announcement
of new flag call signs) points to commissioning
of a fairly large number of new M.T.B.s in the
Russian Northern Waters Fleet. Formation
probably one brigade with 5 sub-divisions.
13 new M.T.B. call signs have appeared in
radio traffic since 18 January 1944, 8 of
them several times.

From radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar
coast: very little radio traffic to submarines
in the operational area.

Murmansk area: destroyer "C".

Britain: no units intercepted. Very few
Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

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- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
9 boats in position east of Jan Mayen.
- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:
 - (1) In spite of repeated requests, no position reports have been received from U 366 (Langenberg) and U 973 (Päpenmoller).
 - (2) Sailing order for U 354 (Sthamer), see Appendix II/3.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 739 (Mangold), second operation, see Appendix IV/10.

VII. Survey of the situation:

Final conclusions to be drawn from the operations against PQ 30 and QP 26.

1. In Captain U-boats' view, the unsatisfactory results of the attacks on the last two convoys, as well as the U-boat losses incurred, compel us to alter our tactics for the future.
2. As long as we did not need to reckon with such strong carrier-borne and land-based air defenses as accompanied PQ 30 and QP 26, interception of the convoy in the early morning hours with a subsequent hauling ahead in preparation for night attacks was found to be successful. However, as recent experience has shown, as soon as there is strong enemy air cover, it is useless to maintain a surfaced disposition in the daytime. It only leads to losses. Moreover, the boats are quickly forced to submerge by aircraft and anti-submarine units and in many cases have no time to transmit the first shadowing report which is of extreme importance for operational control.
3. In future it will therefore be necessary, especially off the enemy's coasts, to order U-boats to take up submerged positions during daylight. Extensive air reconnaissance will continue to be of extreme importance. Submerged positions are also important in preventing the patrol line from being observed. Air reconnaissance, particularly on the night and day before the convoy comes within range of the patrol line, must be so strong in numbers that any evasive action taken by the convoy and major variations in course will be observed without fail. Moreover, during the first night of the operations an air shadower must be continuously with the convoy to transmit beacon signals.

- (4) The U-boat patrol line must be placed and maneuvered in such a way that at nightfall the convoy will be in its immediate vicinity, not more than 30 - 40 miles away. By the elaboration of beacon signal methods and their increased use, as in the Atlantic, all the U-boats must be enabled to attack early during the night. (Establishment of the convoy's position by the U-boat with the help of two position lines. Reception of beacon signals from shadower from various geographical directions). The first night is decisive for the success of the whole operation.
- (5) At dawn, the U-boats must withdraw to a safe distance from the convoy and haul ahead. In case of strong enemy air cover, any of the boats that are too close to the convoy must at first remain submerged for their own protection. But this entails that such boats will not be in position during the following night and will take correspondingly longer before they will be able to attack again.
- (6) During the summer months of continuous daylight in the Arctic (30 April to 15 August), U-boats will only be able to operate in submerged attacks. During daytime, they will either haul ahead or remain submerged in the manner described in para. 5, above.
- (7) A conference on all outstanding problems will take place with the Flieger Führers within the next few days.

(Signed) Peters.

9 March, 1944.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters boats:

U 973 AB 7654)
U 307 AB 7683)
U 361 AB 7932) depth of sweep 30 miles,
U 959 AB 8717) 9-hourly movements to
U 278 AB 8746) northwest and southeast.
U 674 AB 8784)
U 990 AF 2122)
U 288 AF 2162)
U 366 AF 2248)

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In port:

U 312 Alta,
U 313 Hammerfest,
U 315, 362, 703, 716, 737, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 636, 673, 711, 739 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0330
2200
2200

U 354 proceeding from Narvik to AF 22.
U 315 put in to Narvik from AF 10.
U 362 put out from Narvik for Trondheim.
U 737 put out from Narvik for Trondheim.

U-boat group Central:

0200
0415
1040
0800

U 276, 365, 970 Bergen,
U 821, 968 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel.
U 968 put out for Bergen,
U 968 put in to Kristiansand (South) again,
U 766, 993 put out from Kiel for Kristiansand (South)

II.

Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance from 0600 to 1230 Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord (fjords covered by visual reconnaissance) 75° N, 10° E - Banak, not covered.
2 BF 109 on meteorological, shipping and airfield reconnaissance, Motovski - Kola Bay.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AB 7760 - Vaernes. Reconnaissance area 50% covered, no enemy sighted.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance westwards as far as AE 9930. Broken off. Enemy not sighted.
2 FW 200 with radar on reconnaissance to intercept enemy convoy traffic. No enemy sighted.
1 FW 200 on reconnaissance off the north coast of Iceland.

III.

Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

About 12 merchant ships sighted in Kola Bay between Murmansk and Polyarno, 3 of them 5,000 - 8,000 G.R.T. each, of Murmansk putting in to Kola Bay. The remaining ships about 3,000 - 5,000 G.R.T. each, hove to. 1 merchant ship of 3,000 - 5,000 G.R.T. putting in to Kola Inlet. At 1200 in Eyjafjordur 1 tanker 8,000 -

10,000 G.R.T. hove to.

In AE 4352 southern bay of Hvilex island (Hvaley? - Trans.) a seaplane base with 6-7 floatplanes of an unidentified type. On the west coast of the fjord a factory with storage tanks, 6-8 large containers. Bays and fjords from the northern coast of Bakkafloi as far as Eyjafjordur examined. No shipping concentrations observed.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: a few, partly urgent radio messages to submarines in the operational area. Murmansk area: destroyer "C", mine-sweepers Nos. 45, 113, 117.
Britain: no units intercepted.
Radio traffic: no Murmansk or Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

9 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen. As there have still been no position reports from U 366 (Langenberg) and U 973 (Päpenmöller), U 354 (Sthamer) which is now putting to sea is to occupy the most southerly attack area, which was intended for "Langenberg", for the time being.

1159 Radio message 1159/725 sent:

"U 354 (Sthamer) to occupy attack area AF 2248, depth of sweep 20 miles. Starting at 1700 on 10 March from the southeastern limit, 9-hourly movements to northwest and southeast within the attack area. Remain submerged during daytime and twilight until it is time for the radio beacon fix during daytime. Keep watch for the new 4-hourly calls."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer orders for U 362 (Franz) and U 737 (Brasack):

1. Put out from Narvik at 2200 on 9 March for Trondheim.
2. Proceed through Westfjord to Bodø, from there with escort from Admiral North Coast.

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3. Escort from Bodø requested for 1000 on 10 March.
4. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 703 (Brüner) tenth operation.

Short report from U 716 (Dunkelberg) second operation.

Short report from U 737 (Brasack) fifth operation.

See Appendix IV/11 - 13.

VII. Survey of the situation:

Teleprinter message to Group North/Fleet on the U-boat situation in Northern Waters on 10 March:

- "1. At present at sea in attack areas: U 278 (Franz), U 288 (Meyer), U 307 (Herrle), U 361 (Seidel), U 674 (Muss), U 990 (Nordheimer), U 959 (Weitz) also (doubtful) U 366 (Langenberg) and U 973 (Päpenmüller). Neither boat has replied to the second request to report. They must be presumed lost.
2. U 354 (Sthamer) is proceeding to relieve U 288 (Meyer) which will have to return to Narvik for a short period.
3. The next boats to become ready for operations are: 12 March, U 312 (Nikolay) and U 313 (Schweiger); 16 March, U 771 (Lange) and U 956 (Mohs); 20 March U 703 (Brüner); 21 March, U 315 (Zoller); 22 March, U 277 (Lübsen); 23 March, U 355 (La Baume); 24 March, U 673 (Sauer); 29 March, U 360 (Becker); 30 March, U 636 (Schendel); approximately 31 March U 739 (Mangold) and U 716 (Dunkelberg).
4. Thus ten boats will probably be at operational readiness on 15 March, thirteen on 20 March, seventeen on 25 March and twenty boats on 1 April. These are the highest possible figures, but delays in dates of readiness and accidents at sea, which are bound to reduce the number of boats at operational readiness at any given time, must be expected.
5. At present Captain U-boats has a total of 25 U-boats and two experimental boats available for operations. The system of quick repairs by repair ships is designed to ensure that as large a number of boats as possible will be ready for operations at short notice in the event of the approach of a convoy. But as this method allows only the most urgent work to be carried out, quick repairs must needs lead to severe wear and tear, so that after a time, the boats will have to be withdrawn for a long period. For this reason

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the allocation of new boats, at least to the extent of replacing actual losses, is essential if the attack on convoy traffic in sufficient strength is to continue in the future.

(Signed) Peters.

10 March, 1944.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 307 AB 7683)
U 361 AB 7932)
U 959 AB 8717)
U 278 AB 8746) depth of sweep,
U 674 AB 8784) 9-hourly movements to
U 990 AF 2122) northwest and southeast.
U 288 AF 2162)
U 354 AF 2248)
U 366
U 973

In port:

U 312 Alta,
U 313 Hammerfest,
U 315, 703, 716, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 636, 673, 711, 739 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 362; U 737 proceeding from Narvik to
Trondheim.

0900 U 716 put out from Narvik for Hammerfest.

U-boat group Central:

U 376, 365, 970 Bergen,
U 821 Kristiansand (South),
0400 U 968 put out from Kristiansand (South) for
Bergen,
0550 U 766 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel,
0550 U 993 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 broke off meteorological reconnaissance.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance from
0932 to 1623 Banak - Bear Island 75° N, 5° E.
Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

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Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AA 6990 - Vaernes. Jan Mayen area 20% covered, no enemy sighted.

1 Ju 88 from 0631 to 1406 westward as far as the Faeroes sea area.

FW 200 with radar on reconnaissance against enemy convoy traffic. Flying route: Vaernes - Trondheim - AF 2537 - AE 3429 - 3156 - AF 2355 - Vaernes - Trondheim - AB 8973 - 7792 - 7731 - 8923 - Vaerne
Reconnaissance area completely covered, no enemy sighted.

1 Ju 88 from Vaernes - Trondheim - AF 2796 - 1873 broken off. Reconnaissance area 30% covered, no enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic
submarines in the operational area.
Britain: no units intercepted. Very few Murmansk
and Archangel broadcasts.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

8 boats east of Jan Mayen.
As U 288 (Meyer) has important spare parts on board which are intended for Narvik, and it is assumed that the next PQ convoy need not be expected for the next few days, radio message 1049/156 from Captain U-boats was sent:

1049

- "1. "Meyer" to return to Westfjord - Narvik at increased cruising speed.
- 2. "Sthamer" to occupy "Meyer"'s attack area.
- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

- (d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 716 (Dunkelberg):

- "1. Put out from Ramsund at 1900 on 10 March for Alta.

2. From Lødingen to Tromsø with district pilot, then with escort from Admiral Polar Coast. Both have been requested from here.
3. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Organizational:

Teleprinter message received from Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.:

"1. U 365 (Wedemeyer) and U 362 (Franz) are allocated to Captain U-boats Norway as replacements for the lost boats and are to be fitted out immediately for operations in Northern Waters. Admiral Commanding U-boats will decide on flotilla allocations.

2. When the strength of U-boat group Central has reached ten boats, every time that another boat puts out from Kiel, the boat which has been longest with the group will be detailed by Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops., for operations in the Atlantic. Sailing orders will follow at the appropriate time."

II. Survey of the situation:

Teleprinter message received from Group North/Fleet: Interim conclusions on the operation against QP 26:

"1. With the short reports from Captain U-boats Norway, Most Secret 991 A1 and Most Secret 1020, dated 8 March, to hand, it is our opinion that the measures taken by U-boat Command were adequate to the needs of the situation. The transmission of an estimated position as a guide for the U-boats in the absence of 'shadowers' reports or in case of obvious mistakes in fix in the reports of convoy positions has proved satisfactory. Once again, U-boat operations have been very ably supported by the German Air Force so far as their forces and types of aircraft permitted and the weather allowed them to operate. The successes gained, as could be foreseen after the conclusion of operations against PQ 30, were regrettably small. The causes of this comparative failure, apart from strong anti-submarine measures by enemy naval and air forces, were the increasing period of daylight and adverse weather conditions.

2. Possible improvements: the even closer cooperation between the German Air Force and the U-boats, as suggested by Captain U-boats, Norway might increase the chances of success. The same holds for the proposed improvements in shadower

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technique and the bringing up of U-boats. Moreover, improvements in navigation, especially through radio beacon bearings, are regarded as most important measures to increase our successes. Navigational conditions and fixes were evidently better than in the last convoy operation.

3. Future operations:

- (a) With increasing and then continuous daylight, the prospects of U-boat successes will decrease further.
- (b) In order to achieve satisfactory results a maximum number of U-boats should take part in convoy operations. This can be attained by abandoning operations against QP convoys and employing only a small number of U-boats on continuous sea patrol. The main task of reconnaissance must then fall more than ever on the German Air Force. Only after the air reconnaissance has intercepted a convoy should the U-boats put out from the operational ports and be drawn up in positions as deeply staggered as possible in order that they may remain undetected.
- (c) Even then, without the allocation of bombers and long-range fighters, great successes against convoys can hardly be expected.

4. Final conclusions:

In spite of the vigorous and energetic action of the U-boats, which is beyond all praise, and good support from the German Air Force, the operation remained unsuccessful. The cause for this must not be sought in those who took part, or those who directed the operation, but in the very difficult conditions which prevailed."

(Signed) Peters.

11 March, 1944.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 307 AB 7683)
U 361 AB 7932) depth of sweep 20 miles,
U 959 AB 8717) 9-hourly movements to
U 278 AB 8746) northeast and southwest.
U 674 AB 8784)

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U 990 AF 2122) depth of sweep 20 miles,
U 354 AF 2122) 9 hourly movements to
 northeast and southwest.

U 366
U 973.

In port:

U 312 Alta,
U 313 Hammerfest,
U 315, 703, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 636, 673, 711, 739 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 365, 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1430 U 716 proceeding from Narvik to Hammerfest.
U 716 put in to Hammerfest.
U 362, U 737 proceeding from Narvik to
Trondheim.
1800 U 288 put in to Narvik from AF 2162.
0900 U 312 put out from Alta for Hammerfest.
1335 U 312 put in to Hammerfest.

U-boat group Central:

U 276, 970 Bergen,
U 821 Kristiansand (South),
U 968 proceeding from Kristiansand (South) to
Bergen,
0550 U 766, U 993 put in to Kristiansand (South)
from Kiel,
0800 U 736, U 740 put out from Kiel for Stavanger,
0800 U 961 put out from Kiel for Kristiansand
(South).

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance from
0600 to 1244, route Banak - Bear Island -
AG 7833 - Banak. Exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance from
0608 to 1329, route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes.
Route not exhaustively covered, no enemy sighted.
1 Ju 88 from 0522 to 1402 in the sea area west of
the Faeroes, no enemy sighted.
1 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 with radar on reconnaissance
to intercept enemy convoy traffic.
Flying routes: Vaernes - Trondheim - AF 2537 -
AE 3429 - 3156 - AF 2355 - Vaernes.
Vaernes - Trondheim - AB 8973 - 7792 - 7731 -
8923 - Vaernes. Vaernes - Trondheim - AF 2796 -
AE 3894 - 3597 - AF 2529 - Vaernes.
Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered, no
enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

No units intercepted.
At 1743 Hammerfest obtained a bearing of 257°
on British unit "AB".

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

7 boats east of Jan Mayen.

1125 Radio message 1125/167 from Captain U-boats:

"Permanent dispositional order:

1. Group "Thor": "Herrle", "Seidel", "Weitz",
"Franze".
2. Group "Hammer": "Muss", "Nordheimer",
"Sthamer".

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:

Teleprinter message from Captain U-boats, Norway
Most Secret 1058 al:

"U 366 (Langenberg) and U 973 (Päpenmüller) are missing. U 366 put out from Hammerfest on 4 March.
U 973 (Päpenmüller) put out from Narvik on 4 March. Both boats were operating against QP 26. U 973 did not report after putting to sea, U 366 last reported on 5 March in radio message 0618/772, received at 0706, which contained a correction of an earlier radio message which had not been clearly received.
After the conclusion of the operation, both boats were requested several times to report, but without result. It is assumed that the boats were lost near the convoy through aircraft or destroyer attacks."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 315 (Zoller), first operation,
see Appendix IV/14.

VII. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

12 March 1944.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Thor":

U 307 AB 7683) depth of sweep 20 miles,
U 361 AB 7932) 9-hourly movements to
U 959 AB 8717) northwest and southeast.
U 278 AB 8746)

Group "Hammer":

U 674 AB 8784) depth of sweep 20 miles,
U 990 AF 2122) 9-hourly movements to
U 354 AF 2162) northwest and southeast.

In port:

U 312, 313, 716 Hammerfest,
U 288, 315, 703, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 636, 673, 711, 739 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 365, 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1515 U 362 put in to Trondheim from Narvik.
U 737 put in to Trondheim from Narvik.
0600 U 716 put out from Hammerfest for Alta.
1000 U 716 put in to Alta.

U-boat group Central:

U 276, 970 Bergen,
U 766, 821, 993 Kristiansand (South),
U 736, 740 proceeding from Kiel to Stavanger,
U 961 proceeding from Kiel to Kristiansand (South),
0030 U 968 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand (South).

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance from 0555 to 1125, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Nothing to report.
2 BF 109 on shipping and airfield reconnaissance Motovski - Kola Bay from 0855 to 0950. 10 ships of up to 2,000 G.R.T. each, and 11 ships of up to 3,000 - 4,000 G.R.T. each hove to, from Kola town to Polyarno. Motovski Bay empty.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance from 0500 to 1338, route Vaernes - AA 6886 - Vaernes. Route 20% covered, Jan Mayen area 15% covered, no enemy sighted.

1 FW 200 took off at 0643, 1 FW 200 at 0647, 1 FW 200 at 0716 on sea reconnaissance with radar against enemy convoy traffic. Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered, radar operating, enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

13 March at 0530:

Destroyers "D", "U", "E" at sea at 1153.

From radio traffic at sea: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Britain: no units intercepted.

Very little Russian radio traffic.

Britain: no Murmansk or Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

7 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing orders for U 968 (Westphalen):

"1. U 968 (Westphalen) put out from Bergen for Narvik on 13 March.

2. Proceed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast as far as 64° N in accordance with Order No 13.

3. Radio Service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

A teleprinter message was sent in reply to an inquiry from Group North/Fleet concerning new proposals for minelaying operations during the coming summer:

- "1. It is intended to leave out areas off the Samoed coast, and the Ob and Yenisei rivers in order to intensify minelaying on the busiest traffic routes. Areas in order of importance: Belushya, Yugorski Straits, (west and east), Kanin Nos, Kolguev South, Matochkin Straits, Pechora Sea (north and east) also north and south of Dikson, and north and south of Byeli Island (Seehund 4).
- 2. Period delay mechanism 1 for all minefields since only early successes can be expected.
- 3. An application for a minelaying U-boat with 66 SMA mines for the Gorlo Straits has been submitted to Naval War Staff 2nd Division. The boat should subsequently proceed from Bergen for Atlantic operations."

VII. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

13 March, 1944.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

- U 307 AB 7683)
- U 361 AB 7932)
- U 959 AB 8717) depth of sweep 20 miles,
- U 278 AB 8746) 9-hourly movements to
-) northwest and southeast.

Group "Hammer":

- U 674 AB 8784)
- U 990 AF 2122)
- U 354 AF 2162)

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In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 312, 313 Hammerfest,
U 288, 315, 703, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 362, 636, 673, 711, 737, 739 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 425, 957, 965, 968 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1700 U 968 put out from Bergen for Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

U 276, 365, 970 Bergen,
U 766, 821, 993 Kristiansand (South),
U 736, 740 proceeding from Kiel to Stavanger,
put in to Kristiansand (South) at 0730,
0825 U 961 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel,
1700 U 276 put out from Bergen for Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 75°
N, 10° E - Banak. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. Route 70% covered,
enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 in the sea area west of the Faeroes.

2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 with radar on reconnaissance
against enemy convoy traffic.

Flying routes: (a) Vaernes - AB 8972 - 7791 - 7731 -
9023 - Vaernes.

(b) Vaernes - AF 2535 - AE 3434 -
3137 - AF 2319 - Vaernes.

(c) Vaernes - AF 2795 - AE 3886 -
3597 - AF 2813 - Vaernes,
exhaustively covered,

no enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
At 1055 on 13 March 1 radio message of first priority from Polyarno.
Murmansk area: 1 probable ice-breaker.
Britain: no units intercepted.
At 1037 on 13 March Hammerfest obtained a bearing of 237° 8' (?) on British unit "AC".

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

7 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen. After U 366 (Langenberg) and U 973 (Päpenmüller) had been posted as missing, the following radio message was sent to adjust the U-boat disposition:

1325 Radio message 1325/764 from Captain U-boats:

- "1. Group "Thor" in attack areas from AB 7683 to AB 8764, group "Hammer" from AB 8784 to AF 2162. 9-hourly movements from northwest to southeast.
2. Procedure according to Order No. 8. Careful ~~exhaustive~~ hydrophone watch.
3. Daily air reconnaissance against PQ convoys covering one and a half daily runs of a convoy to the southwest of the U-boat positions."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

14 March, 1944.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":)
)
 U 307 AB 7683)
 U 361 AB 7932)
 U 959 AB 8717) depth of sweep 20 miles
 U 278 AB 8746) 9-hourly movements to
) northwest and southeast.
Group "Hammer":)
)
 U 674 AB 8784)
 U 990 AF 2122)
 U 354 AF 2162)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
 U 312, 313 Hammerfest,
 U 288, 315, 703, 956 Narvik,
 U 360, 362, 636, 673, 711, 737, 739 Trondheim,
 U 277, 355, 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 968 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

1500 U 365, 970 Bergen,
 U 766, 821, 961, 993 Kristiansand (South),
 U 736, U 740 put in to Stavanger from Kristiansand
 (South),
 0800 U 276 proceeding from Bergen to Trondheim,
 U 342 put out from Kiel for Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

1 BV 138 from 1140 to 1436 on reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters against a suspected landing craft in the Loppa area, without sighting the enemy.
 1 Ju 88 in the sea area west of the Faeroes, without sighting the enemy.
 1 FW 200 from 0404 to 1744 on supply flight for operation "Bassgeiger". Supply carried out at 1150 according to plan.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
At 1037 on 13 March Hammerfest obtained a bearing of 237° 8' on a British unit "AC".
At 1055 on 13 March 1 radio message of first priority from Polyarno.
Murmansk area: 1 probable ice-breaker.
Britain: no units intercepted.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
7 boats east of Jan Mayen.

2218 Short signal 2207/15/778 received from U 959 (Weitz):
"Am breaking off operation because of engine trouble. Proceeding to Narvik."

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing orders for U 312 (Nikolay) and U 313 (Schweiger):

- "1. Put out from Hammerfest on the morning of 15 March.
2. Proceed to AB 88 at 10 knots keeping 50 miles from the coast.
3. Operational Order No. 1, U-boats Northern Waters wave, proceed in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 1.
4. Our own forces: U 307 (Herrle), U 361 (Seidel), U 959 (Weitz), U 278 (Franze), U 674 (Muss), U 990 (Nordheimer), U 354 (Sthamer), positions as in radio message 1125 of 11 March and radio message 1325 of 13 March."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

After the sudden dropping-out of U 959 (Weitz) they are now only 6 U-boats in the operational area to intercept enemy traffic. These, however, will be reinforced by two boats from Hammerfest and one moving up from Bergen.

(Signed): Peters.

15 March, 1944.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":)

U 307 AB 7932)

U 361 AB 8717)

U 278 AB 8746)

Group "Hammer":)

U 674 AB 8784)

U 990 AF 2122)

U 354 AF 2162)

depth of sweep 20 miles,
9-hourly movements to
northwest and southeast.

In port:

U 716 Alta,

U 312, 313 Hammerfest,

U 288, 315, 703, 956 Narvik,

U 360, 362, 636, 673, 711, 737, 739 Trondheim,

U 277, 355, 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 968 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.

U 959 proceeding from AB 8717 to Narvik.

1630

U 312, U 313 put out from Hammerfest for the operational area.

U-boat group Central:

U 365, 970 Bergen,

U 766, 821, 961, 973 Kristiansand (South),

U 276 Bergen - Trondheim,

U 736, 740 Kristiansand (South) - Stavanger,

U 342 Kiel - Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

Meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AA 9363 - Vaernes. Route 80% covered, Jan Mayen 90%. No enemy sighted. 2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 with radar set 200 to intercept enemy convoy traffic. Area exhaustively covered.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 1403 a surfaced submarine in AF 2133. Course north to northeast, high speed. Nationality not identified. Aircraft opened fire with all armament. Submarine dived. Later an oil patch was sighted. At 1420 a surfaced submarine in AF 3441, course 140°, medium speed. Nationality not identified. Aircraft fired recognition signals, anti-aircraft fire from submarine. No casualties. Submarine was not attacked by aircraft as submarine chasing is prohibited in area in question.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 1240 a Russian destroyer received an urgent radio message from Polyarno. At 1906 Lazar Point (AC 8816) was in radio communication with destroyers and M.T.B.s. Norwegian polar coast: normal radio traffic to submarines in the operational area, including a message at 0917 of first priority. Murmansk area: destroyer "J7". Britain: no units intercepted.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

The following radio message was sent after the air report of possible enemy submarines in our disposition:

2051 Radio message 2051/792:

To "Sthamer" and "Nordheimer" from Captain U-boats:

"Report "Yes" or "No", whether you were attacked by an aircraft at about 1400."

2129 Radio message 2115/15/793 from U 990 (Nordheimer):

"Aircraft (type not identified). It is possible that I was observed."

2220 Radio message 1417/794 received from U 959 (Weitz)

"In AB 2665 FW 200 attacked me did not return recognition signal and after guns were fired."

2319 Short signal 2308/797 received from U 354 (Sthamer)

"No".

2320 Short signal 2312/798 received from U 674 (Muss):

"Land aircraft at 1400, I was probably observed."

2342 Short signal received from U 990 (Nordheimer):

"No".

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b):-


The disposition of the boats off Jan Mayen as well as all changes in it were transmitted on Command Waves (German Air Force/Navy) I and II, so that all Flieger Fuehrers are informed. Our aircraft therefore, should not attack. Moreover, anti-submarine chasing is prohibited in the Westfjord area. Our U-boats behaved correctly. The matter of recognition signals was also correctly handled.

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The following teleprinter message was sent to all stations concerned:

"At 1403 on 15 March a German reconnaissance aircraft in O6E 4918 attacked a German U-boat. The U-boat disposition had been transmitted in radio message 1610 of 7 March. Boats surface in the daytime, especially after 1000 and 1400. Exact information of aircraft on operations is urgently requested. Another U-boat reported at 1417 in O6E 9832 recognition signal was not returned until after he had fired his guns. Aircraft attacks on U-boats should not occur in a prohibited area for anti-submarine operations. Radio message 0949 dated 15 March announced the U-boat was putting in to port. It should be remembered that in bad weather U-boats often cannot get the recognition signal on the bridge clear immediately. The matter has been discussed by telephone with Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters."

(Signed) Peters.




CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II.

Most Secret.

Sailing orders.

1. Sailing orders for U 288 (Meyer).
2. Sailing orders for U 354 (Sthamer).
3. Sailing orders for U 354 (Sthamer).



CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/1.

COPY.

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Emergency. Group North/Fleet.


Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret.

Sailing order for U 288 (Meyer).

1. Put out from Bergen on the evening of 1 March.
2. Proceed as far as 63° N, keeping 50 miles from the coast, in accordance with Order No. 13. Then to AC 47 at 12 knots.
3. Group "Boreas" with 6 boats at present in patrol line approximately along 27° 30' E. Request 11th U-boat Flotilla for information on composition and exact position of group. German aircraft BV 138, FW 200 and Ju 88 on meteorological and reconnaissance flights in the sea area.
4. U 957 (Schaar) on open water passage from Westfjord to Bergen, at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.
5. QP convoy expected shortly.
6. Operational Order No. 1. Radio Service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave.
7. Report by latitude short signal when passing 65° N and 70° N. From 65° N, U-boats Northern Waters wave.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret - 868 - A1.



CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/2.

COPY.

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. 13th U-boat Flotilla.
2. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.


Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret.

Sailing order for U 354 (Sthamer)

1. Put out from Trondheim on the afternoon of 2 March.
2. Proceed to AC 47 at 12 knots, at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.
3. Group "Boreas" with 6 boats at present in patrol line approximately along 27° 30' E. Request 13th U-boat Flotilla for information on composition and exact position of group. Our aircraft BV 138, FW 200 and Ju 88 on meteorological and reconnaissance flights in the sea area.
4. U 957 (Schaar) on open water passage from Westfjord to Bergen, at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.
5. QP convoy expected shortly.
6. Operational Order No. 1, U-boats Northern Waters wave.
7. Report by short signal on passing 70° N.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret - 874 - A1.



CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/3.

COPY.


Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 7 March, 1944.

Most Secret.

Sailing order for U 354 (Sthamer).

1. Put out from Narvik at 1200 on 8 March with U 362 (Franz).
2. Proceed to AF 22 via Westfjord.
3. Operational Order No. 1, U-boats Northern Waters wave.
4. Our forces: U 973 (Päpenmüller), U 307 (Herrle), U 361 (Seidel), U 959 (Weitz), U 278 (Franze), U 674 (Muss), U 990 (Nordheimer), U 288 (Meyer), U 366 (Langenberg) in attack areas, from AB 7654 to AF 2248, depth of sweep 20 miles.
U 315 (Zoller) returning to Westfjord from AF 13, will reach point VI about 1900 on 8 March.
Daily meteorological flights in the direction of Bear Island and Jan Mayen.

p.p. Reche.



CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX III.

COPY.

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 3 March, 1944.

Most Secret.


Transfer order for U 425 (Bentzien).

1. Put out from Narvik at 1700 on 4 March for Bergen.
2. Proceed through Westfjord and on at a distance of 50 miles from the coast via Frohavet (making for Trondheim). Report arrival at HA 1 in good time.
3. Try to transfer spare parts intended for Trondheim (except Ju condenser) to escort vessel under the protection of the coast. Escort vessel has been informed. (Transfer of Ju condenser intended at Bergen). If this is impossible because of weather conditions, put in to Trondheim for a short time. Ju condenser should then be handed over there.
4. After unloading spare parts put out via Grip-Hølen (via point GR 1). Then proceed on to Fejeosen at a distance of 50 miles from the coast. Report arrival at Hellisøy in good time.
5. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave after putting out from Narvik (cf Communications Order No 2 of Captain U-boats, Norway).
6. From 64° N proceed according to Order No. 13.

NOTE:

- 2 March. Submarine attack on steamer off Buholm (grid square AF 6488).

p.p. Eckermann.



CONFIDENTIAL.

APPENDIX IV.

Most Secret.

Short reports.

1. Short report from U 673 (Sauer), first operation.
2. Short report from U 990 (Nordheimer) first operation.
3. Short report from U 362 (Franz), first operation.
4. Short report from U 313 (Schweiger), first operation continued.
5. Short report from U 366 (Langenberg) first operation.
6. Short report from U 674 (Muss) first operation.
7. Short report from U 312 (Nikolay) first operation.
8. Short report from U 956 (Mohs) fourth operation continued.
9. Short report from U 425 (Bentzien) second operation.
10. Short report from U 739 (Mangold) second operation.
11. Short report from U 703 (Brünner) tenth operation.
12. Short report from U 716 (Dunkelberg) second operation.
13. Short report from U 737 (Brasack) fifth operation.
14. Short report from U 315 (Zoller) first operation.

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APPENDIX IV/1.

COPY.

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 5th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 673 (Sauer), first operation in Northern Waters and simultaneous testing of conning tower VI.

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| 15 February | Put out from Kiel with escort. |
| 17 February | Put in to Kristiansand. Put out from Kristiansand. |
| 18 February | Put in to Bergen. In dock. |
| 20 February | Put out from Bergen. Made for AB 7660. |
| 23 February | Made for new position AB 6750. Convoy sighted by German Air Force. |
| 24 February | Orders to operate on convoy in group "Hartmut". "Wanze" (radar), and forward 3.7 cm gun out of action through heavy seas. |
| 25 February | At 0400, 0750, and 0902 location, searching continuous note intercepted.
At 0902 alarm, at 0904 three aircraft bombs. Depth A-10, at short intervals a total of 15 bombs. Diesel mounting hatch leaking. |

CONFIDENTIAL.

At 0930 propeller noises. At 1330 depth charges well-placed. Boat between A + 60 and 2A + 20. Up to 6 tons of water. Bilge regulator empty. Air in main ballast tank 3. At 2145 greatly increasing Borkum location, "Aphrodite" (radar decoy) could not be started because of sea and wind. Alarm, 18 bombs. At 2152 continuous propeller noises. Depth charges. At first well-placed; then far off. Shipping large quantities of water.

26 February Surfaced in spite of depth charges. Driving snow, made off. Intercepted "Borkum" location. Alarm, no attack. Heavy series of depth charges in the vicinity. Surfaced and made off. Operation broken off. Diesel mounting hatch leaking, both 3.7 cm. guns out of action. "Wanze" (radar) out of action. Both Diesel couplings slipping, noises in electric motor, radio transmitter out of order. A total of about 35 bombs in diving positions. 300 depth charges, about 100 near.

27 February Put in to Narvik.

NOTE.

According to his oral report, the Commander believes that twice on 25 February he was in the immediate vicinity of the convoy without sighting it because of very poor visibility. But several hydrophone bearings were made out.

Experiences with conning tower VI.

Good until sea and wind 3-4. Anti-aircraft defense possible. From sea 6 (ahead) boat rolled continuously. With wind on the beam, heavy list. Depth keeping at periscope depth very difficult with sea more than 3. Boat thrown up with sea over 6 (ahead).

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret -
889 - A1.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX IV/2.

COPY.

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 990 (Nordheimer) first operation.

- 21 January Put out from Kiel. Proceeded to Bergen via Kristiansand (South). Put out from Bergen on 27 January. Operated at once against reported eastbound convoy. Proceeded northward at maximum speed.
- 30 January Group "Wiking".
- 31 January AC 5726 four destroyers. 2 approached. Fired T5 torpedo from bow, running time 13 minutes, 9 seconds. Violent explosion - probably sunk according to hydrophone observation (crackling and rumbling) at the place of explosion. Afterwards only 3 destroyers heard on hydrophones. Depth charges. In patrol line from 1 February, group "Werwolf". From 5 February operated on convoy reported by air reconnaissance. Damaged while in position in patrol line owing to high speed and heavy seas.
- 21 February Ordered to return. 23 February new attack area AB 8435. Subsequently with 16 cu.m. fuel, operated on convoy reported by air reconnaissance on 23 February.
- 24 February Again ordered to return. Set course so that it might still be possible to intercept convoy.

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25 February Carrier-borne aircraft in AB 8634, not observed. At 1536 in AB 8634 Ju 88 made an attack, boat opened fire with anti-aircraft guns, as aircraft did not give recognition signal.
At 2000 6 destroyer silhouettes. Rear of convoy. Fired T5 torpedo from bow, explosion after 2 minutes 16 seconds. Destroyer blew up. Then acted as shadower with beacon signals and shadower's signal buoys. Put out "Aphrodites" on several occasions. Intercepted by location after sending beacon signals and shadower's signal buoys, depth charges. Broke off operations on 26 February because of lack of fuel.

28 February Put in to Hammerfest.

Additional note by Captain U-boats:

A young Commander, who operated very skillfully as convoy shadower.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret -
860 - A1.

CONFIDENTIAL.

APPENDIX IV/3.

COPY.

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Clear as multiple address message.

Secret.

Short report from U 362 (Franz), first operation.

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| 6 February | Put out from Kiel. Proceeded to Bergen via Kristiansand (South). |
| 10 February | Put in to Bergen. |
| 14 February | Put out for AF 22. |
| 17 February | Attack area AB 8419. |
| 24 February | In patrol line group "Werwolf". Operated against convoy. Two destroyers in AB 8793, shadowed them, later lost contact. |
| 25 February | Two destroyers in AB 8543. Gunfire at 8,000 m., hunted, accurate firing. Failure from tube V, as bow-cap closed too soon. Depth charges for 3 hours. No damage. Ordered to return to Hammerfest because of inability to submerge. |
| 27 February | At 1600 clouds of smoke. Sighted destroyers, then convoy, in AC 4943. 5 destroyers, 3 steamers on southeasterly course. Was outlined against horizon and therefore drew fire of destroyers. At 1631 gunfire from 2 |

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destroyers at 8,000 m., one destroyer showed strong red flashing light. "Wanze" location 166 cm. At 1634 fired T5 torpedo from stern at nearest of 3 approaching destroyers, bearing 0, range 5,000 m. Alarm. 4 minutes 13 seconds after firing, torpedo explosion. No sinking noises heard because of our bilge mechanism and high speed. Not until several minutes later several deterrent depth charges and pursuit by one destroyer. Later two. Hydrophone bearing, determined depth charge attacks. Slight damage at 2x plus 20. Surfaced in snow squall, no contact. Pressed on until 2215. Returned because of limited ability to submerge, and strong underwater noises.

28 February Put in to Hammerfest.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret - 859 -A1.

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APPENDIX IV/4.

COPY.

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 313 (Schweiger),
first operation, continued.

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| 7 February | Put out from Hammerfest for AC 4680 - AC 4881 in patrol line. |
| 8 February | AC 5841 in patrol line. |
| 11 February | AC 6279 in patrol line. At 1853 location 120 - 160 cm., 2 seconds, clear note. |
| 14 February | At 0128 location in AB 7391, short clear note, at 1615 in attack area AB 7375. |
| 15 February | Location at 0105 in AB 7356, clear note 6 times per second. |
| 22 February | At 1100 in attack area AB 7328. |
| 23 February | Operated on reported convoy from 2237 to 2400 in AB 7352. |
| 24 February | At 1000 in attack area AB 7937. At 1525 advanced towards convoy. At 2305 location 1 - 5 seconds in AB 8829, clear note. Submerged to 40 meters, 6 straddling depth charges, no damage. Hydrophone and depth charge pursuit, three destroyers. Approximately 20 depth charges. |

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25 February Not clear for operations because of icing-up of anti-aircraft guns. At 0905 Catalina in AB 8916, easterly course. At 1146 in AB 892 carrier-borne aircraft, course south. At 2159 port Diesel out of action.

26 February Location at 0309.

27 February At 1711 in AC 5784 hydrophone pursuit by 6 destroyers. Depth charges far off.

28 February Put in to Hammerfest.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret - 929 -

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX IV/5.

COPY.

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).


Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret.

Short report from U 366 (Langenberg), first operation.

- 15 February Put out from Kiel to Bergen via Kristiansand.
- 18 February Put in to Bergen.
- 20 February Put out from Bergen for Trondheim, at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.
- 23 February Put in to Trondheim.
- 24 February Put out from Trondheim to operate on eastbound convoy.
- 26 February In AB 6885 shadowed convoy while surfaced. Fired T5 torpedo at 2 destroyers during alarm. Torpedo explosion, later only one destroyer heard in hydrophones, depth charges.
- 27 February In AC 4674 fired T5 torpedo at destroyer - torpedo failure caused by deep diving just before firing with open bow-cap. A + 30 m, depth charges.
- 28 February Broke off operations in AC 8182. Returned.
- 29 February Put in to Hammerfest.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret - 963 - A1.



APPENDIX IV/6.

COPY.

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).


Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret.

Short report from U 674 (Muss), first operation.

- | | |
|-----------------------|---|
| 10 February | Put out from Bergen.
Proceeded to patrol line. |
| 13 to 14
February | Patrol line AB 8881. |
| 14 February | Proceeded to attack area AB 8842, remained there till 16 February. |
| 16 February | Moved one position further northwest to AB 8817, remained there till 22 February. |
| 22 February | Proceeded to position AB 8732. |
| 22 to 23
February. | Proceeded to attack area AB 8846. |
| 23 to 24
February. | Patrol line AF 2276. |
| 24 February | Operated on PQ convoy. No contact. |
| 25 February | Aerial bombs, no damage. |
| 27 February | Depth charge pursuit, submerged to listen on hydrophones, no damage. |
| 28 February | Operations broken off, returned. |
| 29 February | Put in to Hammerfest. |

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret - 956 - A1.



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APPENDIX IV/7.

COPY.

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret.

Short report from U 312 (Nikolay), first operation (first and second parts).

- 23 January Put out from Bergen for AE 3255.
- 27 January to
2 February As weather boat in AE 32 and 35. No sightings, no locations.
- 4 February Put in to Narvik.
- 6 February Put out from Narvik via AC 5763 - AB 6255 - AB 7390 for attack area AB 7324.
- 24 to 28
February Operated on PQ convoy.
- 25 February At 0740 in AB 8653 submerged unnoticed by destroyers, at 1430 in AB 9418 submerged from destroyer, at 2100 infra-red location.
- 26 February At 0746 in AB 6865 location on 163 cm., 2 inaccurate bombs while diving, then inaccurate depth charges. At 2250 in AC 4479 starshells from destroyer, forced to submerge, inaccurate depth charges.

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27 February At 1035 in AC 4588 submerged, fired T5 torpedo from bow at destroyer, range 2,500 meters, submerged to position five. Explosion after 9 minutes 34 seconds, later 50 accurate depth charges. No further sightings until operations ended at 0600 on 28 February.

28 February Submerged four times because of Naxos locations, put in to Hammerfest.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret - 960 - A1.

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APPENDIX IV/8.

COPY.

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Red - Most Secret.

Short report from U 956 (Mohs) fourth operation, continued.

- 15 February Put out from Hammerfest. 29 February, put in to Hammerfest.
- 16 February In patrol line AB 8842.
- 22 February Moved attack area 20 miles on course 315°.
- 23 February Moved attack area 40 miles on course 317°.
- 24 February Patrol line AF 2525, operated against convoy reported by air reconnaissance.
- 25 February Patrol line AB 9466.
Operated on convoy after air reconnaissance report.
AB 9167 aircraft, crash dived.
At 2158 in AB 9167 two destroyers, contact lost in poor varying visibility.
- 26 February At 0006 surprised by light machine-gun fire from destroyer at 200 meters' range. At 0007 in AB 9167 fired torpedo at destroyer without director angle. Alarm, depth charges, explosion after 13 minutes, possible hit on destroyer behind. Range approximately 4,500 meters, bearing 15°, enemy speed 9 knots, hydrophone and depth charge pursuit.
Operated further according to air report.

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- 27 February At 1158 in AC 4936 alarm for carrier-borne aircraft. Withdrew from convoy on U 362's convoy report. Hauled ahead for night attack. At 2222 in AC 8271 - the place of meeting with the convoy according to dead reckoning - no contact. Searched between AC 8271 and AC 8572.
- 28 February Broke off operation at 0600, withdrew on course 325° to 29° E. Aircraft of unknown type in AC 8167. At 1530 set off on return voyage from AC 4928.
- 29 February Put in to Hammerfest.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret - 958 - A1.

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APPENDIX IV/9.

COPY.

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret.

Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), second operation.

- 6 February Put out from Hammerfest. Proceeded to AC 4580. Then to AC 8385 to join group "Werwolf" in patrol line from AC 1982 to 4658.
- 7 to 12 February Various patrol lines.
- 14 February New attack areas from AB 8842 to 7324. Group "Werwolf" moved several times until 23 February.
- 19 February Sank drifting mine by gunfire in AB 8494.
- 23 February Operated against convoy reported by air reconnaissance.
- 24 February German FW 200 attacked at 1011. Opened fire with anti-aircraft guns. Hits not observed, then exchanged recognition signals. At 1022 destroyer in AF 2162. At 1056 contact lost. Submerged several times because of British carrier-borne aircraft and flying boats. Boat operated further on convoy report.

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- 25 February At 1410 in AB 9428 ran into 3 destroyers in snow squall. Since one of our own U-boats was in the vicinity and range was only 100 meters, did not open fire. At 1415 lost contact in snow squall. At 2245 in AB 9156, at place of meeting with convoy according to dead reckoning, visibility at times below 30 meters, nothing sighted, nothing heard on hydrophones. Operated further on convoy report. Radio transmitter out of action, no further contact with the convoy until end of operation.
- 27 February In AC 4575 submerged several times because of carrier-borne aircraft as armament completely iced-up.
At 1210 propeller noises heard in boat. No depth charges - muffler valves leaking strongly.
At 1316 withdrew westward as anti-aircraft guns out of action and only 70 kg. air left. At 1600 pressed on to southeast.
- 28 February At 0400 in AC 5785, nothing sighted. Broke off operation at 0600.
- 29 February Returned to Hammerfest.

Captain U-boats. Norway. Most Secret - 964 - A1.

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APPENDIX IV/10.

COPY.

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 739 (Mangold), second operation.

21 February. Put out from Narvik. Put in to Narvik
5 March. Proceeded to AB 8510, 7392.

24 to 28
February Operated on PQ 30.

28 February
to 4 March Attack area AC 4388.

4 March QP convoy intercepted. Fired T5 torpedo
from stern at destroyer.
Probably sunk, very loud explosion heard
which was probably the magazine blowing up.

5 March 2300 1 destroyer aimlessly firing starshells
in AC 7233.
Put in to Narvik because unable to submerge.
Drifting mines in AC 4625 on 4 March.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret - 995 - A1.

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APPENDIX IV/11.

COPY.

Most Secret.

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Naval War Staff. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 703 (Brünnner), first operation.

- 1 March 1944 Put out from Trondheim.
- 8 March Put in to Narvik. Proceeded to attack area AC 4536.
- From 4 March At 0900 operated on QP convoy which was in AC 4359 at 0430.
1545 fired T5 torpedo from stern at escorting destroyer. Explosion after 3 minutes 10 seconds. Depth charges, no damage.
- 6 March In patrol line AB 8343.
- 6 March At 1700 drove off carrier-borne aircraft (Albacore) in AB 8798. 2 or 3 rockets missed. After bursts of fire from about 6 machine guns and 2 cannons 3 dead, 3 wounded.
Returned to Narvik as also very far behind convoy.
- 2 March Sank drifting mine by gunfire in AF 3714.
Additional note by Captain U-boats, Norway.
Breaking off operations on account of casualties among personnel not justified. 1 probable hit on destroyer.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret -
1043 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX IV/12.

COPY.

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division,
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).


Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 716 (Dunkelberg), second operation.

- | | |
|---------|---|
| 1 March | Put out from Hammerfest. 7 March put in to Narvik. Proceeded to attack area AC 4560, group "Taifun". |
| 4 March | Operated on QP convoy. At 0830 in AC 4539 drove off attack by carrier-borne aircraft (bi-plane). Rockets missed. Then depth charge and hydrophone pursuit by two destroyers with towed noise buoy. 200 depth charges. Damage. |
| 5 March | Ordered to return. |

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret - 1044 - A Ops.



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APPENDIX IV/13.

COPY.

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 737 (Brasack), fifth operation.

- 28 February Put out from Narvik. 8 March put in to Narvik.
- 28 - 29
February Proceeded to Hammerfest via Ramsund and Tromsø.
- 29 February Took on T5 torpedoes at Hammerfest.
- 1 March Put out from Hammerfest with U 716 (Dunkelberg) to patrol line AC 4596.
- 2 - 3 March Southernmost boat of group "Taifun" in attack area.
- 4 March Made for place of sinking of U 472 (von Forstner). Nothing seen apart from aircraft. Subsequently in group "Taifun" against QP convoy.
No contact on 4 March.
- 5 March Proceeded in reconnaissance line to attack QP convoy the following night. Again no contact.
- 6 March At 0735 attacked by carrier-borne aircraft (bi-plane), single-engined, fixed under-carriage with very quick-firing armament,

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possibly rockets. Two parallel streaks of flame from aircraft down to the water. At the very moment of attack boat was grinding muffler valves. Armament iced-up. No damage. Aircraft tried to guide nearby destroyers to the boat by firing illuminant rockets. At 1145 attacked by carrier-borne aircraft of the same type, which once again tried to guide destroyers to the spot by firing illuminant rockets and dropping smoke floats on to the water. Aircraft driven off after one hour by concentrated fire from all guns, then submerged. At 1745 attacked by very fast 4-engined flying boat with supporting floats (more slender and faster than a Sunderland) with gunfire and depth charges. In spite of very heavy anti-aircraft fire, the aircraft pressed home the attack at a height of 10 meters, and dropped 8 to 12 depth charges at not more than 10 meters from the port side. Explosions from the middle of the bow compartment as far as the electric motor. The whole boat was lifted 1 meter out of the water and then listed heavily to starboard. Explosion approximately 5 seconds after depth charges hit the surface of the water. (Depth setting approximately 15 - 20 meters). It is thought that the pressure hull resisted the attack because there was an almost uniform strain on the entire boat at the same time. The flying boat's outer starboard engine was set on fire. Almost the whole of the electric installation out of order (rudder, lights, emergency lighting), but was repaired within two minutes. Then second attack with aircraft machine guns. Many hits scored with concentrated anti-aircraft fire; outer port engine set on fire. Flying boat then gained altitude and made off. Flying boat's cockpit obviously strongly armored, crew extremely daring and obviously experienced in submarine warfare, probably from the Iceland passage. Before the attack at 0735 and 1745 scratching and rustling in "Naxos" and "Borkum" as experienced during snow showers, rain squalls or corpusant. No actual location. At 0735 the aircraft emerged from low cloud cover immediately over the boat, which it could only have done with the help of radar.

7 March Operation broken off because of depth charge damage.

8 March Put in to Narvik.

Additional note by Captain U-boats, Norway.

Commander and crew have acquitted themselves extremely well in driving off the attack and repairing damage.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret - 1042 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX IV/14.

COPY.

Most Secret.

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 315 (Zoller), first operation.

- 21 February Put out from Bergen. 8 March put in to Narvik.
- 22 February Proceeded to the operational area via AN 2332 - AF 8475.
- 23 February Acting on orders by radio message made for AB 6750 at maximum speed against the reported PQ convoy of 40 ships, 1 aircraft carrier and 15 destroyers.
- 24 February Joined group "Hartmut".
- 25 February Patrol line formed from AB 9275 to 9137. One Diesel failed, therefore not in position on time. Beacon signals received from shadower.
- 26 February Operated on faint hydrophone bearing, afterwards saw short flashes but did not gain contact. At dawn in AB 9325 destroyers and two aircraft submerged as one of them attacked. At 1240 in AB 9311 rockets fired by carrier-borne aircraft guns iced up, no damage. Operated further on air reconnaissance reports of convoy.
- 27 February No contact.

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- 28 February Single hydrophone bearing. Nothing seen in spite of pressing on. Operation broken off. New attack areas AC 4388 to 4928.
- 29 February to 3 March In patrol line.
- 4 March Operated on "Forstner"'s war distress signal. Nothing found. After abandoning search, operated on reported convoy with aircraft carrier.
- 5 March Forced away by flying boat. Patrol line from AF 1344 to 2468.
- 6 March At 0830 in AB 8294 and at 0952 in AB 8297 alarm for flying boat. Snap bearing on destroyer.
- 7 March Ordered to break off operations. Returned to port.

Captain U-boats Norway. Most Secret - 1076 - A Ops.

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CHART.

Operations against QP 26.

4 March 1944 - 7 March 1944.

(from left to right)

QP 26	= QP 26.
35 H-Schiffe	= 35 merchant ships.
1 Flugzeugträger	= 1 aircraft carrier.
20 Sich. Fahrzeuge	= 20 escort vessels.
Gruppe "Orkan"	= Group "Orkan".
Boote im Angriffsraum	= Boats in attack area.
AB 8267 - AB 8667	= Grid square AB 8267 - AB 8667.
vom 5.3. 18 ⁰⁰ - 6.3. 03 ⁰⁰	= From 1800 on 5 March to 0300 on 6 March.
Gruppe "Boreas" u. Gr. "Taifun"	= Group "Boreas" and group "Taifun".
Boote im Angriffsraum	= Boats in attack area.
AB 9451 - AB 5897	= AB 9451 - AB 5897.
vom 5.3. 18 ⁰⁰ - 6.3. 03 ⁰⁰	= From 1800 on 5 March to 0300 on 6 March.
Gruppe "Taifun".	= Group "Taifun"
Boote im Angriffsraum	= Boats in attack area.
AC 4536 - AC 4596	= AC 4536 - AC 4596
vom 1.3. 08 ⁰⁰ - 4.3. 08 ⁰⁰	= From 0800 on 1 March - 1800 on 4 March.
Gruppe "Boreas"	= Group "Boreas"
6 Boote im Angriffsraum	= 6 boats in attack area.
AC 4359 - AC 4955	= AC 4359 - AC 4955
vom 1.3. 08 ⁰⁰ - 4.3. 08 ⁰⁰	= From 0800 on 1 March to 0800 on 4 March.
Island	= Iceland.
Bäreninsel	= Bear Island
Nordkap	= North Cape.
Ost	= East.

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WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

16 - 31 MARCH, 1944

PG/31855

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16 March, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered, nothing to report. Special operation carried out.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance in the Jan Mayen area. Route 60%, Jan Mayen area 10%, covered, enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 in the sea area west of the Faeroes. Enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

The transfer of an ice-plane from Amderma to Moscow or Archangel is planned for April. Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines.

Murmansk area: minesweepers Nos. 62, 64. Britain: no units intercepted.

(c) By G.I.S. station: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 307 AB 7932) depth of sweep 20 miles
U 361 AB 8717) 9-hourly movements to
U 278 AB 8746) northwest and southeast.

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Group "Hammer":

U 674 AB 8784) depth of sweep 20 miles
U 990 AF 2122) 9-hourly movements to
U 354 AF 2162) northwest and southeast.

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 288, 315, 703, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 362, 636, 673, 711, 737, 739 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1600

U 968 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
U 959 put in to Narvik from AB 8717.
U 312)
U 313) proceeding from Hammerfest to AB 88.

U-boat group Central:

0645
1730

U 365, 970 Bergen,
U 766, 821, 961, 993 Kristiansand (South),
U 276 Bergen - Trondheim,
U 736, 740 Kristiansand (South) - Stavanger,
U 342 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel,
U 970 put out from Bergen for the Atlantic.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

6 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen. The formation is being increased to 9 boats again.

1437

Radio message 1437/703 from Captain U-boats:

"U 312 (Nikolay) to occupy attack area AB 7654.
U 313 (Schweiger) AB 7683, depth of sweep 20 miles, 9-hourly movements within the attack areas. At 2000 on 17 March be at northwestern limit, at 0500 on 18 March at southwestern limit, and so on. Join group "Thor" as boats Nos. 1 and 2. Obtain radio beacon fix once during daytime, otherwise remain submerged up to and including dusk. Order No. 8."

1441

Radio message 1441/116 from Captain U-boats:

"U 968 (Westphalen) to proceed from AF 58 at 10 knots to attack area AF 2248, depth of sweep 20 miles, otherwise according to radio message 1437/703 of 16 March. Join group "Hammer" as boat No. 4. Observe Operational Order No. 1 and Northern Waters Order No. 1."

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(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 959 (Weitz):

- "1. Put out from Narvik at 1200 on 17 March for Trondheim.
2. Proceed via Westfjord and onwards at a distance of 50 miles from the coast via point RA (approach to Ramsøyfjord). Proceed via Ramsund to take on torpedoes. Report sailing time by time short signal on wave "Anton".
3. Report 24 hours before reaching escort rendezvous.
4. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 288 (Meyer), see Appendix III/1.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

17 March, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Nothing to report, almost exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

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Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 on air reconnaissance of Scottish east coast, 2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance to intercept enemy convoy traffic in southeast Northern Waters.
Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Transfer of ice-plane from Amderma to Moscow and Archangel planned for April.
Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines.
Murmansk area: minesweeper No. 116.
Iokanka area: minesweepers Nos. 62, 64.
Britain: no units intercepted.
Russian radio traffic: moderate to slight.
Britain: very few Murmansk or Archangel broadcasts.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

- (a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 307 AB 7932)
U 361 AB 8717)
U 278 AB 8746) depth of sweep 20 miles
Group "Hammer":) 9-hourly movements to
northwest and southeast.

U 674 AB 8784)
U 990 AF 2122)
U 354 AF 2162)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 288, 315, 703, 956, 959 Narvik,
U 360, 362, 636, 673, 711, 737, 739 Trondheim,

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U 277, 355, 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 312 proceeding from Hammerfest to)
AB 7654) Group
U 313 proceeding from Hammerfest to) "Thor".
AB 7683)
U 968 proceeding from Bergen to AF 2248 -
Group "Hammer".
1200 U 959 put out from Narvik to Ramsund.

U-boat group Central:

1300 U 365 Bergen,
2100 U 766, 821, 961, 993 Kristiansand (South),
U 276 Trondheim,
U 736, 740 Stavanger,
U 342 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand (South),
U 821 put out from Kristiansand (South) to Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

6 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen from 2000 strength increased to 9 boats by U 312 (Nikolay), U 313 (Schweiger) and U 968 (Westphalen).

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 959 (Weitz), see Appendix III/2.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

18 March, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

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Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Area almost exhaustively covered, nothing to report. From 1018 to 1403, attack carried out on signal station recognized on Bear Island, 2 misses.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance from 0555 to 1215, route Vaernes - AN 2824-Orland. Route 60% covered, enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 from 0550 to 1357 in the sea area west of the Faeroes.

3 FW 200 from 0651 to 1235 on reconnaissance with radar set 200 to intercept enemy convoy traffic. 1 aircraft covered reconnaissance area exhaustively. 2 aircraft, radar gear out of order, exhaustive visual reconnaissance of area. Enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

2320 Radio message 2225/760 from U 307 (Herrle):

"Approached by aircraft intercepted by own radar."

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0755 in AF 5291 one enemy warship probably minelayer, about 400 G.R.T., course 180°, high speed.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

18 March. Shipping movements Gorlo Straits. Sosnovets light (AW 2850) to be switched off at 0500.

Norwegian polar coast: slight, at times urgent, radio traffic to submarines.

Murmansk area: destroyer "E", 1 probable M.T.B.

Britain: no units intercepted.

Lively exchange of radio messages between Murmansk and Archangel.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

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B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 312 AB 7654
U 313 AB 7683
U 307 AB 7932
U 361 AB 8717
U 278 AB 8746

Group "Hammer":

U 674 AB 8784
U 990 AF 2122
U 354 AF 2162
U 968 AF 2248

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 288, 315, 703, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 362, 636, 673, 711, 737, 739 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 959 proceeding from Narvik to Trondheim.

U-boat group Central:

U 276 Trondheim,
U 342, 365 Bergen,
U 766, 961, 993, Kristiansand (South),
U 736, 740 Kristiansand (South) - Stavanger,
1700 U 821 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand (South),
0800 U 765 put out from Kiel for Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

9 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen.
The boats received a provisional order for
PQ 31 which may be approaching soon.

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2239 Radio message 2239/761 sent plus the following:

"From Captain U-boats to groups "Thor" and "Hammer":

1. It is possible that a new PQ convoy will be approaching within the next few days. The successful attack on Russian supplies is of vital importance for the Eastern front.
2. Plans: to intercept the convoy and attack it on the first night in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 1. The patrol line is to be adjusted in accordance with air reconnaissance reports, and, if possible, brought closer together. At dawn on the following morning haul away from convoy to a distance required by the strength of its defenses, haul ahead, approach convoy again during late afternoon with the help of beacon signals from aircraft.
3. Daily air reconnaissance by FW 200 and Ju 88 at present. After the convoy's interception expect also BV 138 and He 111.
4. From 1000 on 19 March, 2-hourly very long wave calls at every even hour.
5. D/F wave "Bruno" to be used by aircraft and U-boats. As long as air shadowers are with the convoy, constant watch on the beacon waves is expressly ordered. Send immediate and current reports of bearings by short signal until ordered to stop by Command. Bearings and distance, as reported by shadower, to be repeated. Observe Northern Waters Order No.1.
6. Shadower's signal buoy No. 3 to be used.
7. Hold in readiness ordered short signals in current code. Report before attack.
8. At night when on the convoy, do not submerge in face of enemy location. Use "Aphrodite". Up to now no enemy aircraft have been encountered at night.
9. During the day enemy air cover consisted of carrier-borne aircraft, latest type flying boats and, near the coast, a few land planes. Where boats were able to bring their anti-aircraft defenses into action early, they have always successfully beaten off attacks by carrier-borne aircraft.
10. By day every effort should be made to forge ahead on the surface in order to reach a forward position.

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11. To prevent danger of being surprised, and while on the convoy, use own location gear.
12. Proceed with "Zaunkönig" torpedo at the ready. Allow destroyers to approach near enough before firing.
13. Take bearings from radio beacons with care.
14. Remember to send "flying weather" while near the convoy. Northern Waters Order No. 3.
15. Length of the operation will only be 3 or 4 nights. Therefore attack as soon as possible. The first night will offer the best opportunities.
16. Read all orders and make yourselves familiar with their contents. Flotillas, bases, and U-boats should be kept well informed."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes:

Nothing to report.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re IIa:-

The enemy air reconnaissance reported by U 307 (Herrle) points to preparations for the next PQ convoy. It is unfortunate that the boat was located while in position in the formation which may thus have been betrayed. The other boats were warned accordingly.

(Signed) Peters.

19 March, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 from 0552 to 1100 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Area exhaustively covered, nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 from 0638 to 1145 on shipping and harbor reconnaissance Kola coast to West Fairway. Exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 from 0453 to 1330 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes. Enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 from 0603 to 1250 on sea reconnaissance, Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. No convoy reconnaissance because of weather.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0737, in AC 8987, 1 patrol vessel, course 130°, low speed. At 0747 in AC 8989, 1 merchant ship of 1,500 G.R.T., course 130°, low speed. At 0750 in AW 2124 1 merchant ship of 1,500 G.R.T., course 130°, low speed. At 0815 in Iokanka harbor 2 merchant ships of 3 - 4,000 G.R.T. each, 1 merchant ship of 1,000 G.R.T. putting in to port. 6 to 8 harbor and fishing vessels. At 0820 in AW 2275, 1 patrol vessel, 1 fishing vessel, course 80°, low speed. At 0824 in AW 2267, 1 merchant ship of 1,500 - 2,000 G.R.T., course 210°, moderate speed.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Northern Waters: from 2339 on 18 March until 0204 on 19 March Lazar Point (AC 8816) in radio communication with 2 or 3 M.T.B.s. Invergordon broadcast code word "Rabbit" at 1230 and 1518.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Northern area.

Bearings from Hammerfest: At 1637 units "AB" on 235.2° and "AL" on 249°. At 1942 "AG" on 165.3° at 2012 "AZ" on 173°, approx., at 2042 "AX" in 263.5°.

Russian radio traffic: normal.

Britain: very few Murmansk and Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 312 AB 7654)
U 313 AB 7683)
U 307 AB 7932)
U 361 AB 8717)
U 278 AB 8746)

depth of sweep 20 miles,
9-hourly movements to
northwest and southeast.

Group "Hammer":

U 674 AB 8784)
U 990 AF 2122)
U 354 AF 2162)
U 968 AF 2248)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 288, 315, 703, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 362, 636, 673, 711, 737, 739 Trondheim,
U 277, 355, 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1210 U 959 proceeding from Narvik to Trondheim.
U 711 put out from Trondheim for Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

1615 U 276 Trondheim,
2355 U 342, 365 Bergen,
0800 U 766, 961, 993 Kristiansand (South),
U 736, 740 Stavanger,
U 821 put out from Bergen for the Atlantic,
U 765 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel,
U 473 put out from Kiel for Kristiansand (South),

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

9 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen.
In addition to U 307 (Herrle), who located
an aircraft which approached it on the
evening of 18 March, U 313 (Schweiger), the
boat one position further north reported
today in radio message 0001/767:

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"At 0055 "Wanze" location on 190 megacycles."
(= 158 cm.)

1442

As this may be a harmonic of our own U-boat sets, radio message 1407/782 was sent by Captain U-boats:

" "Schweiger"'s report possibly location of neighbor boat. In order not to betray the formation, do not use own radar while in attack areas. Cf. Order No. 7, para. 3 "Bruno"."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 711 (Lange):

- "1. Put out from Trondheim for Narvik early on 19 March.
2. Proceed at maximum speed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast. Report estimated time of arrival at V 1 24 hours in advance, also report passing by time short signal.
3. Radio service in accordance with Communications Order, Captain U-boats Norway."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

The 13th U-boat Flotilla reported on U-boat pens at Trondheim:

"Practical tests have shown that 3 boats can lie in the water berths. The bow of the center boat should reach as far as the forward edge of the conning tower of the two outside boats. Stern is protected by water-berth gate which can be closed. Use of dock gates practicable. From now on we can count on 9 berths in U-boat pens at Trondheim."

E. Survey of the situation: Re II (b) of 18 March:-

0916 Teleprinter message Most Secret 061 A1, received from Admiral North Coast:

"Re the sighting of an enemy M.T.B. or gunboat in AF 5291 (160 miles west of Mosjoen) on 18 March, 0755 by FW 200:

The vessel may possibly have been towing a special submarine for operations against our battle group in the Arctic area."

(Signed) Peters.

20 March, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 from 0510 to 1045 on armed meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Nothing to report, not exhaustive. At 0645 bombing attack on a radio station near Tunheim on Bear Island, radio installation probably put out of action.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 from 0443 to 1345 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area of the Faeroes. Enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 from 0550 to 1246 in the sea area of Jan Mayen, route 60%, Jan Mayen 80% covered, enemy not sighted.

2 Ju 88 from 0842 to 1636 on radar reconnaissance with set 200 to intercept convoy traffic, also 4 FW 200 from 0604 to 1842.

Routes:

Trondheim - AF 6786 - AB 4975 - 4912 - 6734 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AB 8663 - 7427 - 7157 - 9167 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AB 8995 - AA 9997 - 9931 - AB 8922 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AF 2537 - AE 3527 - AE 3554 - AF 2342 - Trondheim.

Reconnaissance areas exhaustively covered, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 1935 Hammerfest obtained a bearing in a westerly direction on a British unit.

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

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Pummanki area: probably guardship No. 21, minesweepers Nos. 33, 45, 4 probable Mo-boats. Britain: no units intercepted in Northern Waters.

At 1935 on 19 March Hammerfest obtained a bearing of 265° on British unit "AF" in radio traffic with Cleethorpes.

Britain: very few Murmansk or Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 312 AB 7654)	
U 313 AB 7683)	
U 307 AB 7932)	
U 362 AB 8717)	
U 278 AB 8746)	depth of sweep 20 miles,
)	9-hourly movements to

<u>Group "Hammer":</u>)	northeast and southwest.
)	

U 674 AB 8784)
U 990 AF 2122)
U 354 AF 2162)
U 968 AF 2248)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
 U 288, 315, 703, 956 Narvik,
 U 360, 362, 636, 673, 737, 739 Trondheim,
 U 277, 355, 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1430	U 959 put in to Trondheim from Narvik.
2100	U 355)
	U 277) put out from Bergen for Narvik.
	U 711 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

	U 276 Trondheim,
	U 342, 365 Bergen,
	U 736, 740 Stavanger,
	U 765, 766, 961, 993 Kristiansand (South),
1920	U 765 put out from Kristiansand (South) to Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

9 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 277 (Lübsen):

- "1. Put out from Bergen on the evening of 20 March for Narvik.
2. Proceed at a distance of 50 miles from coast as far as 64° N. in accordance with Order C-in-C U-boats, No. 13, then at maximum speed.
3. Report estimated time of arrival at V1 24 hours in advance, also report passing by time short signal.
4. Radio service in accordance with Communications Order Captain U-boats Norway."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

21 March, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 from 0501 to 1124 on meteorological reconnaissance, route, Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak, not exhaustive, nothing to report. At 0715 bombing attack on radio station at Tunheim on Bear Island: not successful.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 from 0600 to 1232 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes Route 50%, Jan Mayen 40%, covered, enemy not sighted.

2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 from 0712 to 1651 on reconnaissance to intercept enemy convoy traffic. Routes: Trondheim - AF 2537 - AE 3438 - 3161 - AF 2345 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AB 8975 - AB 7797 - 7732 - 8922 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AF 2795 - AE 3891 - 3598 - AF 2579 - Trondheim.

Reconnaissance areas exhaustively covered, enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 from 0501 to 1327 in the Faeroes sea area. Enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines, "51" named in the evening.

Britain: no enemy units intercepted.

Britain: very few Murmansk or Archangel broadcasts.

At 1907 and 2236 on 20 March Spitsbergen in procedure message traffic with Murmansk on 71.91 m. At 0215 on 20 March Murmansk transmitted on the same wave one operational radio message to Whitehall (probably connected with approach of convoy).

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 312 AB 7654
U 313 AB 7683
U 307 AB 7932
U 362 AB 8717
U 278 AB 8746

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Group "Hammer":

U 674 AB 8784
U 990 AF 2122
U 354 AF 2162
U 968 AF 2248

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 288, 315, 703, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 362, 636, 673, 737, 739, 959 Trondheim,
U 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1600 U 277, 355 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
U 711 put in to Narvik from Trondheim.

U-boat group Central:

U 276 Trondheim,
U 342, 365 Bergen,
U 736, 740 Stavanger,
U 766, 961, 993 Kristiansand (South),
1200 U 765 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand (South),
1045 U 473 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel,
1910 U 473 put out from Kristiansand (South) for
Bergen,
1910 U 766 put out from Kristiansand (South) for
Bergen,
0800 U 385 put out from Kiel for Kristiansand (South).

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

9 boats in formation east of Bear Island.

2150 Radio message 2120/743 received from U 307
(Herrle):

"Submarine, which did not respond to recognition signal, submerged after warning salvo from machine gun."

0058 In order to withdraw our own boats from a possible enemy submarine, radio message 2306/1/745 was sent: "At 2330 move attack areas 50 miles on course 50°, speed 10 knots."

0019 Radio message 2319/1/746 sent:

"New disposition for groups "Thor" and "Hammer" on 22 March, from AB 8174 to AB 8897. Nine-hourly movements to northwest and southeast within the attack areas, commencing at 0600 from the southeastern limit."

(e) Special operations by single boats: None.

- V. Reports of successes: None.
- C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.
- D. (a) Organizational:

0845 Teleprinter message received from Admiral
Commanding U-boats:

"The transfer on 1 March of U 968 from the 5th U-boat Flotilla to the 3rd U-boat Flotilla has been canceled. U 968 has been allocated to the 13th U-boat Flotilla as from 1 March."

(b) Plans:

Teleprinter message sent to Luftflotte 5 and the Flieger Fuehrers on the question of U-boat - Air Force cooperation during convoy operations:-

- I. Reconnaissance and shadowing of QP convoys will have to be abandoned in favor of concentrated attacks on PQ convoys.
- II. Reconnaissance and shadowing of PQ convoys, observing the following rules, is requested:
1. X-day is the day on which the boats will surface at nightfall in order to carry out a concentrated attack during the night.
X-1 day is the day preceding X day, and X+1 day is the day following X day, etc.
 2. Surfacing time for U-boats on X day is to be announced as early as possible. This will be zero hour, on which the entire time schedule of the operation must be based.
 3. Continuous air shadowing of convoy on X-2 and X-1 days is to take place as usual, with the express purpose of obtaining an exact convoy position on the evening of X-1 day, so that final adjustments in the U-boat patrol line can take place during the night.
 4. Shadowing on X day must be concentrated around zero hour (the time of surfacing of the U-boats), starting approximately 4 hours beforehand and continuing to 4 hours after zero hour. It would be desirable, if the strength of our forces permits, to maintain contact throughout the whole night. Beacon signals from the air shadower will commence 30 minutes before zero hour and continue until air shadowing ceases.

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5. If air-shadowing during day-time means overstraining our forces it may be dispensed with on X+1 and the following days, since the U-boats will at those times be hauling ahead away from the convoy. On the other hand it will be necessary to maintain contact and send beacon signals on the evening of X+1 day and the following days from 4 hours before twilight ends until 4 hours afterwards so as to guide the boats back to the convoy. Uninterrupted shadowing and transmission of beacon signals during the night would be desirable.

III. With reference to a discussion between Air Liaison officer of Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway at Luftflotte 5, it should be noted that reconnaissance of the Iceland - Jan Mayen area is considered as important as ever since we do not know whether the next PQ convoy will put out from a north Scottish port or from Reykjavik. A proposal for PQ reconnaissance which in our opinion would cover the area north of Iceland even better, is being sent separately."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b): In the course of his regular movements within his attack area U 307 (Herrle) must have been in the same grid square AB 7936 as on 18 March, the day when he was approached by an aircraft. A connection is possible. It may have been an enemy submarine, intended to intercept and attack our formation in preparation for the next PQ convoy. The radio traffic between Murmansk, Spitsbergen and Britain may also indicate preparations.

(Signed) Peters.

22 March, 1944

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

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1 Ju 88 from 0456 to 1205 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 75° N, 5° E - Banak.

Reconnaissance area almost exhaustively covered, nothing to report.

4 BF 109 from 0714 to 1647 on shipping reconnaissance Motovski Bay and reconnaissance of Russian Straits.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 from 0610 to 1300 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. Route and Jan Mayen area 40% covered, enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 from 0725 to 0752 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes. Broken off. Enemy not sighted in area covered.

2 FW 200 from 0653 to 1716 and 1 Ju 88 from 0752 to 1403 on reconnaissance with radar set 200 to intercept enemy convoy traffic. Reconnaissance areas exhaustively covered by radar, enemy not sighted.

Routes: Trondheim-AF 2529 - AE 3438 - 3164 - AF 2345 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AB 8976 - 7797 - 7732 - 8922 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AF 2796 - AE 3892 - 3598 - AF 2812 - Trondheim.

2 Ju 88 from 1845 to 2137 on reconnaissance of Scottish east coast.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0723 in Motka Bay 1 freighter 3-5,000 G.R.T., 1 freighter 1-2,000 G.R.T., hove to. In Eina Bay 1 freighter 3-5,000 G.R.T., hove to. In Motovski Bay no shipping traffic observed.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: 1 ice-breaker.

Britain: no units appeared. Lively radio exchanges between Archangel and Murmansk.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

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B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 312 AB 8174)
U 313 AB 8413)
U 307 AB 8425)
U 362 AB 8467)
U 278 AB 8496) 9-hourly northwest and
southeast movements.

Group "Hammer":

U 674 AB 8815)
U 990 AB 8843)
U 354 AB 8882)
U 968 AB 8897)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 288, 315, 703, 711, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 362, 636, 673, 737, 739, 959 Trondheim,
U 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 277, 355 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
U 711 put out from Narvik for AB 8970.

2200

U-boat group Central:

U 342, 365, 765 Bergen,
U 736, 740, Stavanger,
U 961, 993 Kristiansand (South),
1330 U 473, 766 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand
(South),
U 385 proceeding to Kristiansand (South) from
Kiel,
0910 U 276 put out from Trondheim for a special
operation.

IV. Current U-boat Operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy
traffic:

9 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen.
In connection with the submarine sighting of

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1038

21 March,
radio message 0955/1/195/751 was sent:
"At approximately 2100 on 21 March U 307 (Herrle sighted an apparently enemy submarine in AB 7936. Connection with next PQ convoy possible. Groups "Thor" and "Hämmer" to preserve radio silence except for reports on the enemy. Aircraft to report only in case of carrier-borne aircraft."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 711 (Lange):

1. Put out from Narvik at 2200 on 22 March.
2. Proceed at 14 knots via Westfjord to AB 8970.
3. Operational Order No. 15, U-boats Northern Waters wave.
4. Own forces: U-boats in attack areas, depth of sweep 20 miles, from AB 8174 to AB 8897. Group "Thor": U 312 (Nikolay), U 313 (Schweiger), U 307 (Herrle), U 361 (Seidel) and U 278 (Franze); Group "Hammer": U 674 (Muss), U 990 (Nordheimer), U 354 (Sthamer) and U 968 (Westphalen). Nine-hourly movements to northwest and southeast within the attack areas, at 2600 on 22 March in the southeast, at 0900 on 23 March in the northwest, etc. Radio silence except for reports on the enemy, aircraft to report only in case of carrier-borne aircraft. Surface only during darkness while in attack area, by day only once for radio beacon-fix."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re I:-

The air reconnaissance carried out daily by Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters with 2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 against the expected convoy overlaps the U-boat formation and lies obliquely across the suspected convoy route. A series of aircraft routes at right angles to the convoy route and in front of the U-boat formation would cover evenly the whole width of the reconnaissance area between Norway, Iceland and Jan Mayen and at the

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same time would go rather farther south. A proposal to this effect has been submitted to Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters and Luftflotte 5.

Re IV (b):-

It is known from experience that the appearance of enemy submarines is a sign of the approach of a convoy. At the same time, unsettled weather conditions have been forecast which makes the running of PQ 31 even more likely. The boats at readiness in Narvik should therefore now put to sea to reinforce the U-boat formation.

(Signed) Peters.

23 March, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 from 0915 to 1432 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Nothing to report. Area exhaustively covered.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

3 BV 138 from 1223 to 2239 on radar reconnaissance against PQ convoy instead of Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters.

Routes: Tromsø - AB 8899 - 7513 - 7546 - AF 2237 - Tromsø.

Tromsø - AF 2255 - AB 7812 - 7871 - AF 2512 - Tromsø.

Tromsø - AF 2541 - 1244 - 1511 - 2492 - Tromsø.

1 BV 138 broke off operation at 1656 in AF 1241. No report of enemy sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 from 0456 to 1345 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes.

1 Ju 88 from 1213 to 1815 on sea reconnaissance, route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. Area exhaustively covered, enemy not sighted. Late start on account of weather.

In reply to the proposal for a suitable alteration in the convoy reconnaissance, a teleprinter message was received from Luftflotte 5:

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"In accordance with your wishes, the reconnaissance area will be altered as far as possible. However, the proposed operation of 4 aircraft daily or 3 FW 200 cannot be put into practice.

In order to cover a complete daily run of convoys coming from Iceland and yet use no more than 2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 it was therefore necessary to alter the course of the suggested flying routes at the northwestern end of the reconnaissance area."

II. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

At 0910 on 22 March a probable ice-breaker, the "Deshnev" lay 22 miles southeast of Terski Orlov (AW 2934).

North Sea: 18 Group; forenoon very lively flying activity (35 planes); reconnaissance area not made out. In the afternoon considerable reconnaissance (11 planes) in the Shetlands/Iceland area.

British unit located at 1711 in AN 2825.

23 March shipping movements in the Gorlo Straits Terski Orlov light AW 2678 switched on from 0300 to 0500.

From radio traffic at sea: Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area, submarine "S 51" named.

Murmansk area: 3 M.T.B.s (5316, 5317, 5318).

Britain: no units intercepted.

British radio traffic: a few Archangel and Murmansk broadcasts.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Noethern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 312 AB 8174)
U 313 AB 8413) 9-hourly movements to
U 307 AB 8452) northwest and southeast.
U 362 AB 8467)
U 278 AB 8496)

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Group "Hammer":

U 674 AB 8815)
U 990 AB 8843) 9-hourly movements to
U 354 AB 8882) northwest and southeast.
U 968 AB 8897)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 288, 315, 703, 956 Narvik,
U 360, 362, 636, 673, 737, 739, 959 Trondheim,
U 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1630 U 277, 355, put in to Narvik from Bergen.

Group "Blitz":

1600 U 711 proceeding from Narvik to AB 8970,
1600 U 288 put out from Narvik for AB 8830,
1600 U 315 put out from Narvik for AB 8940,
1600 U 956 put out from Narvik for AB 8970.

U-boat group Central:

U 342, 365, 473, 765, 766 Bergen,
U 736, 740 Stavanger,
U 385, 961, 993 Kristiansand (South),
U 276 on special operation,
0050 U 385 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel,
0800 U 974 put out from Kiel for Kristiansand (South),
0800 U 955 put out from Kiel for Kristiansand (South),
1615 U 766 put out from Bergen (Atlantic),
1700 U 961 put out from Kristiansand (South) for
Bergen,
1700 U 993 put out from Kristiansand (South) for
Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

9 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen.
The formation is to be strengthened by U
711 which is to extend it to the northwest.

1159 Radio message 1049:

"U 711 (Lange) will occupy attack area
AB 8897 at 2000 on 23 March, depth of sweep
20 miles.
Groups "Thor", "Hammer": at 1900 proceed to
attack areas from AB 7365 to 8859, depth of
sweep 20 miles. Movements as previously,
starting at 2200 at the southeastern limit
of new attack areas."

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(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1. Transfer order for U 673 (Sauer):

- "1. Put out from Trondheim for Narvik on 24 March.
2. Proceed at maximum speed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.
3. Report estimated time of arrival at V1 24 hours in advance; report passing of approach point by time short signal.
4. Radio frequency according to Communications Order, Captain U-boats, Norway."

2. Sailing orders for U 288 (Meyer), U 315 (Zoller) and U 956 (Mohs), see Appendix IV/1.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

The Battle Group has reported "Huascarán" free on 1 April.

It is intended to transfer the auxiliary warship "Huascarán" to Bogen Bay instead of to Hammerfest as originally planned, for the following reasons:-

1. To reduce the number of ships in Hammerfest harbor because of increasing danger of air attack (cf. air raid on Hammerfest on 14 February).
2. As much decentralization as possible of valuable U-boat base ships.
3. It must be expected that from time to time more U-boats will use Hammerfest harbor as a result of the increase of Northern Waters boats. In this way and with the help of the floating dock the U-boat repair capacity in the Narvik area will be correspondingly increased.

Transfer order for auxiliary warship "Huascarán":

- "1. Put out from Kaafjord for Narvik on 1 April.
2. Proceed via inner leads with district pilot, as far as Tromsø with escort from Admiral Polar Coast.
3. Pilot and escort have been requested from Admiral Polar Coast in Battle Group Most

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Secret 595/44 A1, of 21 March. Obtain confirmation.

4. Radio frequency "Paula."

D. Plans:

On the subject of attacks on convoys during the period of continuous daylight in Northern Waters, a teleprinter message was sent to Group North/Fleet Naval War Staff, 1st Division and Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops:

- "1. From 30 April to 15 August there is continuous daylight in Northern Waters. U-boat warfare must adapt itself to the prevailing conditions, and tactics must be altered accordingly.
2. There are two possible methods of operating against convoys during the light period:
 - (a) Attack from a stationary, deeply staggered, submerged formation, which presupposes that the actual enemy routes have been intercepted and are covered by the boats.
 - (b) Independent surface operations of the U-boats in the convoy sea area, advancing to attack positions at a distance from the convoy, using their anti-aircraft defenses, and, in this case, making torpedo attacks from submerged positions.
3. Re 2 (a). A successful attack from a stationary submerged formation requires a relatively large number of boats to cover the sea area in question as well as an exact knowledge of the enemy's route of advance. Radical changes in a submerged disposition are not possible. To consider the matter in detail:
 - (a) Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway has at his disposal 27 boats and 1 experimental boat, of which about 15 at a time can be at operational readiness in case of the approach of a convoy. This number is too small for a successful attack based on these tactics. We are not in a position to say whether, and if so how many, new boats could or should still be allocated to the Northern area.

- (b) Moreover, even with adequate air reconnaissance it will still be difficult, particularly during the months of June to August when the ice limit recedes very far north, to determine the convoy route in advance with sufficient accuracy. Convoys may well haul off far to the north, or considerable and unpredictable alterations in course may take place so that the U-boat position may be easily by-passed.
4. Re 2 (b). Free-lance operations by the boats on the surface to reach positions ahead of the convoy, and subsequent attacks from submerged positions have the advantage of mobility and adaptability to sudden changes in the situation. But they do presuppose adequate means of defense against carrier-borne aircraft, flying boats and land planes.
 5. Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway prefers the tactics described in para. 4, provided it will be possible to change the armament of all Northern Waters boats to 3.7 cm. guns by the end of April. This preference is supported by the fact that, as compared with the Atlantic, the enemy's air forces have, up to now, been rather weak, especially as regards heavy land planes and flying boats, so that it may be assumed that after a change of armament, the U-boats will be able to ward off attacks from the air. U 737 (Brasack)'s experience on the other hand has shown that 2 cm. guns, even when firing is highly concentrated and at close range, cannot prevail against armored planes (Sunderlands etc.) and the boats would be greatly endangered if attacked.
 6. Of the 28 boats in the Northern area six, including U 673 (Sauer), are equipped with 3.7 cm. guns, so that there are still 22 boats which will have to be re-equipped as quickly as possible.
 7. If these suggestions are approved, it is requested:-
 - (a) To dispatch immediately by special vessel six 3.7 cm. guns to both Bergen and Trondheim, and 16 to Narvik. The necessary reserves are included in these figures.
 - (b) To detail one petty officer each from the anti-aircraft school as instructors for Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik.
 8. An early decision is requested."

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E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b):-

The three boats putting out from Narvik are to form a new group which will reinforce the present disposition in such a way that a patrol line of equal extent (180 miles) will be formed, but with the boats only 15 miles apart. The patrol line will thus consist of 13 boats.

(Signed) Peters.

24 March, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 from 0500 to 1049 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Area exhaustively covered. Bomb attack on radio station at Tunheim, unsuccessful.

2 BF 109 from 0525 to 0606 on shipping reconnaissance Motovski Bay, no shipping movements observed.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 He 111 from 0540 to 1254 on meteorological reconnaissance, in the Jan Mayen area. Route 90% covered, enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 from 0652 to 1528 on meteorological reconnaissance in the Faeroes sea area. Enemy not sighted.

2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 from 0645 to 1631 on reconnaissance with radar set 200 to intercept enemy convoy traffic. Reconnaissance areas exhaustively covered, no report of enemy sighted. Routes: Trondheim - AF 2538 - AE 3437 - 3164 - AF 2344 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AB 8972 - 7792 - 7731 - 8933 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AF 2795 - AE 3891 - 3597 - AF 2579 - Trondheim.

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II. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very slight radio traffic to submarines.

Murmansk area: destroyer "E" (probably proceeding east), minesweeper No. 111.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: destroyer "J", ice-breaker "Deshnev".

Britain: no units intercepted. No Murmansk or Archangel broadcasts. 23 March, Russian destroyer "J", at sea according to radio traffic, received a radio message from Archangel at 1955.

23 March, Russian destroyer "E", at sea according to radio traffic, received a radio message at 2030 from Polyarno which was acting as radio link for Archangel.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

- (a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 312 AB 7365

U 313 AB 8174

U 307 AB 8413

U 362 AB 8452

U 278 AB 8467

Group "Hammer":

U 674 AB 8496

U 990 AB 8815

U 354 AB 8843

U 968 AB 8882

Group "Blitz":

U 711 AB 8897

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In port:

U 716 Alt.,
U 277, 355, 703 Narvik,
U 360, 362, 636, 673, 737, 739, 959 Trondheim,
U 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 288 proceeding from Narvik to AB 8830)
U 315 proceeding from Narvik to AB 8940) group
U 956 proceeding from Narvik to AB 8970) "Blitz".
U 673 put out from Trondheim for Narvik.

1330

U-boat group Central:

U 342, 365, 473, 765 Bergen,
U 736, 740 Stavanger,
U 385 Kristiansand (South),
U 955, 974 proceeding from Kiel to Kristiansand
(South),
U 276 on special operation,
U 961)
U 993) put in to Bergen from Kristiansand (South).

1200

1200

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen. This disposition will be formed into a closely spaced patrol line by the arrival of the three boats from Narvik:

Radio message 1031/768 sent by Captain (U-boats):

"1. U 288 (Meyer), U 315 (Zoller), U 711 (Lange), U 956 (Mohs) to form group "Blitz" in that order from north to south.

2. Groups "Thor", "Hammer", "Blitz" to be in position in patrol line from AB 7365 to AB 8897 at 2200 on 24 March. Distances between boats 15 miles. Procedure according to Commanders' Handbook Para. 370 and following See Order No. 8. Surfacing only during hours of darkness, by day only once for radio beacon fix."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing orders for U 277 (Lübsen) and U 355 (La Baume), see Appendix IV/2.

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1040

Radio message 0732/25 received from U 276 (Borchers):

"Approached by 2 FW 200 in spite of warning shots and recognition signals. No further aircraft. Yesterday at 1729 periscope in grid square 5699."

Thereupon a teleprinter message was sent to Group North/Fleet, Naval Chief Command, Norway, and for information Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops:

"The report from U 276 (Borchers) of 0730 on 24 March concerning an attack by 2 FW 200 and of a periscope in AF 5699 gives rise to the following comments:

- (a) Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway has up to now no knowledge of the operational order for U 276's special operation. Information on all U-boat movements in the Norway area is absolutely essential for the guidance of Northern Waters boats, and, if need be, for the prohibition of anti-submarine operations in the central sector of Northern Waters.
- (b) The information given to air and coastal defenses is apparently not sufficient. Responsibility for this cannot be accepted here."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

0017 The Battle Group sent teleprinter message Most Secret 603/44:

"Fuel oil quota for April 1944:

(a) Fuel oil:

1. "Tirpitz": Four periods of 3 sea days for individual exercises, 2,100 cu.m. About 20 days on large auxiliary drive, 400 cu.m.
2. Destroyers: 2 escort destroyers each for each sea day of the "Tirpitz", 1,440 cu.m. Own exercises and auxiliary drive 750 cu.m.

(b) Heavy Diesel oil:

1. "Tirpitz" 60 cu.m.
2. Destroyers 125 cu.m."

1310

Teleprinter message "Tirpitz" Most Secret 248, Emergency Admiral Polar Coast, Emergency Sea Commandant Hammerfest, harbor-master Alta, Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway, received:

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"The "Tirpitz" intends to carry out gunnery tests in Kaafjord inside the boom from 25 to 28 March. From 29 to 31 March direction finder calibration scheduled off Bossekop: escort for direction finder calibration ship by one anti-submarine vessel at the boom in Kaafjord has been arranged.

A second anti-submarine vessel is desirable, as well as increased patrol of Altafjord. The "Tirpitz" will be at anchor from 29 March until the evening of 31 March inside the boom in Kaafjord. From 31 March inside net enclosure."

2125 Radio message 2020/39 received from the "Tirpitz":

"From 0700 on 25 March until 31 March off Auskarneset (Altafjord) inside outer boom, from 29 to 31 March outside the boom at anchor for tuning and D/F calibration.

Teleprinter liaison as at present through teleprinter station Alta; Radio service, see radio message 1455/0/28."

D. Plans:

Teleprinter message from Supreme Command of the Navy, Naval War Staff, Chief of Naval Meteorological Service 6:

"Since the meteorological transmitters are no longer serviceable, Inspector Kuckuck is to dispatch them to Berlin. The Inspector himself should proceed to Berlin immediately afterwards."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (d):-

U 276 (Borchers) was assigned to Naval Chief Command, Norway for special duty against enemy submarines in the coastal area. All we know about this so far is that it was thought best to operate the boat through the 11th and 13th U-boat Flotillas, but no details have been received as to operational areas and movements.

Re D:-

The meteorological transmitters, which have been ready in Narvik for some time could not be taken out, as during this period all U-boats at operational readiness had to operate continuously against convoy traffic. The built-in batteries have therefore run down to a considerable extent, and the instruments are to be replaced by new and possibly better ones.

(Signed) Peters.

25 March, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 from 0506 to 1056 on armed meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Nothing to report, almost exhaustively covered. Bombing attack on radio station at Tunheim, Bear Island, unsuccessful. 2 BF 109 from 0425 to 0521 on shipping reconnaissance Motovski Bay.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 from 0458 to 1301 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area east of the Faeroes. 1 He 111 from 0530 to 1354 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AB 7597 - Sola. Broken off because of technical trouble. Diverted to Sola because of weather. Enemy not sighted. 2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 from 0645 to 1601 on sea reconnaissance with radar set 200 to intercept enemy convoy traffic to Russian Arctic ports. Reconnaissance areas exhaustively covered. Enemy not sighted.

Routes: Trondheim - AF 2813 - AB 7893 - AA 9981 - 9688 - AF 7677.

Trondheim - AF 5122 - 1437 - AE 2637 - 1244 - 2766 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AF 4625 - AE 3962 - 1471 - AF 4369 - Trondheim.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: destroyer "E".

Russian radio traffic: moderate to slight.

British radio traffic: 1 Murmansk broadcast, no Archangel broadcasts.

Archangel/Murmansk line (very short wave) very lively traffic.

Murmansk transmitted 1 operational radio message to Whitehall.

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(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 312)
U 313)
U 307)
U 362)
U 278)

Group "Hammer":

U 674) in patrol line from
U 990) AB 7365 to AB 8897.
U 354)
U 968)

Group "Blitz":

U 288)
U 315)
U 711)
U 956)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 703 Narvik,
U 360, 362, 636, 737, 739, 959 Trondheim,
U 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 673 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.

0000 U 277 put out from Narvik for AB 8510.
0000 U 355 put out from Narvik for AB 8550.

U-boat group Central:

U 342, 365, 473, 765, 961, 993 Bergen,
U 736, 740 Stavanger,
U 385 Kristiansand (South),
U 955, 974 from Kiel to Kristiansand (South),
U 276 on special operation,
1745 U 961 put out from Bergen for the Atlantic,

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1745 U 993 put out from Bergen for the Atlantic,
0800 U 740 put out from Stavanger for Bergen,
1600 U 740 put in to Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

13 boats in patrol line east of Jan Mayen.
2 boats en route.

1204 Radio message 1043/776 from Captain U-boats:

- "1. U 277 (Lübsen) and U 355 (La Baume) are making for AB 8850.
- "2. "Nikolay" to advance on course 320° to report the ice limit by short signal, last three grid square digits."

As there are, for the moment, no definite indications of the approach of a convoy, there is no reason why the U-boat disposition should not be expanded again into attack areas 20 miles apart. The new disposition should, if possible, adjoin the ice limit, about which there has been no exact information for quite some time. Moreover, the air reconnaissance for intercepting PQ convoys does not extend to the ice limit, but only as far as Jan Mayen. The boats with very little heavy Diesel oil are to be withdrawn.

1230 Radio message 1139/777 from Captain U-boats:

- "1. 0000 on 26 March "Herrle", "Seidel", "Nordheimer" to return Andfjord - Harstad - Narvik at high speed.
- "2. Remaining boats to start at the same time for attack areas from AB 4948 to AB 8858 at increased speed, depth of sweep 20 miles. Order, Group "Thor": "Nikolay", "Schweiger", "Franze", "Muss". Group "Hammer": "Sthamer", "Westphalen", "Meyer", "Zoller". Group "Blitz": "Lange", "Mohs", "Lübsen", "La Baume"."

2128 Radio message 2041/782 from Captain U-boats:

"Groups "Thor", "Hammer" and "Blitz":
In new attack areas surface only during darkness and once during the day for radio beacon fix. Nine-hourly movements, with irregular courses, starting at 0600 on 26 March at the southeastern limit of the attack areas, reaching the north-western limit at 1500, etc. Report ice hindrance by short signal on wave "Anton", otherwise preserve

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radio silence except to report enemy vessels and carrier-borne aircraft."

2250

Radio message 1700/62 received from U 354 (Sthamer):

"First petty officer second class in charge of Diesels has suppuration of the upper jaw with swelling of lymphatic glands. Slight temperature. Treatment till now: heat, gargling with camomile, 4 times double prontosil, incision necessary. Request permission to put in to Harstad to land petty officer and to pick up a relief. 72 cu.m. AB 8591."

2349

He received a reply in radio message 2349/785:

"1. You were wrong to leave the patrol line and to break the order to preserve radio silence.

2. Attempt meeting with "Seidel" in AB 8435 or with another returning boat. Exchange petty officers, second class, in charge of Diesels. Do not delay longer than necessary before occupying attack area."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 366 (Langenberg) is reported "missing first time of reporting", with effect from 7 March.

U 472 (v. Forstner) is reported "missing first time of reporting", with effect from 4 March.

U 973 (Päpenmöller) is reported "missing first time of reporting", with effect from 7 March.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Naval forces:

(a) On the subject of fighter protection in Altafjord, teleprinter message received from Naval War Staff, Most Secret 3441/44:

"After careful examination of the possibilities of fulfilling Admiral Northern Waters' request C-in-C, Fighter Command for Navy, wired the following:

"1. The need for adequate fighter protection for the Battle Group's anchorage in Altafjord is fully appreciated.

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2. The present needs of the defense of the Reich, however, demand an ever increasing concentration of all fighter forces, if their effectiveness is to be maintained in the future.
 3. It is therefore impossible to strengthen the present fighter forces in Norway, and Luftflotte 5 will only be in a position to protect our extensive shipping traffic off the Norwegian coast. A withdrawal and diversion of fighter forces to protect the fleet in Altafjord would prevent the proper execution of this task and endanger our position in the Scandinavian area.
 4. C-in-C of the Air Force therefore does not find it possible to supply fighter protection for Altafjord, not even the smallest of contingents."
- (b) On the subject of minelaying project in NW 69 (Rognsund), teleprinter message Naval Chief Command Most Secret 3153 was received:

- "1. The plan has been approved in German Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, 1st Division 1 E 29611/43 Most Secret, of 24 October 1943.
2. On account of the altered situation and the laying of minefield NW 104 (Altafjord), there is no longer any necessity for strengthening Rognsund - NW 69.
3. Intention: To divert the 48 standard mines type C allocated for the NW 69 project as operational mine reserves for Naval Chief Command, Norway.
4. Consent and permission to keep the mines requested."

- (c) Teleprinter message C.O. Battle Group Most Secret 617 received:

"Re Naval Chief Command Norway. Most Secret 3153 A 1 M of 24 March:

On account of very special responsibility for the safety of the Battle Group, request execution of mining plans in Rognsund, NW 69; the Altafjord boom NW 104 neither prevents penetrating enemy forces from occupying an effective firing position against Kaafjord nor does it afford protection for our one and only practice area north of Altafjord."

This request is justified, everything must be done to make Altafjord - the principal practice area of the Battle Group - as safe as possible.

D. (a) Plans:

Teleprinter message received from Group North/Fleet on the subject of convoy attacks during the period of continuous daylight:

- "1. Equipment of U-boats with 3.7 cm. guns is considered urgently necessary in view of the enemy's increasing air cover for Northern Waters convoys. The request of Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats Norway is therefore supported.
2. It seems doubtful however whether, even with 3.7 cm. guns, enemy aircraft can be beaten off sufficiently to permit unhindered U-boat operations on the surface as visualized by Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway.
3. Group North/Fleet believes that the most favorable operational possibilities will be found in a semi-stationary system. The boats should first be drawn up in a stationary, closely spaced, submerged formation and when the convoy has passed over them, they should haul ahead on the surface at a safe distance from the convoy to take up a new stationary position. In weather conditions which preclude air activity, the boats could operate independently as hitherto. To lessen the effectiveness of enemy air attacks, the boats might, if suitable, haul ahead off the Norwegian coast, under the protection of our own fighters. Protection against enemy fighters in the shape of our own fighters would be needed in this case.
4. The boats should be equipped with a larger number of T5 torpedoes to combat the very strong convoy escorts, as soon as the supply situation will permit.
5. Which of these operational procedures is most valuable will have to be shown by experience. Any support which the U-boats will receive from the German Air Force through engagement of the enemy's air forces or through direct attacks on carriers and escort forces would greatly improve the U-boat's prospects of success, during this difficult period of continuous daylight."

(b) Organizational:

By order of Luftflotte 5 the Staff of Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten is to move to Trondheim between 25 and 31 March, but will operate in

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the same area as before.

E. Survey of the situation:

German Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, 3rd Division reports:

"There is no evidence to show that PQ 31 is under way. According to the not very reliable statement of a prisoner of war from the steamer "Port Bellingham" of PQ 27, QP traffic is supposed to occur at intervals of 4 to 5 weeks. According to this PQ 31 would sail from England or Iceland at the earliest on 20 March. According to recent reliable information, the reserves of shipping space, partly loaded, which have now been accumulated in Britain, have reached about 2.2 million G.R.T., or 40% of the total shipping space of 5.5 million G.R.T. theoretically available for new military operations. According to the same source this shipping is concentrated in English west and southwest coast ports (about 1.5 million G.R.T.): the rest presumably along the east coast of Scotland.

The impression of rapidly increasing readiness in the jumping-off ports in the south of England area and possibly in east Scotland too, is growing. Among the mass of intelligence on the enemy's plans, there are now, apart from the many reports of the postponement of the landings, numerous mentions of the end of March or beginning of April as the actual date.

(Signed) Peters.

26 March, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 from 0937 to 1445 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Nothing to report, exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 from 0535 to 1427 in the sea area west of the Faeroes. At 1140 aerial photograph of Thorshavn, 2 Swedish ships, otherwise no vessels. 1 He 115 from 0543 to 1318 in the Jan Mayen area. Route 50% covered. Enemy not sighted. 2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 from 0925 to 1904 with radar

set 200, on reconnaissance to intercept enemy convoy traffic. Reconnaissance areas exhaustively covered, enemy not sighted. In AF 2791 radar set 200 of one of the aircraft broke down. Routes:
 Trondheim - AF 4625 - AE 3961 - AF 1471 - 4369 - Trondheim.
 Trondheim - AF 2599 - AB 7892 - AA 9981 - AA 9688 - AB 7677 - Trondheim.
 Trondheim - AF 5121 - 1437 - AE 2637 - 2367 - AF 1166 - 2766 - Trondheim.

II. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines.
 Murmansk area: minesweepers Nos. 39, 112, BO-boat No. 204, MO-boat No. 141.
 Britain: no units intercepted.
 Britain: very few Murmansk and Archangel broadcasts.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations:

On 18 March, 2 convoys totaling 11 ships put in to port. Of these one was a 10,000 tonner and ten 5,000 tonners. Two ships are said to have put out again.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

- (a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 312 on ice reconnaissance northeast of Jan Mayen.
 U 312 AB 4984)
 U 278 AB 7326)
 U 674 AB 7362) in attack areas,
) depth of sweep 20 miles.

Group "Hammer":

U 354 AB 8171)
 U 968 AB 8179)
 U 288 AB 8427)
 U 315 AB 8456)

Group "Blitz":

U 711 AB 8495)
U 956 AB 8812) in attack areas,
U 277 AB 8843) depth of sweep 20 miles.
U 355 AB 8858)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 673, 703 Narvik,
U 360, 362, 636, 737, 739, 959 Trondheim,
U 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 307)
U 361) proceeding from AB 80 to Narvik.
U 990)

U-boat group Central:

U 342, 365, 473, 740, 765 Bergen,
U 736 Stavanger,
U 385 Kristiansand (South),
U 955, 974 proceeding from Kiel to Kristiansand
(South),
U 276 on special operation,
1500 U 955, 974 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel,
1915 U 365 put out from Bergen on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
12 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen.
- (c) Special operations by single boats:

1603 Radio message 1546/79 received from U 312
(Nikolay): "114".

According to his instructions, this must mean "BB 4114"; that is, about 180 miles northwest of the U-boat formation. This would be an ice situation which normally occurs only in summer or autumn. It seems improbably far west for spring.

For elucidation, radio message 2229/799 was sent:

"At 1542 Nikolay reported the ice limit in AB 4114. In case the grid square has been wrongly interpreted, report by short signal on frequency "Anton" distance of ice limit from new attack area."

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 739 (Mangold):

- "1. Put out from Trondheim at 1600 on 27 March for Narvik.
2. Proceed at maximum speed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.
3. Report estimated time of arrival at V1 24 hours in advance. Also report passing of approach points by time short signal. Do not under any circumstances put in to Westfjord earlier than the time announced. See Northern Waters Order No. 4.
4. Radio frequency in accordance with Communications Order, Captain U-boats, Norway."

On the subject of the 2 boats of group Central, detailed for anti-submarine operations, teleprinter message Most Secret 1330 sent to Group North/Fleet, Naval Chief Command Norway, and for information Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops. and 11th and 13th U-boat Flotillas:

"Re Naval Chief Command Norway, Operational Staff, Most Secret 3188 A1, of 25 March:

1. Since our own boats proceed continually along the coastal strip between Bergen and Trondheim on transfer passages, it is essential for safety reasons that every additional U-boat operating in the same area should be notified to us. Thus, for instance, the Most Immediate radio message Admiral North Coast, of 23 March, according to which the coast guard at Kya reported a U-boat at 1710 20 miles northwest of Kya, has caused confusion.
2. So far, Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops., Most Secret 1472, is the only information available to Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway concerning the employment of U-boats in the leads. A decision on the command and type of this operation has not yet come to our notice.
3. Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway will in future ensure his own information through the 11th and 13th U-boat Flotillas.
4. All basic questions of the direction of Northern Waters U-boats in the coastal area are the concern of Admiral Northern

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Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway. The Flotillas have only an executive capacity in this connection."

Group North/Fleet has requested Naval Chief Command, Norway in teleprinter message Most Secret O456 to forward the operational order in accordance with Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 3188 of 25 March, or, alternatively in abbreviated form by teleprinter message. Prompt information on the limits of the operational area is vitally important.

In answer, Naval Chief Command Norway sent the following teleprinter message Most Secret 3199: "For purposes of clarification it is again stated that operational control and the drafting of the operational order is the task of the 11th and 13th U-boat Flotillas. It is therefore up to them to inform Captain U-boats, Norway, and to pass on the operational order in case this is necessary. The U-boat Flotillas' operational orders in their final form have not yet reached Naval Chief Command, Norway either. However, permission to commence operations on the basis of the oral discussions has been given, as the matter is urgent."

Meanwhile, the Flotillas have reported details about the anti-submarine operation. The 13th U-boat Flotilla reported in teleprinter message Most Secret 881:

- "1. Operation of U 276 (Borchers).
Task: The tracking down and destruction of enemy submarines by patrolling the boom gaps west of booms 1, 2 and 3 (from 64° 40.3' N, 10° 28.8' E to Kya) and the southern entrance to Follafjord near Kya. Surfacing at night; by day submerged close inshore. Operation planned to last 14 days.
2. The operational area is limited in the south by latitude 64° 20' N, in the north by 65° N, in the east by the line passing through Buholmraasa - Kya - Gjeslingen, and in the west by a line at a distance of 50 miles from the coast and parallel to it.
3. Radio frequency "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave.
4. U 739 (Mangold) is bringing the complete operational order."

In teleprinter message Most Secret 711, the 11th U-boat Flotilla reported the operational area of U 365 (Wedemayer):

"Further to message Most Secret 1330 of 25 March from Captain U-boats Norway, the following details regarding the putting out of U 365 on 26 March are

reported.

From the operational order now in course of transmission:

The task lies in the operational areas "Anton" and "Bruno". The area of the first is roughly the blue grid square CV 8121 and the surrounding small grid squares, and the latter, which is to be entered only at night and after special permission, extends eastwards as far as the western point of Rennesoy and the southeastern corner of Vestre Bokn in the inner Boknfjord.

The anti-submarine units will be separated by a neutral strip. Procedure by day according to Order No. 13: surfacing at night and at twilight, anti-aircraft guns to be manned, searching sweeps. Return by order of 11th U-boat Flotilla after about 10 days. Exact position of minefields, and coastal installations on board. Diversion of convoys, prohibition of anti-submarine hunts, etc., fully agreed with Admiral West Coast Special secrecy, partly Most Secret, senior officers only."

Teleprinter message Most Secret 1340 sent to Luftflotte 5, and for information Group North/Fleet, Liaison Officer, Air Force: "The U-boat from the patrol line which in accordance with orders has been advancing northwestwards, reported the ice limit in 17 W 7571. Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway intends to let the U-boat follow the course of the ice limit, but requests the Air Force to reconnoiter the ice limit northwest of Jan Mayen and northwards and eastwards as far as their range will permit."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Teleprinter message Most Secret 294 received from the "Tirpitz":

" "Tirpitz"'s readiness to put to sea:

(a) Provisionally by 7 April with two shafts, 2 turbines and one Diesel electric motor without auxiliary boiler.

(b) From 8 April provisionally with 3 shafts, otherwise as under (a)."

D. Plans:

With reference to the use of automatic meteorological transmitters Most Secret 469/44 was received from Supreme Command of the Navy, Naval War Staff, Chief of Naval Meteorological Service 6:

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- "1. The following meteorological shore transmitters installed in 1943:

	<u>Place.</u>	<u>Operating time</u>	<u>Total no. of days.</u>
(a)"Edwin II":	Bear Island	18 March - 28 May	72
(b)"Gerhard":	Novaya Zemlya	22 August - 30 October	70
(c)"Dietrich":	Bear Island	7 September - still operating	
(d)"Christian":	Bear Island	6 December - still operating	

One shore transmitter, "Robert", was not put into operation owing to a technical fault.

2. In view of satisfactory results, both from the meteorological point of view and as regards the increased "life" of the transmitters (maximum 5 - 6 months), it is intended to operate an increased number of shore transmitters during 1944, in the following places:

(a) Bear Island:	time of installation: 2nd half of April.
(b) Novaya Zemlya:	time of installation: July.
(c) Franz Josef Land:	time of installation: while dismantling "Schatzgräber".
(d) North Spitsbergen:	time of installation: while dismantling "Kreuzritter".
(e) Greenland, East Coast:	time of installation: while dismantling "Bassgeiger".

3. Group North/Fleet is requested to arrange for installation of each set as soon as the Chief of the Naval Meteorological Service has reported them to be in working order at the jumping-off port.

4. Intended jumping off ports:-

(a) and (b):	Narvik,
(c), (d) and (e):	Tromsø, German Air Force seaplane station.

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The plans for the installation of meteorological buoys during 1944 will follow separately after the buoys at present in use have been exhausted."

E. Survey of the situation:-

Re IV. :-

Even if the surprisingly westerly position of the ice limit were to be confirmed, it would seem that the present U-boat formation extends sufficiently far to northwest. It covers all probable convoy routes east of Jan Mayen. Ice reconnaissance by the Air Force and by the experimental boat U 673 (Sauer) should provide accurate information on the ice situation. Only 9 U-boats can be kept permanently in the waiting position. It is intended to withdraw the other three in about 3 days, if up to then there have been no further indications of an approaching PQ convoy.

(Signed) Peters.

27 March, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 from 0458 to 1105 on armed meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Nothing to report. Almost exhaustive. Bombing attack on radio station near Tunheim on Bear Island. One hit near a hut.
2 BF 109 from 0656 to 0720 on shipping reconnaissance Motovski Bay.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 from 0530 to 1237 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. Route 50%, Jan Mayen 30%, covered, enemy not sighted.
1 Ju 88 from 0428 to 1234 on sea reconnaissance Sola area. Exhaustively covered, enemy not sighted.

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2 FW 200 from 0649 to 1514, 1 Ju 88 from 0749 to 1300 on sea reconnaissance to intercept enemy convoy traffic. Enemy not sighted.

1 FW 200 on northerly course: abandoned because radio broke down.

Routes: Trondheim - AF 4625 - AE 3961 - 1471 - 4369 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AF 2579 - AB 7893 - AA 9981 - 9687 - AB 7671 - AF 2537 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AF 5121 - 1437 - AE 2637 - 2367 - AF 1166 - 2766 - Trondheim.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Shipping movements in the Gorlo Straits on 27 March.

Norwegian polar coast: few transmissions to submarines.

Britain: no units intercepted in Northern Waters region. Bearings on British units from

Hammerfest: 26 March. At 1718 "AJ" in 255°, inaccurate. At 1820 "AD" in 270°, inaccurate.

At 1830 "AJ" in 250°. At 2015 "AF" in 264.6°.

At 2045 "AO" in 253.4°.

Britain: very few Murmansk and no Archangel broadcasts. On 27 March at 0201 on 71/91 M. one operational radio message from Murmansk to Whitehall.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 312 on ice reconnaissance.

U 313 AB 4984) in attack areas,

U 278 AB 7326) depth of sweep 20 miles.

U 674 AB 7362)

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Group "Hammer":

U 354 AB 8171)
U 968 AB 8178)
U 288 AB 8427)
U 315 AB 8456) in attack areas,
depth of sweep 20 miles.

Group "Blitz":

U 711 AB 8495)
U 956 AB 8812)
U 277 AB 8843)
U 355 AB 8858)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 673, 703 Narvik,
U 360, 362, 636, 737, 739, 959 Trondheim,
U 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1500 U 307 put in to Narvik from AB 80.
1500 U 361 put in to Narvik from AB 80.
1500 U 990 put in to Narvik from AB 80.
1500 U 673 put out from Narvik for AA 93.
1630 U 739 put out from Trondheim for Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

U 342, 473, 740, 765 Bergen,
U 736 Stavanger,
U 385, 955, 974 Kristiansand (South),
U 276, 365 on special operation,
0800 U 240, U 347 put out from Kiel for Kristiansand
(South),
1700 U 473, U 740 put out from Bergen (Atlantic).

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

12 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen.
No reports.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

Operational order for U 673 (Sauer), see Appendix II.

(d) Miscellaneous:

The repair ship "Huascaran" reported that U 716 (Dunkelberg) would be ready in Alta at 1800.

Transfer order for U 716 (Dunkelberg):

- "1. Put out from Alta on 28 March with escort for Hammerfest.
2. Radio service "Ulli".
3. Five hours' readiness at Hammerfest."

Sailing order for U 360 (Becker):

- "1. Put out from Trondheim on morning of 29 March for Narvik.
2. Proceed high speed at a distance of 60 miles from the coast.
3. Report estimated time of arrival at entry to Westfjord 24 hours in advance; and passing of V1 by time short signal.
4. Radio frequency in accordance with Communications Order of Captain U-boats, Norway."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Teleprinter message Most Secret 0466 received from Group North/Fleet:

"Concur with Naval Chief Command, Norway. Most Secret 3153 Al M of 24 March, in spite of the objections put forward by C.O. Battle Group, since owing to the absence of minefields in the main fairway and the shortage of mines, the blocking of the auxiliary fairway in Rognsund by minefield NW 7 is considered to be sufficient."

The Battle Group replied as follows in Most Secret 633/44:

"Reference the protection of Alta by minefields in accordance with Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 12317 Al M, of 21 December, 1943 we give up the project of laying minefields in Stjernsund and Vargsund, in view of the shortage of mines and minefield patrols. We propose, nevertheless, to declare the following as mined areas: Stjernsund between 22° 25' E and 22° 34' E, Vargsund between 70° 23' N. and 70° 26' N. The declaration of the mined area might be published with some such addition as the following:

"This area is mined: for through-passage routes, which change from time to time, inquire at the nearest German harbor master's office, before each passage."

Actually the through-passage routes could be altered

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at irregular intervals, e.g. varying between the northern and southern edge of the sounds. Assumption: Intercepting mine-hawsers as employed by the British. Slight additional route controls arising from this would have to be borne. Convoys and all warships could proceed as hitherto on the old route, all warships would have to be given "Most Secret" instructions that there are in fact no mines. Disadvantages do not arise from such declared mined areas; and they should have the advantage of creating uncertainty in the enemy's mind, and may therefore keep him off."

In reply to Battle Group Most Secret 633/44 A1, teleprinter message Most Secret 1368 was sent to Naval Chief Command, Norway, Group North/Fleet, Admiral Polar Coast, Sea Commandant Hammerfest, Battle Group:

"Proposal is supported. With the present lack of materials for providing adequate protection for the Alta area, skillful and changing employment of deceptive measures is considered suitable. Authorities concerned have been informed."

In reply to Battle Group Most Secret 633/44 A1, Admiral Polar Coast sent the following teleprinter message Most Secret 33334 A1:

"Proposal as to warning zones agreed to. However, the varying through-passage routes must be used for all warships and merchant ships alike, as otherwise the deception would be quickly discovered."

Teleprinter message "Tirpitz" G 1301 received:

"In reply to German Naval High Command K IV AD 717 Most Secret/44 K 2nd issue, of 23 March and "Tirpitz" Most Secret 261/44 of 16 March:

1. Transport of runner no longer necessary. The runner which had an 0.3 mm has been righted here.
2. Cause: see sketch BBC TMQK K 238 408 Section B - B.
At the first inspection the play was 0.03 mm. Nuts type 8 could not be tightened. On first testing, strong vibration at 160 revolutions per minute; on second testing at 200 revolutions per minute.
3. At the last test, several nuts type 8 which had been anchored were found to have loosened and by use of the strongest and longest available monkey wrench could be tightened by as much as two complete turns, i.e. section

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of the type 6 screws was presumably caused through the explosion impact of the runners or, in other words, the screws were loosened by rotational force.

4. Tests at maximum speed will probably commence on 31 March."

On the maximum speed test, teleprinter message Most Secret 296 was received from the "Tirpitz":

"Intended repetition of maximum speed test in Stjernsund - Vargsund sometime between 1 - 3 April. Duration one day. Decision as to date 30 March. Extensive safeguard against mines on fleet route FP 53 Bruno via 53 Dora to 53 Fritz with turning circles. Increased outside protection on western entrance to Stjernsund, also stopping of traffic Stjernsund - Vargsund requested during the whole time the "Tirpitz" will be there."

D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):-

The radio bearings from Hammerfest are in the direction of our own U-boat formation, but might also come from the Iceland area. No definite conclusions can be drawn from them. Otherwise nothing to report.

(Signed) Peters.

28 March, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 from 0500 to 1132 on meteorological reconnaissance, Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Almost exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 from 0527 to 1250 on meteorological reconnaissance of the Jan Mayen area. Route 60%, Jan Mayen 40%, covered. Enemy not sighted.
1 Ju 88 from 0525 to 1347 in the area west of the

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Faeroes. Enemy not sighted.

2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 from 0643 to 1625 on reconnaissance of convoy routes to the Soviet Arctic ports. Enemy not sighted.

Routes: Trondheim - AF 2579 - AB 7893 - AA 9981 - 9688 - AB 7671 - AF 2537 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AF 5121 - 1437 - AE 2631 - 2364 - AF 1166 - AF 2766 - Trondheim.

Trondheim - AF 4625 - AE 3962 - AF 1471 - 4369 - Trondheim.

1 FW 200 on northerly course, broke off because of engine trouble in AB 7734.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: few transmissions to submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: destroyer "E", guardships Nos. 18, 19, 81, minesweeper No. 111, guardboat No. 625, ice-breaker "Deshnev", 4 unidentified vessels.

Britain: no units intercepted.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 312 AB 4948)
U 313 AB 4984)
U 278 AB 7326)
U 674 AB 7362)

Group "Hammer":

U 354 AB 8495)
U 968 AB 8812)
U 288 AB 8843)
U 315 AB 8858)

in attack areas,
depth of sweep 20 miles
9-hourly movements to
northwest and southeast.

Group "Blitz":

U 711 AB 8495)
U 956 AB 8812)
U 277 AB 8843)
U 355 AB 8858)

In port:

U 716 Alta,
U 307, 361, 703, 990 Narvik,
U 360, 362, 636, 737, 959 Trondheim,
U 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 739 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.
U 673 proceeding from Narvik on ice reconnaissance between 10° W and 10° E.
1300 U 716 put out from Alta.
1900 U 716 put in to Hammerfest.

U-boat group Central:

U 342, 765 Bergen,
U 736 Stavanger,
U 385, 955, 974 Kristiansand (South),
2110 U 276, 365 on special operation,
U 240, 347 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

12 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen.
No reports.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 673 (Sauer) on ice reconnaissance north of Jan Mayen.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

At 1200 on 29 March Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters will move to Oslo.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten announced in Most Secret 1091/44:

"As from 1200 on 28 March 1944 I am assuming the command of the forces up to now under command of Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters in the Trondheim area. (3rd Gruppe/Bomber Geschwader 40, 1st Gruppe/Long-range Geschwader 22, Meteorological Staffel 5, 1st Staffel/Coastal Air Gruppe 406, part of 2nd Gruppe/Long-range Geschwader 130, Arado-chain in Aalesund). Dividing line between the areas of Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten and Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters: Northern tip of the Faeroes - Northern boundary: office of crash boats, Bergen and office of crash boats, Oslo. Action position Trondheim - Lade. Cover name Kastell, Roman II, Roth, Major General and Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten."

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E. Survey of the situation:

Re D:

The co-ordination of the air reconnaissance against Murmansk convoys under Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten raises hopes of a speedier and more effective co-operation in convoy attacks.

(Signed) Peters.

29 March 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance, route Banak - Belushya - Kanin Nos - Banak. Nothing to report. Not exhaustive because of weather. Belushya not covered.
2 BF 109 from 1031 to 1054 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance Motovski Bay.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

1 Ju 88 from 0517 to 1226 on meteorological reconnaissance in the Jan Mayen area. Route and Jan Mayen area 80% covered. Enemy not sighted. No reconnaissance against PQ convoy.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 from 0425 to 1247 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes; enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

28 March. Shipping movements in Gorlo Straits. (Danilev light (AW 2944) switched on at 1700.) Norwegian polar coast: only repeats of radio messages to submarines in the operational area. Murmansk area: destroyers "C", "E". Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

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Bearing obtained on 28 March at 1709 on unit "U 6X4" located by direction finder from Hammerfest on 255°. Britain: very few Murmansk or Archangel broadcasts. Murmansk to Whitehall: operational radio messages.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 312 AB 4948)
U 313 AB 4984)
U 278 AB 7326)
U 674 AB 7362)

Group "Hammer":

U 354 AB 8171) in attack areas,
U 968 AB 8179) depth of sweep 20 miles
U 288 AB 8427) 9-hourly movements from
U 315 AB 8456) northwest to southeast.

Group "Blitz":

U 711 AB 8495)
U 956 AB 8812)
U 277 AB 8843)
U 355 AB 8858)

In port:

U 716 Hammerfest,
U 307, 361, 703, 990 Narvik,
U 360, 362, 636, 737, 959 Trondheim,
U 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0830 U 739 put in to Narvik from Trondheim.
U 673 proceeding from Narvik on ice reconnaissance between 10° W and 10° E.
1415 U 360 put out from Trondheim for Hammerfest.

U-boat group Central:

U 342, 765 Bergen,
U 736 Stavanger,
U 385, 955, 974 Kristiansand (South),
U 276, 365 on special operation,
U 240, 347 Kristiansand (South),
1900 U 347 put out from Kristiansand (South) for Stavanger.

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

12 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen.
No reports.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 673 (Sauer) proceeding on ice reconnaissance north of Jan Mayen.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 636 (Schendel):

- "1. Put out from Trondheim on the morning of 30 March for Narvik.
2. Proceed at high speed at a distance of 60 miles from the coast.
3. Report estimated time of arrival at the entrance to Westfjord 24 hours in advance, also the passing of V1 by time short signal.
4. Radio frequency in accordance with Communications Order, Captain U-boats, Norway."

0647 Radio message 0616/736 sent to U 360 (Becker):

"Proceed to Hammerfest via SR 1 at a distance of 50 miles from the coast. Report approach and passage."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 307 (Herrle) fifth operation,

Short report from U 361 (Seidel) first operation,

Short report from U 990 (Nordheimer) second operation, see Appendix III/3-5.

C. Surface forces:

Teleprinter message Most Secret 1274 sent to Luftflotte Command 5 IA, and for information Group North/Fleet, and for information Battle Group:

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"Information requested as to what extent and in what strength the Air Force could provide protection for the Battle Group (the "Tirpitz" and 5 destroyers) for the following:

1. Exercises in the open sea (fighter protection, close escort).
2. Transfer passages through inner leads or inshore waters.
3. Any enemy break-through in the Alta area directed against the Battle Group.

We are thinking of the announcement of a code-word which would bring up the available bomber and fighter forces without delay."

Luftflotte 5 requested more exact details on point 3.

Teleprinter message Most Secret, S.O.'s only 24/44 was therefore sent:

"Further to Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 1274, liaison officer, Air Force, re point 3. After many unsuccessful attempts by the enemy to sink the "Tirpitz" by air attacks, midget submarines, self-propelled torpedoes, sabotage, etc., we must also reckon with the possibility that the enemy may attempt to force Altafjord by means of surface forces of all types (including battleships) with the definite aim of destroying the battle Group. A simultaneous attack by carrier-borne aircraft or long-range bombers is expected. This attack would presumably be carried out as a special operation independently of a general landing action. A war game dealing with this problem recently took place at the office of Admiral Polar Coast, Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten took part. In this war game the effects of air support were not considered.

The question is, what would the Air Force be able to provide, with the forces at present at its disposal, by way of defense against enemy naval and air forces. If found suitable, it is intended to publish a code-word, e.g. "Kaafjord", for this special operation. In such an emergency the battle Group will have to confine itself to local defense in the Alta area."

In reply teleprinter message Luftflotte Command 5 Most Secret 2568/44 was received:

"As Luftflotte 5 has at present no bombers, and as the available ground attack and fighter forces are tied up in other operations in Finland and Southern Norway, the Luftflotte Command is not in

the position to state now whether, and if so what, forces could be freed to give defensive support in such an action. Only in an actual case could Luftflotte Command make the necessary decisions, which will depend on the general situation, the forces available at the time, and on the weather. Apart from that, the period at which the enemy's intentions will be discovered would have a decisive influence on the bringing up of forces. In the Northern area the transfer of flying squadrons at short notice is, as we know from experience, rarely possible, owing to weather difficulties."

In teleprinter message 1447 Group North/Fleet and the Battle Group were informed of the answer of Luftflotte 5.

After this general and rather negative reply it is useless to publish a code-word. It will only turn out at the actual time, whether the Air Force will be able to give support.

D. Survey of the situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Peters.

30 March, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 from 0457 to 1031 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance, route Banak - AC 9189 - Kenin Nos - AC 9371 - Banak. Not exhaustive.

2 BF 109 from 0735 to 0817 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance of Motovski - Kola Bay; only partially covered.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

1 He 111 from 0529 to 1530 on meteorological reconnaissance in the Jan Mayen area. Route 60%, southern part of Jan Mayen area 20%, covered.
2 Ju 88 from 0520 to 1407 Vaernes. Sea reconnaissance of inner leads and fjords of Iceland. Nypsfjordur and Vopnafjordur unoccupied.

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Rest of northeast coast not examined because of coastal mist.

2 FW 200 from 0637 to 1948 on sea reconnaissance to intercept enemy convoy traffic.

Routes: Vaernes - AE 3933 - AB 7894 - AA 9983 - 9921 - AB 7911 - AF 1636 - Vaernes.

Vaernes - AF 1427 - AE 3665 - 3677 - 3379 - AF 1198 - 1496 - AE 3676 - 6933 - 3991 - Vaernes.

3 Ju 88 from 0753 to 2037 on sea reconnaissance to intercept enemy convoy traffic.

1 Ju 88, route Vaernes - AE 3966 - 3992 - 3841 - 3571 - AF 1471 - Vaernes. Area 100% covered by "Bläumeise", 70% by visual reconnaissance. Enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 from 0455 to 1347 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0750 15 merchant ships, each 3-5,000 G.R.T. in Kola Bay from Kolabend to Vaenga. Motovski Bay, Eina Bay and Motka Bay only partially examined; apparently unoccupied.

At 0915 in AE 3666 according to visual reconnaissance 1 destroyer, 2 merchant ships, each 6-8,000 G.R.T., 1 escorting destroyer. On starboard bow, 2 merchant ships in line abreast. Destroyers probably "Hunt" class, merchant ships high superstructure, broad, 8 cargo hatches. Unsuccessful attack with 2 thinly cased bombs 250 on 1 merchant ship.

At 1500 in AE 3999 by visual reconnaissance 3 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 30 merchant ships, each 2-6,000 G.R.T., 15 unidentified ships; course 025°, speed 8 knots. Convoy spread over 120 km. Destroyers in all-round screen. At center of convoy 30 merchant ships. One cruiser each to port and to starboard. Cruising disposition: ships in three lines, anti-aircraft fire from cruiser and destroyer.

At 1600 convoy located in AE 1455.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Recent weather forecasts from Archangel to Amderma (69° 45' N, 61° 41' E) for all ice-breakers point to shipping movements in the Novaya Zemlya area.

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Norwegian polar coast: Few transmissions to submarines, Submarine "K 21" called.

Britain: no units intercepted.

Britain: very few Murmansk, no Archangel broadcasts.

On 29 March unsuccessful reception attempts between British radio stations Bermuda and Halifax on the one hand and Murmansk on the other on convoy wavelengths.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Northern area: no information about approach of PQ 31. It is possible that the arrival in Reykjavik of 11 and 4 merchant ships of fairly heavy tonnage, as reported by reliable agent, is the beginning of ships assembling for PQ 31; but it is also possible that PQ traffic has temporarily ceased perhaps on account of the present increase of traffic on the north Atlantic route or as a result of the concentration of shipping in England for invasion purposes. Last convoy observed about 19 February was PQ 30 from England. Last year no convoy traffic was observed from Iceland or England between PQ 22 (from Reykjavik about 20 March) and PQ 23 (about the middle of November, 1943).

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 312 AB 4948)
U 313 AB 4984)
U 278 AB 7326)
U 674 AB 7362)

Group "Hammer":) in attack areas,
depth of sweep 20 miles
U 354 AB 8171) 9-hourly movements to
U 968 AB 8179) northwest and southeast.
U 288 AB 8427)
U 315 AB 8456)

Group "Blitz":)
U 711 AB 8495)
U 956 AB 8812)
U 277 AB 8843)
U 355 AB 8858)

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U 673 on ice reconnaissance between 10° W and 10° E as far as 75° N.

In port:

U 716 Hammerfest,
U 307, 361, 703, 739, 990 Narvik,
U 362, 636, 737, 959 Trondheim,
U 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2000 U 360 proceeding from Trondheim to Hammerfest.
2200 U 739 put out from Narvik to AB 85 (PQ 31).
2200 U 716 put out from Hammerfest to AB 8250 (PQ 31).

U-boat group Central:

0600 U 342, 765 Bergen,
0800 U 736 Stavanger,
U 240, 385, 955, 974 Kristiansand (South),
U 276, 365 on special operation,
U 347 put in to Stavanger from Kristiansand (South),
U 992 put out from Kiel for Stavanger.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

PQ 31:

1315 Teleprinter message received from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:
"FW 200 reported at 0950 in 16 W 5843: 1 destroyer, 2 merchant ships, each approximately 5,000 G.R.T. (AE 3663).
At 1050 attack on center of group, course 040°, 15 knots. Aircraft is shadowing. Report delayed on account of counter questions for clarification."
As it is improbable that 2 single merchant ships are proceeding to Russia, 2 hours' readiness was ordered for boats clear for operations at Narvik and Hammerfest.
Also sent:
1412 Radio message 1346/739 from Captain U-boats:
"At 0950 in AE 3663 1 destroyer, 2 merchant ships each 5,000 G.R.T., course 040°, 15 knots."
1458 Radio message 1431/740 from Captain U-boats:
"1. Approach of PQ convoy possible.
2. At 2100, surface. D/F signals received."
1542 Radio message 1443/609 from Captain U-boats:
"U 360 (Becker): switch to frequency "Ulli" immediately. Proceed at maximum speed to AB 89."

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- 1513 Radio message 1459/742 from Captain U-boats:
"Sauer": proceed to AB 4910 at maximum speed."
- 1605 Radio message 1459/44 received:
"FW 200 (GL) reported: at 1300 convoy position 16° W 5748 (AE 3993), course 025°, speed 8 knots, 30 ships. Shadower's wavelength "Bruno". 2 tenths QB, 400 QBA 50, wind 60° 15 km./h. - Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten."

This is the expected PQ 31. I intend to start the attack tomorrow evening in accordance with the new procedure: to let the boats surface at dusk 40 miles ahead of the convoy and to bring them in to attack by D/F signals from the air shadower. To announce attack day and surfacing time, the following was sent:

Teleprinter message Most Secret 1441 to Luftflotte 5, Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten, Flieger Fuehrer Arctic, Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters, for information Group North/Fleet, for information Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops:
"Reference Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 1214 of 21 March.
X-day is 31 March, zero hour 2045."
- 1722 After a further air report, radio message 1710/745 was sent by Captain U-boats:
"Convoy position at 1500 AE 3939. Reckon with speed 10 knots."

The boats U 739 (Mangold), U 990 (Nordheimer) and U 361 (Seidel) in Narvik, and U 716 (Dunkelberg) in Hammerfest are getting ready at increased speed and were ordered to put to sea. The Narvik boats are to proceed to AB 85, U 716 to AB 8250.
- 1740 Teleprinter message Most Secret 1443 sent to 71st Army Corps H.Q., Section Commander, and Admiral Polar Coast:
"At 1500 in naval grid square AE 3939 3 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 30 merchant ships on northeasterly course sighted by air reconnaissance. Assumed to be approaching PQ 31."
- 1832 Radio message 1752/136 received from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

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"At 1615 Ju 88 (OH) reported composition of convoy: 40 merchant ships up to 10,000 G.R.T. each, 22 escort vessels (cruisers, destroyers) 4 lines ahead, escort in all-round screen, open cruising formation."

At a speed of 10 knots according to dead reckoning, and an assumed convoy course of 045° the U-boat disposition for tomorrow, with an interval between the boats of 10 miles, should be taken up under cover of night, as follows:

1947

Radio message 1921 from Captain U-boats:

- "1. Groups "Thor", "Hammer" and "Blitz" to proceed immediately at maximum speed to patrol line from AB 5763 to 8625.
- "2. "Sauer" to join group "Thor" as boat No. 1: "Becker" to join Group "Blitz" as boat No. 5."

The following preliminary messages were also sent:

2223

Radio message 2147/748:

- "1. Air reconnaissance reported 40 merchant ships of up to 10,000 G.R.T. each in 4 lines ahead, 22 escort vessels in full screen, open cruising formation.
- "2. Start of attack planned for 31 March: surface at 2045 in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 1, then immediately send D/F reports.
- "3. From 2200 our own air reconnaissance will operate flares (2 white stars in succession); also from 2300 "lux" light buoys 5-10 km. behind the convoy."

2244

Radio message 2153/750:

"Groups "Thor", "Hammer" and "Blitz":
The size of this convoy shows the importance the enemy attaches to Russian supplies. We must do our utmost to help our comrades on the Eastern front."

2220

Teleprinter message received from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"At 2120, aircraft "FL3" 40th Bomber Squadron reported convoy position 16° W 2863 (AF 1573). Position accurate."

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- 2250 Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten further reported by telephone that the convoy's position, according to D/F was approximately AF 1469, also that the air shadower flew along the convoy which extended over 120 km.
- 2320 In short signal 2300/752/753 U 277 (Lübsen) also reported a bearing from the air shadower which helps in drawing up a very favorable position line.
- 0200 Radio message 2345/754:

"By reason of new air reports, new patrol line from AB 5795 to 8673 for groups "Thor", "Hammer" and "Blitz"."

The Operational Order for Luftflotte 5 (teleprinter message Most Secret 2595) for 31 March runs as follows:

1. Continuous shadowing of the intercepted convoy to be maintained by one aircraft.
2. The time around which air reconnaissance is to be concentrated is to be agreed upon directly with Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway.
3. (a) Shadowing and D/F routine in accordance with Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway, No. 1066/44 Most Secret of 11 March, and teleprinter message Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats Norway No. 1214/44 Most Secret of 21 March.
(b) Trial of the signal lights to be preceded by a report on the lights to be used (LC 50, Mark 50, parachute signal ammunition and "lux" lights) to Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway.
4. Flares should be placed such that the ships will be silhouetted against a lighted background for the attacking U-boats; "lux" lights are to be dropped at distances of 5 to 10 km. in the wake of the convoy."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

No further measures.

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(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 673 (Sauer) had to abandon the ice reconnaissance at the approach of the convoy.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing orders for U 361 (Seidel), U 739 (Mangold) and U 990 (Nordheimer):

- "1. Put out from Narvik 30 March for Ramsund as soon as ready, to take on T5 torpedoes.
2. Continue through Tjeldsund - Andfjord, from Lodingen to Harstad with district pilot. Proceed at maximum speed to AB 85.
3. Operational Order No. 15, U-boat Northern Waters wave.
4. Air reconnaissance reported on 30 March at 0950 in AE 3663 1 destroyer, 2 merchant ships of up to 5,000 G.R.T. each. Course 040°, 15 knots(?), possibly PQ convoy. Own air shadower on convoy. Air reconnaissance reported convoy in AE 3939 at 1500, course 025°, 3 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 30 merchant ships, 15 escort vessels. Reckon with speed of 10 knots.
5. Own forces:

(a) U-boats:

In attack areas, depth of sweep 20 miles from AB 4948 to 8858 in order:-

Group "Thor": U 312 (Nikolay),
U 313 (Schweiger),
U 278 (Franze)
U 674 (Muss).

Group "Hammer":

U 354 (Sthamer),
U 968 (Westphalen),
U 288 (Meyer),
U 315 (Zoller).

Group "Blitz":

U 711 (Lange),
U 956 (Mohs),
U 277 (Lübsen),
U 355 (La Baume).

U 673 (Sauer) is making for AB 4910 from the west.

U 360 (Becker) approaching from south to AB 89.

U 716 (Dunkelberg) is putting out from Hammerfest for AB 8250:

- (b) Own convoy reconnaissance by FW 200, Ju 88 and BV 138.
- (c) Northern Waters Order No. 1 and radio message 2239 of 18 March for special attention."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Teleprinter message Most Secret 37/44 S.O.s only A1 received from C-in-C Battle Group on 26 March:-

"Query: To what extent and in what form can we expect U-boat defense in the event of a sudden enemy thrust into Altafjord to eliminate the Battle Group. Propose code-word order so as to save time in emergency."

In reply teleprinter message Most Secret S.O.s only 30/44 A1 was sent to C-in-C Battle Group:

"Following U-boat operations are planned in the event of enemy penetration into Altafjord:

1. Immediate operation of all available U-boats according to instructions from Group North/Fleet.
2. Available forces: as long as there is no convoy operation there are:-
 - (a) about 3 to 4 boats in Hammerfest at 5 hours' readiness;
 - (b) about 2 to 3 boats in Narvik mostly undergoing minor or medium repairs. All at 12 hours' readiness.
 - (c) about 9 to 10 boats in patrol line in the operational area west of Bear Island passage.
3. The approach of boats as under 2. (a) might possibly be quickest via Vargsund into the Alta area, will depend on the situation. Use of the boats as under 2. (b) and (c) depends on their time of arrival at the point of the enemy's penetration and the situation at the time, as well as on the time it takes the boats at Narvik to put to sea.
4. In the absence of convoy operations there is generally daily air reconnaissance in the area Trondheim - Jan Mayen - Iceland.

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5. During a convoy operation, decision on the employment of U-boats, depending on the general situation, in accordance with directions from Group North/Fleet.
6. Code-word "Feindeinbruch Alta".
7. Confirm point 6."

D. Plans:

Teleprinter message Luftflotte 5 ~~Most Secret~~ 2588 on use of D/F to bring up the U-boats:

"Reference Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 1066/44 of 1 March 1944.

Subject: Use of D/F to bring up U-boats.

The D/F routine communicated in the above reference, which has already been successfully employed in the Atlantic, should always be put into operation during convoy reconnaissance as soon as the shadower has gained contact. Instruction in the new method for all crews that may have to take part in convoy reconnaissance should be arranged immediately."

E. Survey of the situation:

U-boat situation 30 March 2200:

1. Convoy operation 30 March. At 1300 the convoy was intercepted by air reconnaissance in AE 3993. Composition: 40 merchant ships of up to 10,000 G.R.T. each, 22 escort vessels, among them 3 cruisers. Further convoy reports at 1500, 1600 and 2100. Open cruising formation, 4 lines ahead. Course northeast, speed about 10 knots.
2. 12 U-boats (groups "Thor", "Hammer" and "Blitz") in attack areas from AB 4948 to AB 8858.
3. Approaching the operational area: U 673 (Sauer) from ice reconnaissance, U 360 (Becker) from the south. The following are putting out: U 716 (Dunkelberg) from Hammerfest U 739 (Mangold), U 990 (Nordheimer), U 361 (Seidel) from Narvik. A total of 18 boats will probably take part in the operation.
4. Plans:
 - (a) The boats have been ordered to occupy a patrol line from AB 5795 to AB 8673 at once. Patrol line has been placed in such a way that the boats will converge on the convoy for attack most probably during the night of 31 March to 1 April. The boats are spaced 10 miles apart. Any further alterations in the disposition in accordance

with the air shadowers' reconnaissance reports. Procedure in accordance with Northern Waters Order No.1.

- (b) Air shadowers are at present maintaining continuous contact. All arrangements with Flieger Fuehrer regarding shadowing, position of concentration of forces, transmission of homing signals, and use of light signals have been completed.

(Signed) Peters.

31 March, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Arctic:

1 Ju 88 from 0457 to 1028 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Not exhaustive, nothing to report. At 0657 unsuccessful attack on radio station near Tunheim (Bear Island).

1 Ju 88 from 0858 to 1344 on shipping reconnaissance east coast of Kola Peninsula - West Fairway - west coast of Kanin Peninsula - Kanin Nos, no shipping traffic.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

1 Ju 88 from 0526 to 1300 on meteorological reconnaissance in the Jan Mayen area. Route 40%, Jan Mayen area 10%, covered, enemy not sighted.

4 FW 200 and 2 Ju 88 shadowing convoy:

Two of the FW 200 are overdue since 1845 on 31 March and 0030 on 1 April. At 1450 in AB 7921

1 Ju 88 located the rear of convoy, then immediate jamming of radar set.

Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters:

1 Ju 88 from 0434 to 0957 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes. Broken off in AB 8111. Enemy not sighted.

2 Ju 88 from 1834 to 2225 on reconnaissance of shipping berths between Moray Firth and Fife Ness.

1 Ju 88 from 1000 to 1530 on navigational flight in the sea area of the Faeroes.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See under IV. (a).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 1530 in AB 7692 3 merchant ships of 5,000 G.R.T. each and 1 destroyer appeared out of fog. Destroyer steering at a distance of 10 km. from merchant ships on a parallel course of 50°. Over the merchant ships, 2 aircraft of unidentified type. At 1540 in AB 7665 one destroyer: it was ascertained by search dial in radar set that this was the head of the convoy. At 1543 escort vessels were intercepted in AB 7645. Course 050°, all-round screen. Close formation, intervals not more than 3-5 km. Observation only by radar. No anti-aircraft fire.

Supplementary report for 30 March, 1944:
1 FW 200 visual reconnaissance at 2040: convoy observed in AF 1571. Composition could not be made out because of darkness. 20 merchant ships of up to 6,000 G.R.T. each, 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers were sighted. At 0400 located in AF 1137, position inaccurate. At 0600 convoy intercepted in AB 7982 by visual reconnaissance. Over 60 ships, of which 56 were counted including warships. Course 030°, 8-10 knots. Convoy was proceeding in 6 or 8 rows of 6 or 8 ships each. At 0750 1 aircraft sighted over convoy, unknown type. Anti-aircraft fire from destroyers.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very few transmissions to submarines in the operational area:
Murmansk area: destroyer "C", minesweepers Nos. 17, 112, motor boats "PS 75", "PS 48".
Britain: no units intercepted in Northern Waters.
Bearings from Hammerfest: British unit, 30 March at 2126 "AC" in 274. 6°: allied unit at 2242 "P2Q7" in 243. 5°.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Thor":

U 673)
U 312) in patrol line from
U 313) AB 5795 to AB 8673.
U 278)
U 674)

Group "Hammer":

- U 354)
- U 968)
- U 288)
- U 315)

Group "Blitz":) in patrol line from
AB 5795 to AB 8673.

- U 711)
- U 956)
- U 277)
- U 355)
- U 360)

In port:

- U 307, 361, 703 Narvik,
- U 362, 636, 737, 959 Trondheim,
- U 387, 425, 957, 965 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

- U 716 proceeding from Hammerfest to AB 8250 (PQ 31).
- U 739 proceeding from Narvik to AB 85 (PQ 31).
- 0030 U 990 put out from Narvik to AB 86 (PQ 31).
- 1030 U 361 put out from Narvik to AB 85 (PQ 31).
- 0940 U 636 put out from Trondheim for Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

- U 342, 765 Bergen,
- U 347, 736 Stavanger,
- U 240, 385, 955, 974 Kristiansand (South),
- U 276, 365 on special operation,
- 1950 U 992 put in to Kristiansand (South) from Kiel,
- 1800 U 736 put in to Bergen from Stavanger.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

PQ 31:

Since the first D/F report from U 277 (Lübsen), others have been received from U 956 (Mohs) and a further one from U 277 (Lübsen): the cross-bearings however lie considerably further north, which may be due to the vast extent of the convoy.

After an air reconnaissance report the following were sent:

0513 Radio message 0453/764:

"Air reconnaissance reported convoy position at 0133 in AF 1516."

0912 Radio message 0854/765:

"According to air reconnaissance report convoy position at 0700 was AB 7956."

Of the boats putting out from Narvik U 990 (Nordheimer) and U 361 (Seidel) are being held up by work on their radio sets. Also, they still have to go to Ramsund to take on T5 torpedoes.

0924 Radio message 0858/766:

"The boats in the patrol line are ordered not to surface today during daylight; ensure reception of 2-hourly calls."

1041

Radio message 1027/768:

"U 716 (Dunkelberg) and U 739 (Mangold) are proceeding at maximum speed to occupy AB 8264 and AB 8292, respectively. They are joining group "Hammer" as boats Nos. 5 and 6."

Teleprinter message Most Secret 1458 sent to Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"Please maintain contact during night of 31 March - 1 April: if at all possible, also continue after 0045 until dawn. Confirmation requested."

After a discussion with Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten the procedure of D/F signals from the air shadowers was once more precisely defined to ensure that the U-boats would obtain bearings after surfacing.

1153

Radio message 1131/769:

"1. The air shadower will send homing signals on 31 March from 2015. Procedure: 5 minutes of Anton Anton with call signs, bearing and distance. 5 minutes of homing signals, and soon after the eighth, change of position, 45 minutes interval with dropping of light signals as arranged. Then 4 lots of homing signals, 45 minutes interval, and so forth.

2. Boats to surface at 2045."

1233

A returned aircraft reported in radio message 1202/162:

"Left convoy at 0800 in AB 7937."

1615

Radio message 1202/166:

"FW 200 (BL) reported at 1435 in 07° E 1131 (AB 7631) aircraft over convoy. (Position inaccurate.)"

Although the air shadowers' reports give only a rough indication of the convoy's course and speed, the course seems to be rather more northerly. The boats are therefore to proceed on a northerly course at low speed while submerged until it is time to surface:

1613

Radio message 1539/771:

"Groups "Thor", "Hammer", and "Blitz" at 1600 proceed on 320°, speed 3 knots. Surface at 2045."

Further:

1653

Radio message 1647/772:

" "Dunkelberg" to make for AB 5875, "Mangold" to AB 8221."

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Both boats are to strengthen the patrol line at the center. After the receipt of a detailed reconnaissance report, the following was sent:

1738 Radio message 1719/773:

"Air reconnaissance reported the convoy in AB 7937 at 0800, ships in 6 to 8 lines, side escort 25 miles distant, 8-10 knots. Reckon with course 40°."

1826 Teleprinter message received from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"Aircraft (DH) located the convoy at 1540 in AB 8448, course 050°, length 80 km."

The boats were informed.

2142 Radio message 2121/776:

"U 361 (Seidel) and U 990 (Nordheimer) put out from Andfjord approximately 0200 on 1 April, proceeding at high speed to AB 6640."

The D/F reports expected from the boats since 2045 did not at first arrive, because the aircraft, as was learned later, was not transmitting homing signals until 2140. The following was therefore sent:

2148 Radio message 2133/777:

"In accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 1, operate independently on convoy as soon as sufficient D/F details are available." From 2158 the following D/F reports were received:

Time	Boat	Position	Bearing	Aircraft.	
				Bearing	Distance. in km.
2158	U 674	AB 8214	225	-	-
2212	U 288	AB 8283	285	255	35
2241	U 956	AB 8539	306	220	53
2225	U 355	AB 8641	289	235	35
2252	U 355	AB 8641	291	220	53
2247	U 313	AB 5795	224	260	55
2250	U 674	AB 8169	265	180	50
2300	U 355	AB 8641	291	180	50

Nearly half of the short signals were unclear. Also the bearings varied a great deal. This may perhaps be explained by the great length of the convoy. The mean position obtained is approximately 50 miles ahead of the patrol line.

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2335

Radio message 2319/799:

"According to D/F reports center of convoy at 2230 in AB 8172. Go to it."

Further D/F reports from the boats:

Time	Boat	Position	Bearing	Aircraft.	
				Bearing	Distance. in km.
2324	U 313	AB 5795	243	120	45
2312	U 711	AB 8282	282	180	55
2347	U 355	AB 8641	272	20	64
2354	U 968	AB 8265	240	60	47
2202	U 956	AB 8535	296	260	55
0010	U 288	AB 8143	280	280	30
0027	U 355	AB 8617	292	280	30

These reports do not yet show that the boats are operating on the convoy as ordered.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

No further measures.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Radio message Most Secret 296, 2nd issue received from the "Tirpitz":

- "1. Supplementary to teleprinter message Most Secret 296 of 27 March: the trials will take place on 1 April.
2. Confirmation requested, that northern part of Altafjord up to the northern limit of the warning area can be freely used by the "Tirpitz" and 4 destroyers without danger from mines. The area is earmarked for a small exercise ground in the future."

In reply radio message 1335/58 was received from Admiral Polar Coast.

- "1. Minesweeping executed as requested in your Most Secret 296 of 27 March.
2. In addition on 31 March sweeping of the exit route through the Kaafjord gap via Rauberget to Altneset, from there to a width of 0.5 miles as far as fleet route point FP 53 D.

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3. Further sweeping in accordance with your Most Secret 296, second issue of 30 March not possible owing to lack of time.
4. After execution of 2., a group of 5th Minesweeping Flotilla will be at the "Tirpitz"'s disposal for escort duty until the final trials but the escorting of repair ship "Huascaran" will have to wait."
1. This concerns the route which the "Tirpitz" will use for her engine trials (at maximum speed).
2. It is regrettable that the "Huascaran", which is urgently needed by the U-boats, will have to wait. At the moment this can be accepted because of the current convoy operation.

Radio message 1122/56 from Battle Group:

"4th Destroyer Flotilla intends to carry out torpedo firing on 5 April (or 6 April) in Söröysund. Limits of firing area: 22° E, south coast of Söröy, 22° 33' E, north coast of Stjernöy. Anchorage in North Fjord. Request: If necessary, the allocation of "Nympe" and "Thetis" as target ships and also 2 escort boats."

Battle Group reported by teleprinter:

"At 1145 2 reconnaissance aircraft, coming from the east, over Kaafjord. The "Tirpitz" at anchor at 1300 moving to net enclosure."

It may be assumed that this reconnaissance is connected with the current PQ convoy.

D. Plans:

Most Secret 42/44 received from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"Reference Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten Most Secret 36/44 of 30 March, para. 2, concerning homing signal transmission:

At the request of Captain U-boats, the first 45 minute interval will be dropped. Hence homing signal transmission from 2015 to 2215. Then further, as ordered in para. 2."

E. Survey of the situation:

U-boat situation at 0000 on 1 April

1. Groups "Thor", "Hammer" and "Blitz" comprising 16 boats in patrol line from AB 5759 to

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AB 8644 until the evening of 31 March. Patrol line submerged by day. Slight movement in northwesterly direction corresponding to enemy's movements. Surfaced at 2045. From 2140 the boats were to operate on the convoy with the help of homing signals from the air shadower. Up to now no contact by U-boats.

2. Mean course of convoy approximately 030°, speed 9 knots. Should meet northern wing of patrol line if it continues on this course.
3. The air reconnaissance is maintaining contact both during day and at night on 31 March. Will break off in the early hours of 1 April. Resumption intended on same day in the afternoon, 4 hours before dusk.
4. Plans:
 - (a) Attack on convoy during night and if possible by day.
 - (b) Boats which owing to their position cannot close in until dawn are to haul ahead for attack during the following night. Approach point AB 6550. Enemy position at 2100 on 1 April presumed to be AB 6490.
 - (c) By day the boats are to haul ahead at a safe distance from the convoy.

(Signed) Peters.

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APPENDIX II.

COPY.

Admiral Northern Waters On board, 27 March, 1944.
and Captain U-boats, Norway.

Most Secret.

Operational order for U 673 (Sauer).

1. Put out from Narvik at 1500 on 27 March. Be prepared for U 307, U 361 and U 990 in Ofotfjord.
2. Proceed via Westfjord; on leaving it increased danger from submarines.
3. Proceed at increased speed via AF 22 and AA 93 for ice reconnaissance from 10° W to 10° E, but not further north than 75° N. Report the ice limit for independently routed vessels, when you first come upon it, by full position short signal on radio frequency "Anton". Report its further course on reaching 0° and 10° E by short signals, giving last 3 grid square numbers roughly every 50 miles. Do not enter the ice, avoid damage.
4. Proceed to ice reconnaissance between 15° E and 23° E. Report on frequency "Anton" on reaching 20° E.
5. Simultaneously test conning tower 6 in accordance with special directions. Report only important new experiences by radio message.
6. Otherwise procedure in accordance with Operational Order No. 15, current order of C-in-C U-boats, and Northern Waters orders. In case of the approach of a convoy, operate against it. Special attention should be paid to Northern Waters Order No. 1 and radio message 2239 of 18 March.
7. U-boat Northern Waters wave. Test radio beacons for range, effectiveness for obtaining bearings, and accuracy. Keep log of bearings.
8. Own forces:
 - (a) U-boats in attack areas, depth of sweep 20 miles, from AB 4948 to AB 8858 in the following order:
Group "Thor": U 312 (Nikolay) U 313 (Schweiger),
U 278 (Franze), U 674 (Muss).

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Group "Hammer": U 354 (Sthamer), U 968 (Westphalen),
U 288 (Meyer), U 305 (Zoller).

Group "Blitz": U 711 (Lange), U 956 (Mohs), U 277
(Lübsen), U 355 (La Baume).

Surface only once a day for radio beacon fix.

(b) Daily air reconnaissance, one daily run of a convoy to southwest of the U-boat position, by FW 200, Ju 88 or BV 138. Daily meteorological reconnaissance flights, Trondheim - Jan Mayen, and Tromsø - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Tromsø.

9. In the summer of 1943 fighter aircraft were observed on Jan Mayen. Barentsberg in Ice Fjord (Spitsbergen) is occupied by the British.

10. Presumed ice limit 27 March:
AE 2270 - AA 9210 - AB 4110 - AB 2880 - AH 96 - AG 75 -
AB 3290 - AC 17. Jan Mayen and Bear Island free of ice.

p.p. Reche.

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APPENDIX III

Most Secret
Short reports.

1. Short report from U 288 (Meyer), first operation.
2. Short report from U 959 (Weitz), first operation.
3. Short report from U 307 (Herrle), fifth operation.
4. Short report from U 361 (Seidel), first operation.
5. Short report from U 990 (Nordheimer), second operation.

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8 - 10 Attack area AF 2138. Order to return to Westfjord.
March

Additional note by Captain U-boats, Norway:

This is the fifth case of waterlogged aerials in
a boat coming from a home port. Hit on one
destroyer probable.

Admiral Northern Waters/ Captain U-boats,
Norway, Most Secret 1122 A Ops.

APPENDIX III/2.

COPY.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 959 (Weitz), first operation.

- 22 February, 1944 Put out from Kiel; 25 February, put out from Bergen; 16 March, put in to Narvik. Proceeded to AB 69.
- 26 February At 0125 in AF 8751 continuous location on 190 cm.
- 28 February Joined group "Boreas".
- 2 - 4 March With five other boats in attack area AC 4358 to AC 4955. From 0802 on 4 March operated on QP convoy. At 1027 in AC 4674 aircraft alarm, type not identified, 7,000 meters off, we were not observed. At 1135 in AC 4596 aircraft bearing 000°, 6,000 meters off in snow squall, height 20 meters, we were not observed. At 1452 aircraft alarm: aircraft bearing 300° type not identified, 8,000 meters off, height 80-100 meters. Apparently we were not observed. At 1548 in AC 4436 continuous location with "Borkum" set. Remained surfaced, no aircraft appeared. At 1920 fire broke out in port electric motor while charging, owing to complete short circuit in main switch of the main bilge pump. Port electric motor clear for 200 revolutions. Charging only with starboard Diesel.
- 5 March At 0059 in AB 6682 fairly strong noise band in 315°. At 0222 in AB 6671 2 illuminant rockets bearing 250°.

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APPENDIX III/1.

Most Secret.

COPY.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C
U-boats Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 288 (Meyer), first operation.

1 March Put out from Bergen. Put in to Narvik 11 March.

1 - 5

March Proceeded to attack area AB 67.

From

5 March In patrol line AB 8614 against QP convoy, group "Orkan".

6 March At 0055 in AB 8379 "Wanze" and "Naxos" location. From 0135 to 0145 constant "Naxos" locations. In AB 8379 convoy of about 40 vessels with escort, course 220°, speed 10 knots. Short signal not heard because of waterlogged aerials. At 0238 in AB 8614 fired T5 torpedo at destroyer, position zero, distance 4000 meters, explosion heard in boat after 14 minutes 13 seconds. No observation from the bridge. At 0313 fan of four T3 torpedoes, of which 2 were F.A.T. 2 on destroyer, distance 1,000 meters, and line of steamers behind, distance 5,000 meters. Miss, possibly 2 explosions after 11 minutes, 10 seconds. Depth-charges, hydrophone pursuit. Passed over by steamer proceeding in opposite direction to convoy. Pressed on. At 0719 in AB 8665 attack by carrier-borne aircraft. Fired at 3 times with 2 rockets, 3.7 cm. chain-wheel broken. White, red and green stars, then gunfire from 3 destroyers. After submerging, 50 depth charges, no damage. One approach only after echo-sounding.

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Pursued them without result. Patrol line AB 8354 at 2144 searchlights bearing 280° just above the horizon.

6 March

At 0140 in AB 8291 moderate noise band, bearing 200°. At 0419 in AB 8519 "Borkum" location. Simultaneously, aircraft, bearing 310°, height 100 meters, approached distance 1,000 meters: remained unobserved. Alarm after aircraft passed over. From 0531 to 0617 in AB 8545, 4 destroyer silhouettes. At 0626 in AB 8547 location, bearing 220°, 5 miles from convoy. At 0629 in AB 8571 bow T5 torpedo on destroyer astern, bow to right 120°, 10 knots, 2,500 meters, night target firing, after 3 minutes 20 seconds torpedo explosion, sinking noises. At 0657 in AB 8547 we surfaced, high powerful searchlight was sending morse. Two destroyers stopped at place of sinking: saw parts of sunk destroyer, keel uppermost. Could not transmit radio message, as control was sending tuning signals. At 0659 carrier-borne aircraft, type "Gladiator" bearing 290°, aircraft dived, distance 700 meters 4 rockets below the wings, after flying over one observed abaft. No damage. Driven off by anti-aircraft fire. Alarm after flying over. From 0722 to 1350 hydrophone and depth charge pursuit by 2 destroyers. 66 depth charges: no damage. No special method apparent in dropping depth charges.

7 March

At 0614 in AF 1553 operation broken off by order.

8 - 14 March

Attack area with 9 boats from AB 7654 to AF 2248.

10 March

At 0501 in AB 8742, location, anti-submarine vessel, half-minute intervals.

14 March

At 1853 returned to Narvik on account of engine trouble. Starboard Diesel had great deal of water in the lubricating oil, gap between 5th and 6th cylinder. Thus charging is no longer possible, daily current consumption covered in an emergency by port electric motor at limited readiness. Condition of batteries 7,500 spirit level.

15 March

At 1417 in AF 2665 aircraft, bearing 045°, distance 8,000 m., height 200 m.; approached us, remained surfaced: crew at action stations at anti-aircraft guns. After requesting recognition signals three times

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and receiving no answer, opened fire at 4,000 meters. After two bursts of fire from 3.7 and 2 cm., recognition signal given. Reply from aircraft. On coming nearer it was recognized as an FW 200.

Experiences:

1. Spare tube to 3.7 cm. stowed in petty officers' quarters, it would not go through control room hatch: change of tubes impossible.
2. Armor-piercing high explosive 2 cm. ammunition failed after pressure at A + 40.
3. Gema-apparatus operated only up to 3,500 m.

Additional note by Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway:

1. The boat's first operation, not without mistakes. Promises well for the future.
2. Attack of own FW 200 was the fault of the aircraft of Flieger Fuehrer Northern Waters. Anti-submarine operations were prohibited. The matter has been cleared up with Flieger Fuehrer.

Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway.
Most Secret 1126 - A Ops.

APPENDIX III/3.

Most Secret.

COPY.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet .
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 307 (Herrle), fifth operation.

- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| 23 February 1944 | Put out from Trondheim. |
| 27 March | Put in to Narvik. Proceeded to Ramsund to take on T5 torpedoes. Replenished fuel at Harstad. |
| 26 February | Operated on PQ convoy: no contact. |
| 28 February | After breaking off the operation in attack area AC 4652. |
| 28 February -
4 March | In attack area, enemy not sighted. |
| 4 March | AC 4618. Contact with carrier-borne aircraft and escort forces of QP convoy. Forced to submerge by escort, depth charges before each approach, noise like heavy rain on pressure hulls. No damage, contact lost, continued operation according to convoy position assumed by Captain U-boats. |
| 5 March | At 0013 in AB 6655 heard turbines and buzzing noise in hydrophones. At 0730 in AB 6587 carrier-borne aircraft, bombs, no damage. |

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5 - 7 March Operated according to air reconnaissance reports and hydrophone bearings, no contact.

7 March Operation broken off. New attack area AB 7683.

8 - 25 March In attack area.

18 March At 2225 in AB 7936 approaching aircraft located, not sighted.

21 March At 2120 in AB 7936 apparently an enemy submarine. No reply to recognition signals, submerged after warning shot.

26 March Returned to Andfjord - Harstad - Ramsund, handed in T5 torpedoes.

Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats,
Norway. Most Secret - 1423. A Ops.

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APPENDIX III/4.

Most Secret.

COPY.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 361 (Seidel), first operation.

22 February 1944 Put out from Kiel.

24 February Put in to Bergen.

25 February Put out from Bergen; 27 March, put in to Narvik. Proceeded via AC 4850 to AC 4950.

2 March At 1125 in AC 4924 flying boat (probably "Sunderland") course east. "Naxos" location. Submerged.

4 March At 0710 operated on war distress signal from U 472. Proceeded to AC 4683. At 0718 float plane in AC 4913 on northerly course, remained unobserved. At 0930 found nothing in AC 4683. At 1253 in AC 4655 land plane on westerly course, remained unobserved. At 2045 operated on QP convoy.

6 March At 0945 in AB 8565 2 destroyers making a great deal of smoke, course northwest later southwest, high speed. At 0959 in AB 8568 land plane. Submerged as it flew off.

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At 1714 in AB 8787 aircraft on southwesterly course, remained unobserved.

7 March

At 0600 operation broken off.

8 March

Attack area AB 7935. Nothing sighted.

26 March

At 0000 started return passage.

Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats,
Norway. Most Secret - 1425 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX III/5.

Most Secret.

COPY.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 990 (Nordheimer), second operation.

- 4 March 1944 Put out from Hammerfest. Put in to Narvik, 27 March.
- 4 March Escorted by R-boat together with U 366 to SR 1.
At 1528 attacked by a "Boston" in the fjord.
2 torpedo misses: hit on left wing.
Operated with group "Orkan" on QP convoy.
Proceeded at maximum speed to AB 6680 .
- 5 March In patrol line.
At 2145 hydrophone bearing, pursued it at maximum speed. Made use of radar.
- 6 March At 0605 sighted masthead light, morsing, through morning mist. Advanced towards it.
At 0640 ahead heavy, multi-engined aircraft. 7 plumes of smoke, 6 mastheads ahead.
Forced to submerge by 3 destroyers, 4 Swordfish. Carrier-borne aircraft mark the U-boats for the destroyers by means of flares, but do not themselves attack. Depth charge pursuit. No damage. Pressed on.
- 7 March At 0600 broke off operation in accordance with orders. Joined group "Hammer" in patrol line from AB 7654 to 2248.
- 15 March At 1556 aircraft at distance of 8,000 meters,

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possibly FW 200. Otherwise nothing sighted or heard.

22 March At 1358 aircraft course northwest, distance 9,000 meters: heavy sea-plane, probably Sunderland, remained unobserved. At 1638 heard single, indistinct explosions.

24 March At 1351 in AB 8811 very good listening conditions with neighboring boats. Distance apart 20 miles.

16 March At 0000 started return passage. Andfjord - Ramsund. Handed in T5 torpedoes.

Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats,
Norway. Most Secret - 1424 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX IV.

Most Secret.

Sailing orders.

1. Sailing orders for U 288 (Meyer), U 315 (Zoller) and U 956 (Mohs).
2. Sailing orders for U 277 (Lübsen) and U 355 (La Baume).

APPENDIX IV/1.

COPY.

Admiral Northern Waters
and Captain U-boats, Norway.

On board, 23 March 1944.

Most Secret.

Sailing orders for U 288 (Meyer),

U 315 (Zoller) and U 956 (Mohs).

1. Put out from Narvik at 1600 on 23 March.
2. Proceed via Tjeldsund - Andfjord, from Lødingen to Harstad with district pilot. High speed.
3. Operational Order No. 15, U-boat Northern Waters wave.
4. Own forces:

Group "Thor": U 312 (Nikolay), U 313 (Schweiger),
 U 307 (Herrle), U 361 (Seidel),
 U 278 (Franze);

Group "Hammer": U 674 (Muss), U 990 (Nordheimer),
 U 354 (Sthamer), U 968 (Westphalen),

in attack areas, depth of sweep 20 miles, from AB 7365 to AB 8859.
U 711 (Lange) proceeding via Westfjord to AB 8897, depth of sweep 20 miles. All the boats to surface only during darkness, and once by day for radio beacon fix. Radio silence except for reports on the enemy, and carrier-borne aircraft only.
5. The following are approaching at maximum speed:
U 288 AB 8830, U 315 AB 8940, U 956 AB 8970. With U 711 form new group "Blitz".
6. Special attention is drawn to Northern Waters Order No. 1 and radio messages 2239/761 and following.
7. Expect increased danger from submarines at Andenes.

p.p. Reche.
